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Abstract 
Re-Reading Audre Lorde: Declaring the Activism of Black Feminist Theory 
 
Early in January 2013, whilst I was at home in the middle of the day writing this 
thesis, I was subjected to an armed burglary. The experience resonates with 
themes that preoccupy this re-reading of Audre Lorde, specifically with regards 
to: the timing, place and impact of ‘epistemic violence’ (Spivak, 1988:280) visited 
on Black feminisms; the theft of thinking; and the disregard for, and appropriation 
of, the temporal and spatial dimensions of historical and socio-economic contexts 
that constitute Black women’s lives. Armed with weapons of authenticity, 
historical amnesia, hierarchies of oppression, the ‘always already’ (Althusser, 
1971) and categories of identity designed to suppress Black feminism, the 
violations of Black women are unannounced and uninvited. My starting point is 
that ‘[t]he shadow obscuring this complex Black women’s intellectual tradition is 
neither accidental nor benign’ (Hill Collins, 2000:3). This thesis picks up on the 
idea of the impossibility of hospitality (Derrida, 2000) and the ‘critic as host’ 
(Hillis Miller, 1979) to frame a critical analysis of the occupation and location of 
Black feminist praxis. This thesis negotiates ‘…a channel between the “high 
theoretical” and the “suspicious of all theories”’ (Boyce Davies, 1994:43). 
The challenge of ‘Re-Reading Audre Lorde: Declaring the Activism of 
Black Feminist Theory’ is to maintain a persistent, hypervigilant sensitivity 
towards the hostility of ‘epistemic violence’ (Spivak, 1988:280).  I think it is 
possible to re-read Spivak’s (1988) question, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ in terms 
of, ‘Can Black feminist theory speak?’ The question of what is read and utilised 
and what is not, particularly when the ‘what is not’ refers to Black feminist 
scholarship in general, and to the work of Lorde in particular, is fundamental to 
this thesis.   
This thesis produces new re-readings of Lorde’s work that go beyond a 
literary textual analysis. The Kristevan idea of intertextuality as intersubjectivity 
(Kristeva, 1969:37) is used to show that the space and place between the words in 
‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ (Lorde, 1979a:60) function 
as the space and place between Black and white feminisms.  The predicaments of 
positionality reiterated throughout this thesis mirror the predicaments within 
feminism. How can feminist theory present authoritative, metanarrative claims 
(and they need to be authoritative in the face of a racist, homophobic patriarchy 
that denies the legitimacy of Black women) whilst being implicated? 
The quandary is that of how to establish and communicate any sense of a 
comprehensible, coherent re-reading of Lorde when each re-reading destabilises 
and contests any notion of an ‘established.’   The quandary takes on particular 
significance in relation to Black feminist political writings and communication of 
political imperatives. In other words, is there a possibility of ‘the transformation 
of silence into language and action’ (Lorde, 1977a:40) in the condition of the 
impossibility of language?   Re-reading Lorde is both to occupy the margin and to 
  
make use of the margin so that the impossible, the unavailable, and the fissures of 
re-reading Black feminist theoretical communications are the conditions of the 
activism of Black feminist theory.   
Three principles of Black feminist methodology that underpin the work of 
this thesis include:  
1. Lorde’s Black feminist ‘uses of the erotic’ (Lorde, 1978a);  
2. The dialogical and dialectical relationship between experience, practice 
and scholarship (Hill Collins, 2000:30);  
3. That methodology is contingent upon, and constituted through, Black 
feminist activism. Throughout this thesis, I make a concerted effort to transfer the 
text of Black feminist critical theory from the page to the day-to-day struggles of 
Black feminist activism. For example, I demonstrate the relevance of Lorde in 
terms of constructing Black women-only reflective spaces and service provision, 
interventions to confront sexual violence against Black women and the 
‘…psychological toll…’ (The Combahee River Collective, 1977:266)   of 
‘…learn[ing] to lie down with the different parts of ourselves…’ (Abod, 
1987:158). This thesis is a work of re-membering; it is a deliberate transgression 
of fixed, theoretical and disciplinary borders, which reinvigorates the activism of 
theory. 
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Preface 
 
Foundations 
Throughout the journey of undertaking this thesis, I have been engaged in setting 
up a new Rape Crisis Centre in Trafford, Manchester,
1
 including the development 
of specific services for Black, Asian and Minority
2
 Ethnic women. The issues, 
tensions and challenges explored in the thesis are the issues, tensions and 
challenges alive in developing a feminist support service for women survivors of 
sexual violence. These issues, tensions and challenges include representation, 
position, the construction of identity, intersecting vectors of oppressive categories 
of identity, and ‘the transformation of silence into language and action’ (Lorde, 
1977a:40).  We remain steadfast in our mission to form strategies of anti-racist, 
anti-homophobic, feminist resistance whilst dealing with: 
…that piece of the oppressor which is planted deep within each of us, and 
which knows only the oppressors’ tactics, the oppressors’ relationships. 
(Lorde, 1980a:123)     
                                                          
1
 Trafford Rape Crisis services are provided by women for women within a feminist Collective 
structure.  The services encompass two anonymous, confidential helplines open across six three-
hour sessions per week, and an e-mail service that provides regular one-to-one e-mail support. 
Trafford Rape Crisis also provides two weekly drop-in sessions focussed on activities such as art, 
and the production of organic and essential oils-based soaps and self-care products. Trafford Rape 
Crisis has information developed in conjunction with, and accessible to, learning-disabled women, 
and is involved in campaigning and consciousness-raising. Trafford Rape Crisis has a critical 
feminist presence alongside statutory and mainstream service provision, including legal, health 
and social welfare systems (Trafford Rape Crisis, n.d.).  
2
 I want to draw attention to problems with the term ‘minority’ and agree with Burman’s (2005) 
analysis: ‘We used the term “minoritization” (rather than “minority” or “minority ethnic group”) 
to highlight that groups and communities do not occupy the position of “minority” by virtue of 
some inherent property (of their culture or religion, for example), but rather they come to acquire 
this position as the outcome of a socio-historical and political process’ (Burman, 2005:533; 
parentheses in original). 
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Trafford Rape Crisis was launched in March, 2011, and the Black, Asian 
and Minority Ethnic Women’s Service was launched in March, 2012 during 
International Women’s Week. The activism of Audre Lorde in particular, and the 
activism of Black feminist theory in general, continue to provide the foundation of 
our organisational structures, vision, mission and support services to all women 
survivors of sexual violence.
3
  More specifically, my personal work, thinking and 
engagement with Lorde and Black feminist theory in the journey of this thesis 
continue to be instrumental in my role as the Trafford Rape Crisis Black, Asian 
and Minority Ethnic Women’s Service Development Worker. The ripple effects 
of actively engaging with Black feminist theory have enabled members of 
Trafford Rape Crisis to establish and sustain a dedicated Black, Asian and 
Minority Ethnic Women’s Service.   
The activism of Black feminist theory has had an impact on the profile of 
the membership of the Collective, the training provided for volunteers, and the 
discourse and practices used in our work.  For example, the recruitment, training 
and support of volunteers that ran between December, 2011 and March, 2012 
became founded on Black feminist theory. This has resulted in significant changes 
to the socio-economic profile of the membership of the Collective, which is now 
largely made up of Black, Asian and minority ethnic women. In turn, the 
significant changes in the demographic constitution of Trafford Rape Crisis are 
reconstituting the ideology, discourse, practices and vision of the organisation.  
For example, the Collective structure now includes a monthly Black women-only 
reflective space. Even though this space is not always comfortable or consistently 
                                                          
3
 Chapter 2 of this thesis provides a direct example of how Lorde’s work underpins the theory and 
practice of having a specific Black women’s service, Black women’s consciousness-raising 
training programme and reflective space. 
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well-attended, there is a shared sense that ‘[t]hese spaces are not only safe - they 
form prime locations for resisting objectification as the Other’ (Hill Collins, 
2000:101).   This is primarily through a process articulated by hooks as an:  
…ongoing, critical self-examination and reflection about feminist practice, 
about how we live in the world. This individual commitment, when 
coupled with engagement in collective discussion, provides a space for 
critical feedback which strengthens our efforts to change and make 
ourselves new. (hooks, 1989:24-25) 
Sustaining feminist collective-working with ‘…no patterns for relating 
across our human differences as equals’ (Lorde, 1980a:115) brings to life, and 
tests, the function of the erotic, explained by Lorde in the following way: 
The erotic functions for me in several ways, and the first is in providing 
the power which comes from sharing deeply any pursuit with another 
person. The sharing of joy, whether physical, emotional, psychic, or 
intellectual, forms a bridge between the sharers which can be the basis for 
understanding much of what is not shared between them, and lessens the 
threat of their difference. (Lorde, 1978a:56)   
 
The Launch of Trafford Rape Crisis Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic 
Women’s Service   
The Trafford Rape Crisis Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic Women’s Service was 
launched at an event that we named, ‘Declaring the Activism of Black Feminist 
Theory Convention’ (Trafford Rape Crisis, 2012).  Keynote speakers included 
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Sara Ahmed, Gargi Bhattacharyya, Carole Boyce Davies, Kimberlé Crenshaw, 
Sunera Thobani, Hannana Siddiqui from Southall Black Sisters (2013) and Dalia 
Farah from FORWARD (2002-2013). It should be acknowledged that Ann 
Phoenix, Gail Lewis and Kum Kum Bhavnani accepted the invitation to speak, 
but, due to mitigating personal circumstances, were not able to come on the day.  
We were successful in obtaining funding for the event from Feminist 
Review (2013) and the Psychology of Women Section of the British 
Psychological Society (2000-2013). We argued our case for the necessity of the 
convention, with persistent determination and passion, to the Home Office 
department of the Ministry of Justice.  When it looked hopeless and energies were 
low, we turned to Black feminist theory and the testimony of Black women’s 
experiences of collective-working (The Combahee River Collective, 1977), and to 
Lorde. After much hard work and detailed documentation that interweaved Black 
feminist theory with Home Office government policy papers (Home Office, 2010; 
2011), we managed to shift the position of the Ministry of Justice from one of not 
being able to see the relevance of the convention in terms of our service provision 
to a position whereby they agreed to a substantial financial contribution, 
effectively underwriting the convention.   
Indeed, it could be said that the resistance we encountered from outside 
and inside of the Trafford Rape Crisis Collective forced us to articulate, and bring 
to life with increasing clarity and confidence, what the activism of Black feminist 
theory means to us.  More specifically, we articulated, and brought to life, the 
intersection of ‘activism’ with ‘Black feminist theory’; that is, ‘activism’ or 
‘action’ that translates into concrete, tangible outputs that produce outcomes 
which make a measurable difference to women’s lives. Thus, ‘Black feminist 
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theory’ is brought to life and articulated as the thinking upon which the action is 
contingent.   
The work of Lorde has been instrumental in this process, and is evidence 
of the translation and relevance of her work to current feminist practice and 
experience. Through a detailed, critical re-reading of Lorde’s work, this thesis is 
testimony to, and brings to life how and why, the application of Lorde’s work 
continues to have a significant impact within contemporary feminist praxis.  The 
development, launch and continued sustainability of Trafford Rape Crisis services 
are an example of the activism of Lorde.  
 
The Convention 
The two-day convention held in Trafford, Manchester, entitled, ‘Declaring the 
Activism of Black Feminist Theory Convention,’ was used to share, and to 
articulate, the soil of thinking and vision in which Trafford Rape Crisis Black, 
Asian and Minority Ethnic Women’s Service is rooted, nurtured and grown.  The 
convention was a mechanism for demonstrating: 
 The necessity for dedicated Black, Asian and minority ethnic women’s 
services; 
 That grassroots Black feminist service provision must be developed on a 
rigorous foundation of Black feminist theory;  
 That service development must grow out of local, national and 
international consultation, collaboration, situated knowledge and 
experience; 
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 That the activism of Black feminist theory is alive, current and relevant to 
applied practice, the daily lives of people in communities and academic 
scholarship.  
The key objectives of the convention were: 
 Scrutiny of the mechanisms used in a racist, homophobic, patriarchal 
society to violate women; 
 Examination of the intersectionality of Black feminist theory, activism and 
the experience of survivors; 
 Examination of Black feminist ‘Theory as Liberatory Practice’ (hooks, 
1994:59), picking up the potential of Black feminist scholarship to 
confront the violation of women;     
 A direct challenge to the binaries of activism or theory, and experience or 
scholarship, the convention questions what counts as theory and who 
counts as theorist (Christian, 1987); 
 To bring together key Black feminist thinkers alongside grassroots 
activists in order to form collective strategies of survival and bridges of 
resistance against multiple forms of violence against women. 
We received the following comments about the convention: 
Patricia Hill Collins: ‘I think that it is really important that you and your 
colleagues have decided to organize this conference. I applaud your initiative.’ 
Chandra Talpade Mohanty: ‘I will be there in spirit, since I am sure you 
will generate some powerful energy at the meeting! In Solidarity, Chandra.’ 
Kimberlé Crenshaw: ‘It is of course timely, essential and inspired.’ 
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Who Count as Theorists? 
The question of how to ensure that the convention was fully inclusive of academic 
and non-academic Black women went to the heart of the purpose of the 
convention. It was a decisive intervention with the deliberate intention of 
troubling the power/knowledge relation, recognising that: 
…the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and 
redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off 
its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its 
ponderous, formidable materiality. (Foucault, 1981:52) 
One of these procedures is to produce those who count as theorists and those who 
do not count as theorists.  
The convention was about the activism of Black feminist theory in order to 
re-look at what these terms could mean. It provided an opportunity for Black 
women to undertake the task that Mohanty sets out:  
…I am trying to uncover how ethnocentric universalism is produced in 
certain analyses. As a matter of fact, my argument holds for any discourse 
that sets up its own authorial subjects as the implicit referent, that is, the 
yardstick by which to encode and represent cultural others. It is in this 
move that power is exercised in discourse. (Mohanty, 1984:21)  
The convention placed emphasis on the ‘…links between Black feminism as a 
social justice project and Black feminist thought as its intellectual center’ (Hill 
Collins, 2000:xi).  In a direct challenge to the binaries of activism or theory, and 
experience or scholarship, the convention engaged in a re-thinking of Black 
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Women’s activism by interrogating the intersectionality of Black feminist theory 
and activism as lived experience.  
 
Reaching Out to ALL Women 
Too often, the method of reaching ALL women (if it is attempted or considered at 
all in relation to an academic convention) is to scale down or reduce the size, 
scope, intellectual content, discourse and language used reflecting all kinds of 
assumptions, stereotypes and forms of discriminatory attitudes and practices in 
relation to ‘the other.’ 
Trafford Rape Crisis used different methods, including: 
 Ensuring that the convention fee did not present a barrier to attendance via 
the introduction of a ‘contribution’ and ‘free’ places for those who were 
unable to pay the convention fee; 
 Proactive outreach, both formal and informal, through Black Women’s 
community networks, community centres, and targeting Black working-
class, socio-economically marginalised living areas;    
 Moving through, in and across spaces that Black Women use in their daily 
lives, including handing out conference flyers, and generating 
conversations and curiosity on market corners, streets, cafés, nurseries, 
libraries, post offices, corner shops, churches, temples, mosques, clinics, 
schools, colleges, sports centres, hairdressers and shopping centres. In 
addition, we engaged in door-to-door leafleting and put up posters in 
public spaces used by Black women;  
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 Using Facebook and other social networking sites; 
 Community and regional radio, and local, regional and national 
newspapers and broadsheets; 
 Hosting the convention in a Trafford-based, accessible, community venue 
with the provision of transport for specific community groups and 
individuals who would not have been able to attend without transport or 
travel expenses. For example, this enabled asylum-seekers and disabled 
people to attend. 
The effectiveness of these strategies was reflected in the number and diversity of 
the delegates: 
 Over 350 people attended the convention, including over half of the 
delegates from local communities, grassroots activist groups and survivors 
of sexual violence;   
 125 delegates reported that this was the first convention they had ever 
attended; 
 200 delegates identified themselves as Black, Asian or  as a minoriticised 
ethnic group; 
 270 delegates were women.   
 
We continue to have enquiries about the convention and receive feedback 
about how the convention has been transformative in the lives of those who 
attended, and the ripple effects of this continue to be transformative within 
communities, amongst colleagues, family members and service provision.  The 
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keynote speeches were captured on film, and a DVD is in production to enable the 
messages and impact of the convention to continue to ripple.   
 
Launch Speech: ‘Declaring the Activism of Black Feminist Theory’  
My name is Suryia Nayak and I work with Trafford Rape Crisis Black, Asian and 
Minority Ethnic Women’s Services, being launched here today.   
My goodness, here we are, and a brave idea, a courageous vision, becomes 
a reality.  We have our ‘Declaring the Activism of Black Feminist Theory 
Convention.’ Kay, one of the volunteers at Trafford Rape Crisis, explained to me 
last week that the word ‘courage’ has in it ‘cor’ - the Latin word for heart - so that 
‘courage’ comes to mean ‘inner strength from the heart.’  I stand here today, my 
heart pounding with pride and immense humility. I want to start by reading out to 
you part of the invitation we sent across the world to our speakers, here today, 
asking them if they would come. I read it to give you an idea of what we wanted 
to achieve.  
This is what I wrote to them: 
‘This convention idea has grown out of Black, Asian and minority ethnic women 
voicing their desire and need for mutual nourishment, inspiration and exchange of 
intelligence, support and challenge.  We want to be able to talk about putting ideas 
in action; we want to seek the minds of others on really complex, uncomfortable 
issues we are grappling with. Wouldn’t it be wonderful, and a much needed tonic, 
to have a space filled with the ‘…“polyrhythms,” the polyvocality of Black 
women’s creative and critical speech’ (Boyce Davies, 1994:23), and the energy of 
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the activism of Black feminist theory? So, this convention is an expression of our 
courage to ask for want we want and what we believe we have a right to 
experience.   
Positive replies to this invitation came back literally within hours and are 
testimony to the importance of this timely intervention.  Indeed, even when 
barriers such as lack of funding confronted us, speakers who are here today from 
as far as the USA and Canada said they would still be prepared to come and fund 
themselves.  As the barriers appeared one after another, and I was told in very 
kind and reasonable words that, perhaps, it was all rather ambitious, perhaps, too 
divisive, too ‘Black,’ too feminist and, perhaps, too academic, I became even 
more resolute, even more determined that it would and should happen. In my role 
as the Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic Women’s Service Development Worker, 
I was/am convinced that the service has to be underpinned by a rigorous 
foundation of thinking. I was/am convinced that the women we work with need 
and deserve the very best we can give. This convention is symbolic of how 
seriously and passionately we care about the Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic 
women and girl survivors of sexual violence.   
I want to focus for a short while on the title of this event, ‘Declaring the 
Activism of Black Feminist Theory,’ because the title captures key elements of 
the purpose, work and vision of Trafford Rape Crisis.  ‘Declaring the Activism of 
Black Feminist Theory’ is a rather long, complicated title, intertwining a number 
of elements that cannot be separated out from each other - just like the long, 
complicated journey each individual woman survivor of sexual violence travels.    
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Let’s take the word ‘declaring’: if we go back to its roots, ‘declaring’ 
means ‘to reveal, disclose and to make witness in public.’ Indeed, the word 
‘declare’ draws on the Latin word ‘clarus’ or ‘to make clear, to clarify and to 
make bright,’ invoking the spreading of sound and light.  In her essay, ‘The 
Transformation of Silence into Language and Action’ (1977a), the writer and 
Black feminist activist, Audre Lorde, said, ‘Your silence will not protect you’ 
(Lorde, 1977a:41). The work of Trafford Rape Crisis bears witness to the fact that 
not only does silence fail to protect women, but it also serves to deny the 
existence of their experiences. Trafford Rape Crisis is about breaking silence - 
speaking out brightly to make the invisible visible so that the unrecognised is 
recognised. Audre Lorde goes on to explain how this works. She states:  
But for every real word spoken, for every attempt I had ever made to 
speak those truths for which I am still seeking, I had made contact with 
other women while we examined the words to fit a world in which we all 
believed, bridging our differences. (Lorde, 1977a:41)  
Trafford Rape Crisis exists to make declaration about the causes and effects of 
violation against women; we declare to empower and empower to declare.   
Let’s focus on the other words of this title. The word ‘activism’ is 
inextricably bound up with the word ‘theory,’ and not just any theory, but the 
theory or thinking that comes from Black feminism; the often ignored, rich wealth 
of thinking, writing and declarations that come from the active intelligence, 
experience and history of Black, Asian and minority ethnic women. ‘Active’ 
because it comes out of life, is lived, is alive and is transformative.  At Trafford 
Rape Crisis we take action; we proactively raise consciousness; we expose and 
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dismantle the ideas and the behaviours that legitimize rape and sexual violence.  I 
truly believe that Trafford Rape Crisis is feminist theory in action. Our support 
work with women survivors of sexual violence is founded upon feminist thinking 
in order to liberate.  
This convention seeks to trouble the distinction between those women who 
live theory, but, perhaps, do not identify themselves as theorists, and those women 
who theorise the lived experience and identify themselves as theorists.  The 
convention seeks to create debate and share standpoints of theory (Hill Collins, 
2000:252) in order to question what counts as theory and who counts as theorist. 
In other words, ALL Black, Asian and minority ethnic women are important 
thinkers; we are theorising all day, every day. The convention is about the 
activism of Black feminist theory in order to re-look at what these terms could 
mean. 
The daily reality of living with the effects of racism and sexism, mixed up 
with other pressures such as poverty, disability and homophobia, is exhausting.  
The ways in which women are physically, emotionally and sexually violated, and 
survive these experiences, need to be understood in relation to racism and those 
other weights of oppression that press us down. Audre Lorde describes it in this 
way:  
There is a constant drain of energy which might be better used in 
redefining ourselves and devising realistic scenarios for altering the 
present and constructing the future. (Lorde, 1980a:115)   
In other words, Black, Asian and minority ethnic women survivors of this 
racist, homophobic patriarchy have specific issues and needs which require 
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specific strategies, specific knowledge and specific forms of action as a 
foundation for altering the present and constructing futures that enable us to 
realise our potential.   
This event marks an important milestone in Trafford in the provision of a 
specialist service for Black, Asian and minority ethnic women and girls who have 
experienced sexual violence, and the emotional and physical abuse that is so often 
part of this violation.  This specialist service is open to all women and girls, 
whether their experience happened a long time ago, recently or is currently 
happening to them. What we do know is that sexual violence takes many forms; 
for example, forced marriage, rape, ritual abuse, pornography, female genital 
mutilation and sexual harassment. At Trafford Rape Crisis we work with all forms 
of sexual violence.   
The formation and work of Trafford Rape Crisis began two years ago by a 
few committed, passionate and tireless women.  Now, we have premises, helpline 
services, e-mail support services, information leaflets, undertake outreach and 
have close partnerships with voluntary, private and statutory services. We have 
carried out pioneering work with a group called, ‘Change,’ to create materials that 
are accessible for learning-disabled women, we have a Collective of  over  40 
trained volunteers, and the capacity to deliver training and raise awareness about 
the emotional, psychological and practical needs of women and girl survivors of 
sexual violence.  Today, we are launching a dedicated service for Black, Asian 
and minority ethnic women, including a specific helpline and e-mail support.  
The formation of Trafford Rape Crisis is testimony to the power of women 
coming together to make something happen for the liberation of other women and 
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girls. It is truly inspirational.  We are a Collective of the most diverse group of 
women you can imagine in terms of age, race, class, sexuality, skills and 
knowledge.  We are ambitious, strong, resourceful, visionary and resolute.  Into 
this mix, we are first and foremost woman-centred; this is a service by women for 
women.   It is a service that women and girls can use, confident that they will be 
believed, they will be heard and they will be supported through their particular 
journey.   
At Trafford Rape Crisis we use the speech act (Austin, 1975; Searle, 1969, 
1975) - the activism of speaking out as a tool of feminism to spread sound and 
light on our thinking about the ways in which racism is inextricably linked to the 
violation of Black, Asian and minority ethnic women.  At Trafford Rape Crisis we 
understand something of what the feminist writer, Judith Butler, meant when she 
said:  
What does it mean for a word not only to name, but also in some sense to 
perform and, in particular, to perform what it names? (Butler, 1997a:214) 
We use the speech act to re-position, to re-locate and re-orientate blame, shame 
and responsibility away from the woman survivor of sexual violence. At the heart 
of what we do on the helpline, in our outreach work, training and campaigning is 
breaking silence - speaking out and enabling women and girls to say the 
unsayable, and give voice about what has happened to them.  
These are the kinds of things we hear as we support women and undertake 
outreach work: ‘I cannot say the words’; ‘I have never told anyone’; ‘if I talked, 
no one would believe me’; ‘to talk about it would bring shame on my family’; ‘to 
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put into words, to say the words, would make it real - it would mean that it really 
happened.’ 
We can see from these examples that silence is used as a powerful tool in 
sexual violence. Silence operates on an individual, family, community, societal 
and global level. Silence is a powerful and clever tool for a number of reasons: 
Silence regulates and controls; 
Silence shifts the shame and blame from the abuser to the abused; 
Silence isolates; 
Silence legitimises the sexual violence; 
Silence means that sexual violence is not talked about openly, it becomes 
taboo; 
Silence drives the violation of women and girls underground, behind 
closed doors;   
Silence - that which is unsayable, which cannot be given voice to, that 
which is prohibited from speech - masks the prevalence and the effects of 
rape and sexual abuse;  
Silence about sexual violence causes and exacerbates mental distress and 
emotional turmoil, resulting in numerous mental health difficulties; 
Silence prevents women and girls living in Trafford from feeling safe, 
confident and secure.  In other words, silence about sexual violence has an 
impact on all areas of life;   
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Silence robs women and girls of the transformational effect of speaking 
out.  Breaking silence is core to the recovery process; 
Silence robs women and girls from collective action and awareness. We 
could say that silence operates a kind of ‘divide and rule’ because it 
separates, fragments and isolates instead of allowing the strength of 
multiple voices to sound out loud and clear - to make a noise that can no 
longer be ignored;   
Silence about sexual violence is not good for all members of all 
communities who live within Trafford. It is not good for all members of all 
communities living across the world, whether they be men, women or 
children. 
Rape Crisis centres throughout the country (Rape Crisis [England and Wales], 
2004-2013), and Trafford Rape Crisis in particular, are founded on breaking 
silence; it is all about giving voice.   
Our knowledge and understanding about the power of giving voice has a 
history in the women’s liberation movement that goes back to the idea of 
‘speaking out.’ On a Sunday afternoon in January, 1971 in America, over 30 
women gave public testimony to their experiences of the abuse of power through 
sexual violence.  This was called a ‘speak out event’ and was the first of its kind 
(Brownmiller, 1999:199-200).  Following in the tradition of this inspiring event in 
  
 xviii    
 
1971, today, in March, 2012, we are going to enact our own ‘speak out’ and I 
invite our women to speak.
4
 
I declare the activism of ‘Trafford Rape Crisis Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic 
Women’s Service.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 At this part of the speech, with the invitation to speak out, six different members of Trafford 
Rape Crisis, who were sitting throughout the audience, stood up one by one and performed a 
‘speak out event,’ reading the testimonies of women survivors of sexual violence.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Why is it that Foucault is read and used more than Lorde?  Is it because Foucault 
is more articulate, erudite and intellectually superior than Lorde?  Is it because 
Foucault is more relevant?  Not that it has much to do with the answer to these 
questions, but consideration of the context and content of their writings makes 
these questions even more intriguing.  Foucault (1926 - 1984) and Lorde (1934 -
1992) both wrote some of their key works during the same historical period 
(1970s and 1980s).  Both Lorde and Foucault were concerned with similar issues, 
such as the production of, and relation between, power, knowledge, subjectivity 
and position.  Both Lorde and Foucault would question why a particular theory is 
more popular than another, and why a particular text, author and/or voice is 
known and used more than another. Yet, the fact remains that Foucault enjoys a 
more prominent, legitimised position in academic scholarship than Lorde.  Indeed, 
the name ‘Foucault’ is so well-embedded in Western scholarship that it gets 
picked up and can be instantly corrected by Microsoft spell-check technology.    
The reasons why Foucault and, indeed, numerous other intellectuals that 
could be named are read and used more than Lorde, and indeed, numerous other 
Black feminist intellectuals that could be named, have nothing to do with 
relevance or intellectual superiority.  To focus on these qualitative yardsticks is a 
diversion from the crux of the matter.   
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The question of who is read and used, and who is not, particularly when 
the ‘who is not’ refers to Black feminist scholarship in general, and to the work of 
Lorde in particular, is fundamental to this thesis.  Spivak focusses on the crux of 
the matter in relation to who is read, used and heard in her question, ‘Can the 
Subaltern Speak?’  (Spivak, 1988). Spivak opens this seminal work with the 
following statement:  
An understanding of contemporary relations of power, and of the Western 
intellectual’s role within them, requires an examination of the intersection 
of a theory of representation and the political economy of global 
capitalism. A theory of representation points, on the one hand, to the 
domain of ideology, meaning, and subjectivity, and, on the other hand, to 
the domain of politics, the state, and the law. (Spivak, 1988:271)  
Lorde’s work and, consequentially, this thesis, are an engagement with ‘…the 
intersection of a theory of representation and the political economy of global 
capitalism.’  My starting point is that ‘[t]he shadow obscuring this complex Black 
women’s intellectual tradition is neither accidental nor benign’ (Hill Collins, 
2000:3).  The project of the thesis is to critically examine this position of 
suppression. 
This thesis demonstrates unequivocally that Lorde’s work goes beyond the 
‘…strategic use of positivist essentialism…’ (Spivak, 2006:281; emphasis in 
original) and has relevance to legitimately intervene in, and shape the direction of, 
contemporary feminist debates.  Indeed, not to do so is both a loss and to be 
complicit with Western hegemony in maintaining unequal relations of power.  It 
demonstrates the ways in which Lorde, in conjunction with Black feminist 
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scholarship, creates a critical lens not only to examine key concepts, issues and 
questions, but, also, to provide a body of theory relevant for applied disciplines 
such as psychology,
5
 social work, psychoanalysis, social theory, critical race 
theory and feminism.    
This thesis produces new re-readings of Lorde’s work that go beyond a 
literary textual analysis, but, inspired by Bhabha’s (1986) ‘Remembering 
Fanon…,’ Gates, Jr.’s (1988) The Signifying Monkey… and Seshadri-Crooks’ 
(2000a) Desiring Whiteness…, this thesis interrogates Lorde’s location in the 
performative ‘…spatial margin, that is, the margin as subject position…’ 
(Seshadri-Crooks, 2000b:8).   
 
Re-Reading Audre Lorde 
“Good” literary criticism, the only worthwhile kind, implies an act, a 
literary signature or counter-signature, an inventive experience of 
language, in language, an inscription of the act of reading in the field of 
the text that is read. (Derrida, 1992a:52; emphasis in original)  
The act of re-reading Lorde is an inventive experience because each re-reading is 
different.  No re-reading is the same and, as such, each re-reading is a new re-
reading.  The predicament is that of how to establish and communicate any sense 
                                                          
5 As demonstrated in the Appendix of this thesis, which provides the monograph proposal 
contracted for the Routledge ‘Concepts for Critical Psychology’ Series, entitled, ‘Why Critical 
Psychologists Must Read Audre Lorde: Race, Gender and Social Change,’ due for submission in 
May, 2013. 
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of a comprehensible, coherent re-reading of Lorde when each re-reading 
destabilises any notion of an ‘established,’ and in doing so, contests any notion of 
an ‘established.’  The predicament takes on a particular significance in relation to 
Black feminist political writings and communication of messages designed to 
create coalitions of resistance to oppression.  In other words, the questions 
become: how can the impossibility of a unified, established communication work 
to form the possibility of a unified, established, political feminist resistance?  How 
can the call to feminist collective action that is reiterated throughout Lorde’s text 
be possible when reiteration produces inevitable fissures?  Is there a possibility of 
‘the transformation of silence into language and action’ (Lorde, 1977a:40) in the 
condition of the impossibility of language?  
The gap between the iterated and the reiterated in the term ‘re-reading,’ 
represented by the hyphen, is a preoccupation of the thesis investigated through 
intertextual (re-)readings of Lorde.  The ramifications of this preoccupation are 
illustrated in Chapter 2 through close re-readings of ‘Black feminism is not white 
feminism in blackface’ (Lorde, 1979a:60). The chapter draws on the Kristevan 
idea of intertextuality as intersubjectivity (Kristeva, 1969) as a method to 
deconstruct the intersubjective interdependence of words.  To be more specific, 
Chapter 2 argues that the space and place between the words in Lorde’s statement 
that ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ function as the space 
and place between Black and white feminisms.   
In contesting any notion of an established, unified singularity, the space 
and place between the iterated and the reiterated contest an established, unified 
singularity of author intention.  Derrida explains that: 
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What holds for the receiver holds also, for the same reasons, for the sender 
or the producer.  To write is to produce a mark that will constitute a sort of 
machine which is productive in turn, and which my future disappearance 
will not, in principle, hinder in its functioning, offering things and itself to 
be read and to be rewritten.  When I say “my future disappearance” 
[disparition: also, demise, trans.], it is in order to render this proposition 
more immediately acceptable.  I ought to be able to say my disappearance, 
pure and simple, my nonpresence in general, for instance the nonpresence 
of my intention of saying something meaningful [mon vouloir-dire, mon 
intention-de-signification], of my wish to communicate, from the emission 
or production of the mark.  For a writing to be a writing it must continue to 
“act” and to be readable even when what is called the author of the writing 
no longer answers for what he has written, for what he seems to have 
signed... (Derrida, 1972a:8; parentheses and italics in original)   
The dialectic here is that Lorde’s ‘nonpresence’ to herself renders her ‘mark’ 
(written and verbal enunciations) and her intention in the ‘mark’ impossible to 
ascertain, but, and here is the bone of contention,  the act of writing and (re-) 
reading relies on some kind of recognition of the ‘mark.’ Derrida summarises the 
dialectic as: 
What is re-markable about the mark includes the margin within the mark.  
The line delineating the margin can therefore never be determined 
rigorously, it is never pure and simple.  The mark is re-markable in that it 
“is” also its margin. (Derrida, 1977a:70)   
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The predicament of the margin, border and boundary is pursued 
throughout each chapter of the thesis.  I propose that critical analysis of the aporia 
of margins provokes a critical re-working of the politics of being on the margins, 
marginalised and marginality.  Re-reading Lorde through a re-reading of Derrida, 
I propose a re-working of ‘…we have no patterns for relating across our human 
differences as equals’ (Lorde, 1980a:115). Here, re-readings, in which 
intertextuality and intersubjectivity are in a relation of infinite and mutual referral 
and deferral, contest the existence of established, stable patterns.   
Re-reading Lorde is both to occupy the margin and to make use of the 
margin so that the impossible, the unavailable and the fissures of re-reading Black 
feminist theoretical communications are the conditions of the activism of Black 
feminist theory.  From this perspective, energy can be directed away from 
establishing a correct (re-)reading or fixing of the intention of political texts - a 
source of so many divisions, exclusions and replication of hierarchical positions 
that have haunted, and continue to haunt, feminism.  Rather, energy should be re-
directed towards the situation and experience of instability as a site of Black 
feminist subversion. Spivak explains that ‘…the absence of sender and receiver is 
the positive condition of possibility of “communication,”’ (Spivak, 1980:80; 
emphasis in original) and I argue that effective feminist resistance to oppression 
depends on effective communication.  
 
Declaring the Activism of Black Feminist Theory 
Lorde had trouble speaking: 
Even one intelligible word was a very rare event for me.  And although the 
doctors at the clinic had clipped the little membrane under my tongue so I 
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was no longer tongue-tied, and had assured my mother that I was not 
retarded, she still had her terrors and her doubts.  She was genuinely happy 
for any possible alternative to what she was afraid might be a dumb child. 
(Lorde, 1996:14)   
My mother had a special and secret relationship with words, taken for 
granted as language because it was always there. I did not speak until I 
was four. (Lorde, 1996:21)  
I was very inarticulate as a youngster.  I couldn’t speak.  I didn’t speak 
until I was five, in fact, not really, until I started reading and writing 
poetry.  I used to speak in poetry.  I would read poems, and I would 
memorize them. People would say, well what do you think, Audre.  What 
happened to you yesterday?  And I would recite a poem... (Evans, 
1979:71) 
These excerpts bring together a range of issues concerned with the act of speaking 
that are relevant to the act of declaring or speaking out about the activism of 
Black feminist theory.  A close re-reading of Lorde’s words here indicates: speech 
as a marker of what it is to be a legitimate, intelligent human being; speech as 
‘taken for granted’ and ‘always there’ whilst holding the quality of the ‘secret’; 
and the relationship between speech, writing, conventions of speech and the 
unconventional chaos of poetry. Austin maintained that:  
Once we realize that what we have to study is not the sentence but the 
issuing of an utterance in a speech-situation, there can hardly be any 
longer a possibility of not seeing that stating is performing an act. (Austin, 
1975:139; emphasis in original)  
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The act being performed is the creation of a social and psychic reality within a 
social context.   
The performative declarative in the title of this thesis, ‘Declaring the 
Activism of Black Feminist Theory,’ could be thought of as a perlocutionary act.  
Both the act of declaration and the ‘act’-ivism within the circumstance of Black 
feminist theory function within the act of  ‘Declaring the Activism of Black 
Feminist Theory’ to bring about an impact on the audience.  This framing draws 
on the theory of the speech act (Austin, 1975; Searle, 1969, 1975) developed by 
Butler into the feminist theory of performativity.  Butler explains that ‘[w]ithin 
speech act theory, a performative is that discursive practice that enacts or 
produces that which it names’ (Butler, 1993a:13).  The implications of this for the 
‘excitable speech’ (Butler, 1997b) of the activism of Black feminist theory include 
the following factors:  
1. The situation of Black women, in every sense of the word, is not a product 
of nature, but a product of discursive practice;  
2. Discursive practices are unstable social, historical, cultural, economic and 
political artefacts (Burr, 1995:3-5); 
3. Performativity is not a one-off act, but works through repetitive re-
inscriptions (Butler, 1999:xv);  
4. The contingent instability of the contextualised artefact, the production of 
communication and the inevitable space represented in the hyphen in the 
term ‘re-inscription’ are opportunities for subversion; 
5. The opportunities in the space between each enactment of the declaration 
of the activism of Black feminist theory are a chance for the insurrection 
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of the laws of discursive practice (especially when those practices 
subjugate Black women). 
The challenge of the title performed through this thesis is summarised in Derrida’s 
caution that ‘…there is no “pure” performative’ (Derrida, 1972a:17), coupled with 
Spivak’s question, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ (Spivak, 1988).  The challenge of 
performing ‘Re-Reading Audre Lorde: Declaring the Activism of Black Feminist 
Theory’ is that of maintaining a persistent, hypervigilant sensitivity towards 
‘epistemic violence’ (Spivak, 1988:280).   
I think it is possible to re-read the question, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ in 
terms of, ‘Can Black feminist theory speak?’  The dilemma of the question is that 
if the reply is ‘yes, the Subaltern/Black feminist theory can speak,’ then the 
questions become: what code, language and condition is this contingent upon? 
What discursive practices permit the reply of ‘yes’? Who/what confers this 
agency of speaking? On the other hand, if the reply is ‘no, the Subaltern/ Black 
feminist theory cannot speak,’ then the questions become: what code, language 
and condition is silence contingent upon?  What discursive practices permit the 
reply of ‘no’? Who/what forecloses this agency of speaking?  Add to this 
Derrida’s deconstruction of logocentrism, in which both the subject and the word 
of the subject are decentered, and the notion of a subaltern who can speak their 
situation, or a Black feminist theory that can speak the situation of Black women, 
is decentred.   
Indeed, I propose that the project of ‘Re-Reading Audre Lorde: Declaring 
the Activism of Black Feminist Theory’ can enable a nuanced re-working of 
reductionist centre/margin perspectives.  The ‘re-markable’ (Derrida, 1977a:70) 
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Lorde as the margin and the decentring of logos as utterance, text, author and 
declarer of Black feminist theory productively messes with neat centre/margin 
configurations of ‘master territories’ (Minh-ha, 1991). The relationship between 
speaking, knowledge and work is articulated by Ahmed in the following way: 
‘…considering the epistemic dimensions of speaking will demonstrate the links 
between representation and broader relationships of production…’ (Ahmed, 
2000:61).  Thus, ‘…“who speaks?”…,’ ‘…“who hears?”’ and ‘…“who is 
knowing, here?”’ (Ahmed, 2000:61) constitute questions that are fundamental to 
the production of, and productions within, this thesis.  Furthermore, these 
questions also constitute a critical lens of self-reflection that provokes me to ask: 
‘who is speaking in this thesis?’ and ‘…how does the act of speaking already 
know “the stranger” as within or without a given community?’ (Ahmed, 2000:61; 
italics in original) With regards to methodology, here I interpret ‘given 
community’ to be this ‘given’ thesis.    
 
Audre Lorde: The Aporia of Positionality 
In the following excerpts from Zami (1996), Lorde takes up the conundrum of 
location, space and margins as she tries to negotiate a subject position:  
I did not like the tail of the Y hanging down below the line in Audrey, and 
would always forget to put it on…We were given special short wide 
notebooks to write in, with very widely spaced lines on yellow paper. 
They looked like my sister’s music notebooks.  We were also given thick 
black crayons to write with…I knew quite well that crayons were not what 
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you wrote with, and music books were definitely not what you wrote in. I 
raised my hand. When the teacher asked me what I wanted, I asked for 
some regular paper to write on and a pencil.  That was my undoing. “We 
don’t have any pencils here,” I was told. (Lorde, 1996:14-15) 
I bent my head down close to the desk that smelled like old spittle and 
rubber erasers, and on that ridiculous yellow paper with those laughably 
wide spaces I printed my best AUDRE.  I had never been too good at 
keeping between straight lines no matter what their width, so it slanted 
down across the page something like this: 
A 
  U 
   D 
    R 
     E 
The notebooks were short and there was no more room for anything else 
on that page.  So I turned the page and went over, and wrote again, 
earnestly and laboriously, biting my lip,  
L 
  O 
   R 
    D 
     E…  
(Lorde, 1996:15) 
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These excerpts show that from as early as the age of four years old, Lorde was 
engaged in:  
The question as to when one should “mark” oneself (in terms of ethnicity, 
age, class, gender, or sexuality for example) and when one should 
adamantly refuse such markings… For answers to this query remain bound 
to the specific location, context, circumstance, and history of the subject at 
a given moment.  Here, positionings are radically transitional and mobile. 
(Minh-ha, 2011:51; parentheses in original)  
This thesis traces the ways in which Lorde takes up Min-ha’s question of when to 
‘mark’ oneself and when to ‘refuse such markings.’  
Although positionings are mobile, the point that is demonstrated time and 
time again throughout this thesis is that mobility does not provide an escape or 
relief from the aporia of positionality.  Lorde’s position of being outside the lines 
of demarcation on the ‘…very widely spaced lines on yellow paper’ remains a 
position in itself, and that position is defined in relation to, and constituted by, the 
specific location, context and circumstance of ‘…that ridiculous yellow paper 
with those laughably wide spaces…’ and the ‘…thick black crayons to write 
with.’  Thus, this thesis provides a critical analysis of the claims of position, 
movement and undoing of position in the metanarrative of Lorde’s work, and in 
doing so, it examines these same claims in the metanarrative of feminist theory.   
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Implicated 
Caselli dismantles the inevitable tension in the following way:  
The metanarrative assertion, however, also presents itself as an 
authoritative claim, as if it could escape the very game of which it is part 
and could guarantee the reality or unreality of what is written.  Although 
there is no ground to decide what is artificial, since the claim belongs to 
the same fictional world that it denounces, the rhetoric creates the illusion 
that, by judging what the narrator has just said, it stands on a higher 
ground.  The metanarrative statement occupies an ambiguous position, as 
it is implicated in the narrative it criticises and it also stands above it in 
order to judge it. (Caselli, 2005:105) 
In the task of ‘judging’ patriarchy, and in the questioning of ‘artificial’ fictions of 
what a woman is, the question becomes: how can the metanarrative of feminism 
present authoritative claims (and they need to be authoritative in the face of 
women’s denied authority, and in particular, in the face of a racist, homophobic 
patriarchy that denies the authority of Black women) whilst being part of the 
‘game’?   
In terms of race, the question for critical race theory, Black feminist 
theory, post-colonial theory and for Lorde is:  
…how can the black subject posit a full and sufficient self in a language in 
which blackness is a sign of absence? (Gates, 1986:218) 
Gates’ query is particularly relevant for two reasons: firstly, because it can be 
applied both to race and gender, and the application takes on increased 
  
 14    
 
significance in terms of the intersectionality of race, gender and other categories 
of identity that are constituted as a sign of absence; and secondly, because the 
problem he articulates establishes that the notion of ‘absence’ in itself does not 
provide an escape from the aporia of positionality. Thus, Gates enables a more 
nuanced understanding of the aporia of positionality, where neither mobility nor 
absence provides an escape.  
More specifically, the question within this thesis is: how does Lorde 
grapple with this ambiguous, implicated position?  Indeed, the process of writing 
this thesis has been a question of, and a questioning of, my own grappling with 
this tension in terms of how I position Lorde and am (re-)positioned by Lorde.  I 
am beginning to understand something of what Spivak wrote in the first paragraph 
of ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’: ‘…although I will attempt to foreground the 
precariousness of my position throughout, I know such gestures can never suffice’ 
(Spivak, 1988:271).  
 
Black Feminist Methodology 
This thesis is a gesture of working with Lorde, and it is a gesture of putting Lorde 
to work.  Drawing on scholarship including, for example, postcolonial, literary, 
Black feminist and deconstructionist theory, this multidisciplinary, pedagogical 
intervention juxtaposes a range of standpoints and theoretical approaches.  In 
terms of methodology, this thesis is an intersection of ‘…interlocking and 
mutually reinforcing…’ (Nash, 2008:3), constitutive approaches.  This thesis 
provides a new critical, close re-reading of Lorde produced out of her ‘…specific 
location, context, circumstance, and history…’ (Min-ha, 2011:51).  The 
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methodology juxtaposes those given moments of production with the given 
moments of current feminist debates.  An objective of this methodology is to 
transgress boundaries across a temporal and spatial spectrum.  Furthermore, 
‘…the specific location, context, circumstance, and history of the subject at a 
given moment’ (Min-ha, 2011:51) applies both to author and reader to produce 
particular and shifting re-readings at any given time, space and place.  Indeed, this 
thesis demonstrates that Lorde performs what Min-ha (2011) calls ‘the boundary 
event’ and, in doing so, Lorde enables us to think about, and to narrate, the 
happenings of the boundary.   
This thesis adopts the concept of ‘the boundary event’ as a methodology 
and, furthermore, the thesis itself performs a theoretical ‘boundary event.’  It is an 
example of content and method intersecting.  Time and time again throughout this 
thesis, the subject under analysis and the method to investigate the subject under 
analysis are mutually constitutive.  Indeed, I would argue that the intersection of 
method, analysis and content is a consistent structure that constitutes the main 
body of this thesis. Because ‘…the space and place we inhabit produce us’ 
(Probyn, 2003:294), the space and place of this thesis has produced its 
methodology.  For example, the space and place of aporia, the dialectic, 
intersectionality and the matrix of domination simultaneously constitute the 
subject under analysis and the methodology for analysis.   
It is no coincidence that this method has evolved as an organic process 
through the journey and content of this thesis, given that: 
Black feminist politics by its very nature exists right at the intersection of 
several issues that are located in Black women’s experiences. And since 
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experience is also ideologically produced, and Black women’s experience 
is what Black women’s writing purports to express, we are also 
simultaneously examining ideological, discursive positions of some Black 
women who are writers. (Boyce Davies, 1994:30)   
The methodology arising from the experience of undertaking this thesis is 
contingent upon, and constituted by, a number of intersecting factors that include:  
1. The fact that: 
Black feminist criticisms, then, perhaps more than many of the 
other feminisms, can be a praxis where the theoretical positions 
and the criticism interact with the lived experience. (Boyce Davies, 
1994:55)   
It is the interaction of theory with lived experience that creates the 
methodology of Black feminist criticism.  More specifically, a core aspect 
of the project of this thesis is to expose, reclaim and assert the theoretical 
position of Lorde’s work - a task that includes the dialectic of examining 
the suppression of that position, whilst contesting that suppression.  Hill 
Collins explains that: 
This dialectic of oppression and activism, the tension between the 
suppression of African-American women’s ideas and our 
intellectual activism in the face of that suppression, constitutes the 
politics of U.S. Black feminist thought.  More important, 
understanding this dialectical relationship is critical in assessing 
how U.S. Black feminist thought - its core themes, epistemological 
significance, and connections to domestic and transnational Black 
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feminist practice - is fundamentally embedded in a political context 
that has challenged its very right to exist. (Hill Collins, 2000:3-4)  
2. Christian states:  
…I think we need to read the works of our writers in our various 
ways and remain open to the intricacies of the intersection of 
language, class, race, and gender in the literature. (Christian, 
1987:13)   
For me, being ‘…open to the intricacies of the intersection…’ is a 
methodology and produces a methodology.  Lorde identifies being ‘open’ 
as a use of the erotic, ‘…whether it is dancing, building a bookcase, 
writing a poem, examining an idea’ (Lorde, 1978a:56-57).  In being ‘open’ 
to examining the ideas of Black feminist literature, I realise, and ‘…“[i]t 
feels right to me”…’ (Lorde, 1978a:56), that Lorde’s Black feminist ‘uses 
of the erotic’ are a methodology.  In other words:  
Beyond the superficial, the considered phrase, “It feels right to 
me,” acknowledges the strength of the erotic into a true knowledge, 
for what that means is the first and most powerful guiding light 
toward any understanding. (Lorde, 1978a:56)  
I believe that:  
…the suppression of Black women’s intellectual traditions has 
made this process of feeling one’s way an unavoidable 
epistemological stance for Black women intellectuals. (Hill 
Collins, 2000:19)   
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I propose that consideration of, ‘It feels right to me,’ provides a 
methodology for negotiating ‘…a channel between the “high theoretical” 
and the “suspicious of all theories”’ (Boyce Davies, 1994:43).  The 
method of opening the ‘high theoretical’ to the intricacies and suppression 
of Black women’s experience, work and voice keeps suspicion alive, 
whilst not allowing suspicion to destroy that which is useful theoretically.   
3. The methodology is contingent upon, and constituted through, the 
grassroots feminist work that is central to my living; for example, working 
in Manchester, Oxford and Trafford Rape Crisis centres, engagement with 
asylum-seekers and refugee women, and numerous community-based 
education projects.  Lorde’s own involvement in grassroots feminist 
activism included the creation of ‘Sisters in Support of Sisters in South 
Africa’ (SISA) (Kraft, 1986:152) under apartheid, and the founding of the 
‘Kitchen Table Press’ with Barbara Smith in the late 1980s (Cavin, 
1983:106).  The dialogical relationship between experience, practice and 
scholarship produces the methodology of the activism of Black feminist 
theory, where the how to do, and the doing of, the project, intersect. Boyce 
Davies makes the point that:  
Scholarship and theoretical writing by Black women, because they 
exist in an academic context, have become distant and removed 
from the day-to-day lives of most people.  But it is not only the fact 
of the critic distantly removed from the people which is the issue, 
but the ways in which Black women as writers, academics, 
teachers, who live lives of multiple oppression, still end up 
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paradoxically unintelligible to those who are unschooled in critical 
discourses and also to those who are. (Boyce Davies, 1994:36)   
Throughout this thesis, I make a concerted effort to transfer the text of 
Black feminist critical theory from the page to the day-to-day struggles of Black 
feminist activism. I agree with Boyce Davies (1994:36) that ‘Black feminist 
critics have to make a concerted effort…to do community work 
whenever/wherever possible.’ For example, in Chapter 3, Lorde’s (1978a) ‘Uses 
of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power’ is used as a framework in the theory and 
intervention to confront sexual violence against Black women.  In Chapter 2, 
Lorde’s statement that ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ 
(Lorde, 1979a:60) is used to examine the necessity of Black women-only 
reflective spaces and specific Black women-only service provision.  In Chapter 4, 
‘The Aporetics of Intersectionality’ form a basis to analyse the emotional impact 
of ‘…integrat[ing] all the parts of who I am…’ (Lorde, 1980a:120).  Examination 
of the ‘…psychological toll…’ (The Combahee River Collective, 1977:266) of 
embodied intersectionality is applied to the struggles encountered in collective-
working, Black women-only spaces and the experience of engaging with Black 
feminist texts.   
 
Writing Genres  
The stylistic construction of this thesis reflects something of the intersection of 
content and methodology adopted to tease out the relevant issues and application 
of those issues.  From different uses of writing genres to the detail of the use of 
pronouns, the thesis mirrors the instability and shifting nature of Lorde’s literary 
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and rhetorical devices.  In this sense, the concept of exceeding the bounds of the 
text (Barthes, 1967, 1971; Foucault, 1969) becomes: 
1. A method of critical textual analysis; 
2. A force that shapes the style and structure of the text of this thesis; 
3. The subject under analysis, in terms of tracking the ways that Lorde’s 
text draws on traditions of the Black vernacular (Gates, Jr., 1988) and 
the highly political patterns of Black feminist literary constructions.     
Lorde’s oeuvre comprises a prolific and diverse range of published and 
unpublished works of fiction and non-fictional pieces. Although this thesis does 
not stretch to include the poems of Lorde, it does draw on her speeches, letters, 
essays, personal journal entries, feminist journal articles, interviews, pamphlets, 
conference papers and biomythography.   
The focus on Lorde’s political speeches, essays and interviews reflect my 
own, personal, evolving relationship with her work. Whilst I have a deepening 
appreciation of Lorde’s poems, it was her political essays and speeches - 
particularly those in Sister Outsider - that provided an anchor for me at an 
especially testing time in my journey of personal, political activism and 
transformation.  Here, I am reminded of Lorde’s own reflection:  
I wrote “The Uses of the Erotic” a little while, maybe a month before I had 
my mastectomy.  And when I surfaced from that experience, about six 
months later, I picked up - when I started looking at my work again - I 
picked up that piece, and it was…exactly what I needed to read.  It was 
what I needed to say to myself... (Abod, 1987:161)  
  
 21    
 
If I were to begin the journey of this thesis again, I would include her poetry, but I 
say this as a different Suryia now than the Suryia who embarked on the task of the 
thesis five years ago.  The importance of this reflection is bound up with 
preoccupation in the thesis of positionality, the shifting nature of subjectivity, and 
the function of author and text.   
Lorde’s spectrum of writing genres is reflected in the spectrum of writing 
genres that comprises this thesis.  For example, the ‘Preface’ includes the speech I 
wrote and delivered to open the ‘Declaring the Activism of Black Feminist 
Theory Convention.’ Chapter 4, ‘The Aporetics of Intersectionality,’ is a personal, 
reflective piece written in the first person, and Chapter 2 presents an analysis of 
‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ (Lorde, 1979a:60) through 
two different styles.  These two styles include a piece of formal, academic prose, 
and the construction of an experimental, pedagogical intervention in the form of 
an imaginary conversation between me, Lorde and a range of other Black and 
white feminist critics.  Rather than talking about Lorde, this particular 
intervention produces the effect of talking with Lorde.  Drawing on a literary 
tradition of dialogue, conversation, interviews and plays, this conversation 
between activists and scholars across a temporal and spatial spectrum juxtaposes a 
range of visions, standpoints and theoretical approaches.  It is a deliberate 
transgression of fixed, theoretical and disciplinary borders that resists 
‘…historical amnesia…’ (Lorde, 1980a:117).  The imaginary conversation that 
structures part of Chapter 2 creates a forum to work with, and to explore, concepts 
such as the speech act and speaking position that are at the heart of the subject 
under discussion.  Furthermore, it represents a performance of intertextuality in 
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action.  More specifically, it is a polyvocal performative representation of 
intertextuality as intersubjectivity (Kristeva, 1969). 
 
Politics of Pronouns: The Matter of Who Is Speaking 
‘In fact, however, all discourses endowed with the author function do possess this 
plurality of self’ (Foucault, 1969:112). This plurality arises because the pronoun 
‘I’ of the author ‘…refers to an individual without an equivalent who, in a 
determined place and time, completed a certain task…’ (Foucault, 1969:112). In 
other words, Lorde as author was never available either to us or to herself. This is 
not just because she is physically dead; equivalence is disrupted because ‘[t]he 
knowing self is partial in all its guises, never finished, whole…’ (Haraway, 
1988:288). In turn, the intentions of Lorde as author are never available even when 
the author ‘…speaks to tell the work’s meaning, the obstacles encountered, the 
results obtained, and the remaining problems…’ (Foucault, 1969:112).   
Furthermore, the self/selves of a pronoun, whether in the form of author or 
reader, is/are always ‘…situated in the field of already existing or yet-to-appear…’ 
(Foucault, 1969:112). This is demonstrated in the methodology and content of 
‘my’ thesis, where the construction of  ‘my’ is through a re-reading, application 
and citation of multiple authors ‘…without an equivalent who, in a determined 
place and time, completed a certain task…’ (Foucault, 1969:112).  In order words, 
the author of this thesis is as unavailable as the authors within the thesis.  This 
dynamic takes on particular significance when the ‘without an equivalent’ is 
manufactured into a totalizing equivalent, as is the case with Black feminist critics.  
Foucault’s point is that the determined place and time function to produce the 
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situation of ‘without an equivalent.’ In short, the time and place of writing five 
minutes ago are no longer available and, thus, the author of five minutes ago is 
also no longer available (Benveniste, 1961).  However, in the case of Black 
feminist writing, the opposite occurs; the notion of a ‘determined place and time’ 
is used to fix and solidify Black feminist writing, resulting in essentialist 
configurations of authenticity and homogeneity.   
This thesis picks up Black feminism’s strategic engagement with the 
politics of pronouns.  This is particularly evident in Chapter 3, ‘An Analysis and 
Application of “Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power”’ and Chapter 4, ‘The 
Aporetics of Intersectionality.’  In both of these chapters, close re-reading of the 
use of pronouns identifies the ways in which semantics operate as instruments of 
connection and disconnection.  Lorde’s writing shifts constantly back and forth 
from the first to the third person, including frequent use of collective pronouns. 
These shifting positions are performative of her claims about difference, 
subjectivity and identity.   
The fluctuations between different pronouns create a polyrhythmic effect 
that enables different signifiers of identity and subjectivity to be played around 
with. Lorde grew up within a household of ‘…that Grenadian poly-language…’ 
(Lorde, 1996:7), where ‘[t]he sensual content of life was masked and cryptic, but 
attended in well-coded phrases’ (Lorde, 1996:22). For example:  
We were never dressed too lightly, but rather “in next kin to nothing.” 
Neck skin to nothing? Impassable and impossible distances were measured 
by the distance “from Hog to Kick ’em Jenny.” Hog?  Kick ’em Jenny?...A 
mild reprimand was accompanied not by a slap on the behind, but a 
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“smack on the backass,” or on the “bamsy.”  You sat on your “bam-bam,” 
but anything between your hipbones and upper thighs was consigned to 
the “lower-region.” (Lorde, 1996:21; emphasis in original)   
Here, Lorde locates the ‘well-coded’ (Lorde, 1996:22) within the polyrhythms of 
polyvocality and poly-language. It could be argued that Lorde exposes the politics 
of signifying practices, and the relationship between location and speech - 
whether that is the location of the private domestic sphere, the location of being 
Black and/or the location of the ‘…“other tongues”…’ (Boyce Davies, 1994:153).   
Lorde’s use of Black feminist literary traditions of polyvocality and 
polyrhythms is explored in Chapter 5, drawing on Gates, Jr. (1988) as a critical 
lens to examine the function of literary devices in Zami (Lorde, 1996). Chapter 5 
analyses how the movement between pronouns such as ‘I,’  ‘we,’ ‘us,’ ‘our,’ 
‘my,’ ‘myself,’ ‘me’ and ‘her’ within the ‘Epilogue’ of Zami produces the effect 
of shifting positions.  However, I argue in Chapter 5 that the shift in position, 
represented by the shift in pronouns, does not resolve the aporia of positionality, 
because the singular and collective plural inevitably refer and defer to each other. 
Pennycook explains that pronouns:  
…are in fact  very  complex  and  political  words, always  raising  
difficult  issues  of  who  is  being  represented.  There  is, therefore,  never  
an  unproblematic  “we”  or  “you”  or  “they”  or  “I”  or  “he/she.” 
(Pennycook, 1994:173)  
These difficult issues become more pronounced when it is a Black woman who is 
being represented.  Using the pronoun, ‘we,’ Jordan succinctly states that ‘[t]he 
problem is that we are saying language, but really dealing with power’ (Jordan, 
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1972:35; emphasis in original).   The conscious political use of pronouns within 
Black feminism functions to disrupt racist, homophobic, patriarchal positionings.  
For example, Hill Collins explains: 
…I argue that Black women intellectuals best contribute to a Black 
women’s group standpoint by using their experiences as situated knowers.  
To adhere to this epistemological tenet required that, when appropriate, I 
reject the pronouns “they” and “their” when describing U.S. Black women 
and our ideas and replace these terms with the terms “we,” “us,” and 
“our.” Using the distancing terms “they” and “their” when describing my 
own group and our experiences might enhance both my credentials as a 
scholar and the credibility of my arguments in some academic settings.  
But by taking this epistemological stance that reflects my disciplinary 
training as a sociologist, I invoke standards of certifying truth about which 
I remain ambivalent. (Hill Collins, 2000:19)   
 
The Critic as Host  
This thesis could be seen as my hosting, with all of the problematics of being a 
host outlined in Chapter 2, the event of Lorde in conversation with scholars such 
as Bhabha, Boyce Davies, Butler, Crenshaw, Fanon, Haraway, Hill Collins, 
hooks, Seshadri-Crooks and Spivak, to name but a few of the guests. This is in 
order to make a decisive intervention into current thinking about issues such as 
identity formation, difference, position, voice, intersectionality and what Hall 
(1996:17) refers to as the ‘…constitutive outside…’. It is a deliberate 
transgression of fixed, theoretical and disciplinary borders to attempt a space of 
  
 26    
 
emotional and ‘…“intellectual hospitality”…’ (Bennett, 2003 and Kaufman, 2001, 
cited in Molz and Gibson, 2007:2), because ‘…what is at stake is not only the 
thinking of hospitality, but thinking as hospitality’ (Friese, 2004, cited in Molz 
and Gibson, 2007:2; emphasis in original). Indeed, it will become apparent in the 
thesis that Derrida’s (2000) notion of the impossibility of hospitality, in terms of 
who is host and who is guest, is an important methodological tool. The 
impossibility of hospitality is used to deconstruct the constitution, position and 
play of power relations in regards to the production of the ‘other’ and what the 
‘other’ produces.   
 
Historical Amnesia 
This intervention tracks and resists the ‘…historical amnesia that keeps us 
working to invent the wheel every time we have to go to the store for bread’ 
(Lorde, 1980a:117) that is so well-documented by Black feminism.  In ‘A Burst of 
Light’ (1988), Lorde provides a personal and poignant reflection that brings in an 
added, tangential dimension to the waste of ‘…working to invent the wheel…’ 
(Lorde, 1980a:117).  In ‘A Burst of Light’ Lorde reflects on the loss and isolation 
that not knowing about the ‘wheel’ gives rise to: 
I often think of Angelina Weld Grimké dying alone in an apartment in 
New York City in 1958 while I was a young Black Lesbian struggling in 
isolation at Hunter College, and I think of what it could have meant in 
terms of sisterhood and survival for each one of us to have known of the 
other’s existence: for me to have had her words and her wisdom, and for 
her to have known I needed them! (Lorde, 1988:288)  
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The point I need to emphasise is that this thesis is a deliberate and purposeful 
intervention to confront the ‘…neither accidental nor benign’ (Hill Collins, 
2000:3) ‘historical amnesia’ of Lorde’s work that is representative of the travesty 
of suppressing the scholarship of Black feminism.  The thesis is a work of re-
membering.  
I want to highlight three mutually contingent points in relation to 
‘historical amnesia’ that recur in different guises throughout the thesis.  I 
introduce the first point with a piece written by Jordan (1982).  Jordan describes 
an encounter that took place during a Black Sisters Speak-Out, where:  
…one of the women announced that we should realize our debt to the 
great Black women who have preceded us in history. “We are here,” she 
said, “because of the struggle of women like,” and here her sentence broke 
down.  She tried again. “We have come this far because of all the Black 
women who fought for us like, like . . .” and, here, only one name came to 
her mouth: “Sojourner Truth!” she exclaimed, clearly relieved to think of 
it, but also embarrassed because she couldn’t keep going. “And,” she tried 
to continue, nevertheless, “the other Black women like . . .” but here 
somebody in the audience spoke to her rescue, by calling aloud the name 
Harriet Tubman.  At this point I interrupted to observe that now we had 
two names for 482 years of our Afro-American history. “What about Mary 
McLeod Bethune?” somebody else ventured at last. “That’s three!” I 
remarked, in the manner of a referee: “Do we have a fourth?”  There was a 
silence.  Thoroughly embarrassed, the first woman looked at me and said, 
“Listen.  I could come up with a whole list of Black women if my life 
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depended on it.”  “Well,” I had to tell her, “It does.” (Jordan, 1982:133; 
ellipsis and emphasis in original)   
The first point is that resisting ‘historical amnesia’ goes beyond ‘…the 
waste of an amnesia that robs us of lessons of the past…’ (Lorde, 1982:139) and it 
goes beyond ‘…having to repeat and relearn the same old lessons over and 
over…’ (Lorde, 1980a:117).  My first point is that resisting ‘historical amnesia’ is 
vital because our life depends upon it, and as such, it opens up a range of issues 
explored within the thesis about the place and production of the subject and 
subjectivity. ‘Historical amnesia’ stands in direct relation to the position of Black 
women and what Black women produce in society.  It is an issue about 
recognition (or not) of the existence (or not) of Black women, their experiences 
and what they produce.  
Thus, it is possible to re-read ‘historical amnesia’ as a manifestation of the 
‘…false and treacherous connections’ (Lorde, 1980a:115) that Lorde refers to 
because ‘…we have no patterns for relating across our human differences as 
equals’ (Lorde, 1980a:115), which leads ‘…many Black women into testifying 
against themselves’ (Lorde, 1980a:121).  This is articulated by Jordan: 
From looking around the room I knew there were Black women right there 
who face critical exposure to bodily assault, alcoholic mothers, and racist 
insults and graffiti in the dorms.  I knew that the academic curriculum 
omitted the truth of their difficult lives.  I knew that they certainly would 
not be found welcome in the marketplace after they got their degrees.  But 
the insistent concern was more intimate and more pitiful and more 
desperate than any of those threatening conditions might suggest.  The 
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abject plea of those Black women students was ruthlessly minimal:  “If 
you see me, you could say, ‘Hi.’ ” Let me know that you see me; let me 
know I exist.  Never mind a conversation between us, but, please, if you 
see me, you could say “Hi.” (Jordan, 1982:133-134; emphasis in original) 
The second point is articulated by Brah and Phoenix, who explain that:  
By revisiting these historical developments, we do not wish to suggest that 
the past unproblematically provides an answer to the present.  On the 
contrary, we would wish to learn from and build upon these insights 
through critique so that they can shed new light on current predicaments. 
(Brah and Phoenix, 2004:75)  
Indeed, it is precisely due to the fact that revisiting Lorde does not 
unproblematically provide answers to current predicaments that makes her a sharp 
critical lens of analysis for the present.  In other words, my encounters with 
unresolved tensions have yielded the most fruitful opportunities for productive 
thinking.   
The third point is the need to track and resist the urge to ‘…romanticize 
our past in order to be aware of how it seeds our present’ (Lorde, 1982:139) - an 
urge that is particularly seductive in relation to the iconic figure and work of 
Audre Lorde that I love and respect.   
 
Suspicion of Lorde, the Icon  
The significance of this point is that ‘…an iconicity that is altogether too good to 
be true’ (Suleri, 1992:250) blurs critical analysis, not least because it freezes the 
subject.  In other words, the effect of ‘“Audre-ism”’ (Joseph, 2009:249) and 
elevation to the status of ‘Shero’ (Betsch Cole, 2009:231) could work to foreclose 
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the audacity of any questioning, dissatisfaction, disappointment or disagreement 
with ‘…the most revered, powerful, and influential African American feminist 
writer/activist of the twentieth century…’ (Guy-Sheftall, 2009:253).  Suleri warns 
that:  
…the embarrassed privilege granted to racially encoded feminism does 
indeed suggest a rectitude that could be its own theoretical undoing. The 
concept of the postcolonial itself is too frequently robbed of historical 
specificity in order to function as a preapproved allegory for any mode of 
discursive contestation. The coupling of postcolonial with woman, 
however, almost inevitably leads to the simplicities that underlie 
unthinking celebrations of oppression, elevating the racially female voice 
into a metaphor for “the good.” Such metaphoricity cannot exactly be 
called essentialist, but it certainly functions as an impediment to a reading 
that attempts to look beyond obvious questions of good and evil. (Suleri, 
1992:250; emphasis in original)  
We would do well to heed Suleri’s warning in the current attention towards Lorde, 
who now seems to be in vogue.  For example, 2004 saw the publication of De 
Veaux’s acclaimed biography of Lorde and Conversations with Audre Lorde, 
edited by Wylie Hall. In 2005 the University of Louisville used a donation of one 
million dollars to create the ‘Audre Lorde Chair in Race, Class, Gender, and 
Sexuality’ that was filled in 2007 (Guy-Sheftall, 2009:259). In 2009 the Spellman 
Archives, featuring Lorde’s papers, was opened to the public and I Am Your 
Sister: Collected and Unpublished Writings of Audre Lorde was published (Byrd, 
et al., 2009).  2012 saw the release of the multi award-winning film, Audre Lorde 
– The Berlin Years 1984 to 1992, that has travelled across the U.S.A. and Europe. 
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Currently in production is a volume of essays with the working title, Audre 
Lorde’s Legacies: Transnational Encounters, Creativity and Activism. In addition, 
the number of conference symposiums, keynotes, blogs
6
  and references to the 
influence of Lorde are evidence of current interest in her work; for example, in the 
work of Ahmed (2009, 2010, 2012) and her trend-setting phrase, ‘Feminist 
Killjoys,’ and the British Association for American Studies’ (BAAS) (2009) 
58
th
 Annual Conference due to be held in April, 2013 will host a symposium 
dedicated to the work of Lorde.   
Although this turn to Lorde is gratifying, I hold Suleri’s position of 
suspicion, articulated vividly by duCille’s use of Moraga’s metaphor of a bridge:  
Both black women writers and the black feminist critics who have brought 
them from the depths of obscurity into the ranks of the academy have been 
such bridges.  The trouble is that, as Moraga points out, bridges get walked 
on over and over and over again.  This sense of being a bridge - of being 
walked on and passed over, of being used up and burnt out, of having to 
“publish while perishing”, as some have described their situations - seems 
to be a part of the human condition of many black women scholars. 
(duCille, 1994:254)   
It would seem that the more Black feminist scholarship is welcomed into the fold 
of academia, the more vigilant Black feminists need to be about the function, 
dangers and consequences of this welcome.  We have nothing to be grateful for. 
 
                                                          
6
 See Mohr (2013), Thestifledartist’s Blog (2012) and Tumblr (no date) for examples of blogs. 
 
  
 32    
 
Historical amnesia functions in two mutually constitutive directions in 
terms of what is remembered and what is forgotten. The point is that what is 
remembered and what is forgotten both pose a threat to the existence of Black 
women, and to what Black women produce, not least because what is remembered 
and what is forgotten have the potential to undermine the resources that Black 
women have access to in relation to the development and survival of a sense of 
sisterhood. The punch line is, as Jordan (1982), Lorde (1980, 1988) and Suleri 
(1992) make clear, that this is performed both in and through Black women 
themselves, ‘…coated in myths, stereotypes, and expectations from the outside, 
definitions not our own’ (Lorde, 1983a:170), so Black women become the 
mechanism for what is both remembered and forgotten in the service of a racist, 
homophobic patriarchy.  
 
Black Feminist Theory: The Function of Absence and Presence 
Within this thesis, ‘breaking bread’ (hooks and West, 1991) with contemporary 
issues is a method of demonstrating the relevance and translation of Lorde as a 
theoretical lens to critically analyse the production of Black women, and what 
Black women produce. The paradox addressed in this thesis is that scholarship 
that follows Lorde enables an enhanced, nuanced, detailed re-reading, but, also, 
begs the question of ‘epistemic violence’ (Spivak, 1988:280), appropriation and 
foreclosure of her work in particular, and Black feminist scholarship in general. 
Hence, what is ‘post’ about post-colonialism and post-modernism? (Ata Aidoo, 
1991:152). Boyce Davies (1994:83) explains that in the ‘post,’ ‘…we are 
automatically interpellated in ideologies of posting or postponing.’ Rather than 
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asking what is ‘post,’ Mukherjee (1990) reframes the questions to ask, ‘Whose 
Post-Colonialism and Whose Postmodernism?’  The question moves the debate 
on from the intersecting issues of the production and position of Black feminist 
theory to an inquiry about: 
1. The suppression of Black feminist theory as a manoeuvre of colonisation, 
where acts of appropriation are fundamental to maintaining racist, 
homophobic, patriarchal supremacy;   
2. The ways in which the suppression of Black feminist theory is disavowed 
and, just as importantly, the function of that disavowal in relation to the 
ambivalence present in all manoeuvres of appropriation.   
The implications of these lines of inquiry are taken up in Chapter 2, which 
demonstrates that tracking the manoeuvres of appropriation is tricky because it 
involves much more than a tracking of the binary of inclusion or exclusion.   
In other words, tracking where, when and why the work of Lorde in 
particular, and the work of Black feminist theory in general, are included and 
excluded in contemporary scholarship, reading lists and citations could produce 
quantitative data of strategic use, but it misses something.  Firstly, the function of 
the absence and presence is missed; actually, to be more specific, the production 
of the binary, and what the binary functions to produce, are at risk of being 
occluded by the fixation on the binary.  For example, it could evade an analysis of 
‘…the rules of recognition…’ (Bhabha, 1994:110) that determine the basis of 
inclusion and exclusion of Black feminist theory within contemporary 
scholarship.  Secondly, the binary of absence/presence misses the event of the 
space in-between.  The point is that missing the in-between space renders that 
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space unacknowledged, so that the happenings in the event of the boundary are 
foreclosed.  
The same points could be applied to the absence/presence of the specific 
Black, Asian and minority ethnic women’s services that I have been engaged with 
at Trafford Rape Crisis.  The analysis can be broadened out to any specific service 
provision for Black, Asian and minority ethnic peoples located within a general 
service, or, indeed, located within a racist, homophobic patriarchy.  For example, 
interrogation about both the number of calls taken on the Black, Asian and 
minority ethnic women’s helpline, and the ratio of Black, Asian and minority 
ethnic women within the organisation - as well as tracking the number of times a 
Black woman’s (as service-user and service-provider) voice is present or absent, 
recognised, unrecognised or misrecognised, acknowledged or unacknowledged - 
could produce quantitative data of strategic use, but it misses something.  What it 
misses is an inquiry into what the Black, Asian and minority ethnic women’s 
service functions to contain within the organisation.  It misses an inquiry into 
what is happening in the in-between space of the binary of absence/presence.  It 
misses an inquiry into what the fixation on the binary functions to produce and 
what produces the fixation in the first place.  Starting and ending with the binary 
of absence/presence is a disavowal of the anxiety of existing with the construction 
of the ‘other.’   
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Hybridity 
I find Bhabha’s (1994) idea of hybridity a particularly useful, analytic lens to 
think about the production and function of the position of Lorde’s work 
specifically, and the activism of Black feminist theory in general: 
If the effect of colonial power is seen to be the production of hybridization 
rather than the noisy command of colonialist authority or the silent 
repression of native traditions, then an important change of perspective 
occurs. The ambivalence at the source of traditional discourses on 
authority enables a form of subversion, founded on undecidability that 
turns the discursive conditions of dominance into the grounds of 
intervention.  It is traditional academic wisdom that the presence of 
authority is properly established through the non-exercise of private 
judgement and the exclusion of reasons in conflict with the authoritative 
reason. The recognition of authority, however, requires a validation of its 
source that must be immediately, even intuitively, apparent - “You have 
that in your countenance which I would fain call master” - and held in 
common (rules of recognition). What is left unacknowledged is the 
paradox of such a demand for proof and the resulting ambivalence for 
positions of authority. (Bhabha, 1994:112; emphasis and parentheses in 
original)  
Hill Collins’ (2000:15) analysis of the not silenced, but not too noisy positioning 
of Sojourner Truth’s contribution to Black feminist critical theory provides a good 
example of how this tactic of ‘hybridization’ works.  Although Sojourner Truth’s 
(1851) speech, ‘Ain’t I A Woman?,’ has not been silenced, as evidenced by 
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frequent citations of her question, neither has it been accredited with the ‘noisy 
command’ of her intellectual prowess, as evidenced by the complexity of the 
philosophical, theoretical and linguistic movements within the speech.   
From a political perspective that sees Lorde’s work and Black feminist 
discourse in the obscuring shadow of hybridization, it is possible to see Foucault’s 
power/knowledge relation at work.  ‘Hybridization’ would be a procedure by 
which ‘…the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised 
and redistributed…’ (Foucault, 1981:52). This ‘…important change of 
perspective…’ that Bhabha (1994:112) refers to is taken up within the thesis as a 
method of close re-reading to track the implicated grounds of hybridity that Lorde 
and Black feminism stand on.  This perspective takes seriously Mbembe’s caution 
that:  
…domination is a regime that involves not just control but conviviality, 
even connivance - as shown by the constant compromises, the small 
tokens of fealty…individuals are constantly being trapped in a net of 
rituals that reaffirm tyranny, and in that these rituals, however minor, are 
intimate in nature. (Mbembe, 2001:66)   
Bhabha (1994), Mbembe (2001) and Caselli (2005) bring a number of 
interconnecting problematics to the table that are pivotal to this thesis:  
1. To what extent, how and why Lorde should be regarded ‘…critically as a 
problem, not a solution, as a sign to be interrogated, a locus of 
contradictions’ (Carby, 1987:15). 
2. What strategies do Lorde and Black feminists use to grapple with the 
aporia of positionality? 
  
 37    
 
3. How do Lorde and Black feminists seek out possibilities for subversive 
manoeuvres in the in-between space of hybridity, as exemplified by 
Anzaldúa’s (2007) redefining of the hybrid position in Borderlands/La 
Frontera: The New Mestiza. 
 
Borderlands of the Dialectic 
Deconstructionist and post-colonial approaches reflected in Bhabha’s explication 
of ‘hybridization’ locate the space and possibility for subversion within the 
‘…undecidability that turns the discursive conditions of dominance into the 
grounds of intervention’ (Bhabha, 1994:112).  Speaking in relation to Lorde and 
the activism of Black feminist theory, I would contend that an aspect of the 
‘undecidability’ is to be simultaneously implicated and subversive.   
The borderlands of dialectic movement between the implicated and the 
subversive is difficult to occupy for a number of reasons: firstly, picking up on the 
metaphor of movement, occupation of the tension between the implicated and the 
subversive invokes a kind of motion sickness; secondly, occupation of movement 
between these tensions that constitute the dialectic entails giving up learnt 
strategies for coping with the symptoms of the motion sickness. It entails not 
resorting to resolving the movement within the dialectic.  For example, staying 
within the dialectic means not resorting to learnt patterns for relating across 
difference (Lorde, 1980a:115).  The dialectic is neither complicity, inversion or 
replication, nor is it a split position of an either/or.  So, the dialectic is inherently a 
place of loss - loss of resolution, loss of stability, loss of security, loss of the 
decided and loss of the prior.  However, this configuration is a trick because the 
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notion of loss implies that resolution, stability, security, decidability and the prior 
existed to be lost.   
Trying hard not to fall foul of the trick, I tackle the tricky business of 
tracking Lorde’s and Black feminists’ occupations of the never-ending movement 
between positions in the dialectic. The line of enquiry in Chapter 2 traces the 
tricky, hybrid position of ambivalence inherent within the power relations of 
Black and white feminisms.  Chapter 2 is a detailed interrogation of the dialectic 
within ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ (Lorde, 1979a:60).  
Re-reading Lorde through the critical lenses of Fanon (2008), Butler (1997c) and 
Bhabha (1994), Chapter 2 picks up on the anxieties of recognition of authority, 
the requirement of validation and the demand for proof that the undecidability of 
colonisation is founded upon.  In the aforementioned quote, Bhabha (1994:112) 
refers to undecidability as a site for subversion and this Derridian idea is reiterated 
throughout the thesis as a tool to ‘…dismantle the master’s house’ (Lorde, 
1979b:112; emphasis in original).   
Furthermore, Chapter 3, ‘An Analysis and Application of “Uses of the 
Erotic: The Erotic as Power”’ investigates Black feminist contestations of the 
totalizing effect of performative re-inscriptions of oppressive constructions of 
Black women.  A close re-reading of Lorde’s (1978a) ‘Uses of the Erotic: The 
Erotic as Power,’ in conjunction with Butler’s (1999) theory of performativity and 
Hill Collins’ (2000:123-148) critical examination of ‘The Sexual Politics of Black 
Womanhood,’ provides tools to open up the inevitable fissures found in all re-
inscriptions.   
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Chapter 3 dismantles the movement of reiteration used to establish and 
maintain the subjugation of Black women through sexual violation.  The chapter 
proposes that within the dialectic of reiteration can be found a productive crisis of 
tension, with the potential for a productive Black feminist political resistance.  It 
makes me think of the name ‘Rape Crisis’ in a new light.  The name is rooted 
historically and politically within the women’s liberation movement 
(Brownmiller, 1993, 1999), and as such, remains the name, even though both a 
frequent reaction to, and the impact of, its enunciation, are extremely 
uncomfortable. The word ‘crisis’ invokes the idea of something immediate, 
traumatic and overwhelming, and most people’s association with the words ‘rape 
crisis’ is that of the crisis of a rape that has just happened.  However, survivors 
who use Rape Crisis services speak about the emotional impact of rape as having 
no time-frame.  In other words, the trauma of rape destabilises time so that terms 
such as ‘recent’ and ‘historic’ rape have no bearing on women’s lived experience. 
So what is the crisis? The crisis is that which is found in the following tensions: 
between silence and speaking out; between the contrasting constructions of 
‘victim’ and ‘survivor’; and between the patriarchal,  reiterative, constitutive tools 
of abuse of power and those of feminist consciousness-raising.  The crisis is a 
productive site for feminist de-constituting and re-constituting of thinking and 
interventions about sexual violence.  
Chapter 4 demonstrates that ‘The Aporetics of Intersectionality’ are 
contingent upon the indeterminate positions of host and guest, and the 
undecidability of borders.  Analysis of the aporia of intersectionality enables a 
nuanced understanding of the unavailability of the solution of intersectionality.  
The chapter proposes that it is within the emotionally difficult site of the 
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unavailable solution that the possibilities of intersectionality as a solution can be 
thought about.   
In addition, Chapter 5 draws on Spivak’s (1997:ix) ‘…“the question of the 
preface”’ in order to examine the ‘Epilogue’ of Zami (Lorde, 1996) not in an 
attempt to anchor the text, but, rather, in an attempt to occupy the aporia of 
positionality.  The chapter uses this occupation as methodology by which to 
investigate ‘…no stable identity, no stable origin, no stable end’ (Spivak, 
1997:xii).  Chapter 5 is also concerned with Lorde’s occupation of the aporia of 
the speaking position, the insecure signification of a name and tensions within the 
‘…house of difference…’ (Lorde, 1996:197).   
 
Black Feminist Author Function 
This thesis is a literary textual analysis of the work of Lorde. The task itself, and 
the methodology available within literary criticism to undertake this task, present 
a set of tensions.  These tensions potentially undermine the legitimacy of the very 
task this thesis sets out to perform.   
Two key objectives support the theoretical scaffolding of this thesis: 
firstly, this thesis seeks to perform an intervention in its own right of explicating 
the work of Lorde (1934 - 1992), located by some as part of second-wave 
feminism; secondly, this thesis seeks to assert Lorde’s authorial legitimacy to 
intervene in current third-wave feminist, post-modernist and post-colonial 
preoccupations about difference.   
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However, theories of literary criticism found in current third-wave 
feminist, post-modernist and post-colonial thinking potentially disrupt the basis of 
the interventions of this thesis, so that they are actually undone.  Barthes (1967, 
1971) and Foucault (1969), for example, present a set of complex problematics 
where the function, position and existence of the author trouble the function, 
position and existence of the subject and subjectivity.   Burke articulates the 
complexity in the following way:   
If knowledge itself, or what we take to be knowledge, is entirely 
intradiscursive, and if, as it is claimed, the subject has no anchorage 
within discourse, then man as the subject of knowledge is thoroughly 
displaced and dislodged. Cognition and consciousness arise as 
intralinguistic effects or metaphors, by-products, as it were, of a linguistic 
order that has evolved... (Burke, 2008:14; emphasis in original)   
These tensions are bound fast with the aporia of positionality and take on 
particular significance in conjunction with the political imperatives of Black 
feminist scholarship.  The particular significance that I am alluding to is taken up 
by Boyce Davies’ question:  
But how does this all shift once Black women are introduced into the 
discussion?  I believe that questions of Black female subjectivity bring a 
more complex and heightened awareness to all theoretics... (Boyce Davies, 
1994:29) 
Once Black feminist authorship and literature are introduced into the 
discussion, it provokes the following questions:  how does Black feminist 
scholarship anchor a position whilst, simultaneously, being unanchored?  How 
  
 42    
 
does Black feminist scholarship establish legitimacy and authority in the face of 
‘the death of the author’ (Barthes, 1967)?  How does Black feminism contend 
with the absence of author when a key objective of Black feminism is to contest 
the absence of Black feminist authors and texts?  How can ‘the death of the 
author’ and the corresponding death of the subject sit with Jordan’s (1982:133) 
conviction that our lives depend on naming, remembering, recognising and 
acknowledging the lives, activism and theory of Black feminists?   
Lorde is concerned with the absence of the Black female subject and Black 
lesbian feminism, and I am concerned with how Lorde takes up these absences.  
Let me be clear that this thesis does not take absence to mean not present.  This 
point is taken up by Lorde (1979c) in ‘An Open Letter to Mary Daly’ in response 
to Daly’s (1978) book, Gyn/Ecology,7  where Lorde posits the presence of the 
Black female subject and her work as constituting an absence:  
So the question arises in my mind, Mary, do you ever really read the work 
of Black women?  Did you ever read my words, or did you merely finger 
through them for quotations which you thought might valuably support an 
already conceived idea concerning some old and distorted connection 
between us? (Lorde, 1979c:68) 
The principles that Lorde articulates here, when read through Foucault’s 
(1969) ‘What Is an Author?,’ prompt a more nuanced set of questions than I have 
just asked.  Foucault explains that: 
                                                          
7
 Interestingly, the absence of a response from Daly to Lorde’s letter prompted Lorde to write: 
‘The following letter was written to Mary Daly, author of Gyn/Ecology on May 6, 1979.  Four 
months later, having received no reply, I opened it to the community of women’ (Lorde, 
1979c:66). 
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Doing so means overturning the traditional problem, no longer raising the 
questions: How can a free subject penetrate the substance of things and 
give it meaning? How can it activate the rules of a language from within 
and thus give rise to the designs which are properly its own? Instead, these 
questions will be raised: How, under what conditions, and in what forms 
can something like a subject appear in the order of discourse? What place 
can it occupy in each type of discourse, what functions can it assume, and 
by obeying what rules? In short, it is a matter of depriving the subject (or 
its substitute) of its role as originator, and of analyzing the subject as a 
variable and complex function of discourse. (Foucault, 1979:118)  
Re-reading Lorde through the microscope of postmodernist, literary criticism 
orientates the analysis through a set of interconnected themes that include the 
conditions of representation of subjectivity, refracted through the prism of 
semiotics and intertextuality.  The themes of intention, name and technologies of 
the self are an aspect of the production of ‘…the ideological figure by which one 
marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation of meaning’ (Foucault 
1969:119). 
 
Question of the Name  
Although she was given the name, ‘Audrey Geraldine Lorde,’ by her parents, 
Lorde is not known by this name.  Actually, no one can be known by their name 
and this point is the basis for deconstructionist theories of the function of the 
name that are taken up within this thesis. Furthermore, this theoretical approach, 
when applied to the ‘not knowing’ of Black feminist scholarship and the treatment 
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of the names of Black women writers, ‘…points to this “figure” that, at least in 
appearance, is outside it and antecedes it’ (Foucault 1969:101).   
The ‘name’ becomes a methodology for understanding the historical and 
political outsider, and the ‘excess’ position of Black feminists and Black feminist 
theory.  ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ (Lorde, 1979a:60) 
because it is outside of, and precedes, the name, the configuration of the name and 
the position of the name.   
In particular, deconstructionist theories of the name enable close re-
readings of the many names of Lorde. The list of names that Lorde uses include: 
Zami, Rey Domini (Audre Lorde in Latin) (Rich, 1979:50) and ‘Gambda Adisa, 
meaning Warrior: She Who Makes Her Meaning Known’ (Reuman, 1997). In 
addition, certain titles or phrases, such as ‘the sister outsider’ (Byrd, 2009:5) and 
‘Warrior Poet’ (De Veaux, 2004), have become synonymous with the name, work 
and identity of Lorde.  However, any equation of the bearer and the name of the 
bearer is problematic.  Derrida proposes that:  
…you will never be your name, you never have been, even when, and 
especially when you have answered to it.  The name is made to do without 
the life of the bearer, and is therefore always the name of someone dead. 
(Derrida, 1987:39) 
The point Derrida is making here is that all names are outside of, and 
precede, the person/subject/object because any name refers and defers to an 
infinite web of historical, social and cultural contexts and concepts.  A name 
carries death in the sense that any attempt to fix any name to any stable entity is 
impossible. Thus, a name signifies the demise of decidability, with all of the 
implications of mourning associated with bereavement.  Any attempt to equate 
  
 45    
 
Lorde with ‘the sister outsider’ and ‘Warrior Poet,’ les amies and African mythic 
Fon figures (such as Afrekete and MawuLisa) is ‘always already’ dead and lost.   
At the age of four, Lorde:  
‘…did not like the tail of the Y hanging down below the line in Audrey, 
and would always forget to put it on…’ (Lorde, 1996:14).   
Lorde explains that ‘I used to love the evenness of AUDRELORDE…’ (Lorde, 
1996:14).  Here, a close re-reading could interpret Lorde’s description as invoking 
the spatial and temporal ‘outside’ and ‘precedes’ quality of a name that Derrida 
translates as the distinction between the name and the bearer of the name.  A close 
re-reading could understand Lorde as invoking the ‘…drama of naming…’ 
(Derrida, 1992a:187), where the drama includes the drama of the implicated 
‘boundary event’ (Minh-ha, 2011).   
 
Both the event of naming, and the event of the name, involve removing the 
anchor of ‘proper’ from the term, ‘proper name.’8  The implications of this are 
huge and go to the heart of longstanding, contested debates about the proper name 
for distinctive, intersecting domains of feminism, and the name and position of 
‘differences that matter’ (Ahmed, 1998) within feminism.  These debates are 
taken up in Chapter 2, ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ 
(Lorde, 1979a:60) and in Chapter 4, ‘The Aporetics of Intersectionality,’ where 
the problematics of the name ‘Black feminist’ is flagged up.   
The dialectic of ‘Black feminism’ is in using the name to signify 
‘differences that matter’ whilst contesting/resisting totalizing, homogenous, fixed 
                                                          
8
  The event is symbolised in the event/drama of naming ceremonies.  In an interview with 
Dorothee Nolte, Lorde explains that ‘“[i]n African cultures, the ritual bestowing of a name is of 
great significance…A child receives its first name eight days after birth, but it receives new names 
at decisive events its whole life long.”’  (Nolte, 1986:143).  
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domains that foreclose ‘differences that matter.’  Thinking specifically about the 
different domains of feminist scholarship, and of course, this thesis concerns 
Black feminist scholarship, the words of Derrida present a set of interconnected 
challenges with wide ranging ramifications for literary criticism: 
…there is no such thing as a literary essence or a specifically literary 
domain strictly identifiable as such…this name of literature perhaps is 
destined to remain improper, with no criteria, or assured concept or 
reference, so that “literature” has something to do with the drama of 
naming, the law of the name and the name of the law. (Derrida, 
1992a:187) 
Perhaps Lorde recognised the essence of this in her creation of a biomythography, 
transgressing domains of the self (bio), writing (graphy) and myth genres.  Thus, 
Lorde troubles the criteria for the domain of a conventional autobiography, which 
goes on to trouble the domains of prescribed identity and demarcations.  This is 
illustrated in the ‘Epilogue’ of Zami, where the movement within self, myth and 
name is outside, and precedes, given domains. Lorde explains that:  
Ma-Liz, DeLois, Louise Briscoe, Aunt Anni, Linda, and Genevieve; 
MawuLisa, thunder, sky, sun, the great mother of us all; and Afrekete, her 
youngest daughter, the mischievous linguist, trickster, best-beloved, whom 
we must all become. Their names, selves, faces feed me like corn before 
labor.  I live each of them as a piece of me... (Lorde, 1996:223; italics in 
original)  
 Zami: A New Spelling of My Name is an interesting title and statement, since 
‘Zami’ is neither a phonetic nor orthographic reconfiguration of the name, ‘Audre 
Lorde.’   
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Lorde’s use of the name ‘Zami’ draws on the French expression, les amies, 
linking this to intimate connections between women so that the theme of Lorde’s 
experience as a Black lesbian is performatively contained within the name of the 
text. This strategy challenges the notion of a determinate domain of text.  Zami is 
simultaneously the title of the text and the subject of the text, the method for 
explicating messages within the text and signifier of Lorde’s multiple 
subjectivities. Sánchez Calle comments that:  
The title of this book, Zami: A New Spelling of My Name, places it in the 
tradition of the slave narratives, in which slaves changed their names after 
reaching freedom. Likewise, Lorde, by choosing for herself a different 
name from the one her parents gave her, challenges the control of the 
dominant culture, and prevents others from speaking and naming on her 
behalf. (Sánchez Calle, 1996:163; italics in original) 
The politics of naming are picked up in Christian’s (1990) analysis of how 
‘[t]he name is made to do without the life of the bearer…’ (Derrida, 1987:39) in 
relation to Black slave women writers. Christian provides a detailed account of 
the way that slave narratives were constructed to omit both the name and the life 
of the bearer.  Christian cites the example of ‘…Incidents in the Life of a Slave 
Girl (1861) written by Harriet Jacobs under the pseudonym, Linda Brent’ 
(Christian, 1990:222) and draws on Morrison’s introductory remarks to a public 
reading of Beloved, at which:  
Morrison pointed out that their omissions were partly due to the fact that 
these ex-slaves addressed a white audience. Even more important, she 
suggested, they omitted events too horrible and too dangerous for them to 
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recall.  Morrison went on to state that these consistent comments made by 
nineteenth-century ex-slaves about the deliberate omissions in their 
narratives intrigued her and that this was the initial impulse for her writing 
the novel that would become Beloved…in the last words of Beloved: “This 
was not a story to pass on.” (Christian, 1990:222; italics in original)   
These points are performatively embodied in Morrison’s dedication of Beloved to 
the nameless ‘…“60 million or more”’ (Christian, 1990:225).   
duCille follows a similar analytic trajectory in her examination of the 
position of Black feminist writing:  
One hundred thirty years ago, former slave Harriet Jacobs was able to 
publish her life’s story only with the authenticating stamp of the well-
known white abolitionist Lydia Maria Child as editor and copyright 
holder. “I have signed and sealed the contract with Thayer & Eldridge, in 
my name, and told them to take out the copyright in my name,” Child 
wrote in a letter to Jacobs in 1860. “Under the circumstances your name 
could not be used, you know.” (duCille, 1994:238; emphasis in original)  
In a similar vein, Simmonds provides a contemporary context and incidence of 
appropriation of the name:  
In public, at conferences for example, I insist that my full name appears on 
my name tag.  In a society that cannot accommodate names that come 
from “other” cultures, this can be a frustrating exercise.  It is no wonder 
that many Black children will Anglicize their names to avoid playground 
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taunts . . . and much worse.  We are still fighting colonialism. (Simmonds, 
1996:113; ellipsis in original)    
The racist act of appropriating a name, documented here by duCille and 
Simmonds, is troubled by Derrida’s distinction between the name and bearer of 
the name. Derrida explains that a name is ‘[a] property that one cannot 
appropriate; it signs you without belonging to you…’ (Derrida, n.d.:119). The 
anxiety of the lacuna within the ambivalence of ‘signs you without belonging to 
you,’ that is disavowed by the coloniser, is a potential space for subversion.   
There is something freeing in the idea of the dead, unanchored name. 
Whilst I appreciate the historical and political Black literary and Black vernacular 
traditions of the importance and use of names, Derrida’s work offers the dialectic 
of the name as a site for antiracist, anti-homophobic, feminist sedition.   For 
example, contesting the property, signature, singularity of name and 
deconstructing the ‘proper’ of ‘proper name’ function to contest and deconstruct 
oppressive constructions of authenticity.  Derrida explains the aporia of the 
‘proper name’ as: 
The proper name, in its aleatoriness, should have no meaning and should 
spend itself in immediate reference.  But the chance or the misery of its 
arbitrary character (always other in each case) is that its inscription in 
language always affects it with a potential for meaning, and for no longer 
being proper once it has a meaning. (Derrida, 1984:118) 
Throughout this thesis, the aporia as a condition of thinking enables the possible 
within the impossible.   
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The significance of this in relation to the activism of Black feminist theory 
can be illustrated in the application of aporia as a condition to the components of 
the term, ‘Black feminist theory.’ The aporia is an ‘active’ condition. The aporia 
messes up the condition of theory.  The aporia messes up the condition of 
meanings inscribed in ‘Black’ and ‘feminist.’  I contend that the anarchy of 
aporia, the chaos, rebellion, lawlessness and mayhem of aporia provide conditions 
for feminist resistance and transformation.   
 
Summary of Chapters   
In Chapter 2, Lorde’s (1979a:60) statement that ‘Black feminism is not white 
feminism in blackface’ goes to the heart of fundamental questions concerning the 
basis, membership, definition and aim of feminism.  Here, I argue that ‘Black 
feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ is contingent upon the fact that 
‘…racist social structures create racist psychic structures…’ (Oliver, 2001:34).  
The chapter uses methods of literary criticism, including the theoretical lens of 
intertextuality as intersubjectivity, for a close re-reading of the statement that 
‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface.’   
Chapter 2 re-reads Lorde through a re-reading of Fanon’s (2008:4) concept 
of ‘epidermalization’  to go beyond the racist regime of visibility, suggesting that 
the mimicry of ‘blackface’ includes mechanisms of the ‘psychic life of power’ 
(Butler, 1997c).  Bhabha’s analysis of the inevitable ambivalence of mimicry in 
the act of colonisation is used to explore ramifications of the ‘…almost the same, 
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but not quite…’ (Bhabha, 1994:86; emphasis in original) for ‘Black feminism is 
not white feminism in blackface.’   
The chapter includes an experimental, imaginary conversation between 
Lorde and a diverse range of interdisciplinary, critical thinkers as a pedagogical 
intervention that transgresses spatial and temporal borders.  The focus of this 
intervention is both an exploration and application of ‘Black feminism is not 
white feminism in blackface’ in relation to the activism of Black feminist theory, 
with specific reference to the necessity of Black women-only reflective spaces 
and service provision.   
In Chapter 3, strategies of a close re-reading explore the tensions and 
constraints of reclamation as a mode of political resistance in ‘Uses of the Erotic: 
The Erotic as Power’ (Lorde, 1978a).  Whilst the ‘boundary event’ (Minh-ha, 
2011) of the title, ‘Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power,’ is structured within 
unspecified demarcations of ‘uses of,’ this chapter explores the extent to which 
even unspecified demarcations constitute forms of demarcation in themselves.  
Thus, the potential and limitations of discourses of reclamation and interventions 
of resignification are examined alongside the aporia of positionality.   
The tension explored in this chapter is that in adopting an authorial 
speaking position to undo prescribed racist, homophobic, patriarchal positions of 
the erotic, Lorde edges dangerously close to proposing ‘uses of the erotic’ that are 
equally prescribed, albeit from a Black feminist perspective.   
Chapter 3 goes on to make an application of the analysis to some feminist 
interventions to confront sexual violence against Black women.  The chapter 
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analyses an encounter of gender violation between Hill Collins and Sarah 
Bartmann (Hill Collins, 2000:141-143) through the theoretical lens of ‘Uses of the 
Erotic: The Erotic as Power’ to scrutinise the production and function of 
distortion, and the objectification of Black women. This chapter highlights the 
implications of ‘uses of the erotic’ as a methodology and foundation for the 
activism of Black feminist theory. 
In Chapter 4, ‘The Aporetics of Intersectionality,’ I re-read Crenshaw’s 
(1989) theory of intersectionality as a theory of the aporia of borders. This chapter 
traces the solution of unavailability in intersectionality not in order to discredit 
intersectionality as a solution, but, rather, to disrupt intersectionality as a unified 
solution.  The point is that if we are not careful, the seduction of intersectionality 
as a solution to confront unified, homogeneous constructions becomes a unified 
solution in itself (Spivak, 1985:55).  I argue that analytic borders created between 
analyses of the structural and analyses of the subject/subjective/subjectivity, using 
intersectionality, run counter to the spirit of intersectionality.   
Chapter 4 places the theoretical frameworks of Crenshaw, Derrida and 
Lorde alongside each other because they have a shared concern with 
intersectionality, and each offer theoretical approaches to the challenges of 
intersectionality. Thus, in terms of methodology, this chapter is an intersection of 
approaches to intersectionality. Lorde states that ‘...survival isn’t theoretical, we 
live it everyday [sic]’ (Greene, 1989:183). In order to better understand the lived 
experience of surviving the intersection of ‘…all the parts of who I am…’ (Lorde, 
1980a:120) as a Black lesbian feminist, this chapter is a reflective, theoretical 
investigation into the psychological turmoil of the experience of the aporia of 
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intersectionality.  Any attempt at a ‘psychic retreat’ (Steiner, 1993:1) from the 
‘psychological toll’ (The Combahee River Collective, 1977:266) of aporia is 
merely to disavow the aporia.  
This reflective inquiry has two primary objectives: firstly, to dismantle the 
conceptual structure of intersectionality to show that it is bound up with the aporia 
of hospitality and borders in an effort to contain the anxiety generated by the 
foreign stranger within me (Kristeva, 1991); and secondly, to examine how and 
why the intersection of selves that constitutes a self is so emotionally difficult.   
In Chapter 5, the ‘Epilogue’ of Lorde’s (1996) biomythography, Zami: A 
New Spelling of My Name, is used as a methodology to interrogate the aporia of 
positionality.  Thus, the relationship between method and analysis within the 
structure of this possible re-reading of Zami mirrors the intersubjective, 
intertextual encounters that constitute the play of identity and difference in Zami. 
Using the space and place of the ‘Epilogue’ in Zami, this analysis examines the 
transgressive potential in the tension of simultaneously doing, and undoing, a 
position.              
Chapter 5 examines the extent to which the creation of a biomythography 
provides a space for the resignification and function of identity categories.  
Picking up Beard’s (2009) concept of ‘acts of narrative resistance,’ I am interested 
in the ways that Zami confronts and argues with ‘the symbolic systems’ and 
‘agency of codes’ (De Lauretis, 1984:3-4) that produce subjectivity, 
representation and self-representation.  
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Zami provides a rich, detailed genealogy of the struggles of being a Black 
lesbian in America in the 1950s. As such, I contend that Zami is an example of 
how Lorde anticipated, and is relevant to, current debates  about the relationship 
between sexuality, race, diaspora (Wesling, 2008:30) and the transgressive 
potential of perversion (MacCormack, 2004:27-40).  This chapter argues that 
contesting notions of author intention, the idea of a correct re-reading and ideas of 
the origin of the text provoke a re-thinking of the act of deciphering intention, 
origin and a correct (re-)reading of the activism of Black feminist theory.  
In Chapter 6, I conclude with an examination of the position and function 
of theory within the current context of attacks on theory.  I propose a re-reading of 
Anzaldúa’s (2007) ‘La Conciencia de la Mestiza: Towards a New Consciousness’ 
through Bion’s (1959) psychoanalytic, theoretical lens of ‘Attacks on Linking.’  
This chapter interrogates the dialectic of occupying theoretical frameworks as a 
site of subversion, whilst being mindful of Lorde’s caution that ‘…the master’s 
tools will never dismantle the master’s house’ (Lorde, 1979b:112; emphasis in 
original).  In order to reiterate the relevance of the activism of Lorde’s work in 
particular, and the activism of Black feminist theory in general, this chapter 
provides a number of problematics that are alive in my engagement with Black 
feminist, grassroots activism.  Ending on Jordan’s (1978) question of, ‘Where Is 
the Love?,’ the conclusion points to the challenges that this thesis opens up in 
relation to a rigorous and ‘erotic’ (Lorde, 1978a) commitment to  the activism of 
Black feminist theory. 
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Chapter 2 
‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ 
 
Introduction 
‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ is the opening sentence of 
Lorde’s essay, ‘Sexism: An American Disease in Blackface’ (Lorde, 1979a:60), 
first published in 1979 in the Black Scholar in response to The Myth of Black 
Macho: A Response to Angry Black Feminists by Staples (1979). Lorde critiques 
Staples’s work, outlining the ways in which the intersection of sexism with racism 
operates dynamics that separate Black women from Black men, and white women 
from Black women. This chapter deconstructs the complexity, implications and 
challenges embodied in the phrase, ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in 
blackface.’  This re-reading of Lorde shows that ‘Black feminism is not white 
feminism in blackface’ incorporates key themes, debates and issues central to 
feminism in general, and to the ‘…particular and legitimate issues which affect 
our lives as Black women…’ (Lorde, 1979a:60).  
The relevance of re-reading ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in 
blackface’ in relation to current and historical feminist debates is demonstrated in 
the following range of inquiries from both Black and white feminists. hooks asks 
the following questions:  
Since men are not equals in white supremacist, capitalist, patriarchal class 
structure, which men do women want to be equal to? Do women share a 
common vision of what equality means? (hooks, 1984:18) 
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hooks continues:  
As a black woman interested in feminist movement, I am often asked 
whether being black is more important than being a woman; whether 
feminist struggle to end sexist oppression is more important than the 
struggle to end racism and vice-versa. (hooks, 1984:29) 
Indeed, Sojourner Truth at the 1851 Akron Women’s Convention in Ohio was 
compelled to ask, ‘Ain’t I A Woman?’ Hill Collins asks: 
What criteria, if any, can be applied to ideas to determine whether they are 
in fact Black and feminist? What essential features does Black feminist 
thought share with other critical social theories, particularly Western 
feminist theory, Afrocentric theory, Marxist analyses, and postmodernism? 
(Hill Collins, 2000:18)   
Suleri raises the question as to ‘…whether the signification of gendered race 
necessarily returns to the realism that it most seeks to disavow’ (Suleri, 
1992:253). Spivak makes the following contribution to the debate: ‘The question 
is how to keep the ethnocentric Subject from establishing itself by selectively 
defining an Other’ (Spivak, 1988:292). In terms of recent debates, Nash asks, 
‘who is intersectional?’ (Nash, 2008:9; emphasis in original) in terms of widening 
the debate beyond race and gender to incorporate ‘…an examination of identities 
that are imagined as either wholly or even partially privileged…’ (Nash, 2008:10). 
Butler asks, ‘If power works not merely to dominate or oppress existing subjects, 
but also to form subjects, what is this formation?’ (Butler, 1997c:18). In terms of 
the concept of performativity, Butler comments: 
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I would therefore suggest that the question to ask is not whether the theory 
of performativity is transposable onto race, but what happens to the theory 
when it tries to come to grips with race. (Butler, 1999:xvi)  
More generally, Bhabha asks, ‘How can the human world live its difference? how 
[sic] can a human being live Other-wise?’ (Bhabha, 1986:xxxvi). 
The primary objectives of this chapter are, firstly, to address the issues 
raised in the questions above and to follow a line of inquiry that interrogates the 
following: what are the implications of ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in 
blackface’ in relation to the subject formation of Black women? What are the 
implications of this statement in terms of how power operates to regulate and 
constitute different subjectivities? Is the Black subject’s psyche interpellated by 
power in a different way to the white subject’s psyche, and if so, how?  (Butler, 
1997c:5) Secondly, this chapter aims to trace the detail, performance and 
deployment of Lorde’s argument with specific reference to the collection of 
political essays and speeches in Sister Outsider (Lorde, 1984).  
 
Epistemology Is Flattened 
Alarcón troubles the idea that feminist thinking can rely on the reductionist 
premise of a shared experience of being a woman, stating that:  
With gender as the central concept in feminist thinking, epistemology is 
flattened out in such a way that we lose sight of the complex and multiple 
ways in which the subject and object of possible experience are 
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constituted…There’s no inquiry into the knowing subject beyond the fact 
of being a “woman.” (Alarcón, 1990:361) 
Lorde’s statement that ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ both 
picks up and contests flattened out epistemology. The focus on race in Lorde’s 
statement is an example of a factor that comprises the ‘…complex and multiple 
ways in which the subject and object of possible experience are constituted’ 
(Alarcón, 1990:361). Alarcón’s stress on multiple factors indicates that 
epistemology would do well to be constituted of the interaction between, rather 
than a separation of, a number of intersecting factors.  It will become evident that 
the relationship between the subject and object of experience is fundamental to the 
reasons why ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface.’ Lorde’s 
intervention is a deliberate shift from emphasis on female subjectivity to a 
‘…move beyond the existing frameworks by exposing the hidden, masculine, 
Eurocentric biases that structure binary thinking’ (Keating, 1996:7).  
Lorde’s uses of the words ‘Black’ and ‘blackface’ invoke the visible 
regime of skin colour whilst refusing to fall foul of hierarchies of difference 
(Lorde, 1983b). Although refutation of hierarchal structures is fundamental to 
feminism, as reflected in collective-working and the quest to formulate feminist 
governance practices, the complexity of asserting the specificity of difference 
without succumbing to dominant hierarchical constructions is often absent  
(Ashcraft, 2001; Gray and Boddy, 2010; Hyde, 2000; Maier, 2008; McMillan, 
2007). For example, Braidotti asserts that:  
…redefinition of the female feminist subject is the notion of the 
asymmetry between the sexes, which results in the political and 
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epistemological project of asserting difference in a non-hierarchical 
manner... (Braidotti, 1991:281) 
Stating the task and the requirements of the task for feminism, as Braidotti does 
here, is necessary, but it is clear from the persistence of hierarchies and the 
struggles with the issues of difference within feminism that we are a long way 
from developing ‘…political and epistemological project of asserting difference in 
a non-hierarchical manner...’  Analysis of ‘…the subject and object of possible 
experience…’ (Alarcón, 1990:361) cannot simply rest on the ‘asymmetry’ 
between men and women. The statement that ‘Black feminism is not white 
feminism in blackface’ complicates the matter further, implying an ‘asymmetry’ 
between women that has to be accounted for.  In relation to Sojourner Truth, Hill 
Collins writes:  
Her question, “and ain’t I a woman?” points to the contradictions inherent 
in blanket use of the term woman…Rather than accepting the existing 
assumptions about what a woman is and then trying to prove that she fit 
the standards, Truth challenged the very standards themselves.  Her 
actions demonstrate the process of deconstruction - namely, exposing a 
concept as ideological or culturally constructed rather than as natural or a 
simple reflection of reality. (Hill Collins, 2000:15; emphasis in original) 
This chapter demonstrates that the claim that ‘Black feminism is not white 
feminism in blackface’ challenges the ‘standards’ of what a woman is. 
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Constitutive Contexts 
Detailed examination of what Lorde implies so concisely in her statement ‘Black 
feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ opens up rich layers of complexity 
that are at the core of critical theory, feminist thinking, semiotics and literary 
criticism .  Lorde questions not only the definition, but also the related 
methodology and epistemology mobilised in the construction of difference and 
multiple identities within the context of feminisms. In her paper, ‘Age, Race, 
Class and Sex: Women Redefining Difference,’ Lorde states that:  
Thus, in a patriarchal power system where whiteskin privilege is a major 
prop, the entrapments used to neutralize Black women and white women 
are not the same. (Lorde, 1980a:118)   
Here, she is clear that the asymmetry between women is predicated upon the 
different ways that patriarchal power operates in regards to Black and white 
women.  Pellegrini argues that:  
…what starkly distinguishes “white” and “black” experiences of bodily 
self-consciousness, however, is their differential situation within the 
historico-psychical network of “race”…the push-pull between “what is 
real and what is psychical” is all the more jarring for subjects who must 
embody and signify the borderlands of dominant frames of reference. 
(Pellegrini, 1997:103) 
Thus, Pellegrini points to the significance of context in the constitution of 
subjectivity and this chapter picks up on the role of context in subject formation.  
Indeed, it will be apparent from this re-reading of ‘Black feminism is not white 
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feminism in blackface’ that the context of the words within the statement itself 
reflects, and is performative of, the lived contexts in which feminisms are located.  
The point is that contexts are constitutive.  Pellegrini implies that the context of a 
racist, homophobic patriarchy is experienced by different women in different 
ways because of the signifiers ‘Black’ and ‘white.’ 
This chapter demonstrates that the ‘entrapments’ in ‘Black feminism is not 
white feminism in blackface’ infers much more than a binary Black and/or white 
division.  What is suggested by the statement is much more than a response to 
lack of inclusion of Black feminists on the part of white feminists.  Lorde is 
saying more than the fact that Black women are Other and Othered.  Lorde is 
invoking the interdependency of difference, with the inherent political and 
epistemological problems, paradoxes and ambivalence of dependency and 
reliance on the Other, especially where there is a power differential.  Butler 
interrogates the implications of interdependency in her statement that:  
…when we think about who we “are” and seek to represent ourselves, we 
cannot represent ourselves as merely bounded beings, for the primary 
others who are past for me not only live on in the fibre of the boundary 
that contains me (one meaning of “incorporation”), but they also haunt the 
way I am, as it were, periodically undone and open to becoming 
unbounded. (Butler, 2004:28; parentheses in original) 
Butler’s use of the words ‘bounded,’ ‘boundary’ and ‘unbounded,’ and 
Pellegrini’s (1997:103) reference to ‘borderlands of dominant frames of 
reference,’ provide clues to suggest that the issue of borders and boundaries are 
fundamental to understanding the reasons why ‘Black feminism is not white 
feminism in blackface.’  Currie (2004:3) comments that ‘…the identity of things, 
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people, places, groups, nations and cultures is constituted by the logics of both 
sameness and difference.’ The point here, in the context of ‘Black feminism is not 
white feminism in blackface,’ is that the boundary of each word, each category 
and the meaning of each term is contested. 
 
Black Feminism without White Feminism? 
‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ provokes questions such as: 
would there be Black feminism without white feminism? Would there be white 
feminism without Black feminism? In the context of racist assumed white 
supremacy, would it make sense to reconfigure the statement to say, ‘white 
feminism is not Black feminism in whiteface’? Can there be feminism without the 
prefix of Black and white? How do the signifiers ‘Black’ and ‘white’ function? In 
the short story, Recitatif, Morrison experimented with:  
…the removal of all racial codes from a narrative about two characters of 
different races for whom racial identity is crucial. (Morrison, 1992:xi) 
Seshadri-Crooks analyses Recitatif to ask:  
When the signifier “black” or “white” points to a specific body, what have 
we discovered about it? Is there some knowledge, something that we 
know, due to the function of the signifier? (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000a:148) 
The problem is how to maintain the ‘crucial’ in relation to racial identity, which 
differentiates Black feminism from white feminism, whilst wrestling with the 
inherent paradoxes, ambivalence and lack of interdependency.  A particular 
difficulty lies in the process of identification.  If the basis for identification is in 
relation to the ‘Other,’ and if for Black feminisms the Other is white feminisms, 
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and vice-versa, then both the relationality and the interdependency are paradoxical 
on a cognitive level, but intensely uncomfortable on an emotional level.  Bhabha 
explains that:  
…to be different from those that are different makes you the same – that 
the Unconscious speaks of the form of Otherness, the tethered shadow of 
deferral and displacement.  It is not the Colonialist Self or the Colonized 
Other, but the disturbing distance in-between that constitutes the figure of 
colonial otherness... (Bhabha, 1986, in Fanon, 2008: xxviii).   
 
Tolerance: The Grossest Reformism 
hooks’ comment that ‘…it is unlikely that women would join feminist movement 
simply because we are biologically the same’ (hooks, 1984:24) opens up the 
issues of ownership and identification in relation to feminism, and questions the 
‘…foundation on which to construct theory or engage in overall meaningful 
praxis’ (hooks, 1984:17) that feminism is based on.  Moreover, both Lorde and 
hooks are pushing for a ‘meaningful praxis’ which moves beyond ‘…the grossest 
reformism’ of ‘[a]dvocating the mere tolerance of difference between women…’ 
(Lorde, 1979b:111). Lorde is suspicious of the idea that ‘[t]he pronouncement “I 
am a tolerant man” conjures seemliness, propriety, forbearance, magnanimity, 
cosmopolitanism, universality, and the large view…’ (Brown, 2008:178).  It 
would appear that her suspicion is well-founded. The Latin root of tolerance is 
‘tolero,’ derived from the Greek verb ‘talao,’ meaning ‘to bear’ and ‘to endure,’ 
invoking a moral and power differential that positions that which endures and that 
which has to be endured. Brown (2008) picks up three particular angles presented 
in the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition:  
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(1) “the action or practice of enduring pain or hardship”; (2) “the action of 
allowing; license, permission granted by an authority”; and (3) “the 
disposition to be patient with or indulgent to the opinions or practices of 
others…” (Brown, 2008:25; emphasis in original).   
It would seem, then, that liberal discourses of ‘tolerance’ rest on constructions that 
solidify, rather than dismantle, power differentials. Brown’s detailed examination 
of the function of tolerance argues that the ‘…Manichean rhetorical scheme…’ 
(Brown, 2008:190) within the discourse and practice of tolerance to make the 
unknown known, relies on a codification of differences into hierarchicalized 
binaries of ‘…“fundamentalist/intolerant/unfree”…’ on the one side, and 
‘“…pluralist/tolerant/free” on the other…’ (Brown, 2008:190).   
 
Application of this analysis of tolerance to ‘Black feminism is not white 
feminism in blackface’ signals a warning that any relationship between 
differences within feminism cannot rest on differences being tolerated.  Any 
‘…hierarchicalized opposites’ (Brown, 2008:189) of ‘Black feminism is not white 
feminism’ is disrupted by ‘in blackface.’  This disruption indicates that the task is 
so much more complicated than the binary of an either/or position of it ‘is’ and ‘is 
not.’  Brown’s critical analysis of tolerance explains the complexity of how: 
Political and civic tolerance, then, emerges when a group difference that 
poses a challenge to the definitions or binding features of the whole must 
be incorporated but also must be sustained as a difference: regulated, 
managed, controlled.’ (Brown, 2008:71) 
‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ asserts Black feminism’s 
refusal to be incorporated into white feminism, whilst asserting the specificity of 
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difference in its own terms rather than any prescribed sustaining of difference.  
What is clear both from the fact of having to articulate that ‘Black feminism is not 
white feminism in blackface’ and from this exploration into the function of 
tolerance is that the ‘…group difference…’ (Brown, 2008:71) of Black feminism 
poses a challenge. 
 
The Yardstick of Fictive Universality 
Butler asks a number of related questions:  
Is there some commonality among “women” that pre-exists their 
oppression, or do “women” have a bond by virtue of their oppression 
alone? (Butler, 2008:5) 
Is the construction of the category of women as a coherent and stable 
subject an unwitting regulation and reification of gender relations? And is 
not such a reification precisely contrary to feminist aims? (Butler, 2008:7)  
Butler’s use of the words ‘commonality,’ ‘bond,’ ‘coherent,’ ‘stable’ and 
‘unwitting regulation and reification’ question ‘…the shortcut to a categorical or 
fictive universality of the structure of domination, held to produce women’s 
common subjugated experience’ (Butler, 2008:5).  Lorde approaches the appeal of 
a ‘fictive universality’ in terms of: 
…our refusal to recognize those differences, and to examine the 
distortions which result from our misnaming them and their effects upon 
human behavior and expectation. […] Too often, we pour the energy 
needed for recognizing and exploring difference into pretending those 
differences are insurmountable barriers, or that they do not exist at all.  
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This results in a voluntary isolation, or false and treacherous connections. 
(Lorde, 1980a:115)   
Both Butler and Lorde caution that the ‘fictive,’ ‘pretending,’ ‘false’ and 
‘misnaming’ strategies of denial, exclusion and foreclosure are the requirements 
for a claim of universalism. The caution needs to be accompanied with the added 
caution of the dangers of using terms like ‘pretending,’ ‘misnaming,’ ‘false’ and 
‘fictive’ to propose, and thereby, fall into the trap of binary positions, the 
existence of a ‘true,’ a ‘real’ and an ‘authentic.’  In her 1999 preface to Gender 
Trouble, Butler revises her understanding of: 
…the claim of “universality” in exclusive negative and exclusionary terms 
[…] to understand how the assertion of universality can be proleptic and 
performative, conjuring a reality that does not yet exist, and holding out 
the possibility for a convergence of cultural horizons that have not yet met. 
(Butler, 1999:xviii)   
Lorde’s basis for hope is expressed: 
...within that interdependency of different strengths, acknowledged and 
equal, can the power to seek new ways of being in the world generate, as 
well as the courage and sustenance to act where there are no charters. 
(Lorde, 1979b:111) 
This statement presents quite a challenge; change is contingent upon epistemology 
which, according to Butler, ‘…does not yet exist…’ (Butler, 1999:xviii).  The 
challenge of the interdependency of difference is the task of grappling with the 
different entrapments used in the ‘psychic life of power’ (Butler, 1997c) to 
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neutralise Black and white women without charters.  Mohanty’s (1984) paper, 
‘Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses,’ addresses 
the strategies, mechanisms and structures in which: 
…the application of the notion of women as a homogeneous category to 
women in the Third World colonizes and appropriates the pluralities of the 
simultaneous location of different groups of women in social class and 
ethnic frameworks; in doing so it ultimately robs them of their historical 
and political agency. (Mohanty, 1984:39)   
Mohanty goes on to add: 
In other words, Western feminist discourse, by assuming women as a 
coherent, already constituted group that is placed in kinship, legal, and 
other structures, defines Third World women as subjects outside social 
relations, instead of looking at the way women are constituted through 
these very structures. (Mohanty, 1984:40)   
Mohanty is saying that the assumption that Black women are a stable, ‘coherent’ 
group is a construction produced out of a particular set of conditions and power 
relations that must be taken account of.  Spivak (1988) adds further layers of 
complexity: 
Between patriarchy and imperialism, subject-constitution and object-
formation, the figure of the woman disappears, not into a pristine 
nothingness, but into a violent shuttling which is the displaced figuration 
of the “third-world woman” caught between tradition and modernization. 
(Spivak, 1988:306)  
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Both Mohanty and Spivak are keen to impress the significance of the 
production of construction of ‘third-world woman’ and what the construction goes 
on to produce.  Both Mohanty and Spivak are highlighting the specificity of the 
entrapments used to neutralize Black women and indicate that ideology produces 
Black women as an ‘already constituted group’ (Mohanty, 1984:40).  The 
‘already’ functions as an entrapment that forecloses and constrains critical 
analysis. This chapter contends that ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in 
blackface’ because of the specificity of the entrapments and goes on to scrutinise 
the ‘sly civility’ (Bhabha, 1994:93) of these entrapments.  Mohanty reflects that: 
…I am trying to uncover how ethnocentric universalism is produced in 
certain analyses.  As a matter of fact, my argument holds for any discourse 
that sets up its own authorial subjects as the implicit referent, that is, the 
yardstick by which to encode and represent cultural others.  It is in this 
move that power is exercised in discourse. (Mohanty, 1984:21) 
This chapter deconstructs the ‘authorial subjects,’ ‘implicit referent’ and 
‘yardstick’ that ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ is contingent 
upon. The tension is in the stating of a position in order to undo a position. The 
challenge for Black feminism lies in its resistance to being seduced into 
replicating the ‘authorial subjects,’ ‘implicit referent’ and ‘yardstick’ (Mohanty, 
1984:21) embodied in the ‘claim to authenticity’ (Suleri, 1992:251).   
‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ goes to the heart of 
fundamental questions concerning the basis, membership, definition and aim of 
feminism.  The statement provokes questions of: who and what is foreclosed? 
Who is constituted, in what ways and why?  Butler asks:  
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What kinds of agency are foreclosed through the positing of an 
epistemological subject precisely because the rules and practices that 
govern the invocation of that subject and regulate its agency in advance 
are ruled out as sites of analysis and critical intervention? (Butler, 
2006:197)   
This close re-reading of ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in 
blackface’ picks up elements of Butler’s question in relation to the foreclosure and 
regulation, not only of agency, but also of analysis and critical intervention of the 
rules and practices that position Black feminism in relation to white feminism.  
Butler exposes the temporal trick of the ‘in advance’ that functions to rule out 
subversive ideas. In other words, and to pick up on the point made earlier, the 
impetus to examine an ‘already constituted group’ (Mohanty, 1984:40) may be 
less than the impetus to examine that which is new and unfamiliar.  Chapter 3, 
‘An Analysis and Application of “Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power”’ 
provides further exploration of the function of the ‘always already’ and the 
‘prior.’ 
In transgressing the ‘already’ and in destabilizing the ‘in advance,’ 
Lorde’s statement that ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ 
embodies and performs its own deconstruction.  Butler explains this dynamic in 
the following way:  
The deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather, 
it establishes as political the very terms through which identity is 
articulated. (Butler, 2006:203) 
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Therefore, ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ ‘…establishes as 
political the very terms through which…’ Black feminism is articulated and 
identified.           
In thinking about the ‘…sites of analysis and critical intervention’ that 
‘…are ruled out…’ (Butler, 2006:197), for Bacchi, the primary issue is not one of 
sameness or difference, but: 
…the question becomes: why has this “difference” been constructed as 
disadvantage?  If women are in fact the “same”, the problem of their 
relative disadvantage and lack of power remains unresolved.  There is a 
need therefore to shift the focus of analysis from the “difference” to the 
structures which convert this “difference” into disadvantage. (Bacchi, 
1990:xviii, cited in Currie, 2004:88). 
Juxtaposing Butler’s and Bacchi’s line of inquiry, it could be argued that the 
positing of epistemology of women as the ‘same’ forecloses the play of unequal 
power differentials.  This happens because the ‘structures,’ ‘rules and practices’ 
that ‘govern,’ ‘convert’ and ‘regulate’ ‘difference into disadvantage’ are ruled out.  
Critical intervention would include a shift in the charter and convergence of 
cultural horizons, asking different questions and re-working the primary issue of 
sameness and difference.  
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The ‘not’ 
‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ is not simply referring to 
sameness and difference; to use the words of Bacchi, Lorde ‘…shift[s] the 
focus…’ (Bacchi, 1990:xviii, cited in Currie, 2004:88).  Lorde not only troubles 
the notion of a shared feminism, but she introduces the ‘not.’  In ‘Black feminism 
is not,’ the distinction between Black feminism and white feminism is made 
available by the ‘not.’ This should not be confused with fixed, oppositional, 
essentialist categories of Black and white. Brah explains that:  
…they are fields of contestation inscribed within discursive and material 
processes and practices in a post-colonial terrain. They represent struggles 
over political frameworks for analysis; the meanings of theoretical 
concepts; the relationship between theory, practice and subjective 
experiences, and over political priorities and modes of mobilisation. But 
they should not, in my view, be understood as constructing “white” and 
“black” women as “essentially” fixed oppositional categories. (Brah, 
1996:110) 
In the statement under analysis in this chapter, the order of the words 
‘Black feminism’ ‘is not’ ‘white feminism’ ‘in’ ‘blackface’ opens up a site of 
critical analysis and intervention to interrogate the performative racist 
configuration in which white is primary, first, an instigator with agency to 
colonise.  Butler’s definition of performativity brings together the embodiment of 
agency, rules, practices and epistemology.  Butler explains that: 
…performativity is not a singular act, but a repetition and a ritual, which 
achieves its effects through its naturalization in the context of a body, 
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understood, in part, as a culturally sustained temporal duration. (Butler, 
1999:xv)   
Here, Butler’s explanation of performativity provides a set of tools for critical 
analysis. The critical lens of performativity brings into focus both the temporal 
and the spatial dimensions of naturalization, and significantly, Butler points to the 
body as representative and the site of the effects of performativity.   In other 
words, the corporeal surface of ‘blackface’ is inscribed with, and ritually re-
inscribed through, a series of acts that seek to produce a fixed identity.  In using 
‘blackface,’ Lorde deliberately troubles the signification of ‘Black feminism.’   
It is in the ‘repetition’ that a space for re-signification opens up because 
each act of repetition refers and defers to the next.  It is in the temporal and spatial 
instability of reiteration that the political imperatives of the activism of Black 
feminism can be asserted.  Each time the names ‘Black feminism’ and ‘white 
feminism’ are communicated - whether by the speech act (Austin, 1975; Searle, 
1969, 1975)  or within text - its meaning, identification and understanding shifts. 
Probyn (2003:294) puts it succinctly: ‘…the space and place we inhabit produce 
us.’ In other words, the production of Black and white feminism is relative to 
space and place, and since we all inhabit different physical, geographical, social, 
economic, emotional and ideological spaces and places, it follows that different 
feminisms will be produced. 
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The Politics of Location 
Reframed as a series of questions relevant to this particular chapter, the 
significance of Probyn’s words could be translated as: how do Black and white 
women inhabit different space and places? Is Black and white subjectivity 
produced differently, and if so, how and why? Is ‘Black feminism not white 
feminism in blackface’ because the space and place that produces Black 
subjectivity is not the space and place that produces white subjectivity? How is 
the Black subject situated? The semantic space and place of the words in ‘Black 
feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ embodies, constitutes and performs 
what Probyn calls ‘…relations of proximity’ that ‘highlights the facts of 
connection or dis/connection’ (Probyn, 2003:294).   
Radhakrishnan’s elaboration of the concept of ‘diasporic location’ has 
relevance here:  
Locations are as factual as they are imaginary and imagined, as physical as 
they are psychic, and as open to direct experience as they are to empathic 
participation…locations are never simple but rather multilayered realities 
overdetermined by diverse cultural and political flows. (Radhakrishnan, 
2000:56)   
Radhakrishnan continues with the explanation incorporating Butler’s concept of 
performativity, and Probyn’s relation of inhabitancy and production:  
The politics of location is productive…because it makes one location 
vulnerable to the claims of another and enables multiple contested 
readings of the one reality from a variety of locations and 
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positions…unless the many mediations that interpellate location are 
studied in all their interconnectedness, locational analyses will be no more 
than exercises in defensive self-absorption. (Radhakrishnan, 2000:56-57).   
Thus, the location of (B)black and white in ‘Black feminism is not white 
feminism in blackface’ is as important as the words themselves. Indeed, location 
mediates and produces meaning, and becomes a site of either appropriation or 
resistance.   
Both the spaces between the words in ‘Black feminism is not white 
feminism in blackface’ and the relation of one word to the other are performative 
of the relationality of intersubjectivity.  The configuration of the words is 
representative of the configuration of the Black subject in relation to the white 
subject, and Black feminism in relation to white feminism.  Thus, the ‘shift in 
focus’ that Bacchi called for earlier in this chapter could be a shift from the words 
themselves to the interdependency of words.  The ‘not’ is only the ‘not’ in relation 
to what it actually is, or the opposite of ‘not.’  The claim of what Black feminism 
‘is not’ is contingent upon a notion of what Black feminism ‘is.’ The danger here 
is of predicating the ‘not’ on a claim of authenticity.  However, a close re-reading 
of the use of the ‘not’ in ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ 
appears to invoke an authenticity of Black feminism.  This could be an example of 
an intervention of the ‘…strategic use of positivist essentialism…’ (Spivak, 
2006:281; emphasis in original) in order to guard against misrecognition of ‘white 
feminism in blackface.’  The challenge for Black feminism lies in the problematic 
of establishing coherence, and a sense of what Black feminism stands for when all 
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representations are unstable and relational, whilst keeping hold of the political 
imperative of suspecting a masquerade or misrecognition.     
 
The Problem of the ‘Native Informant’      
Mohanty adds further complexity to the debate, stating that:  
If relations of domination and exploitation are defined in terms of binary 
divisions - groups that dominate and groups that are dominated - then 
surely the implication is that the accession to power of women as a group 
is sufficient to dismantle the existing organization of relations. But women 
as a group are not in some sense essentially superior or infallible. The crux 
of the problem lies in that initial assumption of women as a homogeneous 
group.... (Mohanty, 1984:39) 
The premise that unequal gender relations bind women together in a shared 
feminist discourse, and the assumption that women are a homogeneous group, are 
contested.  However, the temptation to form factions or impose a ranking of 
whose difference or whose group is more or less oppressed (Lorde, 1983b:219-
220) function to replicate existing power relations and result in ‘…a simple 
inversion of what exists’ (Mohanty, 1984:39).  Bhabha (1994) poses a number of 
relevant questions:  
Must we always polarize in order to polemicize? Are we trapped in a 
politics of struggle where the representation of social antagonisms and 
historical contradictions can take no other form than a binarism of theory 
vs politics? Can the aim of freedom of knowledge be the simple inversion 
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of the relation of oppressor and oppressed, centre and periphery, negative 
image and positive image? (Bhabha, 1994:19) 
hooks (1984) makes several points that are pertinent to this discussion. 
hooks names and exposes  strategies used to flatten out epistemology and used to 
posit the ‘already constituted’ epistemological subject of Black women:  
…the slogan “the personal is political”… became a means of encouraging 
women to think that the experience of discrimination, exploitation, or 
oppression automatically corresponded with an understanding of the 
ideological and institutional apparatus shaping one’s social status […] 
When women internalized the idea that describing their own woe was 
synonymous with developing a critical political consciousness, the 
progress of feminist movement was stalled. (hooks, 1984:24-25)    
hooks argues that an aspect of the stalling serves to re-inscribe the ‘…hegemonic 
dominance of white academic women’ (hooks, 1984:30) and privileges the claim 
of giving voice to Black, poor, marginalised women at the expense of creating an 
inclusive developing theory.  The consequences of this include the invocation of 
marginalised women in feminism on the basis of their ‘…“experiential” work, 
personal life stories’ (hooks, 1984:30).  hooks concludes that: ‘Personal 
experiences are important to feminist movement but they cannot take the place of 
theory’ (hooks, 1984:30). The issue that hooks is flagging up here is that to 
position experience in the place of theory serves to freeze the Black subject into a 
fixed, essentialist position.  This serves as a basis for an authenticity that, by 
definition, is divorced from the tools of critical analysis.  Smith prefers:  
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…the formulation “theorizing black feminisms” to the deceptive and 
monolithic category “black feminist theory.” The participial phrase calls 
attention to the process and activity of doing specific kinds of work in the 
name of black feminism… (Smith, 1998:xix) 
In other words, the activism of Black feminist theory cannot be contained and 
constrained within the border of a singularity, whether that be the singularity of 
experience, identity categories or theory.  Spivak’s reference to the problem of the 
‘Native Informant’ as ‘truth’ resonates with hook’s critique of feminism:  
If one looks at the history of post-Enlightenment theory, the major 
problem has been the problem of autobiography: how subjective structures 
can, in fact, give objective truth.  During these same centuries, the Native 
Informant…was  unquestioningly treated as the objective evidence for the 
founding of so-called sciences…So that, once again, the theoretical 
problems only relate to the person who knows.  The person who knows has 
all of the problems of selfhood.  The person who is known, somehow 
seems not to have a problematic self. (Spivak, 1986:66; emphasis in 
original) 
Thus, the use of autobiographical foundations for ‘knowing’ is beset with 
problems, not least, that of positing an epistemological subject on the basis of 
privileging claims of a decided personhood.  The relevance of these points to 
‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ is that Lorde is both positing 
and troubling a knowing of what it means to be Black.  She straddles the dialectic 
of positing that the selfhood of race is relational, whilst functioning to maintain 
differences.  
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The Constitutive Interstices of Feminisms 
The importance of process in the dialectic articulated above is emphasised by 
Bhabha:  
What is theoretically innovative, and politically crucial, is the need to 
think beyond narratives of originary and initial subjectivities and to focus 
on those moments or processes that are produced in the articulation of 
cultural differences. (Bhabha, 1994:1) 
Here, Bhabha contests the very existence of an ‘originary and initial’ subjectivity 
as part of the dialectic of difference. He proposes that energy should be not be 
directed towards the location of ‘originary and initial subjectivities,’ but, rather, 
towards dismantling process and production.  For Bhabha, theoretical engagement 
requires ‘…the emergence of the interstices - the overlap and displacement of 
domains of difference…’ (Bhabha, 1994:2).  
The configuration of ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ 
directs attention to the interstices that constitute different feminisms.  Lorde is 
indicating that there is a space between Black and white feminism and that the 
space matters.  The issue is that of what happens to the ‘personal experiences,’ 
description of ‘woes’ and ‘personal life stories’ that hooks (1984:24-25 and 30) 
refers to within Bhabha’s (1994:2) inevitable interstices.  
This is further complicated by the notion of Black women as migratory 
subjects who occupy ‘…that in-between space that is neither here nor there…’ 
(Boyce Davies, 1994:1).  However, rather than intervening to fix or stabilise 
Black feminism in the in-between space, an intervention used for the purposes of 
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taking hold of, and appropriating, Black feminism, in contrast, emancipatory 
approaches need to ‘…activate the term “Black” relationally, provisionally and 
based on location or position’ (Boyce Davies, 1994:8).  It could be argued that the 
construction and use of the statement ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in 
blackface’ anticipates many of the arguments found in postmodernist, 
deconstructionist theory concerning positionality, relationality and contestations 
of an originary.  Boyce Davies makes this point in relation to Black feminist 
scholarship in general: 
My contention is that postmodernist positions or feminist positions are 
always already articulated by Black women because we experience, ahead 
of the general population, many of the multiple struggles that subsequently 
become popularly expressed (for example, drugs in communities, teen 
pregnancies, struggle for control of one’s body, one’s labor, etc.).  Black 
feminist criticisms, then, perhaps more than many of the other feminisms, 
can be a praxis where the theoretical positions and the criticism interact 
with the lived experience. (Boyce Davies, 1994:55)   
The subject of experience emerges again here.  However, Boyce Davies offers an 
example of using experience not to displace, but to interact with theory, thereby 
using experience as a vital element in the process of formulating theory, rather 
than positioning experience in the place of theory.  It could be argued that ‘Black 
feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ because of the interaction of 
experience with theory.  The experiences of Black women are different to the 
experiences of white women in the context of a racist, homophobic patriarchy.  
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Turning to Foucault’s (1972) work on ‘discontinuity as history,’ 
Radhakrishnan comments: 
Foucault’s brilliant notion of dans le vrai sums up this notion of truth in 
history as a matter of spatial subjection. […] Hence the need in Foucault to 
“think a different history” and to write the history of the present that 
requires different tools, different strategies, and a different sense of 
space…a historical project of imagining different spaces for different 
histories and knowledges that have been subjugated... (Radhakrishnan, 
2000:60-61; italics in original).   
‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ invites interrogation of the 
history and constitution of feminisms. It would appear that using the tools, 
strategies and space that enable subjugated knowledges arising out of ‘spatial 
subjection’ to be excavated will help in the task.       
 
Intersectionality    
An example of how multiple, connected axes of identity in the locus, spatial 
temporality of personal life stories is grappled with can be found in the theory of 
intersectionality.  Intersectionality, first coined by Crenshaw in 1989, has been 
defined as ‘…the notion that identity is formed by interlocking and mutually 
reinforcing vectors of race, gender, class and sexuality…’ (Nash, 2008:3).  
Crenshaw disrupted notions of adding and subtracting or a hierarchical ranking of 
categories of oppression, demonstrating that the ‘intersectional experience is 
greater than the sum of racism and sexism’ (Crenshaw, 1989:140).  The theory of 
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intersectionality born out of an analysis of Black women’s lived experience of 
multiple discrimination, and the refusal of the U.S. legal system to recognise this, 
has particular relevance to this chapter. Crenshaw illustrates that the basis upon 
which Black women presented their case before the legal courts was not the basis 
upon which white women or black men presented their cases of gender and racial 
discrimination before the court.  These Black women presented their cases of 
discrimination on the basis of the intersection of being both Black and female. 
Thus, the entrapments used in relation to Black women have specificity in their 
own right that has to be accounted for.   
The complexity of the task of intersectionality is explored in this thesis in 
Chapter 4, ‘The Aporetics of Intersectionality’ and is articulated here by 
Radhakrishnan:  
Each of these lived realities, such as the ethnic, the diasporic, the gay, the 
migrant, the subaltern, etc., must imagine its own discursive-epistemic 
space as a form of openness to one another’s persuasion: neither totalized 
oppression… (Radhakrishnan, 2000:61)   
The challenge Radhakrishnan presents here in relation to ‘Black feminism is not 
white feminism in blackface’ is that of understanding the particularity of lived 
realities that constitutes Black feminism whilst resisting the urge to totalize.  Brah 
cautions that the ‘…strategic use of positivist essentialism…’ (Spivak, 2006:281; 
emphasis in original) can lead to a situation where ‘one form of oppression leads 
to the reinforcement of another.’ Rather, Brah advocates for ‘…strategies for 
challenging all oppressions on the basis of an understanding of how they 
interconnect and articulate’ (Brah, 1996:126).   
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The interdependency, interconnections and intersections of multiple forms 
of oppression as a basis for feminist activism will only be effective if they are 
allowed to remain open to each other.  Arguing against a unitary representation 
and fixed hierarchy, Bhabha comments that: 
…the transformational value of change lies in the rearticulation, or 
translation, of elements that are neither the One (unitary working class) 
nor the Other (the politics of gender) but something else besides, which 
contests the terms and territories of both. (Bhabha, 1994:28; emphasis in 
original)  
‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ resists a bolted on, 
cumulative configuration of multiple identity and invites a particular scrutiny of 
‘subjugated knowledges’ (Hill Collins, 2000:252) of ‘the matrix of domination’ 
(Hill Collins, 2000:228).  Drawing on her own experience, Lorde explains that: 
As a Black lesbian feminist comfortable with the many different 
ingredients of my identity, and a woman committed to racial and sexual 
freedom from oppression, I find I am constantly being encouraged to pluck 
out some one aspect of myself and present this as the meaningful whole, 
eclipsing or denying the other parts of self. (Lorde, 1980a:120)   
The mechanisms used to encourage the eclipsing of multiple aspects of 
Black women’s identity and experience may not present as obvious or explicit.  
The subtle and even unwitting encouragement to pluck out one aspect of Black 
women’s identity to formulate a stable, coherent ‘whole’ would be tantamount to 
using the ‘…master’s tools [to] dismantle the master’s house…’ (Lorde, 
1979b:112; emphasis in original), and as such will fail.   
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Examination of Black women located within ‘…complex spaces of 
multiple meanings’ (Nash, 2008:8) is anything but neat and straightforward.  Nash 
speaks of the need ‘…to grapple with intersectionality’s theoretical, political, and 
methodological murkiness…’ (Nash, 2008:1).  However, the ‘murkiness’ is not an 
excuse for reductionist, satisfactory formulations that provide solutions to difficult 
issues.  Rather, the ‘murkiness’ should and will remain murky.  Instead of being 
foreclosed, this murky quality of intersectionality could be used for productive 
thinking that may not necessarily summon up solutions.  Indeed, ‘Black feminism 
is not white feminism in blackface’ opens up, rather than resolves, the complexity 
of issues and questions that it gives rise to.    
 
Injurious Interpellations 
The particular issue this chapter addresses concerns the notion of the ‘psychic life 
of power’ (Butler, 1997c).  Questions in relation to the ‘psychic life of power’ and 
the interdependency of the specificity of Black feminism with white feminism 
could include: How does the ‘psychic life of power’ inhabit, and obtain agency 
through, the intersection of multiple axes of identity and power relations? Is 
‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ because the ‘psychic life of 
power’ interpellates the Black psyche differently than the white psyche? In 
regards to these questions, Probyn offers a particularly relevant observation: 
‘…we are interpellated differently: that we are hailed by different ideologies in 
different ways…’ (Probyn, 2003: 298).  Here, Probyn indicates that the space and 
place Black women inhabit hails and interpellates Black women differently to 
white women.  The ideologies propagated within a racist, homophobic patriarchy 
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hail Black and white subjects differently.  The specific mechanisms used in the 
interpellation of Black subjectivity are explored by a range of Black feminist 
scholars (Amos and Parmar, 1984; Davis, 1981; hooks, 1982; Mirza, 1997).  
Keizer’s (2004) use of Althusser’s theory of interpellation to interpret Morrison’s 
(1987) Beloved is a good example of this particular line of inquiry.  Keizer 
examines Morrison’s: 
…explicit concern with the mechanisms - coercive and consensual - that 
slaveholders used to construct and control black men and women call to 
mind Louis Althusser’s theory of interpellation… (Keizer, 2004:13) 
Taking up these issues in ‘An Open Letter to Mary Daly,’ Lorde speaks frankly 
and with powerful directness:  
To imply, however, that all women suffer the same oppression simply 
because we are women is to lose sight of the many and varied tools of 
patriarchy.  It is to ignore how these tools are used by women without 
awareness against each other. (Lorde, 1979c:67)  
In the same letter Lorde concludes that ‘… beyond sisterhood is still racism’ 
(Lorde, 1979c:70).  
The issue at the heart of ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in 
blackface’ that concerns all feminisms is whether there can be a feminist 
movement and theory that doesn’t replicate, or become, a simple inversion of 
binary divisions, tolerance, regulation and reification.  Thieme’s caution about the 
potential effect of postcolonial theory functioning as a ‘straitjacket,’ shackle or an 
occlusion is applicable here:  
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…the term “postcolonial”, which initially promised liberation from some 
of the hegemonic assumptions of the Western academy, has itself 
threatened to become a straitjacket, shackling or occluding the differences 
that exist amid the particular creative energies of the many peoples, places 
and agendas it has subsumed into its project. (Thieme, 2001:6) 
Throughout Sister Outsider, Lorde continually addresses the issue of how to think 
about the position, and positioning, of intersubjectivity without inverting existing 
power relations.   
In the following quotation, Lorde questions the ‘terms of oppression’ that 
constitute the ‘ticket’ to move from the position of being ‘outside’ to ‘inside’ the 
‘fold’:  
What woman here is so enamoured of her own oppression that she cannot 
see her heelprint upon another woman’s face?  What woman’s terms of 
oppression have become precious and necessary to her as a ticket into the 
fold of the righteous, away from the cold winds of self-scrutiny? (Lorde, 
1981:132)  
A close re-reading of Lorde’s words, in conjunction with Butler’s (1997c) 
analysis of  The Psychic Life of Power, enables a nuanced exploration of the 
mechanisms and impetus that Lorde is referring to.  In answer to the question of, 
‘What woman’s terms of oppression have become precious and necessary to her?’ 
(Lorde, 1981:132), Butler might respond: 
Called by an injurious name, I come into social being, and because I have 
certain inevitable attachment to my existence, because a certain narcissism 
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takes hold of any term that confers existence, I am led to embrace the 
terms that injure me because they constitute me socially. (Butler, 
1997c:104)  
Both Lorde and Butler take up the idea of damage and harm conjured in the 
reference to ‘injury’ and the image of the ‘heelprint’ on another woman’s face.  
Indeed, Butler speaks of ‘…those injurious interpellations…’ (Butler, 1997c:104).  
Lorde and Butler make similar claims; the ‘narcissism’ of being ‘so enamoured by 
her own oppression’ to ‘embrace the terms that injure me’ is fuelled by the 
impulse or desire to ‘embrace’ become ‘so enamoured’ as to ‘take hold of any 
term,’ ‘precious and necessary.’   
Lorde’s warning is addressed to all women; she makes no distinction in 
terms of colour, class, sexuality or brand of feminism, and her warning is that the 
‘psychic life of power’ is able to mobilise the effect of both being ‘so enamoured’ 
and the ‘inevitable attachment.’   
Bringing in the component of desire and attachment underscores the need 
for rigorous vigilance on the part of Black and white feminists in order to resist 
insidious, oppressive forces of stability, inclusion and acceptance in the face of 
racist, homophobic patriarchal rejections and exclusions. Butler explains that: 
…the attachment to subjection is produced through the workings of power, 
and that part of the operation of power is made clear in this psychic effect, 
one of the most insidious of its productions. (Butler, 1997c:6) 
Ahmed also takes up the question of the function and relationship of attachment to 
power:  
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…how do such attachments to feminism relate to attachments that already 
exist in the everyday world, including those that are bound up with the 
reproduction of the very forms of power that feminism seeks to contest. 
[sic] (Ahmed 2004:171)  
In relation to the ‘terms’ Lorde refers to in the passage quoted earlier, she is 
identifying the insidious, plausible binary positions of precious/not precious, 
necessary/unnecessary, righteous/unrighteous that will ultimately result in 
Mohanty’s ‘…inversion of what exists’ (Mohanty, 1984:39).  
 
The Performative Regime of Visibility 
‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ invokes the performative 
regime of visibility.  Seshadri-Crooks’ (2000a) detailed examination of the 
function and meaning of visibility, the looking and seeing in racism, underscores 
the significance of Lorde’s uses of ‘Black’ and ‘white.’  Seshadri-Crooks clarifies 
her theoretical approach:  
Thus by visibility I refer to a regime of looking that thrives on “major” and 
“minor” details in order to shore up one’s symbolic position…I therefore 
focus on race as a practice of visibility…My premise is that the regime of 
visibility secures the investment that we make in “race,” and there are 
good reasons why such an investment cannot be easily surrendered. 
(Seshadri-Crooks, 2000a:2)  
‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ invokes a 
relationship between the regime of visibility and that which is included and 
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excluded.  Thus, in the statement ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in 
blackface,’ the word ‘feminism’ is a potential although contested site of inclusion, 
but being ‘Black’ or ‘white’ is a potential site for exclusion.   
This complex relationship of difference is examined by Seshadri-Crooks, 
who claims that ‘[r]ace is fundamentally a regime of looking’ (Seshadri-Crooks, 
2000a:2) and that: 
By Whiteness, I refer to a master signifier (without a signified) that 
establishes a structure of relations, a signifying chain that through a 
process of inclusions and exclusions constitutes a pattern for organizing 
human difference.  This chain provides subjects with certain symbolic 
positions such as “black,” “white,”…We will therefore have to see how 
this symbolic structuration is related to visibility. (Seshadri-Crooks, 
2000a:3-4; parentheses in original)  
In ‘What’s in a name?...’  (2000a), Seshadri-Crooks uses Butler’s deconstruction 
of gender as a category of representation, identity and identification to interrogate:  
What does it mean to point with the noun “black” or “white”… What kind 
of words are these? Do they possess a meaning, or connote a concept, that 
remains identical with itself in all situations, or do their predicates 
determine the meaning of these words, thus making subject and predicate 
synonymous with each other? Is there any “sense” to naming someone 
black or white? (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000a: 137)   
These questions and, indeed, the whole of Seshadri-Crooks chapter, ‘What’s in a 
name?...’ are relevant to ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ 
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because of the critical examinations of gender and race, performativity, and 
deceptions of coherence, unity and stability in identity categories.  Furthermore, 
Seshadri-Crooks’ (2000a) analysis provides a critical, theoretical microscope 
through which to scrutinise the categories of ‘Black’ and ‘white.’  Seshadri-
Crooks articulates the complexity of the task that could be applied not only to this 
particular close re-reading of Lorde’s statement, but to the activism of Black and 
white feminist theories:   
If one begins from the perspective of power as the ultimate productive 
force in the construction of categories - binary, monologic or differential - 
then one’s task is usually focussed on exposing the sandy bottom of 
power’s foundational pretensions. One’s critical task, to put it rather 
reductively, is to eliminate the modality of necessity and install in its place 
the contingency of all relations. (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000a:136)   
Drawing a clear parallel with the rigidity and limitations of gender identity 
categories already explored in this chapter, Seshadri-Crooks concludes that: 
Racial identity, too, I would like to suggest - i.e., words like black and 
white, when used as nouns - works like names.  That is, they are rigid 
designators - they are signifiers that have no signified. […] it may be more 
productive to view racial color designators as operating not unlike proper 
names. The proper name is nether wholly one’s own (i.e., we are all 
named by others) nor is it meaningful. […] No set of qualitative 
descriptions can establish black or white identity across all possible 
worlds, but we cannot therefore say that black and white do not exist… 
(Seshadri-Crooks, 2000a:141; parentheses in original) 
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The key is not in the noun(s), but in the enquiry into the contingencies of ‘all 
relations,’ or the enquiry into the mechanisms of the ‘psychic life of power’ 
mediated through identity designators.  Seshadri-Crooks proposes a Lacanian 
analysis which foregrounds unconscious anxiety of the lack and incompleteness 
that constitute desire for whiteness or the promise of wholeness:  
…racial naming as referring to properties (or the stereotype) acts as an 
envelope, a cover for the anxiety of racial reference which literally means 
nothing…There is something anxiety-producing about the fullness of the 
signifier/referent relation that bypasses the signified, or the concept, that 
would properly produce meaning and thus desire. (Seshadri-Crooks, 
2000a:143; parentheses in original)   
In relation to the application of this Lacanian analysis of the lack to the realm of 
feminist activism and theory, Spivak observes that: 
Clearly, if you are poor, black and female you get it in three ways.  If, 
however, this formulation is moved from the first-world context into the 
postcolonial (which is not identical with the third-world) context, the 
description “black” or “of color” loses persuasive significance. The 
necessary stratification of colonial subject-constitution in the first phase of 
capitalist imperialism makes “color” useless as an emancipator signifier. 
(Spivak, 1988: 294; parentheses in original)   
Clearly, the issue of context, whether that be ‘capitalist imperialism’ or the place 
of the ‘envelope’ (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000a:143) used to contain anxiety, is crucial.  
Similarly, the place of Black feminism in relation to white feminism in Lorde’s 
statement that ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ is crucial. 
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‘blackface’ 
Of all the different premises available to distinguish Black feminism from white 
feminism, Lorde rests her case on ‘blackface,’ and as such, draws on, and opens 
up, a range of images, connotations and inferences.  This chapter follows up on 
the inference to mimicry invoked in the word ‘blackface.’  As already seen, 
Mohanty, hooks and Hill Collins are amongst many Black feminist scholars who 
warn against the mimicry of inversion.  Black feminists caution against the false 
and treacherous connections of fictive feminist universalities, and the unwitting 
regulation and reification of a feminism based solely on gender.   
Lorde’s gaze on ‘blackface’ plays with the shifting, contradictory, racist 
genre of minstrelsy.  Blackface minstrelsy used slapstick, stump speech, and 
romanticised and exaggerated stereotypes.  These strategies can be seen in the 
Black slave, caricatured by the following figures: Jim Crow; the Black servant; 
the mammy; the dandy, represented by Zip Coon; and the mulatto wench who 
personified the exoticised sexual promiscuity of Black women embodied in light-
skinned, Caucasian features (Toll, 1974).   Lott’s study of the social and 
psychological function of blackface minstrelsy illustrates that the acting out of the 
grotesque, animalistic, infantilisation of Black people provided a vehicle for the 
projective identifications of white audiences (Lott, 1993:143-148).  The 
performative juxtaposition of figures such as Tambo and Mr Bones reiterated 
racist power dynamics. The dynamics of embodied simple mindedness in the 
ersatz form of Black vernacular English, with the blackface interlocutor 
representative of educated sophistication in the voice of aristocratic English, 
functioned to heightened and re-inscribed unequal power differentials.  The 
performance also encompassed the paradox of the ‘…conflictual economy of 
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colonial discourse…’ (Bhabha, 1994:85).  Lorde’s reference to ‘blackface’ 
provocatively invokes and conflates the conscious and unconscious associations 
of black and white signifiers mediated through genres such as black minstrelsy, 
simultaneously conjuring Bhabha’s mimicry, sly civility and hybridity of ‘…the 
“not quite/not white”…’ (Bhabha, 1994:92).  
 
Mimicry 
Bhabha defines mimicry as: 
…the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a 
difference that is almost the same, but not quite. (Bhabha, 1994:86; 
emphasis in original)   
It is in the ‘…area between mimicry and mockery…’ (Bhabha, 1994:86) or in the 
‘not’ in ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ that:  
‘…mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, 
mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference’ 
(Bhabha, 1994:86; emphasis in original).   
The ‘not in blackface’ in ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface,’ or 
in Bhabha’s words, the ‘irony of partial representation,’ points to the ‘menace,’ 
‘strategic limitation or prohibition’ or ‘metonymy of presence’ (Bhabha, 1994:85-
92).  Aligning Seshadri-Crooks, Butler, Lorde and Bhabha with a focus on how 
the ‘not’ operates, amplifies the performative ‘repetition of partial presence’ that 
‘rearticulates presence in terms of otherness,’ so that: ‘Mimicry repeats rather 
than re-presents…’ (Bhabha, 1994:88; emphasis in original).  This results in 
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‘interdictory desire,’ ‘…the prodigious and strategic production of conflictual, 
fantastic, discriminatory “identity effects” in the play of a power…’ (Bhabha, 
1994:90). Or, Seshadri-Crooks (2000a:21) would speak of the interdictory desire 
for whiteness as a translation of anxiety.  Bhabha’s ‘…empty form of “the 
imitation…”’ (Bhabha, 1994:87; emphasis in original) resonates with Seshadri-
Crooks use of Lacan’s ‘…discourse on the “emptiness” of rigid designators…’ 
(Seshadri-Crooks, 2000a:139) in her analysis of Morrison’s Recitatif (1983) and 
her deconstruction of the film, Suture (1993).   
Throughout Sister Outsider Lorde examines the colonisation of the 
psychic space through the mechanism of mimicry.  She incorporates aspects of 
Bhabha’s explanation that: 
In mimicry, the representation of identity and meaning is rearticulated 
along the axis of metonymy. As Lacan reminds us, mimicry is like 
camouflage, not a harmonization of repression of difference, but a form of 
resemblance, that differs from or defends presence by displaying it in part, 
metonymically. (Bhabha, 1994:90)   
Lorde uses metonymy performatively to conjure in the reader’s imagination the 
ways that mimicry operates in the ‘psychic life of power.’  Lorde repeatedly 
cautions against masquerades of emancipatory transformation and the following 
passages provide examples of how she picks up this theme throughout Sister 
Outsider:  
The old patterns, no matter how cleverly rearranged to imitate progress, 
still condemn us to cosmetically altered repetitions of the same old 
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exchanges, the same old guilt, hatred, recrimination, lamentation, and 
suspicion. (Lorde, 1980a:123) 
And when I speak of change, I do not mean a simple switch of positions… 
(Lorde, 1981:127).  
My poetry, my life, my work, my energies for struggle were not 
acceptable unless I pretended to match somebody else’s norm.  I learned 
that not only couldn’t I succeed at that game, but the energy needed for 
that masquerade would be lost to my work. (Lorde, 1982:137) 
But if the quest to reclaim ourselves and each other remains there, then we 
risk another superficial measurement of self, one superimposed upon the 
old one and almost as damaging, since it pauses at the superficial. (Lorde, 
1983a:174)    
Evidently, mimicry operates not only to appropriate, but also to stall progress.                    
Drawing threads of the discussion together concerning configuration, 
disavowal, entrapments, implicit referents, location and regulation, I suggest that 
the metonym ‘blackface’ stands for an inextricable web of constructions that 
configure particular precarious relations of proximity.  Relations between Black 
and white feminism are contingent upon ‘…injurious interpellations…’ (Butler, 
1997c:104) predicated on the regime of visibility. Post-colonial theory offers an 
analogous lens to scrutinise the mechanisms and manoeuvres of the ‘psychic life 
of power’ which are relevant to feminism.  
Picking up references used earlier in this chapter in relation to how 
‘…epistemology is flattened…’ (Alarcón, 1990:361), the ‘…authorial subjects as 
  
 95    
 
the implicit referent…’ (Mohanty, 1984:21) and Lorde’s (1979c:66-71) letter to 
Mary Daly, it is clear that the role of epistemology in feminism is not merely 
academic.  Butler pulls together the relationship between the structure and 
constitution of address and interdependency of difference:  
The structure of address is important for understanding how moral 
authority is introduced and sustained if we accept not just that we address 
others when we speak, but that in some way we come to exist, as it were, 
in the moment of being addressed, and something about our existence 
proves precarious when that address fails. (Butler, 2004:130)   
Here, Butler explains the paradox of adopting a speaking position and being 
simultaneously undone by that position, and the same could be applied to all 
forms of representing and communicating epistemology.  The tension is one of 
making a coherent, assertive and persuasive political address as evidence of 
existence, whilst knowing that the inevitable failure of the address reflects 
something of the precarity of existence.  This situation is acutely amplified in 
relation to Black and white feminism because it provides questions about how 
they listen and address each other, and what is at stake. 
 
Do the Manners of Black Feminists Need Reforming? 
Staying with the tactic of mimicry, the parallels between the doctrine of 
Christianity and bureaucracy as imperial devices of regulatory colonial power 
with the regulatory aspects of the doctrine of feminism can be detected.  Bhabha 
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(1994) details numerous examples of how bureaucracy in many different guises 
functions as an instrument of regulation:  Bhabha states that Charles Grant’s: 
…dream of an evangelical system of mission education conducted 
uncompromisingly in the English language, was partly a belief in political 
reform along Christian lines and partly an awareness that the expansion of 
company rule in India required a system of subject formation - a reform of 
manners… (Bhabha, 1994:87)   
Perhaps here, the question for the ‘dream’ of feminism concerns not only the 
language used, but what the deployment of that language functions to do. The 
following questions make this point in concrete terms: is the language used by 
feminism for the reform of manners, and if so, whose manners and what particular 
manners require reforming?  If feminism is a movement for the emancipation of 
all women, then is there some notion that the manners of non-academic women 
need reforming into the ways of those women in academia?  Do the manners of 
Black feminists need reforming?  Bhabha refers to Sir Edward Cust’s ‘…policy of 
a conferring on every colony of the British Empire a mimic representation of the 
British Constitution’ (Cust, 1839, cited in Bhabha, 1994:85).  Bhabha also refers 
to J. S. Mill’s testimony to a Select Committee of the House of Lords in 1852 and 
quotes that:  
“The whole government of India is carried out in writing,”…This appears 
to me a greater security for good government than exists in almost any 
other government in the world, because no other has a system of 
recordation so complete. (Mill, 1852, cited in Bhabha, 1994:93) 
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Perhaps in relation to the security of feminism, the issue could be 
articulated in terms of a critical analysis of the production and function of feminist 
archives and records.  Furthermore, the issue is that of what is included and 
excluded in feminist records and who the stakeholders are.  Referring to feminist 
scholarship, Mohanty cautions of ‘…a certain mode of appropriation and 
codification of scholarship…’ (Mohanty, 1984:17).  Bhabha is clear that the 
examples he examines demonstrate an effort to ‘…construct a particularly 
appropriate form of colonial subjectivity’ (Bhabha, 1994:87). However, the result 
is only ‘…“partial reform”…’ (Bhabha, 1994:87).  Spivak fittingly names the 
practice, ‘epistemic violence’ (Spivak, 1988: 280).   
Spivak’s deconstruction of ideology as a tool of appropriation is clear in 
her seminal work, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’(1988). Here, Spivak challenges the 
intellectual equivalents of the British Constitution and Christian doctrine in her 
challenge of Foucault, Deleuze and Marx.  Spivak considers: 
…a text by two great practitioners of the critique: “Intellectuals and 
Power: A Conversation between Michel Foucault and Gilles 
Deleuze”…because it undoes the opposition between authoritative 
theoretical production and the unguarded practice of conversation, 
enabling one to glimpse the track of ideology. (Spivak, 1988: 272)   
Spivak argues that the track of ideology demonstrates that ‘…Western intellectual 
production is, in many ways, complicit with Western international economic 
interests’ (Spivak, 1988: 271).  In relation to ‘Black feminism is not white 
feminism in blackface,’ the key point would be to consider the intellectual 
production of feminism within the context of prevailing socio-economic 
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conditions and interests.  Making the parallel between imperial devices of 
regulation and intellectual production explicit, Spivak observes that: 
Sometimes it seems as if the very brilliance of Foucault's analysis of the 
centuries of European imperialism produces a miniature version of that 
heterogeneous phenomenon: management of space-but by doctors; 
development of administrations-but in asylums; considerations of the 
periphery-but in terms of the insane, prisoners, and children. The clinic, 
the asylum, the prison, the university-all seem to be screen-allegories that 
foreclose a reading of the broader narratives of imperialism. (Spivak, 
1988: 291)   
The interdictory discourse embodied in ‘Black feminism is not white 
feminism in blackface’ encapsulates the relationality of difference.  The statement 
that ‘Black feminism is not white feminism’ is contingent upon an understanding 
that Black is not white. However, this representation of the understanding belies a 
set of complex relations that exceed and transgress any idea that the word ‘Black’ 
is bordered off from the word ‘white.’  Currie explains that: 
This suggests that the meaning of words inheres in their relations with 
each other, that words have no foundations, and meanings are not self-
contained. (Currie, 2004:2)   
 
The Slippage of ‘not’ 
The words ‘Black’ and ‘white’ are understood in relation to each other.  In order 
to cope with this dialectic of interdependency and the ambivalence, the relation 
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‘…must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference’ (Bhabha, 
1994:86) in order to maintain the construction of difference on axes of inequality.  
Put simply, the slippage is an inevitable result of maintaining the process of 
disavowal of the interdependency.  In other words, the lack of stability and refusal 
of ‘Black’ and ‘white’ to be contained produces a slip.  In the authority and 
directness of her rhetoric, Lorde does not appear to be slip-sliding and she shows 
no hint of uncertainty or of being undecided in her statement that ‘Black feminism 
is not white feminism in blackface.’  However, a close re-reading of the statement 
reveals the quandary of giving voice to the specificity of particular entrapments, 
whilst also giving voice to the interdependency of difference.  Probyn (1993:120) 
puts it neatly: ‘Without her I’m nothing…’ Butler explains how the process of 
becoming ‘nothing’ happens and she argues that the interdependency of difference 
is an ‘undoing’:  
I tell a story about the relations I choose, only to expose, somewhere along 
the way, the way I am gripped and undone by these very relations...Let’s 
face it. We’re undone by each other. (Butler, 2004:23)   
However, ‘…stricken by an indeterminacy…’ (Bhabha, 1994:86), or stricken 
‘…with signs of its undoing’ (Butler, 2004:23), the ‘not’ in ‘Black feminism is 
not white feminism in blackface’ is undone and fails.  This failure is the slippage 
and excess referred to by Bhabha earlier, and this produces anxiety.   It must be 
noted that, although Bhabha is referring to the situation of colonisation, and to the 
power relations between the coloniser and the colonised, application to the context 
of Black feminism and white feminism must include both Black and white 
feminisms as implicated.  The idea of interdependency implies mutuality and 
Black and white feminisms/feminists are undone by each other. 
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‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ focuses the gaze on 
recognition and cautions against misrecognition.  It appears that Lorde invites a 
scrutiny of the real ‘blackface.’  Lorde seems to be implying the existence, and 
therefore, the possibility of recognition, of the genuine from the imitation.  This 
raises the problem of the construction, constitution and claim of authenticity.  
Spivak comments that: 
…what I find useful is the sustained and developing work on the 
mechanics of the constitution of the Other; we can use it to much greater 
analytic and interventionist advantage than invocations of the authenticity 
of the Other. (Spivak, 1988: 294; emphasis in original).   
Rather than debating whether or not Lorde is claiming a position of authenticity, 
Spivak directs the line of interrogation into the mechanics of the authentic.  This 
would lead to questions about the production, function and contingencies of the 
construction of authenticity.   
The anxious desire for recognition of that self-conscious difference, which 
is not an impersonation or parody of a stereotype, is an aspect of the ‘psychic life 
of power’ and an entrapment.  Butler comments that: 
…what is exteriorized or performed can only be understood by reference 
to what is barred from performance, what cannot or will not be performed. 
(Butler, 1997c:144)   
Impersonations of ‘blackface’ function in relation to the ‘blackface’ that has been 
barred.  Indeed, the situation of ‘barred’ implies that there is something to be 
barred. The word ‘barred’ is, therefore, inextricably bound to other contexts, 
meanings and words - some of which may be present and/or absent, available 
and/or unavailable, and close and/or distant.  This complexity troubles the notion 
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of recognition because, having questioned the notion of a distinction between the 
real and false ‘blackface,’ the predicament is also one of recognition constituted 
on misrecognition, just as presence and absence are mutually constitutive.  So, the 
dialectic of ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ is: who or what 
is constituting, and recognizing, who or what?  Lorde comments that: 
We have recognized and negotiated these differences, even when this 
recognition only continued the old dominant/subordinate mode of human 
relationship, where the oppressed must recognize the masters’ difference 
in order to survive. (Lorde, 1980a:122)   
Perhaps engagement with, rather than disavowal of, the dialectics of recognition, 
would form a stronger basis for disrupting ‘the old dominant/subordinate’ 
positions.  
 
Racist Social Structures Create Racist Psychic Structures  
Butler’s question of, ‘What is the psychic form that power takes?,’ (Butler, 
1997c:2) is helpful in the project of understanding further the nuances and 
implications of ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface.’  Butler 
(1997c:3) explains that the ‘…project requires thinking the theory of power 
together with a theory of the psyche…’ because: 
…power that at first appears as external, pressed upon the subject, 
pressing the subject into subordination, assumes a psychic form that 
constitutes the subject’s self-identity. (Butler, 1997c:3)   
Butler’s focus on the relationship between the psyche and power, and her focus on 
how subjectivity is constituted through the ‘psychic life of power,’ moves the 
enquiry beyond the regime of visibility.  Moreover, Seshadri-Crooks’ analysis of 
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Recitatif (Morrison, 1983) and the film, Suture (1993), ‘…problematizes the 
referent, or the body as a site of knowledge…’ (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000a:148). 
Similarly and helpfully, Butler’s (1997c) The Psychic Life of Power enables a 
shift in gaze from black and white skin colour to a gaze on the mechanisms 
through which power interpellates the psyche.  Thus, the question is not whether a 
psyche is, or becomes, black or white, but how the signifiers ‘black’ and ‘white’ 
are used by the ‘psychic life of power.’  Oliver calls for: 
…a theory that operates between the psyche and the social, through which 
the very terms of psychoanalysis are transformed into social concepts. 
(Oliver, 2004:xiv) 
Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks is a detailed study of the colonisation of 
psychic space as an entrapment of the ‘psychic life of power.’  Fanon states in his 
introduction:  
…I believe that only a psychoanalytical interpretation of the black 
problem can lay bare the anomalies of affect that are responsible for the 
structure of the complex. (Fanon, 2008:3) 
 
Fanon and Lorde 
I now move on in this chapter to juxtapose Black Skin, White Masks, ‘…a clinical 
study’ to analyse the ‘…psychoexistential complex’ (Fanon, 2008:5) with Lorde’s 
Black lesbian feminist, political essays in Sister Outsider.  The aim of this 
juxtaposition is to explore the manoeuvres of the ‘psychic life of power’ and, 
specifically, to trace the particular entrapments used in the colonisation of psychic 
  
 103    
 
space.  This juxtaposition enables this line of inquiry to move from the regime of 
visibility, and the issue of recognition and misrecognition, to an analysis of how 
and why ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ because of what 
gets under, and goes on under, the skin. Butler (1997c:19) speaks about the 
‘…process of incorporation…’ to better understand and formulate questions about 
how power uses the psychic topography.  Butler states that: 
If forms of regulatory power are sustained in part through the formation of 
a subject, and if that formation takes place according to the requirements 
of power, specifically, as the incorporation of norms, then a theory of 
subject formation must give an account of this process of incorporation, 
and the notion of incorporation must be interrogated to ascertain the 
psychic topography it assumes. (Butler, 1997c:19)   
Where Butler speaks of ‘incorporation,’ Fanon (2008:4) speaks of 
‘epidermalization’ in relation to the specificity of racism. Fanon’s concept of 
‘epidermalization’ is particularly useful because it includes an equation of the 
regime of visibility, the psyche and the social. In this equation, the black 
epidermis cannot be mimicked because the process of incorporation that regulates 
the psychic topography forms particular subjectivities.   
In Black Skins, White Masks, Fanon uses the term ‘epidermalization’ to 
describe the process whereby: 
If there is an inferiority complex, it is the outcome of a double process: -
primarily, economic; -subsequently, - the internalization - or, better, the 
epidermalization - of this inferiority. (Fanon, 2008:4)  
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More specifically, Fanon talks about ‘…a racial epidermal schema’ (Fanon, 
2008:84).  Oliver explains this as the process whereby, in racism: 
…the body becomes nothing more than skin, abjected by dominant 
culture, alien to the one whose bodily integrity it paradoxically both 
protects and destroys. (Oliver, 2001:25) 
Lorde invokes this racial bodily schema, recalling her own experience:  
Did bad mean Black? The endless scrubbing with lemon juice in the 
cracks and crevices of my ripening, darkening, body.  And oh, the sins of 
my dark elbows and knees, my gums and nipples, the folds of my neck and 
the cave of my armpits! (Lorde, 1983a:149, emphasis in original)   
Deconstructing this quote, the black epidermis becomes the site where experience, 
affect, sexuality, the psychic relation to sin and the concept of bad are represented.  
Examining the syntax of Lorde’s description here and the relations between the 
words, it could be argued that the spaces in the ‘cracks,’ ‘crevices,’ ‘folds’ and 
‘cave’ personify what Bhabha describes as: 
…an interstitial space for the negotiation of meaning, value, judgement - 
how the “one” survives in/of the “other” as a kind of structure of doubling 
(not sublimation or sublation) - not pluralism, but excessive iteration… 
(Seshadri-Crooks, 2000c:376) 
Lorde’s description summons identification, desire and the gap or slippage 
of the ‘not’ in ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface.’  Bhabha 
explains: 
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For the image - as point of identification - marks the site of an 
ambivalence.  Its representation is always spatially split - it makes present 
something that is absent […] The image is at once a metaphoric 
substitution, an illusion of presence and by that same token a metonym, a 
sign of its absence and loss. (Bhabha, 1986:xxx; emphasis in original)      
The relevance of Fanon’s work lies in his examination of the process of 
incorporation as an aspect of the psychic life of racism.  Similar to Lorde, Fanon 
identifies and investigates how the ‘entrapments used to neutralize’ (Lorde, 
1980a:118) Black people within racism are different than those for white people.   
Neither Lorde nor Fanon are saying that racism only affects Black people; 
their emphasis is on how the entrapments or ‘psychic life of power’ operate 
differently depending on how skin color is positioned and represented.  Both 
Lorde and Fanon analyse how ‘…racist social structures create racist psychic 
structures…’ (Oliver, 2001:34).  The key point is that the way in which ‘…racist 
social structures create racist psychic structures…’ operates differently for Black 
and white people.   
Furthermore, the intersection of the psychic and the social troubles the 
borders that are often created between the two; for example, as reflected in 
disciplinary borders that demarcate the social to sociology and the psyche to the 
psychological.   Butler argues that the ‘…process of internalization fabricates the 
distinction between interior and exterior life…’ (Butler, 1997c:19; emphasis in 
original).  Butler elaborates her analysis to add further layers of complexity:  
Where social categories guarantee a recognizable and enduring social 
existence, the embrace of such categories, even if they work in the service 
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of subjection, is often preferred to no social existence at all. How is it, 
then, that the longing for subjection, based on a longing for social 
existence, recalling and exploiting primary dependencies, emerges as an 
instrument and effect of the power of subjection? (Butler, 1997c:20)   
A close re-reading of Lorde’s and Fanon’s experiences of racism provides 
a powerful response to Butler’s difficult questions.  Fanon explains that: 
…I begin to suffer from not being a white man to the degree that the white 
man imposes discrimination on me, makes me a colonized native, robs me 
of all worth, all individuality, tells me that I am a parasite on the world, 
that I must bring myself as quickly as possible into step with the white 
world, “that I am a brute beast, that my people and I are like a walking 
dung-heap that disgustingly fertilizes sweet sugar cane and silky cotton, 
that I have no use in the world.” Then I will quite simply try to make 
myself white: that is, I will compel the white man to acknowledge that I 
am human. (Fanon, 2008:73)  
A re-reading of Fanon through a re-reading of Lorde opens up interesting 
dimensions of analysis in relation to Butler’s comment that: 
…the desire to survive, “to be,” is a pervasively exploitable desire.  The 
one who holds out the promise of continued existence plays to the desire 
to survive. (Butler, 1997c:7) 
Drawing on her experience as a child, Lorde’s description in the following 
passage brings together desire, epidermalization/racial bodily schema and 
dehumanisation:  
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…the stormy little Black girl who once longed to be white or anything 
other than who she was, since all she was ever allowed to be was the sum 
of the color of her skin and the textures of her hair, the shade of her knees 
and elbows, and those things were clearly not acceptable as human. 
(Lorde, 1983a:174)    
Butler explains: 
…if following Foucault, we understand power as forming the subject as 
well, as providing the very condition of its existence and the trajectory of 
its desire, then power is not simply what we oppose but also, in a strong 
sense, what we depend on for our existence…the “we” who accept such 
terms are fundamentally dependent on those terms for “our” existence. 
(Butler, 1997c:2; emphasis in original)   
Fanon (2008:73) is clear that the imposed terms of being ‘a parasite,’ of ‘no use,’ 
robbed of  ‘all worth, all individuality,’ ‘a brute beast’ and ‘a walking dung-heap’ 
provide compelling motivation  and  rationale for coming into step with the very 
world that imposed the terms to ‘make myself white.’  The terms of what is 
‘allowed’ and ‘acceptable’ (Lorde, 1983a:174) as products of racist ideology 
‘…enter the colonized through the skin’ (Oliver, 2004:51).  Both Fanon and Lorde 
establish the inextricable interdependency between ideology, embodiment and the 
‘psychic life of power.’  
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Resisting the Terms of Oppression 
If feminism is a political movement that questions and resists terms of oppression, 
and if these terms are different for Black and white women, it follows that Black 
feminism requires a questioning of, and resistance to, different terms than white 
feminism.  A close re-reading of Lorde’s ‘not in blackface’  is exactly this 
questioning and resistance to the terms invoked in the racist regimes of visibility 
and in the process of epidermalization, whereby ‘stereotypes of inferiority are 
absorbed into the skin’ (Oliver, 2001:24).  Thus, Lorde uses the trope, but extends 
the analysis beyond mimicry to indicate a refusal to ‘make myself white’ (Fanon, 
2008:73) in ‘blackface.’ Butler comments that: 
If, as Norma Alarcón has insisted, women of color are “multiply 
interpellated,” called by many names, constituted in and by that multiple 
calling, then this implies that the symbolic domain, the domain of socially 
instituted norms, is composed of racializing norms, and that they exist not 
merely alongside gender norms, but are articulated through one another.  
Hence it is no longer possible to make sexual difference prior to racial 
difference or, for that matter, to make them into fully separable axes of 
social regulation and power. (Butler, 1993b:279; emphasis in original)  
‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ both acknowledges the 
psychic life of racism and resists its terms simultaneously.   
 
 
 
  
 109    
 
Re-Reading of the Re-Reading: The Indeterminacy of Reiteration 
This section of the chapter offers a personal, reflective re-reading of ‘Black 
feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ where, in the spirit of re-reading 
Lorde, the analysis already articulated earlier in this chapter becomes a talking 
with Lorde rather than a talking about Lorde. Furthermore, the act of re-reading a 
re-reading, so to speak, offers an illustration of a key theme that runs throughout 
this thesis - namely, the inevitable space between all repetitions.  Here, I am 
mindful of Spivak’s comment that: 
The book is not repeatable in its “identify”: each reading of the book 
produces a simulacrum of an “original” that is itself the mark of the 
shifting and unstable subject… (Spivak, 1997:xii) 
This thesis is particularly concerned to reveal the subversive potential for the 
activism of Black feminist theory within the inevitable fissures of every reiteration.  
This re-reading of the re-reading uses the indeterminacy of reiteration (including 
repetition of my own analysis already provided within this chapter) as a site for the 
application of ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface,’ with regards 
to feminist Black women-only services and spaces. 
Drawing on a literary tradition of dialogue, conversation and interviews, as 
mirrored in Lorde’s work, this experimental pedagogical intervention constructs an 
imaginary conversation between activists and scholars across a temporal and 
spatial spectrum that juxtaposes a range of visions, standpoints and theoretical 
approaches. This imaginary conversation straddles the fictional and non-fictional 
in the sense that the actual words of the scholars cited are juxtaposed within a 
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fictional frame. This invented construction is a deliberate transgression of fixed, 
theoretical borders. This approach resists the: 
…historical amnesia that keeps us working to invent the wheel every time 
we have to go to the store for bread. (Lorde, 1980a:117)   
In grappling with a complex issue or concept, I often find myself 
constructing conversations with Lorde, who I have come to think of as a close 
friend and excellent company!  In my teaching of critical analysis, I ask students to 
imagine they are hosting a dinner party, bringing different voices and perspectives 
to the table of their analysis in conversation with each other.  The imaginary 
conversation that structures this plays with the concepts of the speech act and 
speaking position that are at the core of the subject under discussion.
9
  
Furthermore, it represents a performance of intertextuality in action. 
 
Black Women-Only Spaces and Services?  
This conversation with Lorde grapples with a complexity of the activism of Black 
feminist theory that I continue to engage with - namely, the rationale and 
legitimacy of Black women-only reflective spaces, training, consciousness-raising 
and service provision. This ‘breaking bread’ (hooks and West, 1991) with 
                                                          
9
 A version of this personal, reflective re-reading was delivered in February, 2012 for the 
Manchester Feminist Theory Network in a workshop on Audre Lorde, where the audience 
performed the conversation. Taking it in turns according to where they were seated, each person 
assumed the speaking position of the part that fell to them in their turn, with the exception that I 
maintained consistency of speaking my own words.  This created an interesting situation of a 
white man speaking the words of a Black woman, and a white, middle-class woman speaking the 
words of a Black slave, Sojourner Truth, in 1851.  It provoked discussion generally about the 
relation between the speech act and identity, and more specifically, picked up on important 
elements of the subject of the paper - namely, ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in 
blackface.’    
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contemporary issues, theory and challenges is a method of demonstrating the 
relevance and translation of Lorde’s work in a transatlantic, transnational context.   
I want to show something of the universal reach of Lorde’s attention to the 
specific, in response to reductionist binary divisions between the universal and the 
specific where the universal colonizes the specific and vice-versa.  This 
conversation speaks with Lorde’s statement that ‘Black feminism is not white 
feminism in blackface’ to explore why there is a necessity for Black women-only 
provision. ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ captures the 
complexity of the relation, indicating that feminist approaches to the universal 
patriarchal subjugation of women must attend to the specificity of women’s lived 
experience.  Indeed, this very relation between the universal and the specific is at 
the heart of the activism of Black feminist theory.  
 
The Conversation
10
 
Suryia: Audre Lorde, you have been with me for the last 25 years as a feminist 
involved with the development of specific services for Black women survivors of 
sexual violence.  Your work has helped me to develop Black women-only feminist 
training and Black women-only feminist consciousness-raising and reflective 
spaces.  Within the struggle for, and occupancy of, these spaces, I am coming to 
understand something of being positioned as ‘the sister outsider’ (Byrd, 2009:5; 
Lorde, 1984).   
                                                          
10
 I have taken the liberty of not using ellipses within the quotes used to construct this 
experimental, imaginary conversation so as not to interrupt the flow of the conversation. 
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Audre Lorde: ‘Ignoring the differences of race between women and the 
implications of those differences presents the most serious threat to the 
mobilization of women’s joint power.  As white women ignore their built-in 
privilege of whiteness and define woman in terms of their own experience alone, 
then women of Color become “other”, the outsider whose experience and tradition 
is too “alien” to comprehend’ (Lorde, 1980a:117; italics in original).  
Suryia Nayak: Audre, even though you detailed the difficulty of this struggle, 
even though you sounded out the warnings and alerted me to the entrapments, I 
didn’t get it until I went through the doing of it.  You forewarned the inquisition; 
you said there would be a questioning, where the questions asked of the activities 
of Black women are a questioning of our very being as women.  
Audre Lorde: ‘I find I am constantly being encouraged to pluck out some one 
aspect of myself and present this as the meaningful whole, eclipsing or denying the 
other parts of self.  But this is a destructive and fragmenting way to live’ (Lorde, 
1980a:117).  
Suryia Nayak: The questions, sometimes asked directly, sometimes indirectly, 
sometimes not asked, but it is obvious the questions are being thought and the 
thoughts hang in the air, are: why do you need to have specific services for Black 
women? Why have separate Black women-only training, consciousness-raising 
and reflective spaces? What is so separate? What is so specific?  
Well, Audre, I want to talk you about the answers to these questions, 
because the answers, and there are many answers, often fail to go to the heart of 
the issue and miss the point completely. The answers are difficult answers, not 
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because they are too complicated; the answers are difficult because they are 
difficult to hear; they are uncomfortable. The answers hurt.   
Let us be clear about what is not the answer.  The answer is not because of 
religion, culture, language, dress, geography, tradition or customs. Let us be clear: 
the subordination, regulation and control of women and girls through physical, 
sexual, mental and emotional abuse happens in every culture and uses the same 
mechanisms the world over. It would seem on the face of it that we have a 
contradiction; if the subordination and violation of women and girls uses the same 
tools of regulation, control and legitimization, then why have specific services for 
Black women? Why have Black women-only spaces?  What is so different? 
Before we discuss what the answer is, I want to say something more about 
what the answer is not.  The wrong answers are particularly dangerous because 
they cover up and mask the real issues. The wrong answers function on 
camouflage and mimicry, so that when the real issues are voiced, when the real 
issues are made visible, they are not believed or recognised. What the answer is 
not is particularly dangerous because it silences women about the right answers.  
The result is that women are doubted and doubt themselves. Women are silenced 
and keep silent. Women know that the answers they are given are wrong. Women 
know from their lived experience what the answer is not, and in the face of no 
alternatives, they feel confused, isolated, mad and bad.    
bell hooks: ‘Feminism has its party line and women who feel a need for a 
different strategy, a different foundation, often find themselves ostracized and 
silenced’ (hooks, 1984:9).  
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Audre Lorde: ‘There is a pretense to homogeneity of experience covered by the 
word sisterhood that does not in fact exist’ (Lorde, 1980a:116). 
Chandra Talpade Mohanty: ‘I am trying to uncover how ethnocentric 
universalism is produced in certain analyses.  As a matter of fact, my argument 
holds for any discourse that sets up its own authorial subjects as the implicit 
referent, that is, the yardstick by which to encode and represent cultural others.  It 
is in this move that power is exercised in discourse’ (Mohanty, 1984:21).  
Elizabeth Spelman: ‘[P]ositing an essential “womanness” has the effect of 
making women inessential in a variety of ways.  First of all, if there is an essential 
womanness that all women have and have always had, then we needn’t know 
anything about any woman in particular.  For the details of her situation and her 
experience are irrelevant to her being a woman.  Thus if we want to understand 
what “being a woman” means, we needn’t investigate her individual life or any 
other woman’s individual life.  All those particulars become inessential to her 
being and our understanding of her being a woman.  And so she also becomes 
inessential in the sense that she is not needed in order to produce the “story of 
woman”. If all women have the same story “as women”, we don’t need a chorus 
of voices to tell the story (Spelman, 1988a:236).  
bell hooks: ‘Defined in this way, it is unlikely that women would join feminist 
movement simply because we are biologically the same’(hooks, 1984:24).  
Simone de Beauvoir: ‘Certainly woman like man is a human being; but such an 
assertion is abstract; the fact is that every concrete human being is always 
uniquely situated. Rejecting the notions of the eternal feminine, the black soul or 
the Jewish character is not to deny that there are today Jews, blacks or women: 
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this denial is not a liberation for those concerned, but an inauthentic flight. 
Clearly, no woman can claim without bad faith to be situated beyond her sex’ (de 
Beauvoir, 2010:4).  
bell hooks: ‘As a black woman interested in feminist movement, I am often asked 
whether being black is more important than being a woman; whether feminist 
struggle to end sexist oppression is more important than the struggle to end racism 
and vice-versa’ (hooks, 1984:29).  
Kadiatu Kanneh: ‘The idea that women should ignore the divisions between 
themselves and sweep together across class, race and national boundaries to create 
a post-historical Utopian home, bypasses the knowledge that racial oppression has 
always created the body from obsessive fantasies of biology and environment’ 
(Kanneh, 1992:296). 
Suryia Nayak: The tension is that the very problem that gives rise for the need 
for Black women-only provision could easily become the problem that Black 
women-only spaces reproduce.  Here, I am imagining a Black women-only, 
‘Native Informant’ (Spivak, 1986:66) ‘party line’ (hooks, 1984:9) that inverts the 
‘inauthentic flight’ (de Beauvoir, 2010:4)  based on an assumed authenticity that 
would only reproduce essentialism.  
Sara Suleri: ‘The claim to authenticity - only a black can speak for a black; only 
a postcolonial subcontinental feminist can adequately represent the lived 
experience of that culture - points to the great difficulty posited by the 
“authenticity” of female racial voices in the great game that claims to be the first 
narrative of what the ethnically constructed woman is deemed to want. This desire 
all too often takes its theoretical form in a will to subjectivity that claims a 
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theoretical basis most clearly contravened by the process of its analysis’ (Suleri, 
1992:251). 
Kelly Oliver: The crux of the matter is that ‘Fanon insists that racist social 
structures create racist psychic structures’ (Oliver, 2001:34).  
Suryia Nayak:  A certain logic flows from this; we all live in a racist society, and 
racism shapes who we are and makes us all racist subjects, regardless of whether 
we are black or white.  And here is the clever bit; actually, it has nothing and 
everything to do with the colour of skin.  
Unfortunately, this logic becomes the basis for the following argument; 
because we are all constituted by racism, the specificity of being black or white is 
redundant, or to highlight colour is to replicate racist structures, practices and 
thinking. It is a logic used to question the legitimacy of Black women-only 
spaces.  
Audre Lorde: ‘I can’t tell you how many good white psychwomen have said to 
me, “Why should it matter if I am Black or white?” who would never think of 
saying, “Why does it matter if I am female or male?”’ (Lorde, 1983a:161-162).  
Suryia Nayak: The question is that if ‘racist social structures create racist psychic 
structures,’ does this operate differently for Black and white people, and if so, 
how and why?   
Audre Lorde: I am reminded of the opening sentence to my essay, ‘Sexism: An 
American Disease in Blackface’ found in Sister Outsider: ‘Black feminism is not 
white feminism in blackface’ (Lorde, 1979a:60).  
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Suryia Nayak:  It seems to me that ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in 
blackface,’ and could never be, precisely because ‘racist social structures create 
racist psychic structures’ Audre, I want to stay with your provocative sentence, 
‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ as an anchor for our 
conversation today. Four words from this sentence could act as theoretical lenses 
to look at how and why ‘racist social structures create racist psychic structures’ 
Let me outline this: 
 The word ‘feminism’ as a lens; here, I am concerned with ideology as a 
mechanism to convert the social into the psychic;  
 The word ‘not’ as a lens; here, I am particularly fascinated with the 
difficult dependency each of us has on the ‘not’ and the relationality of the 
‘not’;  
 The word ‘in’ as a lens; here, I want to explore how ideology is ‘in’ skin;  
 The word ‘blackface’ as a lens; all I want to say at this point is: beware of 
mimicry.  
In the context of this conversation, ‘Black feminism is not white feminism 
in blackface’ could be restated as: ‘Black liberation theories are not white 
liberation theories in blackface.’ In other words, liberation ideological approaches, 
in order to be liberating at all, must take into consideration the fact that particular 
social structures create particular psychic structures.   
Judith Butler: ‘Such a project requires thinking the theory of power together 
with a theory of the psyche…power that at first appears as external, pressed upon 
the subject, pressing the subject into subordination, assumes a psychic form that 
constitutes the subject’s self-identity’ (Butler, 1997c:3).  
  
 118    
 
Suryia Nayak: Women only spaces and services must attend to the specificity of 
the ‘pressing’, because if this assumes a different psychic form in the constitution 
of Black and white women then the implications are far reaching.  
Audre Lorde: ‘Thus, in a patriarchal power system where whiteskin privilege is a 
major prop, the entrapments used to neutralize Black women and white women 
are not the same’ (Lorde, 1980a:118).  
Suryia Nayak: The imperative is to attend to the specificity of the ‘entrapments’ 
and, when this specificity is applied to the sentence, ‘Black feminism is not white 
feminism in blackface,’ it opens up a whole range of implications.  Audre, you 
imply much more than a reductionist black and white binary division translated 
into separatist Black and white women only spaces and services.  ‘Black feminism 
is not white feminism in blackface’ invokes the interdependency of difference 
with the inherent political and epistemological problems, paradoxes and 
ambivalence of dependency and reliance on the ‘Other’.  
Audre Lorde: In ‘An Open Letter to Mary Daly’ (Lorde, 1979c), I speak directly 
that: ‘To imply, however, that all women suffer the same oppression simply 
because we are women is to lose sight of the many varied tools of patriarchy.  It is 
to ignore how those tools are used by women without awareness against each 
other.’ (Lorde, 1979c:67) ‘For then beyond sisterhood is still racism’ (Lorde, 
1979c:70).  
Suryia Nayak:  Audre, you establish as political the very terms through which 
Black feminism is articulated and identified.  Audre, I like your use of the word 
‘tools’ and your caution that if we do not get to grips with the ‘many varied tools’ 
of a racist, homophobic patriarchy, how on earth would we be aware of using 
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them against each other as Black and white feminists?  I propose a feminist 
mechanics of theory to encourage a labouring on the engineering of theory.
   
 I 
contend that the tools we use need to be sharp, precise and fit for the job.   
Furthermore, the subject under analysis, for example the concepts, issues 
and tensions that require engineering, constitute the tools required for the job.  In 
other words, ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ is at once the 
subject under analysis and constitutes the tools for analysis.  ‘Beyond sisterhood,’ 
indeed beyond separate spaces, there is still racism and this applies whether we 
self-define as a Black or white feminist. ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in 
blackface’ goes to the heart of fundamental questions concerning the basis, 
membership, definition and aim of feminism.  The statement provokes questions 
as to who and what is foreclosed, and how, and who is constituted, in what ways 
and why?  
Let’s play with your quote, Audre, to get a feel of the possible 
implications. ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ provokes 
questions such as: would there be Black feminism without white feminism? 
Would there be white feminism without Black feminism? In the context of racist 
assumed white supremacy, can there be feminism without the prefixes of ‘black’ 
and ‘white’? How do the signifiers ‘black’ and ‘white’ function? 
An ideology, space or service does not become a Black ideology, space or 
service by painting a black face on it. A white, Eurocentric ideology does not 
convert to a black version by having black faces in the literature, research, 
conferences or institutions.  Any ideology, movement and force for change do not 
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become black by increasing the representation of a particular pigmentation. So, it 
has nothing and everything to do with the colour of skin.  
Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks: ‘Racial identity, too, I would like to suggest - i.e., 
words like black and white, when used as nouns - works like names.  That is, they 
are rigid designators - they are signifiers that have no signified. […] it may be 
more productive to view racial color designators as operating not unlike proper 
names. The proper name is nether wholly one’s own (i.e., we are all named by 
others) nor is it meaningful. […] No set of qualitative descriptions can establish 
black or white identity across all possible worlds, but we cannot therefore say that 
black and white do not exist’ (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000a:141; parentheses in 
original) 
Toni Morrison: In my short story, Recitatif (Morrison, 1983), I experimented 
with ‘the removal of all racial codes from a narrative about two characters of 
different races for whom racial identity is crucial’ (Morrison, 1992:xi).  
Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks:  My reading of Recitatif enabled me to understand 
the questions: ‘When the signifier “black” or “white” points to a specific body, 
what have we discovered about it? Is there some knowledge, something that we 
know, due to the function of the signifier?’ (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000a:148).  
Suryia Nayak: The key is not in the noun(s), but how the nouns act as envelopes 
or containers that transport and transform racist social structures into racist 
psychic structures. 
Louis Althusser:  The way I understand the relationship between social structures 
and psychic structures is that ‘ideology “acts” or “functions” in such a way that it 
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“recruits” subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or “transforms” the 
individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation 
which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the 
lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: “Hey, you 
there!”’ (Althusser, 1971:33; parentheses and emphasis in original).   
Suryia Nayak: So, it could be argued that the recruitment is different for different 
individuals and the transforming is different for different individuals.  
Elspeth Probyn: Black ideology is not white ideology in blackface because ‘we 
are interpellated differently…we are hailed by different ideologies in different 
ways’ (Probyn, 2003:298).  
Suryia Nayak: Having established some basic principles and a general context, 
let us look at the four lenses outlined at the beginning of our conversation:  
 
The First Lens: The Word ‘feminism’  
Feminism – could be described as an ideology to counter and expose oppressive 
patriarchal social productions of women. Even if one were to argue that the 
oppressive effects of patriarchy are universal, feminist ideologies cannot be not 
universally applied because we are hailed and constituted as subjects differently.  
Judith, in The Psychic Life of Power you speak of a ‘passionate attachment’ to 
‘injurious interpellations’ (Butler, 1997c:7 and 104, respectively). So, there is the 
hailing and there is our ‘passionate attachment’ to the hailing, even when the 
hailing oppresses us. 
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Because Black people are recruited, transformed and attached differently 
than white people, and white people are recruited, transformed and attached 
differently to Black people, the ideology required to look at the specificity of the 
recruitment, the specificity of the transformation and the specificity of the 
attachment cannot be the same for Black and white people.  Let us shift the focus 
from ideology to space, remaining with mechanisms of production and 
constitution.   
Elspeth Probyn: ‘the space and place we inhabit produce us’ (Probyn, 2003: 
294).  
Suryia Nayak: Thus, subjectivity is constituted by space and place. If we accept 
that Black and white people inhabit different spaces, it follows that the space and 
place that produces Black subjectivity is not the space and place that produces 
white subjectivity.   
So we have a situation where the Black and white psyche are constituted 
and regulated differently because they occupy different spaces, and are recruited, 
transformed and passionately attached differently. Black women only reflective, 
consciousness raising and service provision spaces acknowledge these differences 
for Black and white women. In all of the Black women-only spaces and services 
we have created, Black women report that it is either or both the first and only 
space available in their lives to share and bear witness to their lived experience of 
the ways that racism, sexism and other forms of oppression intersect.  
The Combahee River Collective: ‘The overwhelming feeling that we had is that 
after years and years we has finally found each other’ (The Combahee River 
Collective, 1977:268). 
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Audre Lorde: ‘Black women and our children know the fabric of our lives is 
stitched with violence and with hatred, that there is no rest…For us, increasingly, 
violence weaves through the daily tissues of our living - in the supermarket, in the 
classroom, in the elevator, in the clinic and the schoolyard, from the plumber, the 
baker, the saleswoman, the bus driver, the bank teller, the waitress who does not 
serve us.  Some problems we share as women, some we do not’ (Lorde, 
1980a:119).  
 
The Second Lens: The Word ‘not’  
‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ is not simply referring to 
sameness and difference.  Audre, you trouble the notion of a shared feminism 
through the word ‘not.’  The distinction between Black feminism and white 
feminism is made available by the ‘not.’ This should not be confused with fixed, 
oppositional, essentialist categories of black and white. The ‘not’ functions to 
embody a difficult interdependency of difference on the ‘Other,’ especially where 
there is a power differential.   
If the basis for identification and recognition is in relation to the Other, 
and if for Black feminisms the ‘Other’ is white feminisms, and vice-versa, the 
relationality is paradoxical on a cognitive level and intensely uncomfortable on an 
emotional level.  This is why the answer to the question of why do we need to 
have Black women only spaces and services is so difficult to hear.   
In other words, the constitution of Black feminism is contingent upon an 
interdependency with white feminism predicated on the ‘not.’ It is Black 
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feminism because it is not white feminism. This dynamic is embodied and 
performed in the linguistic structure of the statement.    
Julia Kristeva: ‘The notion of intertextuality replaces that of intersubjectivity, 
and poetic language is read as at least double’ (Kristeva, 1969:37; emphasis in 
original).  
Suryia Nayak:  So, it could go something like: intertexuality as intersubjectivity, 
where the sum of the parts is greater than the individual elements, as in 
intersectionality.  
Julia Kristeva: ‘each word (text) is an intersection of word (texts) where at least 
one other word (text) can be read…any text is the absorption and transformation 
of another…The word as minimal textual unit thus turns out to occupy the status 
of mediator, linking structural models to cultural (historical) environment, as well 
as that of regulator’ (Kristeva, 1969:37; parentheses and emphasis in original). 
Suryia Nayak: Examination of the function, position, significance, constitution 
and configuration of the gap(s) between the words in ‘Black feminism is not white 
feminism in blackface’ is a method to deconstruct the intersubjective 
interdependence of the words. To be more specific, the space and place between 
the words in ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ function as the 
space and place between Black and white feminisms. 
Julia Kristeva: ‘The word is spatialized’ (Kristeva, 1969:37).  
Rajagopalan Radhakrishnan:  ‘The politics of location is productive…because 
it makes one location vulnerable to the claims of another and enables multiple 
contested readings of the one reality from a variety of locations and 
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positions…unless the many mediations that interpellate location are studied in all 
their interconnectedness, locational analyses will be no more than exercises in 
defensive self-absorption’ (Radhakrishnan, 2000:56-57).  
Suryia Nayak: Can I just add in here the issue of recognition and misrecognition 
as fundamental to ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface.’ What we 
recognise or do not recognise determines whether or not ‘we lose sight of the 
complex and multiple ways’ (Alarcón, 1990:361) in which different women are 
hailed and constituted. Feminist epistemology, inquiry and activism must examine 
the detail of the one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion as an act of 
recognised hailing.  
Sojourner Truth’s experience is a classic example of misrecognition. In 
1851 at the Women's Convention in Ohio, even amongst other women, she had to 
ask over and over again, because it wasn’t obvious, despite the fact that she was 
baring her breasts, ‘Ain’t I A Woman?’  As a Black slave, Sojourner was not 
recognised as a woman. The acts of recognition and misrecognition are mutually 
contingent and constitutive. 
Stuart Hall: ‘identities are constructed through, not outside, difference. This 
entails the radically disturbing recognition that it is only through the relation to 
the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been 
called its constitutive outside that the “positive” meaning of any term - and thus its 
“identity” - can be constructed…identities can function as points of identification 
and attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render 
“outside”, abjected.  Every identity has at its “margin”, an excess, something 
more.  The unity, the internal homogeneity, which the term identity treats as 
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foundational is not a natural, but a constructed form of closure’ (Hall, 1996:17-18; 
emphasis in original). 
Suryia Nayak:  Sojourner Truth personified the ‘constitutive outside.’ 
Identification and attachment amongst the men and women at the convention was 
based on shared commonalities between them. They did not recognise that their 
identification was based on what is different and, thus, excluded and left out. 
Their shared identification and identity as women at the convention was 
contingent upon misrecognition of the ‘Other.’  Sojourner Truth was the ‘Other’ 
and found herself repeating the question, ‘Ain’t I A Woman?’  The point is that 
the ‘constitutive outside’ contingent upon misrecognition creates its own separate 
spaces.  The Women's Convention in Ohio in 1851 effectively became a separate 
space that Sojourner Truth was excluded from.  
Returning to the concern about answers that I opened this conversation 
with, it would appear that the wrong answer, or what the answer is not, is 
constituted by what it excludes and leaves outside - namely, what the answer is.   
There are several intersecting tensions here: the ‘not’ is only the ‘not’ in 
relation to what it actually is, or is not, and this is highly problematic because it 
edges far too close to the dangerous claim of an authentic subject.  Black can only 
be black because it is not white, and white is white because it is not black; thus, 
black and white are mutually constitutive.  The border between black and white 
produces a false binary.   
The predicament is that the ‘not’ demarcates the border of specificity that 
enables us to distinguish Black feminism from white feminism – how else could 
  
 127    
 
we spot the masquerade of white feminism in ‘blackface’?  However, borders are 
indeterminable; borders are mutually constitutive; the tension is that borders are 
not real, they are constructions that cease to exist under deconstruction (Thiongo, 
1996:120).   
To summarise, ‘racist social structures create racist psychic structures’ 
even though the recruitment, transformation and ‘passionate attachment’ are 
different, the ‘not’ reminds us that the difference is in relation to, interdependent 
of, and contingent upon, the ‘not.’ The quandary is how to create black women 
only spaces and services that give voice to the specificity of particular 
entrapments whilst also giving voice to the interdependency of difference, without 
falling foul of authenticity and borders.   
 
The Third Lens: The Word ‘in’    
How does the social get into the psyche in order to create and transform? We have 
established that recruitment and ‘passionate attachment’ mean that the getting ‘in’ 
is different for Black and white people with different effects, even though they are 
constituted by, and through, each other. 
Judith Butler: ‘a theory of subject formation must give an account of this process 
of incorporation, and the notion of incorporation must be interrogated to ascertain 
the psychic topography it assumes’ (Butler, 1997c:19).  
Suryia Nayak: Judith, where you speak of ‘incorporation,’ Frantz Fanon speaks 
of ‘epidermalization’ in relation to the specificity of racism.  Here is where the 
epidermis, or the black skin, comes in very specifically and directly. 
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Frantz Fanon: In Black Skins, White Masks, I use the term ‘epidermalization’ to 
describe the process whereby: ‘If there is an inferiority complex, it is the outcome 
of a double process: - primarily, economic; - subsequently, the internalization – 
or, better, the epidermalization - of this inferiority’ (Fanon, 2008:4). More 
specifically I talk about ‘a racial epidermal schema’ (Fanon, 2008:84).  
Audre Lorde:   ‘Did bad mean Black? The endless scrubbing with lemon juice in 
the cracks and crevices of my ripening, darkening, body.  And oh, the sins of my 
dark elbows and knees, my gums and nipples, the folds of my neck and the cave 
of my armpits!’ (Lorde, 1983a:149).  
Suryia Nayak: In my close re-reading of your words, Audre, the space and place 
of the ‘cracks,’ ‘crevices,’ ‘folds’ and ‘cave’ function in the ‘racial epidermal 
schema’ (Fanon, 2008:84) performatively (invoking the endless repetition) to 
embody the anxiety and ambivalence in the gap of the ‘not’ white, which needs to 
be reformed into a ‘not’ Black.  
We could say that the skin functions as a surface for the incorporation or 
‘epidermalization’ of the ‘psychic life of power.’ The black epidermis or 
‘blackface’ is at once both an empty signifier and a bodily envelope/skin for 
incorporation of ideology. Thus, the skin functions as a symbolic site of 
interpellation. This is why it has nothing and everything to do with the colour of 
skin.  Furthermore, it is another aspect of how social structures constitute, 
interpellate and injure Black and white people differently. 
Judith Butler: ‘I argue that this process of internalization fabricates the 
distinction between interior and exterior life…Where social categories guarantee 
a recognizable and enduring social existence, the embrace of such categories, 
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even as they work in the service of subjection, is often preferred to no social 
existence at all’ (Butler, 1997c:19-20; emphasis in original).  
Suryia Nayak: Hence, the excruciating ‘passionate attachment’ to that which 
oppresses us is one of ‘the many varied tools of patriarchy (Lorde, 1979c:67) that 
Audre referred to earlier on.   
Kelly Oliver: ‘the colonized do not internalize but rather epidermalize racist 
ideology. The values of racist imperialism enter the colonized through the skin.’ 
(Oliver, 2004: 51).  
Frantz Fanon: ‘I begin to suffer from not being a white man to the degree that 
the white man imposes discrimination on me, makes me a colonized native, robs 
me of all worth, all individuality, tells me that I am a parasite on the world, that I 
must bring myself as quickly as possible into step with the white world, “that I am 
a brute beast, that my people and I are like a walking dung-heap that disgustingly 
fertilizes sweet sugar cane and silky cotton, that I have no use in the world.” Then 
I will quite simply try to make myself white: that is, I will compel the white man 
to acknowledge that I am human’ (Fanon, 2008:73).  
Audre Lorde: Let me describe to you ‘the stormy little Black girl who once 
longed to be white or anything other than who she was, since all she was ever 
allowed to be was the sum of the color of her skin and the textures of her hair, the 
shade of her knees and elbows, and those things were clearly not acceptable as 
human. (Lorde, 1983a:174).     
Suryia Nayak: Frantz and Audre, you establish the inextricable interdependency 
between ideology, embodiment and the ‘psychic life of power.’ If feminism is a 
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political movement that questions and resists the terms ‘allowed’ and ‘acceptable’ 
(Lorde, 1983a:174) of oppression, and if these terms are different for Black 
people, it follows that Black feminism perhaps requires a questioning of, and 
resistance to, different terms than white feminism. In turn, perhaps this 
questioning and resistance require Black women-only spaces. 
 
The Fourth Lens: The Word ‘blackface’ 
Suryia Nayak: In using the word ‘blackface,’ Audre, you provoke associations of 
the Black and white minstrels.    
Homi Bhabha: ‘blackface’ conjures up the mimicry of ‘the “not quite/not white”’ 
(Bhabha, 1994:92).  Mimicry is ‘the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as 
a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite’ (Bhabha, 1994:86; 
emphasis in original).  
Suryia Nayak: In other words, in the context of colonisation, any form white 
feminism in ‘blackface’ would be an example of colonisation. The coloniser 
constructs the colonised as ‘almost the same, but not quite’ because the success of 
the takeover rests on maintaining the difference between the colonised and the 
coloniser; the coloniser cannot afford the colonised to make the mistake of 
thinking that they are equal. Well, this is a stressful situation. 
Homi Bhabha: It is in the gap of the ‘almost’ that ambivalence exists; ‘mimicry 
is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must 
continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference’ (Bhabha, 1994:86; 
emphasis in original).   
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Suryia Nayak: In using the term ‘blackface,’ I hear Audre saying: beware of 
mimicry, beware of masquerades and of how the ‘almost’ has to ‘continually 
produce its slippage.’ I am beginning to understand, Audre, why you warn us that 
‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface.’  I understand the reasons 
why you are so suspicious of such mimicry, because: 
 Mimicry is one of the entrapments used to neutralise black and white 
women.  Audre, I am reminded of your words, ‘the master’s tools will 
never dismantle the master’s house’ (Lorde, 1979b:112; emphasis in 
original);  
 Mimicry defends against the painful wrench of undoing the recruitment 
and ‘passionate attachment.’ Mimicry allows the masquerade of an 
unaltered altered position;  
 Mimicry makes collusion with oppression more palatable;  
 The ‘almost the same’ both establishes and shrinks the gap between 
different subjects making unbearable relationality more bearable. Well, the 
‘almost the same’ means that there is less need to interrogate the 
construction of difference. 
Very dangerous territory, indeed!   
 
Conclusion 
Suryia Nayak: ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ could 
translate to say ‘Black women-only feminist spaces and services are not white 
women feminist spaces and services in blackface.’ Changing the face does not 
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fundamentally change the object beneath.  It does not alter the hailing and does 
nothing to alter the unequal power differentials that racism requires. It is like ‘the 
phantom of the opera’ - still ugly beneath the mask. This is why ‘Black feminism 
is not white feminism in blackface’ has nothing and everything to do with the 
colour of skin. Thus, this is why Black women-only spaces and services have 
nothing and everything to do with the colour of skin. 
Audre Lorde:  ‘The future of our earth may depend upon the ability of all women 
to identify and develop new definitions of power and new patterns of relating 
across difference… The old patterns, no matter how cleverly rearranged to imitate 
progress, still condemn us to cosmetically altered repetitions of the same old 
exchanges, the same old guilt, hatred, recrimination, lamentation and suspicion’ 
(Lorde, 1980a:123).  
‘I urge each one of us here to reach down into that deep place of knowledge 
inside herself and touch that terror and loathing of any difference that lives there.  
See whose face it wears. Then the personal as the political can begin to illuminate 
all our choices’ (Lorde, 1979b:113; emphasis in original). 
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Chapter 3 
An Analysis and Application of  
‘Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power’ 
 
Introduction 
…it is necessary to rethink the relation between knowledge and emotion 
and construct conceptual models that demonstrate the mutually 
constitutive rather than oppositional relation between reason and emotion. 
(Jaggar, 1989:190)   
…a return to an interest in affect as that which gives rise to subjectivity, 
rather than following on from it. (Frosh and Baraitser, 2009:159)   
Between these two quotes there are two sets of relationships: knowledge and 
emotion, and subjectivity and emotion. This chapter provides a possible re-
reading of Lorde’s (1978a) paper, ‘Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power.’    
This chapter explores the ways in which Lorde demonstrates the 
inextricable link between the two sets of relationships outlined above; that of 
affect and epistemology, and that of affect and subjectivity.  For Lorde, 
epistemology constructs and constitutes affect, affect constructs and constitutes 
epistemology, affectual epistemology and epistemology of affect constructs and 
constitutes subjectivity.   
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The ‘Always Already’ 
Although Lorde does not explicitly propose these mutually constitutive relations 
in any linear sequence, her line of enquiry pushes at the temporal and spatial 
implications of the concept of the ‘always already.’ Chapter 4 of this thesis 
provides an exploration of the ways in which the ‘always already’ is taken up by a 
range of Black feminist thinkers in relation to subject constitution and 
representation.  However, with specific reference to Black women and the ‘always 
already’ of the erotic, the work of Kaplan (1996) interrogates a range of Black 
women’s writing through the lens of The Erotics of Talk…  
Actually, Lorde does not use the aphorism, ‘always already.’ In fact, in the 
text of ‘Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power,’ Lorde does not use the word 
‘already’ and only uses the word ‘always’ once, prefixed with the qualification, 
‘almost always’ (Lorde, 1978a:59).  However, as will become evident in this 
analysis, Lorde’s contestation of given constructions of the erotic and her analysis 
of the function of ‘…certain proscribed erotic comings-together’ (invoking 
‘prescribed’ and the forbidden/prohibited of ‘proscribed’) enable her to make the 
claim of an alternative woman-centred erotic (Lorde, 1978a:59).  The problem 
here is that, whether the construction of the erotic is an appropriated patriarchal 
construction or an alternative construction proposed by Lorde, the fact of a 
construction of the erotic is being proposed and exists.  In other words, there is no 
escape from the situation of a construction.  
All constructions are implicated
11
 and, as such, the following questions are 
relevant to this critical inquiry: what does the construction function to do? What 
                                                          
11
 See the ‘Introduction’ to this thesis for a fuller exploration of ‘implicated.’ 
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does the construction open up and foreclose?  What is the construction a product 
of, and what does it go on to produce?  In regards to the ‘always already,’ these 
questions imply that constructions are always and already part of an infinite web 
of différance (Derrida, 1972b). In other words, constructions are in a never-ending 
dynamic of referral and deferral to all other constructions without beginning or 
end. This point troubles the notions of appropriation and reclamation - two 
notions that are core to Lorde’s thesis concerning ‘Uses of the Erotic,’ and as 
Derrida claims, ‘I do not believe appropriation to be possible in general’ (Derrida, 
1988:141).    
Although I am proposing that these issues are pertinent to a re-reading of 
‘Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power,’ their relevance is much broader.   
Application to the political imperatives of feminist politics means that in stating 
alternative positions to those that are produced within a racist, homophobic 
patriarchy, feminist discourse and practices need to be vigilant not to fall into the 
trap of producing fundamentalist construction of that which is apparently 
appropriated, distorted and ‘Beyond the superficial…’ (Lorde, 1978a:56).  I use 
the word ‘vigilant’ because focussing on whether something has been distorted or 
not, or appropriated or not, is a distraction from the function of the distortion and 
the function of the appropriation.  
The crux of the matter lies in the issue of production. In other words, in 
the context of an examination of the ‘uses of the erotic,’ the crux of the matter is: 
what are the ‘uses of the erotic’ a production of and what do the ‘uses of the 
erotic’ produce? 
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The importance of the temporal and spatial relation between the notions of 
a before and an after in regards to knowledge and formation of subjectivity is 
fundamental to philosophical, political and literary thinking.  Heidegger’s (1962) 
explication of ‘da-sein,’ which literally means that being-there/there-being is 
bound up with the ‘always already’ (immer schon in German) in that ‘da-sein’ 
anticipates, or is ahead of, itself.  The adverb ‘always already’ disrupts the idea of 
temporal and/or spatial dimensions so that inhabiting, experiencing and knowing 
in any particular time and space have always passed (are in the past), and 
therefore, have already been.  Althusser uses the adverb ‘always already’ 
(toujours-déjà-donné in French) to disrupt the idea that there is a subject who, 
through time and space, is influenced by ideology.  Althusser uses the ‘always 
already’ to convey that subjects exist only in, and by virtue of, ideology. 
Perhaps Althusser would ask Lorde the following questions: if we are 
‘always-already interpellated,’ where did the ‘...resource within each of us that 
lies in a deeply female and spiritual plane…’ (Lorde, 1978a:53) originate? How 
did ‘…that part of us which is chaotic, messy, deep, dark, ancient, old, and 
freeing’ (Kraft, 1986:147)  escape the ‘always already’? Is there not an inherent 
contradiction in the statement, ‘If we are to create a new order, we must go back, 
back, back to what is primary…’ (Kraft, 1986:146)?  Are you saying that there is 
a ‘primary’ body of knowledge or feeling that pre-exists or was/is allowed to 
survive in the site of, or that it exists in spite of, the apparatus of racist, 
homophobic patriarchy? This imaginary encounter between Lorde and Althusser 
provokes the following questions:  does Lorde presuppose the subject prior to 
ideology? Does Lorde presuppose the agency of the subject? These questions go 
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to the heart of debates about essentialism, authenticity and the issues inherent in 
claims of reclamation.   
Rather than resorting to a reductionist interpretation of Lorde’s claims as 
positivist, or rather than resorting to an analysis that replicates the binary of 
essentialist/non-essentialist, this chapter explores how Lorde grapples with these 
tensions to open up spaces for feminist emancipation within the apparent, fixed 
boundary of racist, homophobic patriarchal interpellations.  In other words, how 
does Lorde’s reclamation of the ‘uses of the erotic’ fit with Althusser’s influential 
claim that:  
As ideology is eternal, I must now suppress the temporal form in which I 
have presented the functioning of ideology, and say: ideology has always-
already interpellated individuals as subjects, which amounts to making it 
clear that individuals are always-already interpellated by ideology as 
subjects, which necessarily leads us to one last proposition: individuals are 
always-already subjects. (Althusser, 1971:34; emphasis in original) 
Indeed, to complicate matters further, Lorde is in agreement that ideology 
constructs the subject. Lorde uses this to develop an argument that an alternate 
ideology will construct alternate subject formations and encounters. Turning to an 
interview that Lorde did with Adrienne Rich in 1979, Lorde explains: 
AL: After I published “Uses of the Erotic,” a number of women who read 
it said that this is antifeminist, that the use of the erotic as a guide is- 
AR: Antifeminist? 
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AL: Is reducing us once again to the unseen, the unstable.  That in writing 
it I am returning us to a place of total intuition without insight.  
AR: And yet, in that essay you’re talking about work and power - about 
two of the most political things that exist. 
AL: Yes, but what they see is - and I address this at the very beginning: I 
try to say that the erotic has been used against us, even the word itself, so 
often, that we have been taught to suspect what is deepest in ourselves, 
and that is the way we learn to testify against ourselves, against our 
feelings (Rich, 1979:64). 
 
Tensions of the ‘Beyond’ 
Lorde’s complex treatise on the ‘uses of the erotic’ provokes debate about the 
relationship between affective states, the production of knowledge and the 
constitution of female subjectivity.  Lorde proposes a basis for political efficacy 
founded on ‘a place of total intuition’ (Rich, 1979:64).   A close re-reading of the 
text implies that the function and place of ‘total intuition’ is located in the 
‘beyond’ illustrated in the following excerpts: 
It is never easy to demand the most from ourselves, from our lives, from 
our work. To encourage excellence is to go beyond the encouraged 
mediocrity of our society… (Lorde, 1978a:54; emphasis mine) 
Beyond the superficial, the considered phrase, “It feels right to me,” 
acknowledges the strength of the erotic into a true knowledge… (Lorde, 
1978a:56; emphasis mine) 
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The fear of our desires keeps them suspect and indiscriminately powerful, 
for to suppress any truth is to give it strength beyond endurance. The fear 
that we cannot grow beyond whatever distortions we may find within 
ourselves keeps us docile and loyal and obedient, externally defined, and 
leads us to accept many facets of our oppression as women. (Lorde, 
1978a:57-58; emphasis mine) 
I am concerned to explore the tensions of ‘beyond’ because these tensions are 
bound up with the complexity of the ‘always already.’   
My contention is that locating ‘a place of total intuition,’ the space of ‘It 
feels right to me’ and place of ‘our desires’ in the ‘beyond’ may prod at, but 
cannot provide escape from, the implicated ‘always already.’  The claim that ‘The 
fear that we cannot grow beyond whatever distortions we may find…’ implies, 
firstly, the existence of, and distinction between, distortion/distorted and a 
phenomenon that is not distortion/distorted.  Secondly, the claim implies a spatial 
and temporal relation between that which is distorted and that which is not 
distorted.  I agree with Bhabha that:  
The “beyond” is neither a new horizon, nor a leaving behind of the 
past…For there is a sense of disorientation, a disturbance of direction, in 
the “beyond”: an exploratory, restless movement caught so well in the 
French rendition of the words au-delà - here and there, on all sides, 
fort/da, hither and thither, back and forth. (Bhabha, 1994:1; italics in 
original)  
I argue that Lorde’s examination of the construction of the erotic and the 
emotional impact of the erotic destabilises:  
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…the boundary confusions built into the structure of these feelings, 
whether in the form of inside/outside, self/world, or psyche/body, reappear 
in the aesthetic forms and genres they determine. (Ngai, 2005:22)   
This particular close re-reading of ‘Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as 
Power’ examines the rhetorical strategies used by Lorde to produce ‘a sense of 
disorientation, a disturbance of direction, in the “beyond”’ (Bhabha, 1994:1) as a 
basis for feminist political efficacy.  The establishment of a ‘beyond’ is 
impossible, but, perhaps, it is within the conditions of this impossibility that the 
conditions of the possibility of transformation can be contemplated.  The essence 
of this situation is explained by Bhabha in the following way:  
“Beyond” signifies spatial distance, marks progress, promises the future; 
but our intimations of exceeding the barrier or boundary - the very act of 
going beyond - are unknowable, unrepresentable, without a return to the 
“present” which, in the process of repetition, becomes disjunct and 
displaced. (Bhabha, 1994:4; emphasis in original)   
 
Constitutive ‘Uses of the Erotic’ 
In this chapter I investigate the Constitutive ‘Uses of the Erotic’ with specific 
reference to: 
 The inherent tension of positionality of the message and the messenger in 
terms of Lorde’s position as writer, and the content of her argument; 
 How Lorde marshals the problematic of binary positions such as 
public/private and rational/non-rational to transgress borders; 
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 Lorde’s exploration of the relationship between affect in the form of the 
erotic and interpellation; 
 The problematic of the guises and function of ‘distortion’; 
 The mutually contingent, constitutive relationships between fear and 
proximity, and disconnection and connection; 
 How Lorde identifies and proposes an alternative radical re-working of the 
erotic as the basis for harnessing the power for transformation; 
 ‘Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power’ as a tool for intervention and 
thinking in relation to violence against women. 
I will show that the strategies of a close re-reading of the construction of 
Lorde’s text, tracing the lines of her enquiry, exploration of her claims, and 
textual analysis of her literary techniques and rhetorical devices, demonstrate how 
she builds a theory of reclamation as a mode of political resistance.  For example, 
her title, ‘Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power’ refuses any fixed, decided 
position of possession, or right or wrong.  The title itself is an indeterminate space 
without protagonist, without moral judgement and without a decided ‘uses of.’  
Left open, the unknown, unspecified demarcations of ‘uses of’ leaves space for 
the signification of the erotic to be altered.  The uncertainty invoked in the title 
stands in defiance of the fixed positions of the male-fashioned erotic that she is 
contesting.  However, the audience is left in no doubt that there is an inextricable 
relationship between the erotic and power. 
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Taking up Lorde’s focus on fear, proximity, anticipation, mobility, vision 
and knowledge, I examine how the sum of these is greater than the individual 
parts to form an effective strategy of female subjugation.   
Placing Lorde alongside Foucault, it could be argued that the construction 
of the erotic is an example of: 
…one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, 
certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as 
individuals. (Foucault, 1980:98)   
In ‘Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power’ Lorde examines the how the erotic 
functions as an instrument of power to constitute the female subject, so that the 
female is identified as, and is synonymous with, a racist, homophobic, patriarchal 
erotic.  Furthermore, this analysis shows that different categories of the female 
subject are identified with different facets of the erotic.  Here, I am thinking of the 
ways in which the erotic constitutes Black and white women in different ways and 
the ramifications of this in terms of, for example, feminist interventions to 
confront sexual violence against women. 
In the final section of this analysis, I make an application of this close re-
reading of ‘Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power’ to issues of sexual violence 
against women.  More specifically, the discussion uses a detailed textual analysis 
of Lorde’s paper as a framework to make critical comment on the tools of 
intervention and thinking used in grappling the specificity of sexual violence 
against Black women.  Hill Collins states that: 
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Moreover, analyzing questions of sexuality and power within an 
interpretive framework that takes intersecting oppressions into account can 
appear to be a daunting task. (Hill Collins, 2000:127) 
I contend that ‘Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power,’ for example, in thinking 
of the erotic as a bridge of connection (Lorde, 1978a:56), is relevant to this 
daunting task that is too frequently side-stepped.    
 
Critical Social Theory of ‘Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power’  
In what could be described as one of the most detailed evaluations of Lorde’s 
contribution to Black feminist thought, Rudolph Byrd states that: 
…Lorde made…a new critical social theory that provides us with the 
grammar and vocabulary to describe and define difference and the 
complex nature of oppression. (Byrd, 2009:21)   
‘Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power’ is an example of Black feminist critical 
social theory of the mutually constitutive relationship between affect, 
epistemology and subjectivity.   
Lorde recognised ‘…the need to examine the processes whereby we 
naturalize personal experience and desire into general truth’ (Landry and 
Maclean, 1996:10).  This is because the conceptual processes used in languages 
have:  
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…not fallen from the sky fully formed, and are no more inscribed in a 
topos noētos, than they are prescribed in the gray matter of the brain. 
(Derrida, 1972b:89; emphasis in original)   
Derrida’s reference to Plato’s topos noētos is particularly relevant here because it 
concerns philosophical questions such as: what is knowledge? Where does 
knowledge reside? What is the function of knowledge?  Lorde takes up these and 
other related questions with specific reference to the epistemology of the erotic.  
Bornedal explains that:  
…noein, is commonly translated “thinking.”  But Heidegger suggests the 
other translation, “perceive,” and emphasizes that such a perception is not 
the passive reception of the perceived.  With noein as perception, there is 
an active element because what is perceived is specifically “taken-to-
heart” (Wahr-nehmen). (Bornedal, 1997:76; italics and emphasis in 
original)   
Lorde is particularly interested to expose the ‘active element’ in the erotic.  Lorde 
confronts racist, homophobic, patriarchal thinking of the erotic that women ‘take-
to-heart’ and proposes an alternative taking-to-heart, with a particular emphasis 
on the heart.  For Lorde, the active element of perception should not involve a 
Cartesian dualism of mind and body.    
In an interview with Kraft, Lorde speaks about the relationship between 
knowledge and emotion:  
…the white fathers are the ones who have said “I think, therefore I am,” 
having the concept that it is only through our thoughts, through our 
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intellectual, rational processes that we gain freedom.  This is not 
true…That is, I believe, a real distortion of reality.  I think that patriarchy 
has elevated the whole question of rationality to a point where it no longer 
has a context…we are now trapped in the age of rationality that has no 
vision at one end and has no acknowledgement of the true sources of self 
on the other…there has been a false emphasis in Western European 
thought upon what is rational and a total rejection of what is emotional. 
(Kraft, 1986:147-148)   
It will become clear that the binary of the rational/non-rational that is ‘a real 
distortion of reality’ functions as part of a network that produces the effect of 
distortion.  
Distortion is constituted within intersecting and mutually contingent 
binaries, such as the rational/non-rational ‘…fashioned within the context of male 
models of power’ (Lorde, 1978a:53), so that:  
…women are maintained at a distant/inferior position to be psychically 
milked, much the same way ants maintain colonies of aphids to provide a 
life-giving substance for their masters. (Lorde, 1978a:54)  
The connotations conjured here of women as less than human, juxtaposed with the 
connotations conjured up within the non-rational, the intuitive and the emotional, 
produce a basis for treating women as objects and uncivilized animals.  The 
dehumanization of women legitimizes sexual violence against women.  The 
dehumanization of Black women legitimized/ legitimizes their sexual, emotional 
and physical enslavement. Black feminists such as Davis (1978), Hill Collins 
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(2000), hooks (1982) and Walker (1981, 1982) provide overwhelming 
documentation and theorization of:  
Black women’s portrayal in pornography as caged, chained, and naked 
creatures who possess “panther-like,” savage, and exotic qualities…In a 
context where Whiteness as symbolic of both civilization and culture is 
used to separate objects from animals, racial difference constructed on the 
bedrock of sexuality becomes the distinguishing feature in determining the 
type of objectification women will encounter. (Hill Collins, 2000:139)  
It is clear that processes of disconnection between women operate on 
every level in a ‘divide and rule’ strategy within the sexual objectification of 
women.  Disconnected within our own bodies, sense of self and disconnected 
from each other:   
…our lives are limited by external and alien forms, and we conform to the 
needs of a structure that is not based on human need, let alone an 
individual’s. (Lorde, 1978a:58)   
Irigaray described the effect for women as:  
…a masochistic prostitution of her body to a desire that is not her own, 
and it leaves her in a familiar state of dependency upon man.  Not 
knowing what she wants, ready for anything, even asking for more, so 
long as he will “take” her as his “object” when he seeks his own pleasure. 
(Irigaray, 1977:250)   
In her opening statements, Lorde provides an outline of her treatise: 
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There are many kinds of power, used and unused, acknowledged or 
otherwise.  The erotic is a resource within each of us that lies in a deeply 
female and spiritual plane, firmly rooted in the power of our unexpressed 
or unrecognized feeling.  In order to perpetuate itself, every oppression 
must corrupt or distort those various sources of power within the culture of 
the oppressed that can provide energy for change.  For women, this has 
meant a suppression of the erotic as a considered source of power and 
information within our lives. (Lorde, 1978a:53)     
Here, Lorde defines and identifies the erotic as a resource, a source of information 
and power; a type of power with the energy for change.  She begins her address 
by establishing a close proximity to the women in the conference with emotional 
intimacy and immediacy.  Lorde’s performance is erotic. In doing this, Lorde is 
actively contesting the lack of proximity invoked through patriarchal 
constructions of the erotic.  She is direct and quickly builds a personal 
identification that works both on the individual and the collective level: ‘The 
erotic is a resource within each of us…’ (Lorde, 1978a:53).   In other words, 
everyone in the audience (those physically present and those ‘of us’ who go on to 
read and re-read the address) is included, both in terms of being constrained and 
released by the erotic.   
As will become clearer later in this chapter, the technique of building a 
bridge across the differences in the room amongst the participants of the 
conference, through the uses of ‘us,’ ‘we’ and ‘our,’ juxtaposed with ‘female’ and 
‘women,’ performs exactly what she is about to argue for - namely, 
interconnections.  Lorde explains that: ‘By “we” I mean not just the chosen few 
but all of us who are human’ (Winter, 1976:12).   Lorde’s use of pronouns reflects 
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her passionate political belief in building bridges of collective action.  Lorde 
outlines ‘uses of the erotic’ as a force for interconnection through the metaphor of 
a bridge that ‘lessens the threat’ of difference (Lorde, 1978a:56).   
 
Precarious Positionality 
As will become evident through this analysis, Lorde’s use of rhetorical devices 
and literary techniques both perform and embody the complexity of her message.  
However, the irresolvable inherent tension that is very apparent in ‘Uses of the 
Erotic: The Erotic as Power’ and present in all of Lorde’s writing is that of 
proposing the interdependency of difference and non-hierarchical alliances, whilst 
advocating for recognition of the specificity of the lives of Black women and, at 
the same time, maintaining her precarious position as a writer, speaker and 
activist. The predicament is that Lorde imposes an authorial speaking position and 
undoes this position at the same time.  This is exactly what she is doing with her 
examination of the erotic - she does and undoes the ‘uses of the erotic,’ and in 
doing so, she does and undoes ‘the erotic as power.’ 
Thus, the predicament of positionality is manifested in the message, the 
delivery of the message and the messenger.  Derrida explains the complexity of 
this movement,  
I am just one who, like others, is seeking his place, and who does not talk 
from an already identifiable place.  When the voice vibrates, when one 
hears this voice one hears a voice which cannot be localized; it makes 
itself heard because the place of enunciation is not fixed . . . it is a 
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phantom-voice, a voice that searches for its place.  (Derrida, 1983, cited in 
Bornedal, 1997:82; emphasis in original)   
 
Eros 
In negotiating her claims, Lorde traces the etymology of the erotic and invokes the 
characteristics, function and relationships of Eros outlined in Greek mythology.  I 
propose that Lorde’s use of this genre of mythology that is foundational to 
Western civilization, culture and philosophy is a deliberate literary strategy.  
Firstly, the use of recognised mythical figures inherent in mainstream 
Western culture forms a connection with the audience through recognition of a 
familiar, known myth.  This shared knowing and recognition is simultaneously 
disrupted, provoking the audience to revisit and question their knowing.  The 
function of the myth, Arlow argues:  
…constitutes a form of adaptation to reality and to the group in which the 
individual lives, and how it influences the crystallization of the 
individual identity and the formation of the superego. (Arlow, 1961, cited 
in Merkur, 2005:65) 
Secondly, it enables Lorde to draw on a range of unearthly characters that 
are above and beyond the earthly interpellations of ideology.  We are transported 
to the world of the mythical and that transportation, no matter how fleeting, 
kindles the possibility of other spaces.   
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Thirdly, the implications of this move enable her to invoke the non-
rational, chaotic, mythic basis of the apparently rational culture and civilization 
that embraces Eros.   
Fourthly, Lorde’s reference to Eros enables her to demonstrate something 
about how distortion works - namely, the distortion of Eros.  More specifically, it 
points to the aspects of the myth that support the key planks of her treatise.  Lorde 
states:  
The very word erotic comes from the Greek word eros, the personification 
of love in all its aspects - born of Chaos, and personifying creative power 
and harmony.  When I speak of the erotic, then, I speak of it as an 
assertion of the lifeforce of women… (Lorde, 1978a:55; italics in original)   
Thus, reference to Eros enables Lorde to establish a definition of the erotic which 
moves beyond the sexual.  Lorde’s re-working of the erotic through reference to 
the myth of Eros edges very close to mythopoesis and, as such, performs the 
creative potential of the erotic that she is arguing for.   
Born of ‘Chaos,’ Eros, a daimon, exists between divinity and mortality 
representing an agent that bridges, connects and harmonises different elements on 
different planes. Thus, Eros seeks to operate simultaneously and seamlessly on 
spiritual, emotional, intellectual and material planes.  Plato’s Symposium 
represents Eros as a force for transformation that promotes wisdom, wholeness 
and unfolds gnosis. Aphrodite, the personification of freedom and equality, the 
mother of Eros, endows Eros with freedom from fear, the courage to face the 
unknown and the capacity to question conventions which threaten the creative 
processes of the mind.  Lorde’s epistemology of the erotic fuses fundamental 
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characteristics of the mythology of Eros with feminist political theory, and an 
analysis of subject formation, incarceration and emancipation.  Keating cautions 
that:  
This combination of politics, spirituality, and myth seems untenable to 
many contemporary academic critics…it implies a nostalgic world-view 
and a metaphysics - a synthesis of psychic, supernatural, and material 
forces - often dismissed as irrelevant to twentieth-century concerns.  
Because western-trained readers frequently equate tribal myths with 
superstitious beliefs, they regard mythico-religious systems as 
unsophisticated, inaccurate, and naive. (Keating, 1996:20)    
 
‘Uses of the Erotic’: Fear 
In this section of the analysis, I draw on Ahmed’s (2004) work on ‘the affective 
politics of fear’ which reflects ‘…the role of fear in the conservation of power…’ 
(Ahmed, 2004:64). The text of ‘Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power’ is 
structured through the use of repetition and an example of this can be seen in the 
word ‘fear.’  Lorde refers to the word ‘fear’ eight times (three of which are within 
one paragraph) during her paper, underscoring the use of ‘fear’ as one of the ‘uses 
of the erotic.’  However, Lorde does not use the word ‘fear’ in relation to being 
frightened of something monstrous or harmful; quite the opposite, Lorde refers to 
‘fear’ in relation to a racist, homophobic patriarchal fear of ‘the erotic as a 
considered source of power’ (Lorde, 1978a:53) for women.  Thus, the use of 
‘fear’ is primarily to disconnect women from their source of energy, creativity and 
self-affirmation:  
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As women, we have come to distrust that power which rises from our 
deepest and nonrational knowledge. We have been warned against it all 
our lives by the male world, which values this depth of feeling enough to 
keep women around in order to exercise it in the service of men, but which 
fears this same depth too much to examine the possibilities of it within 
themselves. (Lorde, 1978a:53-54; emphasis mine) 
 
But the erotic offers a well of replenishing and provocative force to the 
woman who does not fear its revelation, nor succumb to the belief that 
sensation is enough. (Lorde, 1978a:54; emphasis mine)  
 
But giving in to the fear of feeling and working to capacity is a luxury 
only the unintentional can afford, and the unintentional are those who do 
not wish to guide their own destinies. (Lorde, 1978a:54; emphasis mine)  
 
Another important way in which the erotic connection functions is the 
open and fearless underlining of my capacity for joy. (Lorde, 1978a:56; 
emphasis mine)  
 
And that deep and irreplaceable knowledge of my capacity for joy comes 
to demand from all of my life that it be lived within the knowledge that 
such satisfaction is possible, and does not have to be called marriage, nor 
god, nor an afterlife. This is one reason why the erotic is so feared…’ 
(Lorde, 1978a:57; my emphasis on ‘feared’)  
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We have been raised to fear the yes within ourselves, our deepest cravings. 
But, once recognised, those which do not enhance our future lose their 
power and can be altered. The fear of our desires keeps them suspect and 
indiscriminately powerful, for to suppress any truth is to give it strength 
beyond endurance. The fear that we cannot grow beyond whatever 
distortions we may find within ourselves keeps us docile... (Lorde, 
1978a:57-58; my emphasis on ‘fear’)  
In all of these examples, Lorde uses ‘fear’ in relation to fear of the ‘depth,’ 
‘revelation,’ ‘replenishing and provocative force,’ ‘feelings,’ ‘capacity for joy,’ 
‘cravings,’ the ‘nonrational,’  the capacity to ‘grow beyond’ and ‘the yes within 
ourselves.’  It is clear from this tracing of the uses of ‘fear’ in the weave of the 
text that Lorde positions ‘fear’ on the side of patriarchal ‘uses of the erotic.’ 
Consequently, what is feared are women who ‘…are less willing to accept 
powerlessness, or those other supplied states of being…such as resignation, 
despair, self-effacement, depression, self-denial’ (Lorde, 1978a:58) because 
‘…women so empowered are dangerous’ (Lorde, 1978a:55).   
 
‘The affective politics of fear’ (Ahmed, 2004) is a key strategy for 
delimiting vision and knowledge as a mechanism for the regulation and control of 
women.  The importance of deconstructing the function of fear is explained by 
Massumi:  
…if we are unable to separate ourselves from our fear, and if fear is a 
power mechanism for the perpetuation of domination, . . . our unavoidable 
participation in the capitalist culture of fear [may be] a complicity with our 
own and other’s oppression. (Massumi, 1993, cited in Ngai, 2005:302)   
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Implicit is the relationship between fear, space and proximity found in Massumi’s 
use of words such as ‘separate,’ ‘unavoidable participation’ and the notion of the 
inextricable link between ‘our own and other’s’ subjugation through ‘complicity.’  
 
‘Uses of the Erotic’: Fear and Proximity  
Both Ahmed (2004) and Lorde (1978a) explore the ways in which fear operates in 
relation to two specific axes; those of ‘proximity’ and ‘anticipation.’  The logic is 
that, because we fear the anticipated, we keep a distance; we don’t get too near to 
the unknown.  In turn, this regulates movement. It follows, therefore, that if the 
anticipated is to be kept at a distance to prevent close proximity, then this will 
influence, inform and affect movement, position and situation.  Productions of the 
distortion of the erotic keep women at a distance from each other and from their 
own/collective creativity. Subsequently, productions of distortion function to 
make the notion and/or experience of difference suspect.  Ahmed (2004) explains 
it in the following way: 
Fear’s relation to the object has an important temporal dimension: we fear 
an object that approaches us...Fear involves an anticipation of hurt or 
injury.  Fear projects us from the present into a future...So the object that 
we fear is not simply before us, or in front of us, but impresses upon us in 
the present, as an anticipated pain in the future. (Ahmed, 2004:65; 
emphasis in original)   
Ahmed turns to Heidegger for further clarification:  
That which is detrimental, as something that threatens us, is not yet within 
striking distance, but it is coming close. . . . As it draws close, this “it can, 
and yet in the end it may not” becomes aggravated.  We say, “It is 
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fearsome”.  This implies that what is detrimental as coming-close close by 
carries with it the patent possibility that it may stay away and pass us by; 
but instead of lessening or extinguishing our fearing, this enhances it. 
(Heidegger, 1962, cited in Ahmed, 2004:65; ellipsis in original) 
Crucially, Heidegger relates fear to that which is not present in either the spatial 
or temporal sense of the here and now.  Both Ahmed and Heidegger speak about 
the idea that fear works on the basis of a terror of that which is ‘not yet within 
striking distance’; that is, an anticipated object to come.  Furthermore, Heidegger 
talks about the enhancement or heightening of fear based on the anticipated, even 
though it may never materialise.  This point is articulated by Lorde in the 
following way:  
The fear of our desires keeps them suspect and indiscriminately powerful, 
for to suppress any truth is to give it strength beyond endurance. (Lorde, 
1978a:57-58) 
 
The point is that fear gains legitimacy through terror, anxiety and a phobia 
of the anticipated, of that which is unknown, unfamiliar and different.  Proximity 
is key; no one wants to get too close or near to that which they are fearful of.  This 
restricts movement, limits, regulates (becomes self-regulating of) position and 
maintains a fixity. This is not in keeping with the notion of a shifting, decentred, 
unanchored epistemology and subjectivity.  This is not in keeping with the 
qualities, experience, knowledge and power necessary to lessen the threat of 
difference, to stretch out and build bridges with others.  This delimited, fixed, 
distant position influences the vantage point for vision and looking.  Haraway 
(1988) also asks some important questions in relation to vision and looking:  
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How to see? Where to see from? What limits to vision? What to see for? 
Whom to see with? Who gets to have more than one point of view? Who 
gets blinded? Who wears blinders? Who interprets the visual field? What 
other sensory powers do we wish to cultivate besides vision? (Haraway, 
1988:289)   
Interrogation of these questions requires close proximity to the concepts, positions 
and elements which have been kept at a distance. The theme of vision will be 
explored in more detail later. However, the relationship between power and 
seeing, anticipation and proximity to that which is unknown is apparent.  Implicit 
in the questions posed by Haraway is that some are allowed, enabled to see and 
some are not, some have their vision restricted and some do not. Similarly, 
Ahmed concludes:  
So the question of what is fearsome as well as who should be afraid is 
bound up with the politics of mobility, whereby the mobility of some 
bodies involves or even requires the restriction of the mobility of others. 
(Ahmed, 2004:70) 
Butler comments:  
This kind of questioning often engenders vertigo and terror over the 
possibility of losing social sanctions, of leaving a solid social station and 
place.  That this terror is so well known gives the most credence to the 
notion that gender identity rests on the unstable bedrock of human 
invention. (Butler, 1987:27) 
Outlining the necessity of re-interpreting the relationship between the 
notion of the subject and the notion of discourse, Irigaray points to the need for a 
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‘new perception and a new conception of time and space, our occupation of 
place…’ (Irigaray, 1987, cited in Shands, 1999:87; emphasis in original).        
 
The themes of proximity, movement, position, situation and anticipation 
run throughout ‘Uses of The Erotic: The Erotic as Power’ (Lorde, 1978a).  Firstly, 
here are some of examples of how Lorde brings in the concept of proximity 
(emphasis mine in all): ‘short step’ (53); ‘context of male models’ (53); 
‘distant/inferior’ (54); ‘brings us closest to that fullness’ (55); ‘we are taught to 
separate the erotic’ (55); ‘attempts to equate’ (55); ‘nothing is farther from the 
truth’ (56); ‘forms a bridge between the sharers which can be a basis for 
understanding much of what is not shared between them’ (56).  
Secondly, in relation to the idea of the anticipated/not known/not yet here, 
Lorde refers to:  ‘not recognised’ (53), ‘unacknowledged’ (53), ‘possibilities’ 
(53), ‘revelation’ (54).   
Finally, here are some examples of Lorde invoking the idea of regulated 
movement, position and situation can be found in the following excerpts 
(emphasis mine in all): ‘which fears this same depth too much’ (54),  ‘maintained 
at a distant/inferior position’ (54 ),  ‘we have turned away from the exploration 
(54)’ ,‘to go beyond the encouraged mediocrity’ (54),  ‘the unintentional are those 
who do not wish to guide their own destinies’ (54), ‘the way my body stretches to 
music and opens into response (56); ‘lived within the knowledge’ (57); ‘When 
released from its intense and constrained pellet, it flows’(57), ‘ grow beyond . . . 
keeps us docile and loyal and obedient (58), ‘But within the european-american 
tradition . . .  certain proscribed erotic comings-together’ (59).   
 
  
 158    
 
These selections of text show the complexity of Lorde’s engagement with space, 
movement and position.  However, I would argue that although her rhetorical 
devices function to question space, movement and position, this is achieved at the 
expense of claiming an alternative space, movement and position.  The issue with 
taking a position in the act of undoing a position is bound up with the aporia of 
positionality. Gates, Jr. puts it well: 
They knew just how to keep us in our place.  And the logic was 
breathtakingly simple: If you win, you lose. (Gates, Jr., 1992, cited in 
Minh-ha, 2011:48) 
All positions are implicated and this is why ‘If you win, you lose.’ Thus, rather 
than concentrating on finding or describing a position, it may be far more 
politically circumspect to occupy the implicated position of deconstructing the 
logic, production and function of mechanisms that ‘keep us in our place.’  
 
‘Uses of the Erotic’: The Spatial Politics of Fear 
In relation to the specific ways in which fear regulates movement and orchestrates 
a particular relationship between the body, the psyche and the world, both Lorde 
(1978a) and Ahmed (2004) refer to the capacity for being ‘open’ or ‘openness.’  
Lorde states: 
Another important way in which the erotic connection functions is the 
open and fearless underlying of my capacity for joy.  In the way my body 
stretches to music and opens into response, hearkening to its deepest 
rhythms, so every level upon which I sense also opens to the erotically 
satisfying experience… (Lorde, 1978a:56; emphasis mine)    
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Notice Lorde puts together ‘open and fearless’ in her description of how the erotic 
functions.  Conversely, Ahmed explains how fear operates precisely not to open 
up:  
…openness itself is read as a site of potential danger, and as demanding 
evasive action.  Emotions may involve readings of such openness, as 
spaces where bodies and worlds meet and leak into each other.  Fear 
involves reading such openings as dangerous; the openness of the body to 
the world involves a sense of danger, which is anticipated as a future pain 
or injury…Fear involves shrinking the body; it restricts the body’s 
mobility precisely insofar as it seems to prepare the body for flight. 
(Ahmed, 2004:69; emphasis in original)   
Here, Ahmed makes the link between reading openness and shrinking 
containment that results in a ‘spatial politics of fear’ (Ahmed, 2004:69). Ahmed 
uses this link to develop a feminist analysis of how women are restricted within 
social spaces. Taking up the constituent elements of fear including the 
representation of women’s bodies, the demand for retreat as the body recoils and 
shrinks, and the subsequent shrinking of social space, Ahmed concludes that: 
Vulnerability is not an inherent characteristic of women’s bodies; rather, it 
is an effect that works to secure femininity as a delimitation of movement 
in the public, and over-inhabitance in the private. (Ahmed, 2004:70) 
Similarly, Lorde speaks about how particular spaces, including the private, are 
delimited in: ‘…the erotic so feared, and so often relegated to the bedroom 
alone…’ (Lorde, 1978a:57).  The restriction of women’s access to certain spaces 
legitimates an artificial separation between public and private, and between 
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legitimate and illegitimate mobility, producing a binary which Lorde’s 
reclamation of the erotic seeks to challenge.   
In relation to the binary between public and private spaces, and how this 
particular binary constitutes subjectivity and manages differences, Grosz (1995) 
pushes the analysis further.  Speaking about lesbianism specifically and 
discourses about the erotic, desire and women’s sexuality in general Grosz talks 
about the: 
…split between what one is and what one does that produces the very 
possibility of a notion like “the closet,” a distinction between private and 
public that refuses integration. (Grosz, 1995:225) 
The split between public and private serves as a key element preserving ‘regimes 
of sexuality’ (Grosz, 1995:217).  This ‘codification and control of sexuality’ 
(Grosz, 1995:221) functions to legitimize sexual violence against women 
exemplified in continuing legal and policy battles in relation to rape, immigration 
and the physical, emotional and material implications of domestic abuse. It is 
clear from the wealth of feminist scholarship in this area that the binary of 
public/private operates to control and constrain what is heard/unheard, 
seen/unseen in relation to women’s voices, evidence and representations (Burman, 
2005; Cowling and Reynolds, 2004; Horvath and Brown, 2009; James, 2012; 
Palmary et al., 2010; Siddiqui et al., 2008).  
Throughout her paper, Lorde shifts between, and outlines, the inextricable 
links between physical and social spaces, and mobility and psychic spaces.  
Anzaldúa comments that:  
Borders are set up to define the places that are safe and unsafe, to 
distinguish us from them.  A border is a dividing line, a narrow strip along 
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a steep edge.  A borderland is a vague and undetermined place created by 
the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary.  It is in a constant state of 
transition.  The prohibited and forbidden are its inhabitants. (Anzaldúa, 
2007:25; emphasis in original) 
Re-reading Anzaldúa in the light of Butler’s questions about delimitation enables 
an analysis of delimiting norms, power and vision as a function of borders.  Butler 
asks:  
…how do normative gender presumptions work to delimit the very field of 
description that we have for the human?  What is the means by which we 
come to see this delimiting power, and what are the means by which we 
transform it? (Butler, 1990a:99) 
In the following extracts, Lorde uses the idea of a reclaimed erotic to challenge 
the spatial politics of fear that regulates her movements and access to space: 
 …so every level upon which I sense also opens to the erotically satisfying 
experience, whether it is dancing, building a bookcase, writing a poem, 
examining an idea. (Lorde, 1978a:56) 
There is a difference between painting a back fence and writing a poem, 
but only one of quantity.  And there is, for me, no difference between 
writing a good poem and moving into sunlight against the body of a 
woman I love. (Lorde, 1978a:58) 
Here, the erotic intersects the physical, emotional, spiritual and intellectual.  The 
sunlight is not confined to a public or private space, but transcends spatial and 
temporal enclosure where an openness to ‘the woman I love’ is bright light, warm 
and poetic.  Lorde builds bookcases, writes poetry and analyses concepts, 
transgressing fixed categories of women’s work and women’s space.  In contrast 
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to the spatial politics of fear, Lorde provides a feminist analysis of the ways in 
which intersubjective connections could bridge differences, cross dichotomous 
borders and transgress boundaries prescribed by a patriarchal epistemology of the 
erotic.  
Boyce Davies comments that the work of Black feminists, including 
Lorde, participate:  
…in a growing collage of up-rising textualities.  Their works exist more in 
the realm of the “elsewhere” of diasporic imaginings than the precisely 
locatable. (Boyce Davies, 1994:88) 
Lorde’s treatise on the erotic can be read as a treatise outlining the erotic as a 
force for interdependency, for connection and for a mutual sharing, with the 
potential for transformational emancipatory change.  In her concluding remarks to 
her address, Lorde states that: ‘This deep participation has often been the 
forerunner for joint concerted actions not possible before’ (Lorde, 1978a:59).  
Here, Lorde is not just giving voice to a vision yet to be realised, but, rather, she is 
indicating that ‘the erotic as power’ as feminist praxis already exists within the 
‘“elsewhere” of diasporic imaginings’ (Boyce Davies, 1994:88). 
 
‘Uses of the Erotic’: Binaries  
The following examples illustrate the various ways in which Lorde questions 
binaries and resonate with Anzaldúa’s analysis of the relationship between 
borders, spaces, definition and constitution of subjectivity:  
There are frequent attempts to equate pornography and eroticism, two 
diametrically opposed uses of the sexual. Because of these attempts, it has 
become fashionable to separate the spiritual (psychic and emotional) from 
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the political, to see them as contradictory or antithetical. “What do you 
mean, a poetic revolutionary, a mediating gunrunner?” In the same way, 
we have attempted to separate the spiritual and the erotic, thereby reducing 
the spiritual to a world of flattened affect… (Lorde, 1978a:55-56)    
Lorde uses the text performatively, transgressing the boundaries of identity 
categories and crossing the borders of apparent contradiction.  However, in 
contesting ‘attempts to equate pornography and eroticism, two diametrically 
opposed uses of the sexual,’ Lorde is in danger of reinstating the very binary she 
seeks to undo. Lorde is in danger of proposing a construction of the erotic that 
precludes the ‘contradictory or antithetical.’  
Of course, pornography functions to objectify women, but the challenge 
for feminist movements that confront violence against women is one of occupying 
a position that objects to pornography, whilst occupying what Doyle (2006) refers 
to as the ‘dialectics of desire.’ Occupation of the dialectic of the erotic would 
acknowledge the joy, connectivity and bridge of sharing proposed by Lorde, 
whilst acknowledging the painful disconnection, and the disorientating space and 
experience of the erotic.   
In thinking about the ‘dialectic of desire,’ I find Ngai’s (2005:333) 
analysis of ‘…the striking asymmetry between the careers of disgust and desire in 
literary and cultural theory…’ particularly useful.  Ngai proposes that the 
asymmetry between ugly feelings and attractive feelings is in their construction 
and function.  Ngai’s analysis of disgust and desire provide a useful theoretical 
lens to scrutinise Lorde’s contrasting descriptions of the erotic as ‘…the 
psychotic, the plasticized sensation…the pornographic’ (Lorde, 1978a:54), and 
‘…the nurturer or nursemaid of all our deepest knowledge’ (Lorde, 1978a:56).   
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This is an example of where Lorde uses contrast as a political rhetorical 
device to separate racist, homophobic patriarchal constructions from feminist 
constructions of ‘uses of the erotic.’ However, Lorde’s separation occludes layers 
of complexity alluded to in Ngai’s analysis. This point is imperative to the 
activism of feminist theory, where communication of political imperatives can fail 
to take into account layers of complexity that cast a shadow over clear, 
authoritative political messages.  Ngai points out that:  
Even if disgust is boiled down to its kernel of repulsion, repulsion itself 
tends to be a fairly definite response, whereas the parameters of attraction 
are notoriously difficult to determine and fix.  Put simply, desire seems 
capable of being vague, amorphous, and even idiosyncratic in ways that 
disgust cannot. (Ngai, 2005:335) 
Following the direction of Ngai’s line of enquiry, the totalizing effect of 
the objectification of Black women examined later on in this chapter can be seen 
as an effect of repulsion working through the pornographic.  In other words, the 
characteristic of disgust and repulsion to ‘determine and fix’ functions to totalize.  
Critical analysis of the asymmetry between different versions of the erotic 
proposed by Lorde can open up an inquiry into the function and production of the 
erotic ‘…as that which gives rise to subjectivity, rather than following on from it’ 
(Frosh and Baraitser, 2009:159).   
Lorde brings together two elements that are opposed to each other.  The 
poetic revolutionary and the mediating gunrunner summon up powerful images of 
Anzaldúa’s (2007) borderland identities, banished to the borderlands because 
anticipation of that which is different requires decreased proximity. Lorde 
explains that ‘The dichotomy between the spiritual and the political is also false, 
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resulting from an incomplete attention to our erotic knowledge’ (Lorde, 
1978a:56).  Lorde’s argument here and throughout her paper reflects the style of a 
proselytising sermon.   
The tension is in summoning the power and impact of a sermon whilst 
being on guard against fundamentalist, fixed positions of certainty that so often 
characterize sermons set out to convert the audience.  It could be argued that 
Lorde’s repetitive references to, and connotations of, ‘corrupt or distort’ (Lorde, 
1978a:53), ‘the false belief’ (Lorde, 1978a:53) and the ‘misnamed’ (Lorde, 
1978a:54) function to establish the legitimacy and efficacy of a holy, divine 
canonical truth, light and way.   For example, in claiming that the erotic is the 
bridge between the spiritual and the political, Lorde states that it ‘…is the first and 
most powerful guiding light toward any understanding’ (Lorde, 1978a:56).  
Reminiscent of an act of faith, increased proximity, increased mobility and 
challenging the spatial politics of fear, encountering difference demands a leap 
into the unknown creation of an epistemology which is counter to ‘…a racist, 
patriarchal and anti-erotic society’ (Lorde, 1978a:59).    
In her interview with Kraft (1986), Lorde describes how she draws on 
African and Caribbean legends to represent how crossing borders of binary 
division enables alternate knowledge systems:  
MK: In Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power you described the erotic 
as one of the sources of power and knowledge in our lives. 
AL: The Power of the Erotic, the Uses of Anger, we must not run from 
these parts as women…we must be able to acknowledge all of the parts of 
ourselves…it is the West African women of Dahomey who have the 
legend, who have the belief and who demonstrate this, that there is not a 
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contradiction between the taking of lives and the giving of life, and the 
making of war, so that you have your Dahomeyan amazons who were the 
fiercest warriors of king…in the lives of so many Afro-American women, 
my mother, my mother’s generation, I saw that these women were 
nurturing, they were cherishing, they were loving, but they were also 
really tough warriors, you know.   (Kraft, 1986:148-149; italics in original) 
The mediating gunner and the poetic revolutionary are not just literary devices 
intended to parody dichotomous couplets.  Lorde is drawing on a range of 
mythical elements from Dahomey to ancient Greece to illustrate the power of the 
erotic to operate harmoniously on a range of levels with a range of elements, 
including the spiritual and the material.   
Tracking Lorde’s movements in the text performs both the connection and 
disconnection of the erotic.  For example, Lorde moves between the positions of 
distant and close proximity in her use of questions. This is illustrated in her 
position as narrator. Lorde manipulates the use and position of voice, occupies the 
space of imagination, and moves between the use of singular and collective 
pronouns, leaving all implicated.  Lorde’s complex semantic arrangement mirrors 
the processes of denial and suppression of the erotic, with particular emphasis on 
the role of compartmentalisation and dichotomous binary divisions. It could be 
argued that the struggles Lorde grapples with in trying to find and occupy an 
emancipatory erotic anticipate the struggles of current debates about the 
construction of desire, the erotic and representations of  ‘proscribed erotic 
comings- together’(Lorde, 1978a:59).   
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‘Uses of the Erotic’ in Confronting Violence against Women 
In this section of the chapter, I apply ‘Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power’ as 
an analytic framework to explore an account of gender violation experienced by 
Hill Collins (2000).  I take up this particular account because it includes the lived 
experience of gender violation and detailed testimony of that violation.   
In using Lorde as a framework to investigate Hill Collins’ experience, my 
intention is to demonstrate that the activism of Black feminist theory in general, 
and the activism of Lorde in particular, provide powerful and effective tools for 
confronting gender violence. Although I make reference to gender violence, my 
specific focus is on violence against Black women. My use of Black feminist 
thinking to examine the complex intersection of multiple complex vectors of 
oppression in the sexual denigration of Black women is quite deliberate.   
The point I am making here is that any hope of meaningful alliances 
across difference to combat gender violence will fail if Black feminist 
interventions, wisdom and experience continue to be marginalised.  Furthermore, 
they will fail if any element in those alliances replicate the unequal power 
relations at work in gender violence through hegemonic thinking and positioning 
in those alliances, thereby replicating the very problem they seek to address.  
The tools we use, why and how we use them, what we leave out and what 
we include, and the connections we make between tools, reflect power relations. 
Keating identifies the relevance of Lorde’s work as an effective tool of critical 
intervention in contemporary issues: 
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…Lorde’s theory of the erotic enables her to unite alternate ways of 
thinking with material change: The erotic makes it possible to develop 
“new ways of understanding our experiences. This is how new visions 
begin, how we begin to posit a future nourished by the past...”  (Keating, 
1996:49)  
Keating also refers to Lorde’s approach as a transformational epistemology using 
performative threshold locations (Keating, 1996:4) to ‘…move beyond the 
existing frameworks by exposing the hidden, masculine, Eurocentric biases that 
structure binary thinking’ (Keating, 1996:6-7).    
 
Objectify Myself: Objectify Her 
Writing about the sexual politics of Black womanhood with particular reference to 
violence against Black women, Hill Collins comments:  
…I was invited to objectify myself in order to develop the objectivity that 
would allow me to participate in her objectification. (Hill Collins, 
2000:142)   
The context in which this comment was made refers to three separate occasions 
where Hill Collins was part of the audience in which three different academic 
scholars (a white feminist, a white male and a black male) used Sarah Bartmann’s 
image (Clifton and Scully, 2008; Qureshi, 2004; Willis, 2010).  Hill Collins states 
the issues very clearly:  
…I saw the reactions of young Black women who saw images of Sarah 
Bartmann for the first time…They saw and felt the connections among the 
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women exhibited on the auction block, the voyeuristic treatment of Sarah 
Bartmann, the depiction of Black women in pornography, and their own 
daily experiences of being under sexual surveillance. (Hill Collins, 
2000:141-142) 
When Hill Collins questioned the ‘prominent White scholar’ (Hill Collins, 
2000:142) about his pornographic use of the presentation slides,  
He defended his “right” to use public domain material any way he saw fit, 
even if it routinely offended Black women and contributed to their 
continued objectification. (Hill Collins, 2000:142)   
The ‘prominent Black male scholar’ (Hill Collins, 2000:142), who made no 
mention of Sarah Bartmann’s gender ‘Despite the fact that we stared at a half- 
naked Black woman’ (Hill Collins, 2000:142), responded to Hill Collins, ‘“I’m 
concerned about race here, not gender!”’ (Hill Collins, 2000:142).   These 
encounters encompass the complexity of the politics and practice of entering into 
a dialogue across difference, where issues of race, gender and sexual violence 
intersect.   
In particular, Hill Collins highlights how the mechanism of objectification 
works across, and through, subjectivity and inter-subjectivity to regulate, 
constitute and construct power relations that shape encounters about gender 
violence between men and men, women and men, and women and women. 
Furthermore, Hill Collins demonstrates how the mechanisms of objectification 
work across temporal and spatial contexts. 
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Interconnections: Relations of Proximity 
This section of the chapter uses the interventions of Black feminist theory in 
relation to interconnections, intersectionality, binary positions and representation 
as tools of critical analysis to deconstruct discourses and practices that legitimize 
violence against women.    
Furthermore, I use the conceptual tools developed within Black feminist 
theory both as the subject and method of enquiry.  For example, intersectionality 
conceptualises interlocking and mutually reinforcing vectors (Crenshaw, 1989; 
Nash, 2008) that could refer to public, private, gender, silence, body and family.  
Referring specifically to sexual violence against Black women, Hill 
Collins argues for an analysis of sexual violence in the context of all systems of 
oppression because: 
This conceptualization views sexuality as conceptual glue that binds 
intersecting oppressions together. Stated differently, intersecting 
oppressions share certain core features.  Manipulating and regulating the 
sexualities of diverse groups constitutes one such shared feature or site of 
intersectionality. (Hill Collins, 2000:135)  
However, even though there is an intersection of issues, elements and mechanisms 
that legitimizes violence against women, current politics and practice of 
confronting violence against women is not interconnected. This lack of 
connection is exacerbated in the politics, discourse and representation of sexual 
violence against Black women. Crenshaw explains that: 
  
 171    
 
Although racism and sexism readily intersect in the lives of real people, 
they seldom do in feminist and antiracist practices. And so, when the 
practices expound identity as woman or person of color as an either/or 
proposition, they relegate the identity of women of color to a location that 
resists telling (Crenshaw, 1991:1242) 
Here, Crenshaw’s point is that binary positions, fragmentation and splitting that 
work to silence survivors of gender violence become replicated within the politics 
and practice of challenging violence against women.  
Political, practical and policy solutions to tackle violence against women 
need to be founded on the interdependency of difference (Anzaldúa, 2007; 
Burman, 2004; Butler, 2004; Krizsan, et al., 2012; Lorde, 1980a; Schiek and 
Lawson, 2011;Yuval-Davis, 2006).  In other words, the concept and practice of 
interconnection is central to understanding and working to confront gender 
violence.  Hill Collins explains that:  
For Black women, ceding control over self-definitions of Black women’s 
sexualities upholds multiple oppressions. This is because all systems of 
oppression rely on harnessing the power of the erotic. (Hill Collins, 
2000:128)   
I propose that Black feminist theory born out of intersecting subjugated 
knowledge in the matrix of power (Hill Collins, 2000) offers a ‘politics of 
location’ (Boyce Davies, 1994:153; Kaplan, 1994) that is pivotal to negotiating 
interdisciplinary, inter-subjective, psychic, emotional, political and practical 
solutions to the problems of gender violence.  I argue that critical analysis of 
‘…relations of proximity [that] highlight the facts of connection or 
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dis/connection’ (Probyn, 2003:294; Ahmed, 2000) is central to finding new 
meanings, solutions and tools to confront violence against women.   
 
Lorde and Hill Collins’ Encounter 
I return to the experience of Hill Collins quoted earlier because her identification 
of the propositions at work in the dynamics of her experience are precisely the 
propositions at work in the dynamics of the subjugation of women through sexual 
violation.  Hill Collins (2000) describes a particular encounter that brings her into 
a particular proximity to another Black woman - namely, Sarah Bartmann. I want 
to offer an encounter of Hill Collins’ experience through a particular proximity to 
‘Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power.’   
The rationale for using this particular framework of analysis is, firstly, that 
Lorde’s paper on the erotic as power provides a feminist analysis of the 
intersection of objectification, the politics of location and disconnection as key 
props in the foundation of racist, homophobic, patriarchal constructions of the 
erotic.  The point here is that these are the same props used in racist, homophobic, 
patriarchal constructions of the cause and sanctioning of gender violence.   
Secondly, the juxtaposition of Hill Collins and Lorde offers an encounter 
between two Black women that is in stark contrast to the one Hill Collins was 
invited to participate in with Bartmann.  
In other words, the analysis and the tools used here offer a connection that 
does not trade on objectification and, in doing so, demonstrates an alternative non-
objectifying connection.  Non-objectifying connections offered, developed and 
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lived through the activism of Black feminist theory stand in defiance of the 
connections that trade on the process of objectification described by Hill Collins.  
These trade-offs are present in too many accounts by survivors of gender 
violence, and are failed to be addressed in analyses and interventions designed to 
confront gender violence.   
Thirdly, in the spirit of reassessing the tool box available to confront 
gender violence, I want to demonstrate that Black feminist tools developed in the 
1970s (Lorde wrote her paper in 1978) work alongside tools developed in 1990 
and 2000 (Hill Collins). My point is that interventions to confront sexual violence 
against women must use all feminist resources available across space and time.     
 
Productions of Distortion 
…I was invited to objectify myself in order to develop the objectivity that 
would allow me to participate in her objectification. (Hill Collins, 
2000:142)  
Here, Hill Collins presents a sequence involving three main propositions 
contingent upon the first proposition: 
 I objectify myself – I distort myself 
 I develop objectivity – distorted thinking 
 I participate in her objectification – distortion of her 
Examination of this sequence reveals that Hill Collins has to distort herself and 
her thinking as a condition for the distortion of Bartmann. Hill Collins is invited 
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to subject herself to the same process of objectification that Bartmann is subjected 
to and, as will become evident this invitation, is a crucial aspect of the process.   
Furthermore, the distortion of Bartmann into an object is the distortion of 
Hill Collins into an object and, ultimately, the distortion of all Black women into 
objects.  What is performed here is the construction of the objectification of the 
Black woman produced through a repetitive chain of distortions.  What is 
demonstrated here is the function of the construction of the distortion.   
The point is not the fact of the distortion; indeed, to rest on this alone 
would be a distraction and diversion from the crux of the matter - namely, the 
production of the construction of distortion and what this production functions to 
do; nor is this to imply that there could be no distortion.  
Furthermore, the inquiry into the function and production of the 
construction would do well to include questions of who and what is foreclosed, 
and who and what is privileged, in the construction. Butler explains that:  
…construction is neither a subject nor its act, but a process of reiteration 
by which both “subjects” and “acts” come to appear at all. There is no 
power that acts, but only a reiterated acting that is power in its persistence 
and instability. (Butler, 1993a:9)   
‘Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power’ repeatedly refers to distortion as a 
mechanism of the ‘reiterated acting that is power.’  Lorde’s use of the rhetorical 
device of repetition performatively re-inscribes the relationship between distortion 
and reiteration:  
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In order to perpetuate itself, every oppression must corrupt or distort those 
various sources of power within the culture of the oppressed that can 
provide energy for change. (Lorde, 1978a:53) 
…that we cannot grow beyond whatever distortions we may find within 
ourselves keeps us docile and loyal and obedient, externally defined, and 
leads us to accept many facets of our oppression as women. (Lorde, 
1978a:58) 
…this misnaming of the need and the deed give rise to that distortion 
which results in pornography and obscenity… (Lorde, 1978a:59) 
In other words, distortion functions as a mechanism to sustain and extend 
oppression.  However, the rigour of the analysis and its translation into effective 
feminist interventions lie in being suspicious of anything that claims to have 
escaped distortion.   
Setting up the polarities of the ‘distorted’ and the ‘not distorted’ may 
function as a political tactic of the ‘…strategic use of positivist essentialism…’ 
(Spivak, 2006:281; emphasis in original). However, failure of the tactic lies in the 
transformation of the essentialist from a strategy to a claim of representation.  
This point is made by Spivak in her explanation of two meanings of the word 
‘representation’: 
Treading in your shoes, wearing your shoes, that’s Vertretung.  
Representation in that sense: political representation.  Darstellung-Dar, 
there, same cognate.  Stellen, is to place, so “placing there.”  Representing: 
proxy and portrait…Now, the thing to remember is that in the act of 
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representing politically, you actually represent yourself and your 
constituency in the portrait sense, as well. (Spivak, 1990:108; italics and 
emphasis in original)   
Making an application of Spivak’s two meanings of ‘representation’ to the issue 
of distortion, it would seem that distortion by proxy or ‘treading in the shoes of’ 
Bartmann would enable a discourse and analysis of the pornographic 
objectification of her body, whilst holding on to the temporal and spatial 
instability of ‘treading in’ the shoes of indeterminate perspectives.  For example, 
the body of Bartmann is not in fact distorted.  The distortion is a product of, and 
produces the, reiterated acts of the abuse of power. The body of Bartmann is 
‘treading in the shoes of distortion’ and any analysis of the ‘representation’ of her 
body in the shoes of distortion must be from a position of ‘treading in the shoes 
of’ ‘…conventions of representational realism’ (Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 
1996:15).  However, a ‘placing there’ of distortion, so that Bartmann is 
represented as distorted, and the portrait of a distorted Bartmann, functions to 
produce a fixed, concrete, essentialist identification of Bartmann as the 
personification of distortion.    
Spivak’s point, however, is not a reductionist proxy/portrait binary.  
Spivak contends that although it is important to understand the difference between 
essentialist and anti-essentialist positions, it is not possible to deconstruct ‘the 
treading in the shoes of’ without simultaneously deconstructing the essentialist 
position that these are the true authentic shoes, my shoes and the only shoes.  This 
would be tantamount to claiming that if the shoe fits, then the true subject of the 
shoe has been located. Landry and MacLean summarise the predicament 
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succinctly: ‘The critique of essentialism is predicated upon essentialism’ (Landry 
and Maclean, 1996:7).   
 
The Totalizing Effect of Distortion 
Distortion is effective because it serves to mask, disavow and censor the 
existence, space and energy for the disruption and destabilization of oppression.  
This is precisely why Butler thinks: 
…conceptions of constructions is a return to the notion of matter not as a 
site or surface, but as a process of materialisation that stabilizes over time 
to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter. 
(Butler, 1993a:9; emphasis in original)   
The temporal and spatial, fixed (in both senses of the word - immobile and 
contrived) matter of Black women’s bodies produces fixed, degrading, obscene, 
shameful objectifications that legitimize sexual violence.  Ngai explains that: 
…disgust is never ambivalent about its object.  More specifically, it is 
never prone to producing the confusions between subject and 
object…disgust strengthens and polices this boundary. (Ngai, 2005:335)   
The totalizing disgust of the obscene Black woman functions to fix ‘…its object 
as “intolerable,” disgust undeniably has been and will continue to be 
instrumentalized in oppressive and violent ways (Ngai, 2005:340). Incorporating 
the process of stabilization imprisons women within the ‘boundary, fixity’ (Butler, 
1993a:9; emphasis in original) of docility, obedience and loyalty with no apparent 
alternative position. The repetitive action of performativity continues as 
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‘boundary, fixity’ becomes translated into women’s compliance in sexual 
violence.   
Williams’ (1995) analysis demonstrates something of how the ‘boundary, 
fixity’ works with specific reference to objectification:  
A habit of thinking that permits the imagination of the voyeur to indulge in 
auto-sensation that obliterates the subjectivity of the observed.  A habit of 
thinking that allows that self-generated sensation to substitute for 
interaction with a whole other human being, to substitute for listening or 
conversing or caring…the object is pacified, a malleable “thing” upon 
which to project. (Williams, 1995:123)   
Here, Williams’ use of ‘a habit of thinking’ resonates with Butler’s (1993:9) 
‘reiterated acting that is power’ and the ‘auto-sensation that obliterates the 
subjectivity of the observed’ (Williams, 1995:123)  resonates with Lorde’s 
rejection of ‘…using another's feelings as we would use a kleenex’ (Lorde, 
1978a:58).  
Objectification is a mechanism that forges ‘false and treacherous 
connections’ (Lorde, 1980a:115) through a process of disconnection based on 
distortion. This is illustrated in the disconnection of sensation from feeling, and 
the disconnection of ‘self-generated sensation’ from ‘interaction with a other 
whole human being’ (Williams, 1995:123).  In accordance with Williams’ 
analysis, Lorde concludes that ‘Pornography emphasizes sensation without 
feeling’ (Lorde, 1978a:54).  Lorde is clear that ‘The erotic cannot be felt 
secondhand’ (Lorde, 1978a:59).     
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These intersecting distortions become an incorporated norm that 
‘…qualifies a body for life within the domain of cultural intelligibility’ (Butler, 
1993a:2). However the terms of viability are simultaneously the terms for lack of 
viability. Lack of viability of Black women as human beings ‘within the domain 
of cultural intelligibility’ is well-documented by Black feminists (Davis, 1978, 
1981; Hill Collins, 2000:123-148; hooks, 1982; Walker, 1981:41-53; Walker, 
1982).   
 
The Invitation 
…I was invited to objectify myself in order to develop the objectivity that 
would allow me to participate in her objectification. (Hill Collins, 
2000:142)  
Other components of the sentence above open up further lines of enquiry, and it is 
worth dwelling upon these because the issues raised are the issues that Lorde is 
concerned with. They are issues that are fundamental to our understanding of the 
mechanisms used in sexual violence against women and the development of 
emancipatory interventions to confront this pernicious problem.  
Hill Collins (2000) uses words that simultaneously invoke her subjectivity 
and position her subjectivity in relation to Bartmann.  The uses of ‘I,’ ‘me,’ 
‘myself’ and ‘her’ identify and locate the subjectivity of Hill Collins and 
Bartmann as the conduit for the process of objectification.  This stands in contrast 
to the invitation which has no pronoun. Hill Collins states that ‘I was invited.’ 
Here, the lack of a pronoun, the use of the passive voice and no- named, identified 
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inviter leave the ‘invited’ unfixed. In other words, the initiator of the invitation is 
left open.  Thus, the invitation could be epistemology, social constructions, social 
sanctions and/or representations.   
The questions that could be asked, and indeed, are frequently asked by 
women survivors of sexual violence, are: Does invitation imply choice? Does the 
choice invoked in the invitation designate responsibility?  Survivors of gender 
violence are left feeling that: if I am invited and chose to take up the invitation, 
then I am responsible for the consequences of the invitation. The invitation locates 
shame and blame with the survivor of sexual violence and not with the originator 
of the invitation, nor with the invitation itself. The invitation situates 
responsibility in the subjectivity of the survivor of sexual violence. This keeps the 
process of objectification alive so that self-blame becomes self-objectification, 
which in turn, becomes a significant block to the self-connection that is so vital to 
the recovery process.  
Objectification causes emotional, psychological and physical 
fragmentation because the self becomes too contemptible to be in proximity with.  
This condition of self-abhorrence, self-blame and overwhelming shame creates 
disintegration and prevents a sense of self-connection that is crucial to the 
recovery process.  However, I would argue, and here is where I would question 
Lorde’s proposal, that the challenge for feminist thinking and interventions is to 
hold on to a rigorous analytic framework in order to track the manoeuvres of 
distortion.  For example, the notion that distortion resides and functions only in 
disconnection would foreclose analysis of the location and function of distortion 
within self-connection.   
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Lorde argues that the process of disconnection functions to distort and 
suppress the erotic in order to prevent women from using the erotic as a source of 
power, revelation and transformation: 
The erotic has often been misnamed by men and used against women. It 
has been made into the confused, the trivial, the psychotic, the plasticized 
sensation. For this reason, we have often turned away from the exploration 
and consideration of the erotic as a source of power and information, 
confusing it with its opposite, the pornographic. (Lorde, 1978a:54)  
Close scrutiny of the language used by Lorde and Hill Collins indicates that this 
process of distortion is a construction; Hill Collins says, ‘in order to develop’ and 
Lorde says, ‘It has been made into.’  In other words, there is a deliberate 
manipulation occurring that these two, and many other Black feminists, seek to 
identify, expose and challenge.  Furthermore, the words ‘develop’ and ‘made into’ 
open up the possibility of a different ‘develop’ and a different ‘made into,’ leaving 
room for social change, emancipatory interventions, imagination and activism.  
Further close scrutiny of the words used by Hill Collins indicates further 
elements that intersect to produce a powerful package of distortion, objectification 
and regulation. Her use of the word ‘objectivity’ invokes the idea of an obtainable 
position of impartiality and neutrality, conjuring up the notion of a truth 
contingent upon fairness.  The word ‘objectivity’ functions to resist questioning, 
because to question that which has a claim of objectivity would be to question 
fairness, impartiality and neutrality.   
The psychological and emotional impact of this sequence is interrogated 
by the ‘The Duluth Model: Social Change to End Violence Against Women, 
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Domestic Abuse Intervention Programs (DAIP)’ (1980) and articulated within the 
Duluth ‘Power and Control Wheel.’ The Duluth programme discusses how the 
claim to ‘objectivity’ is used by those who abuse power over women through 
sexual and domestic violation in order to distort perception.  The consequence of 
distorted perception is self-doubt and a lack of trust in cognitive functioning. This 
results in confusion, fear, dependency and deep internal disconnection. Lorde 
describes the process in the following way: 
As women, we have come to distrust that power which rises from our 
deepest and nonrational knowledge. We have been warned against it all 
our lives by the male world, which values this depth of feeling enough to 
keep women around in order to exercise it in the service of men, but which 
fears this same depth too much to examine the possibilities of it within 
themselves. So women are maintained at a distant/inferior position to be 
psychically milked, much the same way ants maintain colonies of aphids 
to provide a life-giving substance for their masters. (Lorde, 1978a:53-54)   
The unequal power relation that Lorde refers to is picked up in Hill Collins’ use of 
the word ‘allow.’  Connotations of the word ‘allow’ invoke a power dynamic 
between the ‘allowed’ and that which, or who, ‘allows.’  This power dynamic 
conjures up the conditions upon which being ‘allowed’ depends, and gives rise to 
the notion of a border and criteria for crossing the border.  To ‘allow’ is not the 
same as to enable or to empower.  Interestingly, Hill Collins places the passive 
‘allow’ with the active ‘participate’ in which she is invited to be active. This 
implies more than a reductionist regime of visibility.  In other words, ‘allow me to 
participate in her objectification’ involves more than Hill Collins’ looking at 
Bartmann.   
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Just as racism operating within the regime of visibility has nothing and 
everything to do with the colour of skin (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000a), sexual 
violence against women, such as rape, pornography, sexual abuse, prostitution, 
forced marriage and Female Genital Mutilation, has nothing and everything to do 
with sex and the erotic (Lorde, 1978a).  In other words:  
The parallels between distortions of deep human feelings in racial 
oppression and of the distortions of the erotic in sexual oppression are 
striking. (Hill Collins, 2000:171) 
Participation brings to mind all of the implications of Butler’s theory of 
performativity, and the repetitive re-inscribing of identity categories, subjectivity 
and positioning. Hill Collins’ use of the word ‘participation’ invokes the ways in 
which racism and sexism intersect through mechanisms of representation as a tool 
of oppression. The role and meaning of ‘participation’ are significant components 
of the self-blame, self-hatred and self-disconnection that survivors of sexual 
violation grapple with, and have to confront in the process of recovery.    
 
Disconnection and Connection 
Any intervention or analysis, whether packaged in the form of policy, activism or 
scholarship in response to a problem, needs to have a detailed understanding of 
the mechanics of that problem - namely, how and why it works.  Lorde argues that 
racist, homophobic, patriarchal formulations of the erotic function to suppress 
detailed critical analysis: 
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…suppression of the erotic as a considered source of power and 
information within our lives. (Lorde, 1978a:53) 
…we have often turned away from the exploration and consideration of 
the erotic as a source of power and information, confusing it with its 
opposite, the pornographic. (Lorde, 1978a:54) 
Here, Lorde’s point is that the erotic is the source of critical enquiry, so that 
suppression of the erotic is, by definition, the suppression of detailed critical 
analysis. The trick of the distortion of the erotic is that ‘confusing it with its 
opposite, the pornographic,’ means that the source of critical analysis to enable 
women to be ‘less willing to accept powerlessness, or those other supplied states 
of being…such as resignation, despair, self-effacement, depression, self-denial’ is 
where it is least expected (Lorde, 1978a:58).  
In other words, who would look to the pornographic as ‘our most 
profoundly creative source’ (Lorde, 1978a:59)? Who would think of ‘the 
pornographic, the abused, and the absurd’ (Lorde, 1978a:59), and ‘the trivial, the 
psychotic, the plasticized sensation’ (Lorde, 1978a:54) as ‘a well of replenishing 
and provocative force’ (Lorde, 1978a:54) to women?  In a racist, homophobic 
patriarchy such juxtapositions would appear to be non-rational and chaotic. 
However, uncovering the mechanisms by which ‘We have been taught to suspect 
this resource, vilified, abused, and devalued within western society’ (Lorde, 
1978a:53) is precisely the task of breaking silence about sexual violence against 
women.  
Indeed, a significant part of the journey of recovery for women survivors 
of sexual violence is being able to trust that ‘uses of the erotic’ that wield ‘power 
over’ can be displaced by ‘uses of the erotic’ in a form of ‘power to.’ It should be 
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noted that the notions of ‘power over’ and ‘power to’ that I am using here pick up 
on particular discourses of power that are used within some feminist activist 
contexts, primarily with specific reference to confronting sexual violence (Allen, 
1996, 1998, 1999, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Elshtain, 1982; Yoder and Kahn, 1992). 
   
Moving from Generality to Specificity 
I propose that Lorde’s feminist use of the erotic provides a rigorous framework 
for enabling ‘the transformation of silence into language and action’ (Lorde, 
1977a:40) that is vital for survivors of sexual violence.  Lorde states that:  
…the erotic is not a question only of what we do; it is a question of how 
acutely and fully we can feel in the doing. (Lorde, 1978a:54) 
Our erotic knowledge empowers us, becomes a lens through which we 
scrutinize all aspects of our existence, forcing us to evaluate those aspects 
honestly in terms of their relative meaning within our lives…not to settle 
for the convenient, the shoddy, the conventionally expected, nor the 
merely safe. (Lorde, 1978a:57) 
The therapeutic potential of feminist consciousness-raising works in direct 
relation to ‘how acutely and fully’ we collectively and honestly scrutinise the 
discourse, behaviours and impact of sexual violence.  For example, in relation to 
gender violence, this could represent moving from the ‘general’ to the ‘specific.’  
Too often, therapeutic and political interventions in relation to women’s 
experiences of sexual violence fail to get close to the specificity of those 
experiences. Lorde argues that ‘[t]he erotic is a measure’ (Lorde, 1978a:54), and 
  
 186    
 
application of this in terms of moving from the general to the specific is vital for a 
number of reasons.  
Firstly, staying with the ‘general’ is used to silence the ‘specific,’ creating 
a barrier to survivors speaking out about the particular acts and processes they 
have endured, and continue to endure. Generalities skim over the specificities of 
the horrors of sexual violation.  
Secondly, overt and subtle resistance to interrogating the specific 
mechanisms used in the control and regulation of women subjected to gender 
violence reaffirms the survivor’s sense of shame, blame and disconnection.  The 
logic becomes that the unnameable must remain unnameable because it is so 
abhorrent.   
Thirdly, resistance to naming the specific acts and processes used in 
gender violence confirms to the survivor that the experience needs to remain 
hidden and silenced in order not to contaminate others.  
Finally, resting within the ‘psychic retreat’ (Steiner, 1993:1) of 
generalities is to be complicit with, and to maintain distance from, the destructive 
consequences of disconnection. The disconnection ‘…puts woman in the position 
of experiencing herself only fragmentarily…’ (Irigaray, 1977:254), and maintains 
her isolation from others.  
Understanding the issue of sexual violence against women requires 
detailed deconstruction of the constituent components of the mechanisms used 
within this violation. The component of disconnection is central both in terms of 
the process of the abuse of power and in relation to the trauma experienced as a 
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result of that abuse. Examination of disconnection under the analytic lens of 
Lorde’s (1978a) work indicates that the component of disconnection is not 
arbitrary, random or a generic consequence of the experience of gender violence.  
Lorde proposes a Black feminist ‘uses of the erotic’ that is primarily a force for 
connection.  The erotic functions as a bridge enabling deep self-connection and 
connection with others. As she explains: 
For the bridge which connects them is formed by the erotic - the sensual - 
those physical, emotional, and psychic expressions of what is deepest and 
strongest and richest within each of us, being shared: the passions of love, 
in its deepest meanings. (Lorde, 1978a:56)   
Thus, it is possible to re-read Lorde’s vision of the ‘uses of the erotic’ as part of a 
wider tradition of Black feminist discourses on connection and difference that 
both preceded and anticipated Crenshaw’s (1989) seminal work on, and current 
debates about, intersectionality (see Chapter 4 of this thesis):   
…forms a bridge between the sharers which can be the basis for 
understanding much of what is not shared between them, and lessens the 
threat of their difference. (Lorde, 1978a:56)   
Here, I want to make a link between Lorde’s metaphor of ‘bridge,’ Hill Collins’ 
experience of objectification, and the necessity for intersectional approaches to 
feminist thinking and interventions to confront sexual violence against women 
(Lockhart and Danis, 2010).  Hill Collins (2000) identifies three sequential 
elements in her experience and process of gender violation, namely: ‘to objectify’ 
or disconnection from self; ‘objectivity’ or disconnection from mobility of 
position; and ‘objectification’ or disconnection from other women. Moreover, 
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these mechanisms of disconnection are contingent upon a configuration of other 
intersecting phenomena.  The reason for identifying the interconnection between 
elements in the mechanisms used to abuse and legitimize power in gender 
violence is to emphasise that no intervention, policy or analysis can focus on, or 
pick out, one element in isolation of the others.  
 
Conclusion 
This analysis and application of ‘Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power’ 
explicates a number of tensions that are at the heart of this thesis.  Re-reading 
Lorde enables the activism of Black feminist theory in the context of violence 
against women to expose some of the dangers and predicaments of using tools 
such as reclamation, re-appropriation and the ‘…strategic use of positivist 
essentialism…’ (Spivak, 2006:281; emphasis in original).  This close re-reading 
of ‘Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power’ set out to: 
…rethink the relation between knowledge and emotion and construct 
conceptual models that demonstrate the mutually constitutive rather than 
oppositional relation between reason and emotion. (Jaggar, 1989:190)   
It would be reductionist to measure ‘Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power’ 
against the yardstick of whether it uses an ‘oppositional’ or a ‘mutually 
constitutive’ conceptual model, because Lorde employs both. Furthermore, the 
setting up and evaluation of such a measure could mask the complexity of her 
literary moves and political message. The point is not whether ‘Uses of the Erotic: 
The Erotic as Power’ gets caught up in the aporia of positionality, but to use the 
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aporia as a site for productive thinking and application.  In terms of ‘…a return to 
an interest in affect as that which gives rise to subjectivity, rather than following 
on from it’ (Frosh and Baraitser, 2009:159), it would seem that Lorde may take 
objection to this.  Lorde may object to the notion of ‘a return’ and the either/or 
position of ‘gives rise to,’ ‘rather than following on from,’ because her treatise 
sustains an argument based on the idea of the erotic as mutually constitutive: the 
erotic as that which gives rise to subjectivity and subjectivity following on from 
the erotic.   
 Placing Lorde within this chapter alongside Black feminists such as Sara 
Ahmed, Gloria Anzaldúa, Kimberlé Crenshaw, Patricia Hill Collins, Sianne Ngai, 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Patricia Williams not only performs the 
transgression of temporal and spatial disciplinary borders, but, also, provides a 
particular methodology for teasing out the nuances of a detailed, close re-reading 
predicated primarily upon Black feminist scholarship.      
I want to conclude with a quote from Spivak: 
The feminist, reversing this hierarchy, must insist that sexuality and the 
emotions are, in fact, so much more important and threatening that a 
masculist sexual politics is obliged, repressively, to sustain all public 
activity.  The most “material” sedimentation of this repressive politics is 
the institutionalized sex discrimination that seems the hardest stone to 
push…The opposition is thus not merely reversed; it is displaced.  It is 
according to this practical structure of deconstruction as reversal-
displacement, then, that I write…Displacing the opposition that it initially 
apparently questions, it is always different from itself, always defers itself.  
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It is neither a constitutive nor, of course, a regulative norm.  If it were 
either, then feminist activity would articulate or strive toward that fulfilled 
displacement of public (male) and private (female): an ideal society and a 
sex-transcendent humanity.  But deconstruction teaches one to question all 
transcendental idealisms.  It is in terms of this peculiarity of 
deconstruction, then, that the displacement of male-female, public-private 
marks a shifting limit rather than the desire for a complete reversal. 
(Spivak, 1979:30-31; parentheses and emphasis in original)    
Spivak is referring here to the regulatory, hierarchical division between the public 
and private, but in using this as an example, she demonstrates the relevance of her 
principles to all hierarchical divisions that exist between one position and another, 
even when these divisions are in the interests of political expediency.  The key 
principle is that of bringing into ‘question all transcendental idealisms’ and this 
would include a questioning of the erotic as an example of ‘transcendental 
idealisms,’ but this does not preclude using the acts of questioning and the result 
of the acts of questioning as a foundation for feminist intervention. 
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Chapter 4 
The Aporetics of Intersectionality 
 
Introduction 
CR: Here’s a question that I want to ask you, partly because it’s been a big 
problem to me and I’d like to know how you have handled it. Being black, 
a lesbian, and a feminist puts you in a position where you have to deal 
with what, at times, appear to be three mutually exclusive ideologies or 
priorities. How do you manage to integrate them all . . . or do you? 
AL: Well, Cheryl, as I’m sure you know, it has felt, at different points in 
my life, like every single way in which I would identify myself was in 
total conflict with every other way. First of all, there’s always going to be 
some group or some person who wants you to talk from only one 
particular perspective.  That’s very destructive.  It’s like putting all the 
eggs in one basket. It also reduces you to one component, and it’s just such 
a terrible injustice to all the other pieces of yourself.  It cuts me off from 
the energy that comes from all those different pieces.  So integration is 
absolutely necessary.  I have to work on integration for myself.  You have 
to do it for yourself.  What I’ve learned, and this was indeed a learning 
process, is that it is absolutely essential not to allow pieces of myself to be 
at war with each other. . . But as long as you let yourself be baffled, as 
long as you let one piece of yourself be cancelled out by another, you will 
always be subject to the kind of turmoil that sucks energy away.  It’s hard, 
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it’s very hard.  But it’s not harder than the way they want us to live, which 
is in categories. And, it’s far more productive. (Savren and Robinson, 
1982:81-82; ellipsis in original) 
Although Lorde did not use the term ‘intersectionality,’ it is clear from her life 
and works that she refused to: 
…pluck out some one aspect of myself and present this as the meaningful 
whole, eclipsing or denying the other parts of self. (Lorde, 1980a:120)   
The elements, essence and conceptual framework of the term ‘intersectionality’ 
have evolved through, and are evident in, Black feminist writing and testimony.  It 
is within this historical, social and political context that Crenshaw coined the term 
‘intersectionality’ in her 1989 seminal work entitled, ‘Demarginalizing the 
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination 
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’. In this paper Crenshaw uses 
intersectionality as a critical lens within the context of the U.S. legal framework in 
regards to discrimination and, as such, intersectionality offers a powerful tool for 
feminist legal theory, critical race theory and critical legal studies.  
Intersectionality has been taken up by a range of disciplines, including feminism 
and sociology, and provides an invaluable tool for critical analysis of 
simultaneous, multiple, structural discrimination. Indeed, recent evaluations of the 
conceptual framework of intersectionality indicate the reach, importance and 
relevance of intersectionality in current debates (Burman, 2004; Davis, 2008; Lutz 
et al., 2011; McCall, 2005; Nash, 2008; Pateman and Mills 2007; Phoenix and 
Pattynama, 2006; Taylor et al., 2010) and scholarship, including the introduction 
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in 2012 of Intersectionalities: A Global Journal of Social Work Analysis, 
Research, Polity and Practice. 
Territorial disputes over who owns the term ‘intersectionality’ and where 
the term originated not only function as a distraction from the point of Crenshaw’s 
paper, but, also, function to establish and maintain the very notion of separate 
borders that Crenshaw contested.  I believe that splits between analyses of the 
structural and analyses of the subject/subjective/subjectivity using 
intersectionality run counter to the spirit of intersectionality.   
This chapter picks up on three specific components of Lorde’s reply to 
Robinson’s question quoted earlier.  The objectives of this chapter (in no specific 
order because the components under examination are mutually constitutive) are: 
firstly, I want to understand the nature of the turmoil, or why ‘It’s hard, it’s very 
hard’ (Savren and Robinson, 1982:81) to: 
…integrate all the parts of who I am, openly, allowing power from 
particular sources of my living to flow back and forth freely through all 
my different selves, without the restrictions of externally imposed 
definition. (Lorde, 1980a:120)
 
 
Secondly, I want to understand the nature and function of the ‘terrible injustice’ of 
living in categories (Savren and Robinson, 1982:81). Thirdly, I want to 
understand what is productive about integration.  
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Intersectionality: An Experience of Aporia 
This reflective analysis examines the challenge I confront as a Black
12
 lesbian 
feminist in trying to ‘integrate all the parts of who I am’ (Lorde, 1980a:120). This 
chapter picks up on Lorde’s reply to Robinson that ‘I have to work on integration 
for myself.  You have to do it for yourself’ (Savren and Robinson, 1982:81) in an 
effort to understand better the personal, political task of doing intersectionality for 
myself and within myself. The challenge turns out to be more complicated and 
more emotionally difficult when integrating becomes the task of intersecting all 
the parts of ‘who I am’ and when those parts of who I am are constituted as the 
stranger within (Kristeva, 1991).   
This chapter concentrates on two intersecting aspects of the challenge: 
firstly, I argue that any attempt to dismantle borders constructed to separate out 
categories of experience and identity bumps up against a number of 
interconnected aporia; secondly, I argue that the emotional task and experience of 
intersecting ‘all my different selves’ (Lorde, 1980a:121) across psychic borders 
has a ‘psychological toll’ (The Combahee River Collective, 1977:266). Lorde 
describes the difficulty in the following way:  
It was hard enough to be Black, to be Black and female, to be Black, 
female, and gay. To be Black, female, gay, and out of the closet in a white 
                                                          
12
 In an interview with Pratibha Parmar and Jackie Kay that took place in London in 1988, Lorde 
explores the meaning of the term ‘Black’: ‘Take the issue of how we name ourselves, for example.  
In the United States, Black means of African heritage and we use the term Women of Color to 
include Native American, Latina, Asian American women.  I understand that here, Black is a 
political term which includes all oppressed ethnic groups, and the term Women of Color is 
frowned upon’  (Parmar and Kay, 1988:176). However, I acknowledge that the use of the term 
‘Black’ is problematic and contested.  Brah (1996) provides a detailed analysis of the issue, stating 
that: ‘In practice, the category “black feminism” in Britain is only meaningful vis-à-vis the 
category “white feminism”’ (Brah, 1996:112). 
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environment, even to the extent of dancing in the Bagatelle, was 
considered by many Black lesbians to be simply suicidal. (Lorde, 
1996:195)  
The point is that it is the experience of aporia that produces the psychological 
turmoil. Any attempt at a ‘psychic retreat’ (Steiner, 1993:1) from the 
‘psychological toll’ of aporia is merely to disavow the aporia.  Royle defines 
aporia as: 
…loosely a rhetorical term for “doubt” or “difficulty in choosing”, but 
more precisely it means a sort of absolute blockage, a “No Way”… 
(Royle, 2003:92) 
This chapter seeks to use aporia as the site and method for the ‘You have 
to do it for yourself’ experience of intersectionality (Savren and Robinson, 
1982:81; emphasis in original).  Speaking of all experience, Derrida asks: 
Can one speak - and if so, in what sense - of an experience of the aporia?  
An experience of the aporia as such?  Or vice versa: Is an experience 
possible that would not be an experience of the aporia? (Derrida, 1993:15; 
emphasis in original)  
As will become evident through this chapter, it is the experience of the 
‘impossible’ in the aporia that creates the conditions for the ‘possible’ and the 
‘productive.’  The graft of the ‘psychological toll’ (The Combahee River 
Collective, 1977:266) in negotiating the aporia opens up opportunities for an 
indeterminate becoming.  Emphasis must be placed here on the word 
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‘indeterminate’ because intersectionality and the aporia are both constituted by, 
and contingent upon, the indeterminate.   
I argue that it is engagement with the indeterminate that produces the 
transformation that is core to the activism of Black feminist theory.  Furthermore, 
transforming the ‘terrible injustice’ (Savren and Robinson, 1982:81) of that which 
has been determined for Black women into a shifting indeterminate is the basis for 
an ethical, productive encounter.   
The challenge of Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality is the challenge 
presented in the aphorism, ‘the personal is the political.’  Intersectionality goes 
beyond merely combining inadequate and oppressive socio-economic, political 
and legal structures, and inadequate feminist theories and practices. In regards to 
this point, Hill Collins offers a useful distinction between intersectionality and her 
own concept of the matrix of domination:  
…I use and distinguish between both terms in examining how oppression 
affects Black women.  Intersectionality refers to particular forms of 
intersecting oppressions, for example, intersections of race and gender, or 
of sexuality and nation.  Intersectional paradigms remind us that 
oppression cannot be reduced to one fundamental type, and that 
oppressions work together in producing injustice.  In contrast, the matrix 
of domination refers to how these intersecting oppressions are actually 
organized. (Hill Collins, 2000:18) 
In this chapter I want to think of intersectionality in the light of Butler’s 
comment that: 
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Such a project requires thinking the theory of power together with a theory 
of the psyche…power that at first appears as external, pressed upon the 
subject, pressing the subject into subordination, assumes a psychic form 
that constitutes the subject’s self-identity. (Butler, 1997c:3)  
This chapter proposes and interrogates the ‘psychic form’ of intersectionality that 
‘constitutes the subject’s self-identity’ in two ways that are interconnected.  
Firstly, the analysis dismantles the conceptual structure of intersectionality to 
show that it is bound up with the aporia of hospitality and borders in an effort to 
contain the anxiety generated by the foreign stranger within me.  Secondly, the 
analysis examines how and why the intersection of selves that constitutes a self is 
so emotionally difficult.  I want to understand how and why my emotional 
experience of the impact of intersectionality feels like Kristeva’s description:  
Confronting the foreigner whom I reject and with whom at the same time I 
identify, I lose my boundaries, I no longer have a container, the memory of 
experiences when I had been abandoned overwhelm me, I lose my 
composure. I feel “lost,” “indistinct,” “hazy.” (Kristeva, 1991:187) 
 
The Aporia of Intersectionality as Method and Content 
This chapter brings together conceptual frameworks from Crenshaw, Derrida, and 
Lorde as theoretical lenses across temporal and spatial theoretical borders.  
Although they may appear to speak in different tongues, have different traditions, 
standpoints and could be seen as foreigners to each other, I suggest that 
Crenshaw, Derrida, and Lorde have a shared concern with intersectionality and 
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each provide ways to approach the challenges of intersectionality. In terms of 
methodology, this chapter is an intersection of approaches to intersectionality.  It 
is a deliberate transgression of borders to attempt a space of emotional and 
‘intellectual hospitality’ (Bennett, 2003 and Kaufman, 2001, cited in Molz and 
Gibson, 2007:2) because ‘…what is at stake is not only the thinking of hospitality, 
but thinking as hospitality’ (Friese, 2004, cited in Molz and Gibson, 2007:2; 
emphasis in original).   
It will become evident that both the subject under analysis and the method 
used to examine the subject under analysis mirror each other.  The subject under 
examination is the challenge of Crenshaw’s (1989) theory of intersectionality in 
relation to ‘…mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis’ 
(Crenshaw, 1989:139). To be more specific, the challenge under examination is 
not the identification or naming of the exclusive categories of identity, nor is it 
concerned with proving that particular categories exist; the challenge under 
examination is the exclusivity of the categories, or how and why the categories are 
bordered off from each other so that the separateness serves to maintain 
exclusivity.  These borders between categories of experience and analysis are 
maintained even when the cost is erasure of ‘…conceptualization, identification 
and remediation of race and sex discrimination by limiting inquiry…’ (Crenshaw, 
1989:140). The subject under analysis has the construction of borders and the 
maintenance of exclusive categories as core elements.  Derrida’s work exposes 
that the complication is in the construction itself and this is demonstrated in the 
inherent aporia of borders, categories and exclusivity.   
The theory of intersectionality effectively challenges mutually exclusive 
categories of experience and analysis.  The theory of intersectionality successfully 
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exposes that these are socially constructed borders of experience and analysis, and 
goes on to detail the destructive negative consequences of separated out 
categories. However, and this is the crux of this chapter, intersectionality does not 
resolve the aporia.   
As a Black lesbian feminist my emotional struggle to tolerate
13
 the 
intersection of experience, and even desiring the fragmented parts of self to touch 
each other, come up against the aporia of borders and the aporia of hospitality. 
However, it is precisely within the indeterminate space of the aporia that the 
potential for an ethical, accountable relation to self can be experienced.   
In other words, what is being proposed is the idea of the ‘possible’ within 
the ‘impossible.’ Within the context of this chapter, the ‘possible’ refers to Black 
women’s resistance to fixed, stable, totalized identity formations imposed by a 
racist, homophobic patriarchy. I contend that multiple and intersecting aporia 
create, rather than foreclose, the revolutionary potential of the activism of Black 
feminist theory.  The task of confronting prior decided horizons of 
‘representational realism’ (Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 1996:15) is the task of 
enduring the experience and experiment of the undecidable. Derrida states that:  
I will even venture to say that ethics, politics, and responsibility, if there 
are any, will only ever have begun with the experience and experiment of 
the aporia (Derrida, 1992b:41; emphasis in original)  
 
                                                          
13
 I use the word ‘tolerate’ with caution, aware of the aporia of tolerance and the relationship 
between tolerance, power and aversion, as superbly detailed by Brown (2008). Lorde speaks of 
tolerance as ‘the grossest reformism’ (Lorde, 1979b:111).  For a more detailed exploration of the 
problematic of tolerance, please see Chapter 2, ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in 
blackface.’ 
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Inhabiting Intersectionality 
In this thesis Lorde’s work is primarily focussed on the tribulations of relating 
across difference and transgressing externally imposed ideological, structural, 
emotional and psychic borders used to separate, distort and fragment.  Lorde 
explains the focus of her work in the following succinct summary:  
My writing is about difference.  My writing is about how do we learn to lie 
down with the different parts of ourselves, so that we can in fact learn to 
respect and honor the different parts of each other so that we in fact can 
learn how to use them, moving toward something that needs to be done, 
that has never been done before. (Abod, 1987:158)   
Of significance to the analysis in this chapter is the way that Lorde prescribes the 
intersectional experience as a condition for moving toward the unknown and the 
unexpected.  Derrida states that: ‘If there were a horizon of expectation, if there 
were anticipation or programming, there would be neither event nor history’ 
(Derrida and Stiegler, 2002:12).    
My primary concern is to better understand why it is so difficult to ‘learn 
to lie down with the different parts of ourselves’ (Abod, 1987:158) in order to 
transgress internal apparently mutually exclusive categories of experience and 
analysis. My concern is to find assistance in the sustained fight against seductive, 
comfortable resolutions to an already difficult life in a racist, homophobic 
patriarchy.  Lorde outlines the dangers in the following caution:  
And make no mistake; you will be paid well not to feel, not to scrutinize 
the function of your differences and their meaning, until it will be too late 
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to feel at all.  You will be paid in insularity, in poisonous creature 
comforts, false securities, in the spurious belief that the midnight knock 
will always be upon somebody else’s door. (Lorde, n.d.:204)  
I want to better understand the emotional difficulty of embodied 
intersectionality. I find Alcoff’s development of Merleau-Ponty’s idea of the 
‘habitual body’ in her article, ‘Towards a Phenomenology of Racial Embodiment’ 
(Alcoff, 1999), useful in thinking of intersecting vectors of identity categories 
inhabiting the body and constituted of bodily experience.  The concept of the 
‘habitual body’ picks up on the intersection of inhabitance and habit, where the 
idea of location and conditioning are inextricably linked.   
The relevance of focussing on the embodied emotional experience of the 
aporia of intersectionality is revealed in the meaning of the word itself.  The 
etymology of aporia is from the Greek ‘aporos’ which, when spilt into its two 
morphemes, a and porous, means ‘without’ and ‘passage’ so that ‘aporos’ comes 
to mean ‘impassable’ (Royle, 2003:92).  From poros we get the word pore or 
pores, conjuring the idea of ‘passage’ from the inside to the outside of the body 
and vice-versa.  Thus, in the context of the body poros comes to mean a passage 
that stimulates circulation, flow, and a type of bodily breathing which denotes a 
healthy living organism. However, I want to use Crenshaw’s theory of 
intersectionality alongside Derrida’s theory of aporia to contend that it is in the 
‘without passage’ or it is in the ‘impassable’ indeterminacy of intersectionality 
that our ‘…fullest concentration of energy is available…’ (Lorde, 1980a:120). 
However, the point is not to rank the indeterminacy of aporos above the 
determinacy of poros, or vice-versa, but to see these terms as mutually contingent.  
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Resorting to the configuration of a binary opposition of determinacy and 
indeterminacy is to miss the productive space of the dialectic. 
Mairs (1989) explains that: ‘The body itself is a dwelling place, as the 
Anglo-Saxons knew in naming it banhus (bonehouse) and lichama 
(bodyhome)…’ (Mairs, 1989:471). For as long as I inhabit my body, the subject 
of this chapter inhabits me. It has become, and continues to be, my home; or in 
Lorde’s words, ‘…in my journey to this house of myself’ (Lorde, 1996:31). So I 
say to you and to myself, ‘Welcome, make yourself at home; my home is your 
home’ and, yet, as will become evident, this is impossible.  The impossibility of 
this invitation of hospitality is concerned with the relationship between host and 
guest inextricably bound up with the aporia of borders.  
This chapter argues that the impossibility of hospitality functions within 
the ‘bodyhome’ between the different intersecting elements of my subjectivity as 
a Black lesbian feminist.  The attempts of my race, gender, class, sexuality and 
age to play host and guest to each other across multiple borders, within the 
territory of my psyche, are caught up in Derrida’s (1999:51) problematic, ‘Is not 
hospitality an interruption of the self?’  
 
The Psychological Toll of Intersectionality 
This is not a comfortable scrutiny. Even though it takes work to understand and 
communicate what is wrong with a single axis framework, it is perhaps harder to 
feel directly and fully that the ‘…intersectional experience is greater than the sum 
  
 203    
 
of racism and sexism…’ (Crenshaw, 1989:140). The intersectional experience can 
be emotionally overwhelming. I am reminded of Lorde’s questions:  
“How much of this truth can I bear to see/ and still live/ unblinded?/ How 
much of this pain/ can I use?” (Lorde, 1979d:106) 
The following excerpts from Crenshaw’s (1989) paper highlight the 
function of borders within constructions of identity categories that the concept of 
intersectionality seeks to contest. The ‘tightly-drawn parameters’ (152), 
‘normative vision’ (145), ‘filtered through categorical analyses that completely 
obscure’ (149-150), notions of discrimination ‘narrowly tailored to embrace only 
a small set of circumstances’ (151), ‘separate spheres ideology’ (154) and ‘limited 
view’ (145) that ‘erases Black women in the conceptualization, identification and 
remediation of race and sex discrimination’ (140) serve me very well in mitigating 
threatening collisions of exhaustion, vulnerability, pain, hatred and anger located 
firmly within my patrolled psychic borders.  There are times when I ‘…hide 
behind the mockeries of separations that have been imposed upon us…’ (Lorde, 
1977a:43) and ignore the ‘…fallacies of separatist solutions’ (Lorde, 1979a:61). 
The tension of the task is articulated by Lorde, on the one hand:  
My fullest concentration of energy is available to me only when I integrate 
all the parts of who I am, openly, allowing power from particular sources 
of my living to flow back and forth freely through all my different 
selves… (Lorde, 1980a:120-121)  
Whilst on the other hand: 
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And of course I am afraid, because the transformation of silence into 
language and action is an act of self-revelation, and that always seems 
fraught with danger. (Lorde, 1977a:42)  
The challenge of the activism of Black feminist theory is in relation to 
external, racist, homophobic, patriarchal structures of oppression, but is also 
equally in relation to my internal, psychological self and our internal, 
psychological selves as Black women.  Lorde points out that: 
It is easier to deal with the external manifestations of racism and sexism 
than it is to deal with the results of those distortions internalized within our 
consciousness of ourselves and one another. (Lorde, 1983a:147) 
 
Learning from the Combahee River Collective 
The Combahee River Collective
14
 has given us one of the most articulate and 
comprehensive statements of the necessity for, and difficulty of being in, Black 
feminist activist spaces.  The position and explanation of intersectionality in the 
very first paragraph of A Black Feminist Statement (The Combahee River 
Collective, 1977) emphasises the importance of the intersectional experience to 
the Collective’s existence and mission:   
…we are actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, 
heterosexual, and class oppression and see as our particular task the 
                                                          
14 ‘The Combahee River Collective first met in 1974. During “second-wave” feminism, many 
black feminists felt that the Women’s Liberation Movement was defined by and paid exclusive 
attention to white, middle-class women. The Combahee River Collective was a group of black 
feminists who wanted to clarify their place in the politics of feminism. The name of the Collective 
comes from the Combahee River Raid of June 1863, which was led by Harriet Tubman and freed 
hundreds of slaves. The 1970s black feminists commemorated a significant historical event and a 
black feminist leader by selecting this name’ (Napikoski, n.d.).  
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development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that 
the major systems of oppression are interlocking. The synthesis of these 
oppressions creates the conditions of our lives. As Black women we see 
Black feminism as the logical political movement to combat the manifold 
and simultaneous oppressions that all women of color face. (The 
Combahee River Collective, 1977:261) 
However, any notion, myth or fantasy that Black feminist spaces and experiences 
are comfortable, cosy, safe and secure is false.  The Combahee River Collective 
makes this point clear: ‘The overwhelming feeling that we had is that after years 
and years we had finally found each other’ (1977:268). However, at the same 
time, the Combahee River Collective also acknowledges that: 
The psychological toll of being a Black woman and the difficulties this 
presents in reaching political consciousness and doing political work can 
never be underestimated. (1977:266)  
The Combahee River Collective identifies a number of reasons for the difficulty: 
There is a very low value placed upon Black women’s psyches in this 
society, which is both racist and sexist (1977:266) 
…it calls into question some of the most basic assumptions about our 
existence… (1977:267) 
The material conditions of most Black women would hardly lead them to 
upset both economic and sexual arrangements that seem to represent some 
stability in their lives. (1977:267) 
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Many Black women have a good understanding of both sexism and 
racism, but because of the everyday constrictions of their lives cannot risk 
struggling against them both. (1977:267) 
In addition to this list, Lorde adds that: 
…we have all been programmed to respond to the human differences 
between us with fear and loathing…we have no patterns for relating across 
our human differences as equals. (Lorde, 1980a:115; emphasis in original) 
…the true focus of revolutionary change is never merely the oppressive 
situations which we seek to escape, but that piece of the oppressor which 
is planted deep within each of us, and which knows only the oppressors’ 
tactics, the oppressors’ relationships. (Lorde, 1980a:123) 
Both Lorde and the Combahee River Collective make reference to Black 
women’s experience of feeling ‘crazy’ within the distorted perspectives of a 
racist, homophobic patriarchy. For example, Lorde states:  
…I wanted to say to the Black women of London, young Black women 
with whom I was in contact; it is not all in your head.  Don’t let them 
muck around with your realities. You may not be able to make very much 
inroad, but at least you’ve got to stop feeling quite so crazy. Because, after 
a while, constantly exposed to unacknowledged racism, Black women get 
to feeling really crazy. And then, it’s all in our heads, the white women 
say. (Parmar and Kay, 1988:175)  
The Combahee River Collective states that:  
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Black feminists often talk about their feelings of craziness before 
becoming conscious of the concepts of sexual politics, patriarchal rule, 
and, most importantly, feminism, the political analysis and practice that 
we women use to struggle against our oppression. (The Combahee River 
Collective, 1977:263).  
After arguing that ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ (Lorde, 
1979a:60), after arguing that ‘…the entrapments used to neutralize Black and 
white women are not the same’ (Lorde, 1980a:118), after arguing that, ‘…beyond 
sisterhood is still racism’ (Lorde, 1979c:70), and after arguing for structures, 
ideology and spaces to attend to the intersection of simultaneous, multiple 
oppression, finally we actually obtain Black feminist spaces and services - a space 
longed for, rare and often unfamiliar; we are left with ourselves and each other in 
the space. Lorde reflects:  
…I thought, wait a minute, racism doesn’t just distort white people - what 
about us? What about the effects of white racism upon the ways Black 
people view each other? Racism internalized? (Lorde, 1979d:96)  
Black women are left with the ‘psychological toll’ (The Combahee River 
Collective, 1977:266) of difference, no patterns for relating across difference and, 
furthermore, we are left with the aporia of borders and hospitality.  
These tensions do not just inhabit Black feminist spaces, services and 
scholarship. These tensions are inhabited and inhabit each other.  Of course, this is 
no coincidence given that Black feminist spaces, services and scholarship are born 
out of subjugated knowledge in the matrix of oppression (Hill Collins, 2000). In 
other words, the activism of Black feminist theory arises out of, is understood in 
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terms of, and transforms, the daily lived experience of Black women.  Lorde states 
that:  
…survival isn’t theoretical, we live it everyday.  We live it on the streets, 
we live it in the banks, we live it with our children. (Greene, 1989:183)  
Thus, and this is the point of this chapter, intersectionality is not just theoretical, 
but, rather, the process of surviving the intersectional experience needs to be 
understood in the context of Black women’s lives. Lorde explains that:  
…those of us who have been forged in the crucibles of difference - those 
of us who are poor, who are lesbians, who are Black, who are older - know 
that survival is not an academic skill. (Lorde, 1979b:112; emphasis in 
original). 
 
Intersecting Encounters between Black Women 
No matter how many times I read Ain’t I A Woman? by hooks (1982), I am 
overwhelmed by feelings of rage, pain and despair. The emotional impact is 
traumatic, exhausting and more than I can bear.  I am clear that this is not about 
first-encounter emotional impact, and I know there is no option of desensitisation 
due to familiarity, just as the emotional impact of working in Rape Crisis centres
15
 
                                                          
15
 ‘Rape Crisis (England and Wales) campaign continuously to raise awareness of the prevalence 
of sexual violence and, in particular, we highlight the importance and need for appropriate, high-
quality and specialised support. Through our campaigns and briefings we raise awareness of 
sexual violence, challenge attitudes and press for change. We also work with other organisations, 
agencies and government departments to improve the response to those who are affected by and 
who perpetrate sexual violence. Rape Crisis Centres provide crucial crisis and long term 
specialised counselling, support and independent advocacy for all women and girls of all ages who 
have experienced any form of sexual violence both recently and/or in the past; centres are 
community based, and independent of government and the criminal justice system’ (Rape Crisis 
[England and Wales], 2004-2013). 
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is the same today as it was when I first started thirty years ago.   The emotional 
impact is an intersectional experience. Looking back on writing Ain’t I A 
Woman?, bell hooks (1989:151-153) reflects: 
The book emerged out of my longing for self-recovery, for education for 
critical consciousness - for a way of understanding black female 
experience that would liberate us from the colonizing mentality fostered in 
a racist, sexist context. (151) 
While writing, I often felt an intense despair that was so overwhelming I 
really questioned how we could bear being alive in this society, how could 
we stay alive. I was profoundly discouraged by the many forces colluding 
to support the myth of the strong super-black woman, and it seemed that it 
would be impossible to compel recognition of black women’s exploitation 
and oppression.  It is not that black women have not been and are not 
strong; it is simply that this is only a part of our story, a dimension, just as 
the suffering is another dimension - one that has been most unnoticed and 
unattended to. (152-153) 
The intersectional experience of living, writing and re-reading Ain’t I A 
Woman? includes the suffering, exploitation and silencing of Black slave women 
in conjunction with the physical and emotional toil experienced by the Black 
feminist, bell hooks. This toil is inextricably entwined with my own encounter as 
a Black woman, and is a toil that is inextricably entwined with being a Black 
woman in relation to other Black women in the context of a racist, homophobic 
patriarchy.   
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What can be seen at play here is the refusal of intersectionality to be 
bounded.  It is important to understand that although the intersectional experience 
is greater than the sum of race plus class plus gender plus other constructs of 
identity, intersectionality is not a unifying mechanism.  The political function and 
lived experience of intersectionality is captured in Derrida’s statement: 
What interests me is the limit of every attempt to totalize, to gather, 
versammeln…the limit of this unifying, uniting movement, the limit that it 
had to encounter, because the relationship of the unity to itself implies 
some difference. (Derrida and Caputo, 1997:13; emphasis in original) 
What interests me is the emotional difficulty of encountering and resisting the 
limit that includes my own emotional resistance to the element of unavailability in 
intersectionality. 
 
The Excess of Black Women 
Furthermore, in the context of a racist, homophobic patriarchy, Black women are 
constituted as the abject subject defined by Kristeva as:  
…what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, 
positions, rules.  The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite. (Kristeva, 
1982:4) 
Black women are excess in every sense of Bill Ashcroft’s exploration of the word: 
Too much, too long, too many, too subversive, too voluble, too insistent, 
too loud, too strident, too much-too-much, too complex, too hybrid, too 
convoluted, too disrespectful, too antagonistic, too insistent, too insistent, 
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too insistent, too repetitive, too paranoid, too . . . excessive. (Ashcroft, 
1994:33; ellipsis in original) 
Each identity category that constitutes the subjectivity of the Black woman, each 
identity category that constitutes me as a Black lesbian feminist, is excessive in 
itself.  The infinite referral and deferral of intersections of excess produce excess, 
and are felt as an excess. The emotional impact of intersectionality is an excess 
that I find ‘too much-too-much’ to bear. 
 
The Relation without Relation  
The intersectional dynamics at work transgress temporal and spatial borders. I 
find Derrida’s statement that ‘What disrupts the totality is the condition for the 
relation to the other’ (Derrida and Caputo, 1997:13) useful when applied to 
Lorde’s example of attending her first job interview.   
My first interview for a part-time job after school.  An optical company on 
Nassau Street has called my school and asked for one of its students.  The 
man behind the counter reads my application and then looks up at me, 
surprised by my Black face.  His eyes remind me of the woman on the 
train when I was five.  Then something else is added, as he looks me up 
and down, pausing at my breasts. (Lorde, 1983a:149)    
The intersection of racism and sexism flows across time and space in a 
performative, embodied experience of infinite intersections.  The body, breast and 
skin are sites of objectification that incorporate being treated as if she were a five-
year-old roach intersected with hundreds of other inhabited habits of racism, 
sexism and homophobia experienced by Lorde across her life span, as indicated 
  
 212    
 
by the use of the present tense.  Lorde is caught in an indeterminate present-to- 
past, past-to-present relation. Referring to Lévinas’ (1969) notion of ‘rapport sans 
rapport,’ Derrida explains that: 
The structure of my relation to the other is of a “relation without relation.”  
It is a relation in which the other remains absolutely transcendent.  I 
cannot reach the other.  I cannot know the other from the inside and so on. 
(Derrida and Caputo, 1997:14)  
What I am trying to demonstrate is that hooks’ writing of Ain’t I A Woman?, 
contingent upon Truth’s question, ‘Ain’t I A Woman?,’ is inextricably bound with 
my personal engagement with Ain’t I A Woman? and with Lorde’s encounters as 
‘the sister outsider.’ These intersecting relations are a ‘relation without relation’ 
(Derrida and Caputo, 1997:14), where the relation to the other is an impossible 
relation to self.  Relation without relation is a borderless relation.   The infinite 
intersections remain ‘absolutely transcendent,’ and although this condition is 
overwhelmingly destabilising, it is the very condition of transformation. To return 
to the quote by Lorde that I used to open this chapter, it is the condition in which: 
My fullest concentration of energy is available to me…allowing power 
from particular sources of my living to flow back and forth freely through 
all my different selves… (Lorde, 1980a:120-121)    
Lorde and Derrida each propose a political ethics that resists the limitations of 
presenting the self as a ‘meaningful whole’ (Lorde, 1980a:120).  Derrida explains: 
…it is because I am not one with myself that I can speak with the other 
and address the other. That is not a way of avoiding responsibility.   On 
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the contrary, it is the only way for me to take responsibility and to make 
decisions (Derrida and Caputo, 1997:14)  
Derrida’s reference to responsibility alludes to a kind of ethics where the refusal 
of categories, or refusal of that which is already decided, is the basis for an ethics 
of decision-making.  In the following quote Lorde brings in the notion of justice: 
I am not one piece of myself. I cannot be simply a Black person and not be 
a woman too, nor can I be a woman without being a lesbian . . . Of course, 
there’ll always be people, and there have always been people in my life, 
who will come to me and say, “Well, here, define yourself as such and 
such,” to the exclusion of the other pieces of myself.  There is an injustice 
to self in doing this… (Evans, 1979:72)    
 
Intersectionality: The Unavailable Solution 
I find particularly useful the phrase Minh-ha (2010) uses when she speaks of ‘the 
boundary event,’ conjuring up connotations of the active, productive dynamics of 
‘event’ as something absolutely not static, emphasising ‘boundary’ as a verb, not a 
noun. The ‘boundary event’ of the activism of Black feminist theory becomes a 
question of who or what is host and guest in the intersecting borders of my 
experience and analysis. I propose that host and guest are at the heart of the 
matter; then, to go a step further, to propose that it is not hospitality, but the 
‘impossibility’ of hospitality that is the issue.  Reflecting on my experience as a 
Black lesbian feminist, it continues to be a training in understanding the ‘possible’ 
in the ‘impossible.’  
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This task calls for a rigorous and vigilant resistance to expected solutions, 
frameworks of thinking and instructions, especially where credibility is contingent 
upon prior anticipated expectations.  Derrida articulates the caution well: 
The arrivant must be absolutely other, the other I expect not to be 
expecting, that I’m not waiting for, whose expectation is made of a 
nonexpectation, an expectation without what in philosophy is called a 
horizon of expectation, when a certain knowledge still anticipates and 
amortizes in advance. If I am sure that there is going to be an event, this 
will not be an event (Derrida and Stiegler, 2002:13; italics in original)   
In speaking of the journey of the activism of Black feminist theory, Lorde picks 
up on the idea of the ‘horizon of expectation’ and, like Derrida, she resists the 
‘already’: 
What you chart is already where you’ve been.  But where we are going, 
there is no chart yet…Our Black women’s vision has no horizon. (Parmar 
and Kay, 1988:180) 
Furthermore, Spivak speaks of: 
 …a placing forth of the solution as the unavailability of a unified solution 
to a unified or homogeneous, generating or receiving, consciousness.  This 
unavailability is often not confronted. It is dodged and the problem 
apparently solved… (Spivak, 1985:55)  
In accordance with Spivak, this chapter attempts to trace the solution of 
‘unavailability’ in intersectionality not in order to discredit intersectionality as a 
solution, but, rather, to disrupt intersectionality as a ‘unified’ solution.  If we are 
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not careful, the seduction of intersectionality as a solution to confront unified, 
homogeneous constructions becomes a prior, unified solution in itself.  
Intersectionality becomes victim to the very phenomenon it seeks to undo.   
This chapter argues that in the primary task of dismantling borders 
between race, class, gender, age, sexuality and (dis)ability, intersectionality 
performs the solution as the unavailability of a unified solution.  Derrida 
summarises the predicament: 
You see, pure unity or pure multiplicity - when there is only totality or 
unity and when there is only multiplicity or disassociation - is a synonym 
of death. (Derrida and Caputo, 1997:13)  
 
Intersectionality: A Theory about Borders 
I want to think of my subjectivity, identity and encounters as a Black lesbian 
feminist in terms of a psychic territory, picking up on Radhakrishnan’s comment 
that:  
Locations are as factual as they are imaginary and imagined, as physical as 
they are psychic, and as open to direct experience as they are to empathic 
participation. (Radhakrishnan, 2000:56)  
The notion of a psychic location where multilayered experiences and emotional 
responses to those experiences intersect brings to life the idea that: 
The politics of location is productive…because it makes one location 
vulnerable to the claims of another and enables multiple contested 
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readings of the one reality from a variety of locations and positions. 
(Radhakrishnan, 2000:56-57)  
The various locations within my psychic territory actively resist the vulnerability 
of multiple intersecting claims.  My theoretical empathic participation in the 
articulation and politics of intersectionality is not always welcomed into the 
location of my emotional experience,   particularly when it concerns multi-layered 
realities of oppression. 
I re-read Crenshaw’s (1989) theory of intersectionality as a theory about 
borders. When Crenshaw speaks of Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and 
Class…, the ‘demarginalising’ involves the actual sociological margins, and the 
position and experience of being on the margins.   
Crenshaw explains that ‘[t]hese problems of exclusion cannot be solved 
simply by including Black women within an already established analytical 
structure’ (Crenshaw, 1989:140). In other words, saying, ‘Come on over the 
border, we include you,’ is not enough as this does not move the border one jot; to 
do this is simply to be re-positioned across an existing border. Border plus border 
plus border plus border equates to borders in the plural.  In stark contrast, the 
intersection of borders is greater because it accounts for the structural and 
emotional collision of the traffic of discrimination flowing in multiple directions: 
The point is that Black women can experience discrimination in any 
number of ways and that the contradiction arises from our assumptions 
that their claims of exclusion must be unidirectional.  Consider an analogy 
to traffic in an intersection, coming and going in all four directions. 
Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one 
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direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident happens in an 
intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any number of 
directions and, sometimes, from all of them.  Similarly, if a Black woman 
is harmed because she is in the intersection, her injury could result from 
sex discrimination or race discrimination.   (Crenshaw, 1989:149)  
In order words, what is required is an understanding of the injuries caused by the 
collision and why the force of the impact of the collision is so powerful.  
This is not just an intellectual exercise; the injuries caused by the collision 
have an emotional impact. The problem is that acknowledgement of the injuries 
are both desired and resisted at the same time. Indeed, Crenshaw is clear that not 
to understand the collision at the intersection, and not to understand the ways in 
which the vectors of oppressive constructs play host and guest to each other 
across constructed borders, serve to produce, mask, censor and regulate the 
injurious impact with the following consequences:  
…Black women are caught between ideological and political currents that 
combine first to create and then to bury Black women’s experiences. 
(Crenshaw, 1989:160)  
Awareness that I get caught up in, and collude with, the burying of my own 
experiences in order to avoid the emotional impact of multiple injuries is 
particularly excruciating.  
The actual construction of borders further complicates the situation. 
Thiongo states that:  
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…if a border marks the outer edge of one region, it also marks the 
beginning of the next region.  As the marker of an end, it also functions as 
the marker of a beginning.  Without the end of one region, there can be no 
beginning of another.  Depending on our starting point, the border is both 
the beginning and the outer edge.  Each space is beyond the boundary of 
the other.  The border in between serves as both the inner and the outer of 
the other.  It is thus at once the boundary and a shared space. (Thiongo, 
1996:120)     
The predicament of borders is, thus: without the border, how can things be 
defined? But, at the same time, borders are indeterminable. Application of 
Thiongo’s explanation to categories of experience becomes a question of trying to 
pinpoint the outer edge of, or marker of a beginning and an end between, race, 
gender, class, sexuality, age and (dis)ability.  It would seem that, depending on 
our starting point, all categories of identity and experience are the beginning, end 
and outer edge; each category and experience is beyond the boundary of the other. 
Borders as a structure undo themselves. Borders produce a false binary.  The 
structure of a border is an aporia, where aporia is the tension made up of, and 
arising out of, the ‘impossible’ or that which deconstructs itself in practice.  
In other words, the predicament is more than a paradox.  In a paradox, the 
relationship and structure between the things in the paradox do not necessarily 
undo each other.   However, borders simultaneously position and reposition; thus, 
position is undone. Derrida comments: ‘That is what gives deconstruction its 
movement, that is, constantly to suspect, to criticize the given determinations…’ 
(Derrida and Caputo, 1997:18). It is within the ‘movement’ of ‘given 
determinations’ that the ‘possible’ within the ‘impossible’ and the ‘available’ 
  
 219    
 
within the ‘unavailable’ can be found.  The ‘movement’ of ‘given determinations’ 
of race, gender, class, age, sexuality and (dis)ability is a dynamic that is at the 
core of intersectionality, and a dynamic that is infinitely difficult to embody and 
feel.  
The intersection or dissolution of borders between the constituent parts of 
myself and experience is not just a difficult emotional task because I have the 
habit of thinking in bordered, categorical, hierarchical binaries; it is not just 
difficult because I have no patterns for relating across difference; it is difficult 
because the construction of borders is contingent upon the ‘impossible.’  I rely on 
psychic borders for a delusion of emotional stability. This delusion is because the 
very structure of the concept of borders is inherently unstable. This instability 
becomes compounded by, is contingent upon, and shares, a similar inherent 
instability with the concept and conditions of hospitality.   
Spivak states that ‘[t]he putative center welcomes selective inhabitants of 
the margin in order better to exclude the margin’ (Spivak, 1979:35). The question 
is: what do I allow in and what ‘selective’ criteria do I use ‘in order to better 
exclude’ to the margins of my consciousness?  The criteria for ‘selective 
inhabitants’ to be allowed to cross, or not to cross, constructed borders, have a 
direct bearing on intention and vice-versa.  Intention and construction are 
mutually constituted and contingent. It would seem that both the intention and the 
construction of psychic borders, designed to exclude the unwanted to the margins, 
operate in the same ways, and for similar reasons, as socially constructed borders. 
The psychic and social intention is to disavow the anxiety of the ‘unavailability of 
the solution.’     
  
 220    
 
Intersectionality: The Impossibility of Hospitality  
The tension is that whilst I cannot ‘…afford to settle for one easy definition, one 
narrow individuation of self’ (Lorde, 1996:197) and ‘…realize that our place was 
the very house of difference rather [than] the security of any one particular 
difference’ (Lorde, 1996:197), this does not resolve the problem of absolute 
hospitality between the different selves in the ‘bonehouse’ (Mairs, 1989:471) of 
difference.  Derrida explains the problem: 
The law of hospitality, the express law that governs the general concept of 
hospitality, appears as a paradoxical law, pervertible or 
perverting…absolute hospitality requires that I open up my home and that 
I give not only to the foreigner (provided with a family name, with the 
social status of being a foreigner, etc.), but to the absolute, unknown, 
anonymous other, and that I give place to them, that I let them come, that I 
let them arrive, and take place in the place I offer them, without asking of 
them either reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their names. (Derrida, 
2000:25; emphasis in original) 
Application of this explanation to intersectionality might read something like:  
Absolute hospitality requires that I open up my bonehouse of difference 
and welcome not only those identifiable categories and experiences of 
difference with name and status (such as  age, race, class, gender, sexuality 
and (dis)ability), but to those absolute, unknown, anonymous other 
collisions, injuries, permutations and experiences of difference. Absolute 
hospitality requires that I give place to them, that I let them come, that I let 
  
 221    
 
them arrive, and take place in the place I offer them without any 
conditions.  It requires that I offer unconditional movement between: 
…all the parts of who I am, openly, allowing power from particular 
sources of my living to flow back and forth freely through all my different 
selves, without the restrictions of externally imposed definition. (Lorde, 
1980a:120-121)  
Derrida’s definition of ‘absolute hospitality’ is much more than a friendly 
welcome across the border.  
The problem is that the moment I say, ‘my place is your place,’ the 
demarcation between the host in ‘place’ and the guest in ‘place’ is immediately 
undone. ‘My home is your home’ is a giving up of my home and, in doing so, a 
giving up of my position of host in my home. ‘I give place to them’ (Derrida, 
2000:25; emphasis in original) is to give up any sense of emotional security in the 
place of my ‘bonehouse’ based on stable categories of identity.   
 
Actually, the implications of Derrida’s imperative go much further, as 
summarised by Westmoreland (2008:6): ‘This very welcoming opens up into a 
violence. Such violence turns the home inside out.’ Hillis Miller explains it in the 
following way: 
A host is a guest, and a guest is a host. A host is a host. The relation of 
household master offering hospitality to a guest and the guest receiving it, 
of host and parasite in the original sense of “fellow guest,” is inclosed 
within the word “host” itself. (Hillis Miller, 1979:180) 
Derrida explains the dialectic as: 
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…the hôte who receives (the host), the one who welcomes the invited or 
received hôte (the guest), the welcoming hôte who considers himself the 
owner of the place, is in truth a hôte received in his own home. He 
receives the hospitality that he offers in his own home; he receives it from 
his own home - which, in the end, does not belong to him. The hôte as host 
is a guest. (Derrida, 1999:41; italics and emphasis in original)  
This precarious situation is familiar and recognised in relation to national, social, 
ideological and political borders. 
However, I propose that this is precisely the situation in relation to borders 
of experience, identity and feeling in the psyche.  The situation is an interruption 
of the self.  The precarity is that ‘absolute hospitality’ deconstructs the border 
between host and guest. As Westmoreland (2008:4) explains, ‘[t]he conditions for 
such hospitality are both the conditions for its possibility and its impossibility.’ 
Returning to Thiongo’s (1996) observation, it would appear that the conditions of 
hospitality are ‘…at once the boundary and a shared space’ (Thiongo, 1996:120), 
where the unconditioned needs the conditioned because the conditioned is 
constitutive of the unconditioned.  
Hospitality is a tricky term; Derrida indicates this in the use of ‘pervertible 
or perverting.’ The trickiness is in the word itself: 
…the word “hospitality” carries its opposite within itself…The word 
“hospitality” derives from the Latin hospes, which is formed from hostis, 
which originally meant a “stranger” and came to take on the meaning of 
the enemy or “hostile” stranger (hostilis), + pets (potis, potes, potentia), to 
have power.  “Hospitality,” the welcome extended to the guest, is a 
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function of the power of the host to remain master of the premises. 
(Derrida and Caputo, 1997:110; italics in original) 
Thus, we have numerous intersecting predicaments producing a difficult basis for 
an unconditional welcome:  
1. Potentially, we have a hostile stranger who turns out to be the enemy, a 
parasite with the power to take over the ‘bonehouse’;  
2. We have the host, defined by her position, to welcome the guest in to 
her ‘bonehouse’ and remain proprietor; yet, the moment she says, ‘my 
“bonehouse” is your “bonehouse,”’ her ‘bonehouse’ is no longer her own;  
3.  We have Derrida’s ‘absolute hospitality,’ where host and guest ‘…both 
imply and exclude each other, simultaneously…exclusion and inclusion 
are inseparable in the same moment…’ (Derrida, 2000:81), and as such, 
‘absolute hospitality’ performs ‘the law without law’ (Derrida, 2000:83).  
 
The ‘Pervertible or Perverting’ Law of the Hatch 
I want to offer a re-reading of the hatch example used by Crenshaw (1989) in the 
light of Derrida’s aporia of ‘absolute hospitality’ in order to demonstrate the 
‘paradoxical,’ ‘pervertible or perverting’ law of hospitality at work.   In the 
example of the hatch, Crenshaw asks us to: 
Imagine a basement which contains all people who are disadvantaged on 
the basis of race, sex, class, sexual preference, age and/or physical ability.  
These people are stacked - feet standing on shoulders - with those on the 
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bottom being disadvantaged by the full array of factors, up to the very top, 
where the heads of all those disadvantaged by a singular factor brush up 
against the ceiling.  Their ceiling is actually the floor above which only 
those who are not disadvantaged in any way reside.  In efforts to correct 
some aspects of domination, those above the ceiling admit from the 
basement only those who can say that “but for” the ceiling, they too would 
be in the upper room.  A hatch is developed through which those placed 
immediately below can crawl.  Yet this hatch is generally available only to 
those who - due to the singularity of their burden and their otherwise 
privileged position relative to those below - are in the position to crawl 
through.   Those who are multiply-burdened are generally left below 
unless they can somehow pull themselves into the groups that are 
permitted to squeeze through the hatch. (Crenshaw, 1989:151-152; 
emphasis in original) 
It is clear that the hatch is not opened up to the ‘absolute, unknown, anonymous 
other.’  Hospitality is conditional, producing the criteria for a ‘pact’ (Derrida, 
2000:25).  The ‘family name’ (Derrida, 2000:25) criteria become the ‘but for’ 
(Crenshaw, 1989:151), and Derrida’s (2000:25) ‘social status’ criteria could be 
translated as ‘those placed immediately below’ and ‘the singularity of their 
burden.’ Position becomes criteria and criteria dictate position in a gradient of 
spatial and ideological proximity contingent upon sameness.  Following this logic, 
those who, due to their ‘otherwise privileged position relative to those below’ and 
‘placed immediately below’ the hatch, are offered hospitality.  The ‘absolute, 
unknown, anonymous other’ are: 
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…told to wait in the unprotected margins until they can be absorbed into 
the broader, protected categories of race and sex. (Crenshaw, 1989:152)  
Crenshaw’s analogy of the hatch provides an apposite framework to 
interrogate how hierarchies of oppression function to maintain the positions of 
host and guest within the collective ‘bonehouse’ of feminism, and within the 
individual ‘bonehouses’ of ourselves as feminists.  Lorde asks: 
What woman is so enamoured of her own oppression that she cannot see 
her heelprint upon another woman’s face? What women’s terms of 
oppression have become precious and necessary to her as a ticket into the 
fold of the righteous, away from the cold winds of self-scrutiny? (Lorde, 
1981:132)  
Stamping on the face of an aspect of self or on an aspect of another woman’s self 
is the ‘terrible injustice’ Lorde spoke about in her reply to Robinson, quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter. Enamoured identification with ‘mutually exclusive 
ideologies or priorities’ that lets ‘one piece of yourself be cancelled out by 
another’ (Savren and Robinson, 1982:81-82) produces false hierarchies of 
oppression.   
 
Hostile Strangers: Black Women Go Around to the Back Door 
I contend that it is possible to trace the ‘paradoxical,’ ‘pervertible or perverting’ 
law of hospitality at work in all of the examples that Crenshaw (1989) uses, such 
as: Black women and rape (157) ; Black women and domestic violence; Black 
women and their Black communities (155); Black women and white communities 
  
 226    
 
(156); Black women and the Black political agenda, including ‘the Black 
liberation movement’ (156) ‘Black liberationist agendas’ (150).  In every example 
that Crenshaw examines, Black women are either completely excluded or ‘…have 
to go around to the back door…’ (Crenshaw, 1989:161). In these multiple 
examples of inhospitality, Black women are recognised as the ‘absolute, 
unknown, anonymous other,’ and as such, represent both the ‘“hostile” and the 
stranger’ (Derrida and Caputo, 1997:110). In other words, the ‘absolute unknown, 
anonymous other’ of Black women becomes translated into a known category, 
albeit hostile. Black women come to represent the situation whereby ‘the 
foreigner lives within us…the hidden face of our identity, the space that wrecks 
our abode…’ (Kristeva, 1991:1).  Lorde address this point in the following way: 
It’s easier to deal with a poet, certainly a black woman poet, when you 
categorize her down, narrow her down so that she can fulfil your 
expectations, so she’s socially acceptable and not too disturbing, nor too 
discordant. (Tate, 1983:88)    
Ahmed summarizes the ‘pervertible’ machinations of the stranger situation as:  
…we recognise somebody as a stranger, rather than simply failing to 
recognise them . . .Strangers are not simply those who are not known in 
this dwelling, but those who are, in their very proximity, already 
recognised as not belonging, as being out of place. Such a recognition of 
those who are out of place allows both the demarcation and enforcement 
of the boundaries of “this place”, as where “we” dwell. (Ahmed, 2000:21-
22; emphasis in original)  
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I would say that racism, sexism, homophobia, ageism, classism and (dis)ability 
discrimination are no stranger to me. Indeed, I make it my business to know and 
recognise these forms of oppression. Intersectionality continues to focus my 
recognition so that I see the proximity between different forms of oppression with 
increasing clarity and realise that they are rather intimate.  However, in ‘this 
place’ of my ‘bonehouse,’ I find that which is no stranger to me becomes a 
stranger and I become a stranger to myself.   
 
The Inward Disturbance of Intersectionality 
The ‘pervertible or perverting’ characteristic of hospitality and the ‘pervertible or 
perverting’ characteristic of borders are constituted and function in similar ways.  
Hospitality and borders share a quality of internal instability; they supplement 
each other and function as supplements in their own right. Furthermore, it is 
becoming apparent that the ‘pervertible or perverting’ ‘…operates normatively; 
and how its normativity is rendered oblique almost to the point of invisibility’ 
(Brown, 2008:4).   
The relevance to my argument of tracking how ‘pervertible or perverting’ 
operates, and the disavowal of its anxiety provoking machinations, is that this is at 
work in my bonehouse of difference.  It is the crux of the emotional difficulty I 
encounter in attempting to allow the collision of intersecting experiences and 
analyses of my different selves.  Caputo explains: 
Derrida likes to say that we do not know what hospitality is, not because 
the idea is built around a difficult conceptual riddle, but because, in the 
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end, hospitality is not a matter of objective knowledge, but belongs to 
another order all together, beyond knowledge, an enigmatic “experience” 
in which I set out for the stranger, for the other, for the unknown, where I 
cannot go. (Derrida and Caputo, 1997:112)  
Without careful scrutiny the limits of hospitality could limit the availability of my 
fullest concentration of energy for the activism of Black feminist theory, and limit 
‘the transformation of silence into language and action’ (Lorde, 1977a:40).  
However, as Caputo explains:  
Derrida’s interest in exploring the tensions within “hospitality” is not 
aimed at cynically unmasking it as just more mastery and 
power…hospitality is inhabited from within, inwardly disturbed by these 
tensions, but he does this precisely in order to open hospitality up, to keep 
it on guard against itself, on the qui vive, to open - to push - it beyond 
itself.  For it is only that internal tension and instability that keeps the idea 
of hospitality alive, open, loose. (Derrida and Caputo, 1997:112; emphasis 
in original)  
The emotional task of inhabiting intersectionality from within is residing with the 
inward disturbance.         
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Intersectionality and the Foreigner  
Derrida opens Of Hospitality with the ‘Foreigner Question,’ formulated in the 
following way:  ‘As though the foreigner were being-in-question, the very 
question of being-in-question, the question-being or being-in-question of the 
question’ (Derrida, 2000:3). A close re-reading of Crenshaw’s (1989) paper 
through Derrida’s ‘Foreigner Question’ reads the intersectional experience of 
Black women’s multiple oppression as the very question of being-in-question.’ 
‘[T]he very question of being-in-question’ is at the heart of the ‘psychological 
toll’ (The Combahee River Collective, 1977:266) of dealing with the foreigner 
within me.  
Both the intersectional experience and the foreigner are responded to in 
similar ways for similar reasons. The denial, exclusion and rejection of the 
intersectional experience are contingent upon logics that are used to deny, exclude 
and reject the foreigner.  Both the foreigner and the intersectional experience of 
Black women seek recognition for admission through ideological, analytical, 
physical and emotional border control.   
Both the foreigner and the intersectional experience of Black women find 
themselves subject to the laws, questions and anxieties that determine border 
control.  Westmoreland outlines the position and function of the foreigner:    
An individual was recognized by how he appeared before the law, what 
status he held in the polis. The foreigner was placed inside the law, under 
the law, essential to the law. The foreigner occupied an integral space 
within the city. Indeed, the foreigner was essential because he provided 
that to which citizens could compare themselves. From a 
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phenomenological standpoint, one could claim that one’s identity is only 
understood in relation to others. Citizens understand themselves in relation 
to others, to foreigners. “We are not those sorts of people. We are 
citizens.” In the laws of hospitality, we find a multiplicity involving 
differentiation according to the right of the state. The state establishes 
rules through which people can be divided into citizens and non-citizens, 
citizens and foreigners, hosts and guests. It can identify individuals; and 
therefore, it can include or exclude whosoever it chooses based on the 
laws, which it has created. (Westmoreland, 2008:2; italics in original) 
 
Crenshaw (1989) demonstrates that the criteria, rules and laws invoked to exclude 
Black women’s intersectional experience are contingent upon what is understood 
in relation to others.  The key point is that these ‘others’ are known others; others 
that can be recognised and identified with.  The foreigner is constituted and 
situated by laws that demarcate what is to be included and excluded, 
‘…predicated on a discrete set of experiences…’ (Crenshaw, 1989:140). 
Crenshaw shows that in the case of Black women’s intersectional experience, the 
discreet is ‘…defined respectively by white women’s and Black men’s 
experiences’ (Crenshaw, 1989:143) thus ‘…limiting inquiry to the experiences of 
otherwise-privileged members of the group’ (Crenshaw, 1989:140).  
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Pandora’s Box 
When Black Women ‘…placed inside the law, under the law, essential to the law’ 
(Westmoreland, 2008:2) presented their case of intersectional discrimination, the 
conclusion of the court was:  
Title VII does not indicate that the goal of the statute was to create a new 
classification of “black women”…The prospect of the creation of new 
classes of protected minorities, governed only by the mathematical 
principles of permutation and combination, clearly raises the prospect of 
opening the hackneyed Pandora’s box. (Crenshaw, 1989:142)  
This fascinating summary incorporated the key elements used in immigration 
control designed to include and exclude selective inhabitants.  Those elements 
include the notion of the creation of a ‘new classification’ defined in relation to a 
prior known, the use of mathematical principles and the anxiety of Pandora’s box.  
Westmoreland’s (2008) depiction of the citizen’s evaluation of self in 
terms of the foreigner that ‘“[w]e are not those sorts of people”’ is exactly the 
response of the courts and is exactly where the courts missed the point. The point 
is that Black women were saying exactly that ‘we are not those sorts of people’; 
they were saying, ‘we are not white women and we are not Black men.’  Actually, 
Black women were contesting the ‘…mathematical principles of permutation and 
combination…’ (Crenshaw, 1989:142) used by the court to classify and recognise 
injustice.  It is, as Derrida explains: ‘Justice, if it has to do with the other…is 
always incalculable. You cannot calculate justice’ (Derrida and Caputo, 1997:17).  
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Pandora’s box becomes translated into what Honig observes as the 
familiar response to the foreigner:  
Again and again, I find foreignness used in familiar ways, as a device that 
gives shape to or threatens existing political communities by marking 
negatively what “we” are not. (Honig, 2001:2-3)  
The device becomes a mechanism to produce a number of interconnected 
phenomena simultaneously.  The device of the foreigner produces the threat, 
legitimizes a prior established set of knowns to identify the threat, and produces 
the ‘“we” are not’ border criteria for what is recognised/included and 
unrecognised/excluded.   
It is a set of intersecting productions I recognise performed in my psyche 
in response to ‘the very question of being-in-question.’  Black women since 
Sojourner
16
 Truth, in ‘question of being-in-question, the question-being or being-
in-question of the question’ (Derrida, 2000:3), continue to ask, ‘Ain’t I A 
Woman?’ (Truth, 1851).  Crenshaw explains:  
Unable to grasp the importance of Black women’s intersectional 
experiences, not only courts, but feminist and civil rights thinkers as well 
have treated Black women in ways that deny both the unique 
compoundedness of their situation and the centrality of their experiences 
to the larger classes of women and Blacks.  Black women are regarded 
either as too much like women or Blacks and the compounded nature of 
their experience is absorbed into the collective experiences of either group 
                                                          
16
 Interestingly, ‘Sojourner’ is another word for ‘traveller,’ which conjures connotations of the 
mobile foreigner.   
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or as too different, in which case Black women’s Blackness or femaleness 
sometimes has placed their needs and perspectives at the margin of the 
feminist and Black liberationist agendas. (Crenshaw, 1989:150)   
 
Black Women: The ‘Absolute, Unknown, Anonymous Other’ 
The technique of dealing with difference through the polarities of absorption or 
rejection is articulated by Lorde as ‘…pretending those differences are 
insurmountable barriers, or that they do not exist at all’ (Lorde, 1980a:115).  
Lorde dismantles the hypocrisy of the ‘too different’ (Crenshaw, 1989:150) logic 
in the following way: 
As white women ignore their built-in privilege of whiteness and define 
woman in terms of their own experience alone, then women of Color 
become “other”, the outsider whose experience and tradition is too “alien” 
to comprehend. (Lorde, 1980a:117, emphasis in original)  
The effect of using the experience, subjectivity and identity of the ‘already 
known’ as a measure is to absent anything that is absent from the match. Lorde 
traces these absences and she observes that: 
The literature of women of Color is seldom included in women’s literature 
courses and almost never in other literature courses, nor in women’s 
studies as a whole.  All too often, the excuse given is that the literatures of 
women of Color can only be taught by Colored women, or that they are 
too difficult to understand, or that classes cannot “get into” them because 
they come out of experiences that are “too different.” (Lorde, 1980a:117)   
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Lorde goes on to expose the contradictions, instability and arbitrary nature of the 
criteria of ‘“too different”’ (Lorde, 1980a:117; Crenshaw, 1989:150), pointing out 
that those who see Black women’s work as ‘“too different”’: 
…seem to have no trouble at all teaching and reviewing work that comes 
out of the vastly different experiences of Shakespeare, Molière, 
Dostoyefsky, and Aristophanes. (Lorde, 1980a:117)   
Although contemporary literature courses may now include ‘…the literatures of 
women of Color…,’ so that the manifestation, function and production of ‘“too 
different”’ may have altered since 1980, I would contend that the principle of 
Lorde’s argument remains relevant. 
The ‘Foreigner Question’ of the ‘question of being-in-question’ (Derrida, 
2000:3) is performed in the interview between Lorde and Rich (Lorde, 1979d).  
They discuss the matter of documentation, in which Rich proposes documentation 
as a mechanism to aid a form of understanding based on a shared identification 
that clearly was absent. Documentation becomes, for Rich, a passport to 
understanding the foreign other, whereas for Lorde, documentation represents a 
passport to misunderstanding:  
Adrienne: So if I ask for documentation, it’s because I take seriously the 
spaces between us that difference has created, that racism has created.  
There are times when I simply cannot assume that I know what you know, 
unless you show me what you mean. 
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Audre: But I’m used to associating a request for documentation as a 
questioning of my perceptions, an attempt to devalue what I’m in the 
process of discovering. 
Adrienne: It’s not. Help me to perceive what you perceive.  That’s what 
I’m trying to say to you. 
Audre: But documentation does not help one perceive.  At best it only 
analyzes the perception.  At worst, it provides a screen by which to avoid 
concentrating on the core revelation… (Lorde, 1979d:104; italics in 
original)  
Documentation functions as a foreigner device to make known that which is 
unknown, measured in terms of what is known.  Derrida comments: 
…if I decide because I know, within the limits of what I know and know I 
must do, then I am simply deploying a foreseeable program and there is no 
decision, no responsibility, no event. (Borradori, 2003:118; emphasis in 
original)  
In an attempt to move beyond the criteria of what is known, Rich uses the 
following reasoning: ‘There are times when I simply cannot assume that I know 
what you know, unless you show me what you mean’ (Lorde, 1979d:104). 
However, all that is established is that Rich cannot assume she knows, and her 
request for documentation as a mechanism to ‘show me’ immediately unravels 
any position of not knowing; or, rather, it presumes a stability of a knowing self 
that is in need of mere confirmation rather than transformation.  
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There are several intersecting issues occurring here; a key point is that the 
request comes from Rich and, thus, it is Rich who establishes the criteria. 
Furthermore, documentation is not neutral. The historical, political and social 
symbolic significance of documentation is racialised, and has been used to police 
all kinds of boundaries between people, communities and nations. I am reminded 
of Lorde’s journal entry from her two week trip to Russia in 1976 where she 
writes: ‘I thought of the South African women in 1956 who demonstrated and 
died rather than carry passbooks’ (Lorde, 1976:29). Even though I was born and 
raised in Britain, I carry my British passport with me at all times, vigilant of the 
‘question of being-in-question, the question-being or being-in-question of the 
question’ (Derrida, 2000:3). Detailed deconstruction of the exchange reveals the 
impossibility of ‘the absolute, unknown, anonymous other’ (Derrida, 2000:25).  
Keating argues that: 
No question to the stranger is pure because we already assimilate their 
being into terms that we can arrange into our own conceptions of being 
(Keating, 2004:no page)  
 
Conclusion 
I conclude by using the theory of intersectionality to frame a possible re-reading 
of Lorde’s description of the ‘pellet of yellow colouring’ penetrating packets of 
margarine.  Lorde remembers:  
During World War II, we bought sealed plastic packets of white, 
uncolored margarine, with a tiny, intense pellet of yellow coloring perched 
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like a topaz just inside the clear skin of the bag. We would leave the 
margarine out for a while to soften, and then we would pinch the little 
pellet to break it inside the bag, releasing the rich yellowness into the soft 
pale mass of margarine. Then taking it carefully between our fingers, we 
would knead it gently back and forth, over and over, until the color had 
spread throughout the whole pound bag of margarine, thoroughly coloring 
it.  I find the erotic such a kernel within myself. When released from its 
intense and constrained pellet, it flows through and colors my life with a 
kind of energy that heightens and sensitizes and strengthens all my 
experience. (Lorde, 1978a:57)  
The sealed plastic packets of uncoloured margarine could represent the 
determined categories of identity that are bordered off by a range of mechanisms 
functioning to reduce Black women to one component.   
The ‘intense pellet of yellow colouring perched like a topaz’ could 
represent the potential of the theory of intersectionality. The action of kneading ‘it 
gently back and forth, over and over, until the color had spread throughout the 
whole pound bag of margarine, thoroughly colouring it’ could be the toil of 
allowing different aspects of self to play host and guest to each other, so that host 
is guest and guest is host, breaching predetermined borders between categories of 
experience and identity.  It is interesting to note that Anzaldúa (2007) also uses 
the metaphor of ‘kneading’ to embody the connection between aspects of identity.  
Anzaldúa states that: 
I am an act of kneading, of uniting and joining that not only has produced 
both a creature of darkness and a creature of light, but also a creature that 
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questions the definitions of light and dark and gives them new meanings. 
(Anzaldúa, 2007:103)   
The ‘energy that heightens and sensitizes and strengthens all my 
experience’ (Lorde, 1978a:57) could represent the productive potential, the 
possibility of transformation available in the impossibility of hospitality that 
constitutes the task of intersecting all of the different parts of myself.  
This reflective analysis set out to examine the emotional turmoil of 
intersectionality.  I argue that ‘It’s hard, it’s very hard’ (Savren and Robinson, 
1982:81) because the undecidable aporetic space of intersectionality is a direct 
challenge to the propaganda of predetermined, ‘tightly-drawn parameters’ 
(Crenshaw, 1989:152) that constitute identity positions in this racist, homophobic 
patriarchal world.  This propaganda operates according to an equation where 
certainty is synonymous with rationality and order. Intersectionality is ‘very hard’ 
because it requires trust in ‘…our deepest and nonrational knowledge’ (Lorde, 
1978a:53).   
I contend that the ‘terrible injustice’ (Savren and Robinson, 1982:82) of 
being reduced to one component works in numerous ways.  Firstly, the legitimacy 
of privileging one component of identity that functions to allow ‘…one piece of 
yourself [to] be cancelled out by another’ (Savren and Robinson, 1982:82) is 
contingent upon the criteria of an ‘always already.’17  
                                                          
17
 The term ‘always already’ (Althusser, 1971) has been taken up by Black feminist scholars to 
communicate the predetermined categories of identity and positionality (Boyce Davies, 1994:55; 
Chabram-Dernersesian, 2006:185; Conboy et al., 1997:3; duCille, 1994:233; Durham, 2007:10; 
Fulton, 2006:11; Hammonds, 1995:383; Hayes, 2010:45; Shildrick and  Price, 1998:62; West, 
1988:32; Whelehan, 1995:110). 
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Secondly, the predetermined criteria of identity categories are a 
mechanism of regulation and control that limit the choices, resource and 
experience of self-definition available to Black women.  A predetermined 
decision is no decision at all.  In stark contrast, the aporia of intersectionality 
enables a more just, responsible and ethical encounter with self and others.  de 
Unamuno explains that: 
What I wish to establish is that uncertainty, doubt, perpetual wrestling 
with the mystery of our final destiny, mental despair, and the lack of any 
solid and stable dogmatic foundation, may be the basis of an ethic (de 
Unamuno, 2006:230)  
Thirdly, the potential of the aporia of intersectionality moves beyond the 
self and forms the foundation for an ethical engagement with others.  Butler 
explains how this works:  
If the subject is opaque to itself, not fully translucent and knowable to 
itself, it is not thereby licensed to do what it wants or to ignore its 
obligations to others…Indeed, if it is precisely by virtue of one’s relations 
to others that one is opaque to oneself, and if those relations to others are 
the venue for one’s ethical responsibility, then it may well follow that it is 
precisely by virtue of the subject’s opacity to itself that it incurs and 
sustains some of its most important ethical bonds. (Butler, 2005:19-20) 
The productive potential of the aporia of intersectionality is summarised 
succinctly by the Combahee River Collective: ‘We believe that the most profound 
and potentially the most radical politics come directly out of our own identity…’ 
(The Combahee River Collective, 1977:264).  
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Lorde cautions that ‘[w]e cannot settle for the pretenses of connections…’ 
(Lorde, 1983a:153). The implications of this are infinite; an infinite referral and 
deferral of pretences of connections that form a complex web of interconnected 
pretences.  Through the critical lens of aporia and intersectionality, I now 
understand that the ‘pretenses’ function to mask, censor and disavow the anxiety 
that connections within myself, with other Black women and across political 
alliances produces.  The situation of remaining proprietor of my ‘bonehouse’ of 
difference is contingent upon the ‘pretenses.’  
The success of political coalitions, collaborative working, alliances and 
bridge-building for liberation is dependent upon, and in direct correlation to, our, 
my and your capacity to be in the ‘borderland’ of self. Anzaldúa explains:  
A borderland is a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional 
residue of an unnatural boundary. It is in a constant state of transition. The 
prohibited and forbidden are its inhabitants. (Anzaldúa, 2007:25)   
Being in the ‘borderland’ of self involves giving up inherited inhabitance of the 
habit of borders. Survival of the ‘borderland’ of self is not in that which is 
available, possible and known. So, to the question I am often asked and ask often 
of myself, ‘If “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house” (Lorde, 
1979b:112; emphasis in original), and these are the only tools that I habit and 
inhabit, what and where are the alternative tools? My answer would now be ‘the 
“absolute, unknown, anonymous other”’ (Derrida, 2000:25) within 
intersectionality in which ‘…our creativity can spark like a dialectic’ (Lorde, 
1979b:111).         
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Chapter 5 
Zami: The Epilogue as ‘Myself Apart from Me’ 
 
Introduction 
Every woman I have ever loved has left her print upon me, where I loved 
some invaluable piece of myself apart from me - so different that I had to 
stretch and grow in order to recognize her. (Lorde, 1996:223)  
This is the first sentence of the ‘Epilogue’ of Zami: A New Spelling of My Name 
(Lorde 1996). Where Spivak begins with ‘…“the question of the preface”’ 
(Spivak, 1997:ix), this chapter begins and remains with the question of the 
‘Epilogue’ of Lorde’s biomythography, Zami. The question of the ‘Epilogue’ is 
used here to examine the aporia of positionality. The ‘Epilogue’ as a text inside 
and outside of text, and interdependent as text of text, is performative of 
intertextuality and, as such, enables interrogation of these themes in relation to a 
close re-reading of Zami.   
This chapter uses Kristeva’s (1969) notion of intertextuality as 
interchangeable with intersubjectivity, so that ‘…poetic language is read as at 
least double’ (Kristeva, 1969:37; emphasis in original). A close, ‘double’ re-
reading of the first lines of the ‘Epilogue’ interprets ‘…where I loved some 
invaluable piece of myself apart from me…’ (Lorde, 1996:223) as reference to 
inter/intra-subjectivity and inter/intra-textuality.  The ‘Epilogue’ is a piece of 
Zami apart from Zami, where ‘Zami: A Carriacou name for women who work 
together as friends and lovers’ (Lorde, 1996:223; italics in original) personifies a 
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plurality of intersubjective encounters across multiple configurations. As such, 
Zami anticipates current postmodernist, feminist and critical race theory debates 
that privilege concepts of multiplicity, instability and the implications of the 
‘constitutive outside’ (Butler, 2004, 2005; Hall, 1996:18).  With specific reference 
to Zami, Carlston comments that: 
To the idea of coalition between individuals Lorde adds the concept of 
“positionality,” or individual identity as an unstable construct, constantly 
(re)produced both by and within the social matrix, and by the subject’s 
conscious creation of herself.  In this regard Lorde prefigures more recent 
theoretical work by writers like Chandra Mohanty, Gayatri Spivak, and 
Trinh Minh-ha, while presenting a unique vision of the construction and 
uses of subjectivity. (Carlston, 1993:226) 
 
The Aporia of the Epilogue as Method 
Spivak’s (1997) deconstruction of the preface in Of Grammatology opens the 
question of the ‘Epilogue’ as intertexuality to function as the subject under 
analysis and a tool of analysis. Thus, the relationship between method and 
analysis within the structure of this possible re-reading of Zami mirrors the 
intersubjective, intertextual encounters that constitute the play of identity and 
difference in Zami.  Spivak writes: 
The preface, by daring to repeat the book and reconstitute it in another 
register, merely enacts what is already the case: the book’s repetitions are 
always other than the book.  There is, in fact, no “book” other than these 
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ever-different repetitions: the “book” in other words, is always already a 
“text,” constituted by the play of identity and difference.  A written 
preface provisionally localizes the place where, between reading and 
reading, book and book, the inter-inscribing of “reader(s),” “writer(s),” 
and language is forever at work. (Spivak, 1997:xii; parentheses in original) 
In terms of applying these principles as a method of close re-reading of 
Zami, the ‘Epilogue’ as a reiteration of identity and difference is used to explore 
the dialectic of the place of ‘inter-inscribing’ of identity as provisional and 
localised.  This method is used to explore how Lorde grapples with the dialectic 
of her speaking position, and the instability of an ‘always already’ constitution of 
language, text and identity. For example, I am concerned with the ways in which 
the space of myth in the creation of a biomythography grapples with ‘The myth of 
the positionless speaker…’ (Davies, 1992:54; Davies and Harré, 1990). Spivak 
comments:  
Humankind’s common desire for a stable center, and for the assurance of 
mastery -through knowing or possessing.  And a book, with its ponderable 
shape and its beginning, middle, and end, stands to satisfy that desire. 
(Spivak, 1997:xi)  
However, as Spivak (1997) demonstrates in her translator’s preface to Of 
Grammatology, and as the text of Zami demonstrates, the ‘desire for a stable 
center’ is displaced due to the impossibility of establishing stability, ‘assurance,’ 
‘mastery,’ ‘knowing’ or possession.   
The indeterminate place and space of the ‘Epilogue’ in Zami enables 
examination of the tension of simultaneously doing and undoing position. Caselli 
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describes the tension as ‘…a multiple and changeable notion of textuality which 
nevertheless configures itself in specific ways’ (Caselli, 2005:4).  Recognizing the 
dialectic of the ‘changeable’ as stuck with, and contingent upon, an inevitable 
‘specific’ configuration, the task of this particular analysis goes beyond seeking to 
resist the binary of certainty for uncertainty.  In other words: 
To move beyond the idea of authorial intentionality and of a stable prior 
text entails neither a claim that every meaning can be casually configured 
and attributed nor a claim that we can do away with the idea of authority. 
(Caselli, 2005:4)   
In short, the task is to stay with the dialectic. The questions of what constitutes the 
dialectic and how the dialectic is manifest are central to the play of identity and 
difference. More specifically, it is central to this particular close textual re-reading 
of Zami.   
The logic of staying with the dialectic is: firstly, that it is inevitable, and as 
will become evident, it is inevitable both within textuality and within the activism 
of Black feminist theory; secondly, that uncovering the constituent elements of the 
tension and what the tension is contingent upon may uncover how the tension 
functions; and thirdly, to find out if there is any potential in the dialectic ‘…to 
effect changes, to challenge prevailing and problematic norms governing 
textuality’ (Grosz, 1995:11).  Thus, the objective is not to resolve, but to explore 
the irresolvable as a method of close textual analysis.  
Using the ‘Epilogue’ of Zami as a method by which to interrogate the 
aporetics of positionality presents a number of intersecting dilemmas.  The 
problem concerns the dangers of the relationship between method and analysis.  
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The question is: what is driving what?  What constitutes what in terms of method, 
content and analysis? Have the themes under investigation emerged because of 
the theoretical and philosophical function and place of the ‘Epilogue,’ or is it the 
other way around? Have the themes given rise to the method of using the 
‘Epilogue’?  In other words, does the act of using the ‘Epilogue’ as methodology 
result in a fetishization of the themes? The quandary points to the crux of this 
chapter concerning the question of ‘…the origin of the origin’ (Derrida, 1997:61), 
incorporating a questioning of the idea of the trace, and the disruption of logic 
contingent upon binaries of absence/presence, beginning/end and 
stability/instability. The tension between method and analysis remains ‘…the very 
question of being-in-question…’ (Derrida, 2000:3), where the trick is to avoid 
‘…“guarding the question”…’ in order to privilege the ‘…unanswerable 
question…’ (Spivak, 1999:425) and confront the unavailability of solution 
(Spivak, 1985a:55).    
The situation of confronting the unavailability of solution directs attention 
away from ‘guarding the question’ towards the ‘guarding’ of an ethical re-reading.  
In other words, refusal of a ‘decided,’ and suspicion of the ‘always already,’ may 
help to guard against being constrained by predetermined parameters of the 
question.  These tensions concern the question of the ethics of posing a question 
that is already decided.  Derrida explains that ‘[i]f there were a horizon of 
expectation, if there were anticipation or programming, there would be neither 
event nor history’ (Derrida and Stiegler, 2002:12). In other words, practices and 
thinking contingent upon totalization will inevitably be constrained by 
totalization.  
  
 246    
 
The implication of this in the relationship between politics, responsibility 
and ethics, indicates that relevance and application of the issues at stake are not 
confined to textual analysis, literary criticism or academic scholarship.  This re-
reading of Zami, the tension of the method used and the struggles of staying with 
the ‘possible’ in the ‘impossible’ are fundamental to an ethical and responsible 
foundation for the political activism of Black feminist theory.  In short, the task is 
to attempt to be with each other as Black and white feminists without an ‘always 
already’ decided position, question and answer. 
 
Mapping Out the Tensions 
The implications and relevance of this analysis reach beyond Zami.  The tensions 
explored are the tensions that the activism of Black feminist theory confronts on a 
daily basis. Primarily, these tensions concern how to change positions configured 
on notions of essentialism that are oppressive, to different positions configured on 
notions of fluidity that are liberating. The problem stated earlier by Caselli is that 
the ‘changeable’ is stuck with, and contingent upon, inevitable ‘specific’ 
configurations (Caselli, 2005:4).  All positions are stuck with being implicated in 
the language and constructions of a racist, homophobic patriarchy.   
The predicament reveals further complications when the content of the 
subject or speaking position is further broken down in terms of the specificity of 
particular identity constructions and forms of oppression.  For example, this re-
reading of Zami is relevant to contemporary debates about queer theory and 
diaspora.  The dialectic of positionality is inherent in the challenge of changing 
racist, homophobic positions, whilst resisting complicity with the very 
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mechanisms that foreclose, conflate and, ultimately, prohibit creations of valid 
positions for Black, lesbian and gay people. Wesling picks up these issues in her 
paper, ‘Why Queer Diaspora?’ (2008), where she writes:  
What does it mean to “queer” diaspora studies? To pose the question more 
broadly, what analytical possibilities open up when we consider the 
relation between sexuality, identity, and desire on the one hand, and the 
geographical mobility, estrangement, or displacement of people on the 
other? This essay will approach these questions by considering how the 
contemporary conditions of geographical mobility - the diasporic 
condition that attends the circumstance of globalization - produce new 
experiences and understandings of sexuality and gender identity. (Wesling, 
2008:30)  
As part of her debate, Wesling questions how positions, analyses and scholarship 
in relation to being queer/queer theory, when juxtaposed with positions, analyses 
and scholarship in relation to diaspora, function to open up, or foreclose, 
‘analytical possibilities’ (Wesling, 2008:30).  
The relevance of Zami to these debates is twofold: firstly, Zami is 
concerned with the themes of immigration, geographical and social displacement 
and mobility, sexuality, gender and international lesbian encounters; and 
secondly, the preoccupation within Zami of these themes to the issues of identity 
formation, political resistance and asserting Black lesbianism. Furthermore, the 
relevance of Zami to the issues that concern Wesling is demonstrated in the 
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interview between Nöll-Fischer
18
 and Lorde about Zami, where Lorde explicitly 
identifies the themes of Black lesbianism and diaspora:  
It is also an attempt to tell a few stories that are normally not told: what 
it’s like to grow up as a black woman in the New York of the forties and 
become a lesbian woman.  It is an attempt to consider how black women 
out there in the diaspora raise their children, and it has to do with how we 
articulate our strength. (Nölle-Fischer, 1986: 154) 
Wesling summarises her project in the following way:  
For it is my contention that it is precisely the critical analogy between 
gender mobility and geographic mobility that risks mystifying the material 
and psychic relations it would seem to illuminate. That is, as I will argue, 
the analogy conceals, by rendering them equivalent, the very links 
between desire, practice, and material relations that produce gender and 
sexuality as social formations. This critical move thus occludes the very 
question it would seem to want to ask: what analytical possibilities open 
up when we bring queer studies and globalization studies into closer 
proximity - when we think globally about queerness, and queerly about 
globalization? (Wesling, 2008: 30)    
Perhaps, Lorde’s experiences of being a Black lesbian in Mexico, as recounted in 
Zami, allude to some of the possibilities that Wesling refers to:  
Eudora wanted to know what I was doing in Mexico, young, Black, and 
with an eye for the ladies, as she put it.  That was the second surprise.  We 
                                                          
18
 Karen Nölle-Fischer translated Zami into German for Orlanda Press in 1986. 
  
 249    
 
shared a good laugh over the elusive cues for mutual recognition among 
lesbians.  Eudora was the first woman I’d met who spoke about herself as 
a lesbian rather than as “gay,” which was a word she hated.  Eudora said it 
was a north american east-coast term that didn’t mean anything to her, and 
what’s more most of the lesbians she had known were anything but gay. 
(Lorde, 1996:139)   
In this passage, the international encounter between these two lesbians opens up a 
range of issues including: name (to call oneself ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay,’ the 
connotations of name and how the connotations of the label ‘lesbian’ or ‘queer’ 
are specific to location), geography, gender, race and recognition.  However, it is 
apparent from the encounter between Lorde and Eudora that even across 
geographical borders, there were ‘cues for mutual recognition among lesbians’ 
(Lorde, 1996:139).  Here, there is something productive, even surprising (‘[t]hat 
was the second surprise’ [Lorde, 1996:139]) and freeing up, in the bringing 
together of being Black, queer and geographically mobile.  Indeed, it would seem, 
from the exchange between Lorde and Eudora, that ‘queer’ as an identity position 
is located as much within the person as within geographical locations.  
The juxtaposition of Zami to current debates about Black lesbianism, as 
demonstrated above in relation to Wesling, is a dimension of the way in which the 
themes, literary devices and structure of the text are a part of Zami apart from 
Zami.  In other words, both the act of re-reading and applications of the re-reading 
Zami exceed the bounds of the text (Barthes, 1967, 1971; Foucault, 1969).  
Furthermore, in its failure to provide any resolution to dilemmas in terms of 
application and relevance to other contexts, the struggles and tensions within Zami 
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exceed the bounds of definitive solutions and answers. These principles can be 
translated to Black feminist texts and, indeed, to all texts. Here, we are brought 
back again to the opening sentence of the ‘Epilogue,’ ‘…some invaluable piece of 
myself apart from me…’ (Lorde, 1996:223), where the ‘Epilogue’ functions to 
reiterate indeterminacy.  
This chapter on Zami uses the ‘Epilogue’ as a point of reference for 
important themes that recur throughout the whole text.  These themes include 
temporality, location, space, presence and absence as constitutive of identity. In 
terms of discursive positioning, the ‘Epilogue’ occupies, and performs, the 
undecidable in the text.  It is possible to see the ‘Epilogue’ function as a 
supplement. Royle comments that:  
The logic of the supplement entails the disruption of what we think we 
understand by “the end”, as much as “the beginning”. Neither present nor 
absent, it is ghostly, maddening, something that you can’t finish with. 
(Royle, 2003:56)   
Here we could consider how the notion of the supplement is at work in the 
context of all sorts of peritexts, such as prefaces, introductions, forewords, 
afterwords, dedications, acknowledgements, epilogues, postscripts, 
footnotes, appendices, parentheses and digressions.  Reflecting on the 
strangeness of the supplement, of supplementarity and substitution, 
inevitably leads to a rethinking of what we might formerly have supposed 
was the non-supplementary. (Royle, 2003:57; emphasis in original)   
The implications of ‘rethinking of what we might formerly have supposed was the 
non-supplementary’ (Royle, 2003:57; emphasis in original) go beyond textuality.  
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The idea of the supplement disrupts hierarchical distinctions between what is 
determined as primary and secondary, which potentially disturbs oppressive 
rankings of who is first and last.  
Turning to the activism of Black feminist theory, so often relegated to the 
place of ‘all sorts of peritexts, such as prefaces, introductions, forewords, 
afterwords, dedications, acknowledgements, epilogues, postscripts, footnotes, 
appendices, parentheses and digressions’ (Royle, 2003:57), Derrida’s (1997) 
thinking about the supplement could work as a tool of radical Black feminist 
subversion.  
The ‘Epilogue’ of Zami haunts all aspects of the text including the 
structure, themes and literary devices. The ‘Epilogue’ is both present and absent 
from the text, neither inside nor outside of the text and, as such, it challenges the 
borders of the text.  The ‘Epilogue’ summons a ghostly inter-textual, intra-textual 
relationship.   In other words, rather than functioning as a neat close or end to the 
work, indicated in the root meaning of the word ‘epilogue,’19 the ‘Epilogue’ is 
disruptive of closure.   
Foucault uses the metaphor of ‘a play of mirrors’ to summon the infinite 
movement of language which, when applied to the ‘Epilogue,’ creates the 
disruption of closure or death:  
Headed toward death, language turns back upon itself; it encounters 
something like a mirror; and to stop this death which would stop it, it 
                                                          
19
 From the Latin word epilogus and from the Greek word epílogos, 
‘peroration of a speech, equivalent to epi- epi- + lógos  word’ meaning conclusion of a speech 
(Dictionary.com Unabridged, n.d.; emphasis in original). 
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possesses but a single power: that of giving birth to its own image in a 
play of mirrors that has no limits. (Foucault, 1977:54)  
The supplement of the ‘Epilogue’ of Zami performs the non- linear, disrupted 
movement within text and between text, frames of references and the ways in 
which discourse defers and refers back and forth.  Thus, the ‘Epilogue’ functions 
as a direct mirror and shaper of the movement of identity. As such, the ‘Epilogue’ 
reiterates the major theme within Zami of negotiating identity.  Zami is of 
particular interest in relation to this theme because it concerns the negotiation and 
articulation of transgressive identity positions.  
 
Transgressive Textual Practices 
MacCormack’s (2004) critical analysis of perversion emphasises the transgressive 
potential of using the word ‘perversion’ as an act rather than a noun. As an act of 
transgressing the spatial fixity that dominant discourses rely on, MacCormack 
points to the disruption of the naming and value ascribed to ‘perversion’ taken up 
by lesbian and gay people as a disruption of dominant, oppressive social 
hierarchies (MacCormack, 2004:27-40).  The question is that of how to transgress 
position whilst caught up in the aporetics of positionality. The question takes on 
particular political imperatives when the position being transgressed is a 
subjugated standpoint, as is the case with Black, feminist, lesbian standpoints. 
The ‘Epilogue’ provides ‘…no stable identity, no stable origin, no stable 
end’ (Spivak, 1997:xii) so that any question of ‘…the book’s identity?’ (Spivak, 
1997:xi) that attempts to anchor the text inevitably fails.  Spivak comments that: 
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The book is not repeatable in its “identity”: each reading of the book 
produces a simulacrum of an “original” that is itself the mark of the 
shifting and unstable subject… (Spivak, 1997: xii)  
The implications of using Spivak’s analysis here as a theoretical lens of literary 
criticism extend to the relationships between reader and text, and form, content 
and meaning.  Spivak points to the fact that each encounter between reader and 
text, and between form, content and meaning, ‘always already’ produces a new 
‘spelling’ of name, text and identity.  
It would seem, then, that the title, Zami: A New Spelling of My Name, 
captures the essence of this. The fact that the name ‘Zami’ is not a phonetic 
reconfiguration of the letters within the name ‘Audre Lorde’ indicates that ‘A 
New Spelling of My Name’ destabilises ‘…puts into question the name of the 
name’ (Derrida, 1982, cited in Royle, 2003:75).  The name ‘Zami’ puts the 
singularity of location and possession of the name into question. ‘Zami. A 
Carriacou name for women who work together as friends and lovers’ (Lorde, 
1996:223; italics in original) locates name within a plurality of relations and 
within locations of experiences of work, friendship and making love.  Lorde puts 
into question the idea that name is in any sense neutral or apolitical. Zami: A New 
Spelling of My Name invokes the newness of the intervention of an explicitly 
Black lesbian text within the context of old racist, homophobic spellings of Black 
women’s lesbianism in society (Christian, 1985; Smith, 1977; Wall, 2005). 
Drawing on the work of Barthes (1967, 1971), Foucault (1969) and 
Derrida (1984, 1987, 1992a), this chapter interrogates: 
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…the demise of textual integrity, the abandonment of the search for a 
singular meaning or a received interpretation…the multiplicity and 
ambiguity of all texts, their perpetual openness to re-interpretation, which 
Derrida calls “grafting” or “iterability.” (Grosz, 1995:16)   
It could be argued that Zami asserts the contestation of ‘received interpretation’ 
and disrupts notions of discursive ‘integrity’ through the production of multiple 
and ambiguous subjectivities and subject positions.  However, returning to the 
point made by Grosz (1995) in relation to text, the tension is that of whether the 
disruption and contestation of subjectivities and subject positions within Zami are 
contingent upon an inherent contradiction.   
The contradiction is that the legitimacy of the disruption of the integrity of 
positions of race, gender and sexuality remain contingent upon an assumed 
integrity of alternate positions. For example, Lorde contests ‘received’ 
heterosexual interpretations of her sexuality on the basis of the integrity and re-
interpretation of her sexuality as lesbian.  Lorde comments that: 
…we could not afford to settle for one easy definition, one narrow 
individuation of self…It was a while before we came to realize that our 
place was the very house of difference rather [than] the security of any one 
particular difference. (Lorde, 1996:197)  
Here, Lorde abandons ‘…the search for a singular meaning…’ (Grosz, 1995:16) 
of definition and identity of self. However, in stating that ‘our place was the very 
house of difference,’ she is in danger of replacing one singularity for another.  The 
word ‘place’ is singular and the use of ‘very’ as an adjective denotes the 
particularity or actuality of the ‘house of difference.’  The rhetorical shifts in this 
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passage exemplify the complexity of negotiating shifting positions.  Hekman 
(2000) complicates the situation further by arguing that these assumed alternate 
positions that go on to form positions taken up in ‘the very house of difference,’ 
known as identity politics, may function to re-inscribe the very positions that have 
been imposed upon us which are not of our choosing: 
…the identities that women have embraced under the rubric of identity 
politics are not of their own choosing; they are, rather, precisely those 
imposed by the society they are challenging…These identities originated 
in an effort to subordinate these subjects, not free them. (Hekman, 
2000:296-297) 
 
Another Meeting 
The ramifications of Spivak’s (1997:xii) assertions that identity is not ‘repeatable’ 
and that each encounter ‘…produces a simulacrum of an “original”…,’ resulting 
in the ‘shifting and unstable,’ are wide ranging.  The acts of deciphering author 
intention, contesting notions of a correct or accurate (re-)reading and disrupting 
ideas of the origin of the text are called into question. In turn, the acts of 
deciphering intention, origin and a correct (re-)reading or understanding of the 
speech acts and texts of Black feminists need rethinking in the light of the issues 
that Spivak raises.  
The impossibility of identity being ‘repeatable’ undermines the belief in an 
essentialist or stereotypical identity category.  In stark contrast: 
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Moments of unknowingness about oneself tend to emerge in the context of 
relations to others, suggesting that these relations call upon primary forms 
of relationality that are not always available to explicit and reflective 
thematization. (Butler, 2005:20) 
The ‘relations to others’ that Butler speaks of here could be interpreted as 
the ‘other’ of the text, or, to be more specific, the ‘other’ of Zami. Butler is 
arguing that we do not know what we do not know until it emerges, or that what 
we do not know about our ‘self’ is not always available and may only become 
available in certain conditions of ‘relationality.’   
Application of these principles to the activism of all feminist theory would 
suggest that an aspect of the totalizing effect of essentialism is foreclosure of 
‘[m]oments of unknowingness’ (Butler, 2005:20). Perhaps analysis of the 
obstacles to availability of ‘unknowingness’ would be more profitable to 
feminism than interventions that re-inscribe what is already known.  Furthermore, 
if ‘Moments of unknowingness about oneself tend to emerge in the context of 
relations to others’ (Butler 2005:20), then perhaps those moments will increase 
and become more meaningful in direct correlation to the diversity and 
determinations of relations to others. The activism of all feminist theory would do 
well to remember Spivak’s (1997:xii) assertion of ‘no stable identity, no stable 
origin, no stable end.’   
With specific reference to Zami, Keating emphasises the transformational 
potential of the encounter between text and experience of the text:  
…I want to suggest that the alterations in consciousness Lorde enacts in 
Zami should not be confined to the text.  As she reinvents her own 
  
 257    
 
gender/ethnic identity, Lorde reinvents her readers’ as well. (Keating, 
1996:147; italics in original)  
It would seem that the potential for Zami, or, indeed, any text to reinvent ‘her 
readers’ and alter consciousness, is contingent upon a rigorous inquiry into the 
method and politics of close re-reading.   
The question becomes: how is Zami a dramatization of the thoughts and 
feelings that I/you/we reconstruct, and if this is the case (and I contend that it is), 
on what premise is this subjective reconstruction justified?  Do we rest in a place 
of knowing or risk venturing into a place of Butler’s (2005:20) ‘unknowingness’? 
Here, I am questioning the definite and positive stance on the transformative 
potential of Zami that Keating (1996) proposes. This is not to deny the enduring 
political significance of Zami to intervene in the lives of individuals, collective-
working and within the activism of all feminist theory, but it is not a foregone 
conclusion.   
In the ‘Epilogue’ Lorde speaks of ‘[a]nother meeting’ (Lorde, 1996:223) 
and, perhaps, the term ‘[a]nother meeting’ could be interpreted as alluding to a 
process of encounter and experience which is never fixed, or, alternately, which is 
repeatedly in meeting.  Frosh makes explicit the link between ‘[a]nother meeting’ 
ontologically and another meeting intertextually:  
…the realisation that this “other” lies as much within as without - that it is 
the co-ordinates of inner space which are being mapped, even when the 
outside world is what is apparently under scrutiny.  Put in the literary 
terms…this recognition of the other within the self becomes an instance of 
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intertextuality - reading the other, we reconstruct ourselves. (Frosh, 
1995:289)  
In other words, in Zami, form and content perform and embody each other. The 
multiple, polyvocal, interlinking genres, traditions and inter-texts perform and 
embody Zami’s preoccupation with the unstable, multiple subject. Frosh’s (1995) 
comments are particularly pertinent because he brings time and space into the 
equation.  
In summary, the crossing or dissolution of boundaries occurs on all levels 
and dimensions.  Zami employs the use of memory, myth, the insertion of 
fragments of text, poetry, multiple voices and the speech act in and through 
different people, location, diaspora, historical and social contextualisations, 
including movements between the internal and external world.  
The statement, ‘[a]nother meeting,’ conjures multiple reiterated 
associations and implications of subject formation through multiple and reiterated 
encounters or meetings with others. The ‘Epilogue’ is performative of ‘[a]nother 
meeting’ in terms of its position and non-linear movement through the rest of the 
text. Indeed, the ‘Epilogue’ could be described as ‘[a]nother meeting’ with the rest 
of the text.  
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Bearing Witness 
In her introduction to Acts of Narrative Resistance (2009), Beard explains that a 
characteristic of narrative resistance is: 
In naming their own identities as part of their struggles to challenge 
domination, the women employing these genres create autobiographical 
acts of political and narrative resistance.  Their texts resist easy 
classification into traditional generic categories; many of them 
demonstrate narrative resistance in their form of construction as those who 
tell their life stories resist the conventions and language of the traditional, 
male-authored, Euro-American autobiography. (Beard, 2009:1-2) 
Using the principles outlined here by Beard, Zami is an act ‘…of political and 
narrative resistance.’  The principle of naming her identity as part of her struggles 
to challenge domination continues from the title, Zami: A New Spelling of My 
Name, through to the ‘Epilogue,’ both in terms of adopting the proper name 
‘Zami’ and in terms of what the name means: ‘Zami. A Carriacou name for 
women who work together as friends and lovers’ (Lorde, 1996:223; italics in 
original).   
Lorde’s descriptions of the cost and risks of living the name ‘Zami’ refute 
any notions of sentimentality. This is demonstrated in the following passage:  
In the gay bars, I longed for other Black women without the need ever 
taking shape upon my lips.  For four hundred years in this country, Black 
women have been taught to view each other with deep suspicion.  It was 
no different in the gay world. (Lorde, 1996:195)  
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A more detailed and developed examination of the deep suspicion between Black 
women that Lorde speaks of here is found in her essay, ‘Eye to Eye: Black 
Women, Hatred and Anger’ (Lorde, 1983a). However, here in this passage Lorde 
is standing at the bar expressing a longing that resists and stands in defiance of 
four hundred years of racist, homophobic patriarchal subjugation.   
In Zami Lorde provides a rich, detailed genealogy of the struggles of being 
a Black lesbian in America in the 1950s. Speaking about the significance of Zami 
as a historical report of Black lesbianism, Lorde explains that: 
…for those who don’t know New York, I wanted to give an impression of 
how it was in the streets of Harlem, in the Bagatelle [Club FJD], what the 
cold-water flats in New York were.  That’s what I meant by “history.”  
Zami should be as much a historical report about a definite time as a story 
of black lesbians, as the story of Zami .  So I have described what young 
lesbian women in the Village of the fifties wore, and how that differed 
from other neighborhoods, from Queens or Brooklyn.  I wanted things to 
live on and not get lost. (Nölle-Fischer, 1986:156; parentheses and italics 
in original)   
The attention to detail in terms of place and road names, dates, buildings, events, 
fashions and attitudes provide an invaluable insight into the development of Black 
lesbian feminist struggles within the women’s liberation movement. 20 Zami is an 
                                                          
20
 The following excerpts from Zami (Lorde, 1996) detail socio-historical and geographical 
information, including issues of racism: ‘In 1936-1938, 125th Street between Lenox and Eighth 
Avenues…’ (8);  ‘memories of  World War II…Long before Pearl Harbor…the public school on 
135
th
 Street and Lenox Avenue’ (11);  ‘142nd Street’ (28); ‘Crossing over to the other side of 
Lenox Avenue, we caught the Number 4 bus down to 125
th
 street, where we went marketing at 
Weissbecker’s…’ (30); ‘…we trudged up Sugar Hill, 145th Street from Lenox to Amsterdam, to 
trade old comic books at the used comic-book store up on Amsterdam Avenue in Washington 
Heights, which was an all-white section of town then, in those days before the war, and which is 
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important and relevant political, social and historical piece of writing. The 
juxtaposition of mythic spaces with concrete historical and geographical contexts 
represents the intertextual polyvocal dimension of the biomythography. Lorde’s 
desire that ‘I wanted things to live on and not get lost’ (Nölle-Fischer, 1986:156) 
reflects the text’s refusal to be fixed to decided temporal and spatial locations. 
Paradoxically, the specificity of concrete geographical and sociological details in 
the text functions to establish an authenticity that enables mobility of relevance 
and application.  The key point here is not to confuse relevance and application 
for authenticity. It is important to keep Griggers’ (1994:119) point in mind that 
‘[t]he problem of identity is always a problem of signification in regards to 
historically specific social relations.’ 
                                                                                                                                                               
where my mother now lives’ (36); ‘We trudged up the hill  past Stardust Lounge, Micky’s Hair 
Styling - Hot and Cold Press, the Harlem Bop Lounge, the Dream Cafe, the Freedom Barber Shop 
and the Optimo Cigar Store which seemed to decorate every important street corner of those years.  
There was the Aunt May Eat Shoppe, and Sadie’s Ladies and Children’s Wear.  There was Lum’s 
Chop Suey bar, and the Shiloh Baptist mission Church painted white with colored storefront 
windows, the Record Store…between Bradhurst and Edgecombe Avenues, was the broad expanse 
of tufted green, surrounded by a high wrought-iron fence, that was Colonial Park’ (38); ‘It was 
Pearl Harbour Sunday’ (40); p43 ‘During the war years,[…] She walked to the market on 125th 
Street…’ (43) ‘Our new apartment was on 152nd Street between Amsterdam Avenue and 
Broadway in what was called Washington Heights, and already known as a “changing 
neighbourhood, meaning one where Black people could begin to find overpriced apartments out of 
the depressed and decaying core of Harlem…Two weeks after we moved into the apartment, our 
landlord hanged himself in the basement. The Daily News reported that the suicide was caused by 
his despondency over the fact that he finally had to rent to Negroes. I was the first Black student in 
St. Catherine’s School, and all the white kids in my sixth grade knew about the landlord who 
hanged himself in the basement because of me and my family.  He had been Jewish; I was Black’ 
(45-46; italics in original); ‘The summer of 1948 was a time of powerful change all over the 
world...the girls who were jewfish, and who were making plans to go to Israel and work on a 
kibbutz in the new nation.  The mild-mannered skinny little man in the white sheet had prevailed 
and India was finally free, but they had killed him for it. There was no longer any doubt in 
anybody’s mind that China would soon be Red China, and three cheers for the 
communists…Thousands of american [sic] boys had died to make the world safe for democracy, 
even though my family and I couldn’t be served ice cream in Washington, D.C. ’ (71) ‘This was 
1952, the height of the McCarthy era…’ (101); ‘The Rosenbergs were about to be sacrificed . . . 
One week  later President Eisenhower signed into law an executive decree that said I could eat 
anything I wanted in Washington, D.C….The Rosenbergs were electrocuted on June 19, 1953 – 
two weeks after we had picketed the white house [sic]’ (127; italics in original); ‘That spring, 
McCarthy was censured. The Supreme Court decision on the desegregation of schools was 
announced in the english [sic] newspaper…’ (148).  
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Openly naming the identity of being a Black lesbian in the 1950s came at a 
high price and could cost Black women their lives (Chinn, 2003). Lorde’s 
testimony of this in Zami adds layers of texture and meaning to her political 
essays on the subject.
21
 Reflecting on the absence of, and resistance to, the threat 
posed by Black lesbian identity, Smith speaks out about the risks of ‘coming out’ 
and being recognised as a Black lesbian feminist in the 1970s:  
Even at this moment I am not convinced that one can write explicitly as a 
Black lesbian and live to tell about it. Yet there are a handful of Black 
women who have risked everything for truth. Audre Lorde, Pat Parker, and 
Ann Allen Shockley have at least broken ground in the vast wilderness of 
works that do not exist. (Smith, 1977:172) 
The testimony of being a Black lesbian feminist in the 1940s and 1950s 
recalled within Zami resonate with, and are a resource for, Black lesbian feminists 
across the world in the twenty-first century, who confront similar issues that 
Lorde speaks about (Clare, 1999; Miles, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 2011). The 
following passages from Zami document the complexity of these painful struggles 
in the context of intersecting, multiple oppressions:  
To be Black, female, gay, and out of the closet in a white environment, 
even to the extent of dancing in the Bagatelle, was considered by many 
Black lesbians to be simply suicidal. (Lorde, 1996:195) 
                                                          
21
   Almost all of Lorde’s political speeches, essays, interviews and journal entries refer to her 
identity as, or to the subject of being, a Black lesbian feminist. The following essays and speeches 
are identified here because they were either delivered to a gay and lesbian audience and/or 
addressed the particularity of being a Black lesbian feminist: Beam, 1984; Cavin, 1983; Lorde, 
1977a; Lorde, 1978b; Lorde, 1979e; Lorde, 1979f; Lorde, 1983c; Lorde, 1985; Lorde, 1986; 
Lorde, 1990; Shapiro, 1987. 
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Many of us wound up dead or demented, and many of us were distorted by 
the many fronts we had to fight upon. (Lorde, 1996:196) 
The Black gay-girls in the Village gay bars of the fifties knew each other’s 
names, but we seldom looked into each other’s Black eyes, lest we see our 
own aloneness and our own blunted power mirrored in the pursuit of 
darkness.  Some of us died inside the gaps between the mirrors and those 
turned-away eyes. (Lorde, 1996:197-198) 
This chapter is particularly concerned with the instability of identity and 
the dialectic of positionality. However, in addition, I want to stress that the 
importance of both the context and impact of Lorde’s intervention in the creation 
of Zami is an integral part of that concern.  Questions and factual information 
about who else was writing within this genre are important aspects of that context.  
This includes the reception of a Black lesbian ‘coming out’ narrative, Zami’s 
explicit erotic, sexual and sensual descriptions of a Black lesbian in love and 
making love to other women, and the yearning for emotional and physical 
intimacy with other Black women. Christian (1985) emphasises the political 
importance of this aspect of Zami: 
…in blunting the edge of sexuality between women (a sexuality which so 
threatens society that it denies, even attempts to obliterate, it) we might 
inadvertently miss critical discoveries about why societies seem to need to 
restrict, repress women, whether they are nonwhite or white, lesbian or 
heterosexual, working class or middle class.  For example, when we look 
at the history of the word lesbian, we see how its appearance is related to 
society’s fear of women’s increasing independence.  The word lesbian is a 
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twentieth-century word, cited for the first time in 1908 in the Oxford 
English Dictionary.  Before that time, a woman’s passion for another 
woman was often subsumed under terms such as masturbation or the 
secret sin. Some scholars suggest that the term lesbian appears at a time 
when women are questioning sexual taboos, when discussions about birth 
control were on the rise, and that the new term was a means of 
strengthening the stigmatization of nonprocreative female passion as well 
as a strategy for retarding women’s drive towards social independence. 
The sexual content of the word lesbian then, when seen in its social 
context, seems to me to be critical. (Christian, 1985:5; emphasis in 
original)    
Byrd (2009) provides an important context for understanding the Black 
lesbian feminist tradition that inspired Lorde to use her identity as a tool of 
political resistance. Byrd demonstrates that Lorde’s insistence on public 
recognition of her identity was pioneering:  
While Lorde was not the first black lesbian feminist, she was among the 
first to live her life and to practice her politics in the public domain, that is 
to say, out of the closet.  Other black lesbian feminists who came before 
Lorde in this tradition and who publicly self-defined as lesbian were 
activist Ruth Ellis and novelist Ann Shockley.  Contemporaneous with 
Lorde were writers and activists Barbara Smith and Pat Parker.  The 
lesbianism of such black feminists as Alice Dunbar-Nelson and Angelina 
Weld Grimké was perhaps an open secret in some circles, but during their 
lifetimes it was not public knowledge. As a result of the scholarship of 
Gloria Hull, Erlene Stetson, Cheryl Wall, and others, we now know that 
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these pioneering black feminists possessed complex identities. (Byrd, 
2009:12-13)   
The existence and struggles of the Lesbian Immigration Support Group 
that meets monthly in Manchester, drawing Black lesbian refugees and asylum-
seekers from all over the North West of England, bear witness to the relevance of 
Lorde’s testimony in Zami, and within her political essays and speeches.  Indeed, 
the risks and personal and material cost for the Black lesbians who attend this 
particular group, and in other groups throughout the world, are evidence that 
suicide, mental health difficulties, isolation, violent physical, verbal and 
psychological attacks, murder and torture are as common in 2013 as in they were 
in the 1950s.  Keating comments about Lorde that: 
…she synthesizes autobiography, biography, fiction, and myth into a 
hybrid literary form. In her poetry, fiction, and prose she uses revisionist 
myth to develop an interactional model of identity formation capable of 
transforming her readers as well as herself.  By reinterpreting Yoruban and 
Fon myths from a twentieth-century black U.S. lesbian-feminist 
perspective, she constructs cross-cultural personal and collective 
Africanized identities. (Keating, 1996:14) 
The implications of Keating’s points reverberate through this chapter in 
terms of identity formation, and the relationship between text and reader.  
However, in relation to the relevance of Lorde for Black lesbians today, it is clear 
that Lorde’s ‘interactional model of identity formation’ (Keating, 1996:14) has the 
potential to transform feelings of aloneness, self-doubt and lack of hope.  
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Furthermore, in the tradition of Black feminists over the centuries, Lorde has 
provided an affirmative legacy.    
Lorde uses the strategy of discursive positioning to examine how discourse 
positions, and constitutes, categories such as the Black lesbian and the Grenadian 
immigrant. In relation to ‘…transgressive textual practices…’ (Grosz, 1995:18), 
the issue is to what extent the identifications and provocations that Zami induces 
function to regulate or liberate, inscribe or re-inscribe, and stabilize or destabilise. 
I have deliberately put a series of binaries together here because, within Zami, it is 
not possible to settle on one or the other and, indeed, this is at the heart of the 
predicaments that Lorde grapples with in terms of position.  Of particular interest 
is the way in which signifiers are used in the text to reconfigure meaning in order 
to try to transgress the notion of a bounded identity or subjectivity. I offer a re-
reading of the ‘Epilogue’ of Zami that explores its potential in terms of:  
…a structure of signifiers that absorbs and reconstitutes the signifieds, in 
that its formal patterns have effects on its semantic structures, assimilating 
the meanings words have in other contexts and subjecting them to new 
organization, altering stress and focus, shifting literal meanings to 
figurative ones, bringing terms into alignment, according to patterns of 
parallelism. (Culler, 1997:79) 
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The Problematic of Confrontation 
Central to contemporary literary theory and textual analysis are questions about: 
‘What is an Author?’; the function of the author; the relationship between text and 
context; and the question of intention (Barthes, 1967, 1971; Foucault, 1969).  
These questions, and the literary theory available to explore these questions, 
constitute both the tools for critical literary analysis and the issues that Lorde 
grapples with in relation to the production, transgression and discursive 
positioning of a Black lesbian feminist identity through text. Speaking about the 
multiple arguments and confrontations of feminism in relation to the discursive 
positioning and construction of women, De Lauretis comments: 
That argument is also a confrontation, a struggle, a political intervention in 
institutions and in the practices of everyday life.  That the confrontation is 
itself discursive in nature - in the sense that language and metaphors are 
always embedded in practices, in real life, where meaning ultimately 
resides - is implicit in one of the first metaphors of feminism: the personal 
is political.  For how else would social values and symbolic systems be 
mapped into subjectivity if not by the agency of codes (the relations of the 
subject in meaning, language, cinema, etc.) which make possible both 
representation and self-representation? (De Lauretis, 1984:3-4)    
In relation to Zami, the question is: how does Lorde confront and argue 
with the ‘symbolic systems’ and ‘agency of codes’ that produce her subjectivity, 
her representation and self-representation? I think the kernel of the issue that De 
Laurentis (1984) refers to is that confrontations are structured around positions 
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(that confront each other), even when what is confronted is the notion of a 
position itself.  Anzaldúa summaries the problem as: 
All reaction is limited by, and dependent on, what it is reacting against. 
Because the counter-stance stems from a problem with authority - outer as 
well as inner - it’s a step towards liberation from cultural domination. But 
it is not a way of life.  At some point, on our way to a new consciousness, 
we will have to leave the opposite bank, the split between the two mortal 
combatants somehow healed so that we are on both shores at once and, at 
once, see through serpent and eagle eyes…The possibilities are numerous 
once we decide to act and not react. (Anzaldúa, 2007:100-101) 
Returning back to the first sentence of the ‘Epilogue’ of Zami, the words 
‘…I had to stretch and grow in order to recognize her’ (Lorde, 1996:223) could be 
read as leaving ‘the opposite bank’ in order to attempt the position of being ‘on 
both shores at once’ (Anzaldúa, 2007:100). However, the next two sentences of 
the ‘Epilogue’ take an interesting turn: ‘And in that growing, we came to 
separation, that place where work begins. Another meeting’ (Lorde, 1996:223).  
Within these sentences ‘position’ is undecided. There are a number of ways of re-
reading these sentences in relation to the challenge set out by Anzaldúa (2007).  
Perhaps, ‘separation, that place where work begins’ (Lorde, 1996:223) could be 
interpreted as ‘the split between the two mortal combatants’ (Anzaldúa, 
2007:100); or, alternately, ‘separation, that place where work begins’ could be 
interpreted as an inability to sustain the movement of ‘I had to stretch’ (Lorde, 
1996:223), so that the ‘the split between the two mortal combatants’ is only 
temporary. Using the same methods of close re-reading, Anzaldúa’s (2007:100) 
words that ‘[t]he possibilities are numerous once we decide to act and not react’ 
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could be interpreted as ‘[a]nother meeting,’ understanding ‘[a]nother’ as 
‘numerous’ and ‘meeting’ as ‘to act.’  
 
Intertexuality 
It could be argued that this method of re-reading the epilogue of ‘Zami’ through 
Anzaldúa takes the ‘woven fabric’ (Barthes, 1971:159) of the text and weaves 
new readings, applications and interpretations through intertextuality. Allen 
explains that: 
The idea of the text, and thus of intertextuality, depends, as Barthes 
argues, on the figure of the web, the weave, the garment (text) woven from 
the threads of the “already written” and the “already read”.  Every text has 
its meaning, therefore, in relation to other texts…However it is used, the 
term intertextuality promotes a new vision of meaning, and thus of 
authorship and reading: a vision resistant to ingrained notions of 
originality, uniqueness, singularity and autonomy. (Allen, 2000:6; 
parentheses in original)  
Intertextuality is a transformative relationship between one text and another, 
between text and reader and between different registers or genres.  Each of these 
sets of relations constitutes the weave of Zami.  For example, referring to Zami, 
Lorde explains that: 
It’s a biomythography, which is really fiction. It has the elements of 
biography and history of myth.  In other words, it’s fiction built from 
many sources. (Tate, 1982:99)   
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Here, Lorde identifies different threads in the weave of the text which are 
performative of the intersecting threads of Black women’s identity that are 
resistant to fragmentary, binary representations of the roles of Black women 
(Cade Bambara, 1969:123-135).   
In an interview with Nölle-Fischer, Lorde troubles the binary of women as 
either mothers or warriors: 
And when I later encountered African mythologies, that was very 
productive and wonderful and very validating…I found in West Africa, 
especially in Dahomey…there was a very strong tradition of women - of 
women who did not draw a line between giving and taking life.  In other 
words, there were women who could be mothers and warriors at the same 
time…Well, in Dahomey women are both, and that was a known fact to 
me from the streets of Harlem... (Nölle-Fischer, 1986:157)    
Lorde interweaves representations from African mythologies and biographical 
memory to create what Boyce Davies (1994:86) describes as ‘uprising’ textuality. 
The text is uprising in its contestation of Western, imperialist, dominant, 
Eurocentric discourses.  Boyce Davies (1994) uses concepts of ‘migratory 
subjectivities,’ ‘the politics of location,’ ‘re-mapping,’ ‘re-naming,’ and ‘re-
connection’ to examine the ‘critical movements’ of Black women’s writing in ‘re-
negotiating their identities’ (Boyce Davies, 1994:86).  This is captured in the 
‘Epilogue’ in the sentences: ‘We carry our traditions with us’ (Lorde, 1996:223) 
and ‘I live each of them as a piece of me…’ (Lorde, 1996: 223). Keating picks 
this up in her analysis of Zami, where she states that: 
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In Zami, for example, “self”-transformation occurs only in context of 
others, thus indicating an intersubjective construction of personal identity 
and an interactional self-naming process. (Keating, 1996:146; italics in 
original)   
This ‘interactional’ aspect of the movement both within and between the 
text and reader can be seen as part of the dialogical characteristic of Black 
feminist theory (Hill Collins, 2000:30).  It points to the production of Black 
feminist scholarship as a process of persistent and insistent dialogues with the 
activism and multiple standpoints of Black feminist theory.  Keating explains: 
…I want to suggest that the alterations in consciousness Lorde enacts in 
Zami should not be confined to the text.  As she reinvents her own 
gender/ethnic identity, Lorde reinvents her readers’ as well. (Keating, 
1996: 147; italics in original) 
 
Print, Tattoo, Trace 
Every woman I have ever loved has left her print upon me, where I loved 
some invaluable piece of myself apart from me - so different that I had to 
stretch and grow in order to recognize her.  And in that growing, we came 
to separation, that place where works begins.  Another meeting. (Lorde, 
1996:223) 
The use of the word ‘print,’ in conjunction with reference to ‘[e]very woman I 
have ever loved…,’ takes the reader back to the final sentence of the last chapter 
of Zami: 
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I never saw Afrekete again, but her print remains upon my life with the 
resonance and power of an emotional tattoo. (Lorde, 1996:222) 
This conjures a complex and multiple inter-relationship between the present and 
absent woman and lover, ‘Afrekete’ or ‘Kitty’ (Lorde, 1996:213), the mythic 
figure of Afrekete, and the ideas of ‘print’ and ‘tattoo.’ ‘Afrekete’ is a theaphany 
that conjures ideas of the  indeterminate sacred and spiritual qualities of  Lorde’s 
lesbian relationship with ‘Kitty’ in contrast to racist, homophobic objectifications 
of lesbianism (Ball, 2001).  
Furthermore, ‘Afrekete’ becomes the trope that personifies a discursive 
speaking position that performs the indeterminacy of absence and presence.  This 
is illustrated in the following extract from Zami:  
Afrekete lived not far from Genevieve’s grandmother’s house.  Sometimes 
she reminded me of Ella, Gennie’s stepmother, who shuffled about with an 
apron on and a broom outside the room where Gennie and I lay on the 
studio couch.  She would be singing her non-stop tuneless little song over 
and over and over…And one day Gennie turned her head on my lap to say 
uneasily, “You know, sometimes I don’t know whether Ella’s crazy, or 
stupid, or divine.”  And now I think the goddess was speaking through 
Ella also… (Lorde, 1996:220) 
Here, the referral and deferral of spatial temporality is performed in a complex, 
multi-layered interrelation between the characters. Lorde, who through new 
spelling of her name ‘Zami’ brings into the equation all those ‘…women who 
work together as friends and lovers’ (Lorde 1996:223), is both part of the text and 
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apart from the text, performed through ‘…she reminded me…,’ invoking the 
presence and absence, and shifting proximity of memory.  
Gennie is absent in death, but haunts the text performative of unresolved 
grief.  Gennie, who committed suicide by taking ‘…rat poison’ (Lorde, 1996:80), 
remains in close proximity to the other intimate relationships between Lorde and 
her other friends and lovers, illustrated in the words: ‘Afrekete lived not far from 
Genevieve’s grandmother’s house’ (Lorde, 1996:220).   
In addition, Ella cannot be fixed as either ‘“…crazy, stupid or divine.”’ 
The sentence, ‘She would be singing her non-stop tuneless little song over and 
over and over…’ embodies the iterability of the undecidable. This is demonstrated 
in the use of the pronouns ‘she’ and ‘her’ because the pronouns could, at the same 
time, be tied to the named person, Ella, and to an unnamed. The phrase ‘non-stop’ 
refuses to be fixed to any beginning or end in the same way as:  
…the Text cannot stop (for example on a library shelf); its constitutive 
movement is that of cutting across (in particular, it can cut across the 
work, several works)…In the same way, the Text does not stop… 
(Barthes, 1971:157; parentheses in original) 
The word ‘tuneless’ is configured on the simultaneity of presence and absence, 
sequenced by the lyrical ‘…over and over and over…,’ where three repetitions of 
‘over’ refuse to be over.   
Then there is ‘Afrekete,’ who is and is not the ‘goddess.’  The ‘goddess’ 
has the ability, quality and power to invoke memory; ‘…she reminded me of 
Ella…,’ and the goddess has the ability to speak through Ella, disrupting the 
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boundaries between absence and presence, time and place, and the origin of the 
speaking subject, leaving the speech act undetermined and contained. Barthes 
explains that: 
…the whole of the enunciation is an empty process, functioning perfectly 
without there being any need for it to be filled with the person of the 
interlocutors. (Barthes, 1967:145)   
In relation to the ‘print,’ the origins of ‘print’ and ‘tattoo’ remain 
undetermined and uncontained. Furthermore, inside and outside of the text, the 
situation of the utterance, initiations of memory and positionality remain 
undetermined. The interplay of these elements performs a rhythmic, infinite 
interplay of intersubjective relations between the women invoked, referred and 
deferred to.  The metaphor of ‘print’ works to translate and underscore important 
themes and messages within the text.  Lorde opens the ‘Epilogue’ with the 
juxtaposition between, and interdependence of, presence and absence, and 
recognition and separation.   
The implications of the ways in which Lorde uses pronouns as the author 
go beyond reference to ‘[e]very woman I have ever loved…’ to destabilise or 
initiate ‘[t]he removal of the Author…’ (Barthes, 1967:145). Barthes explains 
that: 
Linguistically, the author is never more than the instance writing, just as I 
is nothing other than the instance saying I: language knows a “subject”, 
not a “person”, and this subject, empty outside of the very enunciation 
which defines it, suffices to make language “hold together”, suffices, that 
is to say, to exhaust it. (Barthes, 1967:145; emphasis in original) 
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Lorde moves in and between ‘every woman,’ ‘I,’ ‘her,’ ‘me’ and ‘myself’ so that 
the text works from multiple intersubjective locations of re-reading, performed in 
the indeterminate position of each pronoun (Barthes, 1967, 1971; Benveniste, 
1961, Foucault, 1969).  For example, the recognition of ‘her’ in the statement, ‘in 
order to recognize her,’ could refer to Lorde herself or to another woman ‘I have 
ever loved,’ or this phrase could be performative of the impossibility of 
establishing the origin and end of Lorde in relation to other women she has loved 
and vice-versa; the interdependency serves the function of indeterminacy: ‘…that 
is to say, to exhaust it…’ (Barthes, 1967:145).  The phrase ‘…piece of myself 
apart from me…’ brings into question any notion of ever being fully present, 
complete or independent. The idea of a ‘piece of myself apart from me’ is ‘…a 
multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, 
blend and clash’ (Barthes, 1967:146).   This approach resonates with Minh-ha’s 
position: 
When i say “I see myself seeing myself,” I/i am not alluding to the illusory 
relation of subject to subject (or object) but to the play of mirrors that 
defers to infinity the real subject and subverts the notion of an original 
“I.”…I write to show myself showing people who show me my own 
showing. I-You: not one, not two. (Minh–ha, 1989:22; parentheses in 
original)   
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The Origin of the Origin 
Subversion of the notion of an ‘original’ precisely because of deferral to infinity is 
also fundamental to Derrida’s meaning of ‘trace.’  Derrida explains: 
Whether in written or in spoken discourse, no element can function as a 
sign without relating to another element which itself is not simply 
present…each “element” – phoneme or grapheme - is constituted with 
reference to the trace in it of the other elements of the sequence or system.  
This linkage, this weaving, is the text, which is produced only through the 
transformation of another text. Nothing, in either the elements or the 
system, is anywhere simply present or absent. There are only, everywhere, 
differences and traces of traces. (Derrida, 1972, cited in Culler, 2007:99; 
emphasis in original)  
Where Derrida speaks of trace, Lorde uses the word ‘print’ to denote the 
interdependence, infinite referral and deferral to others where the ‘…piece of 
myself apart from me…’ resonates with the ‘I-You: not one, not two’ (Minh–ha, 
1989:22).  Zimmerman (1990:202) argues that rather than creating a merger of 
differences, the interdependency of differences in Zami function to open up spaces 
for the creation of new concepts of identity. 
The question remains that of whether this potential space for the creation 
of new concepts can exist outside of the implicated space of language. The 
quandary pushes the potential for the creation of new concepts of identity up 
against the idea of an implicated indeterminate that refuses any position of 
separation. 
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Derrida (1977a) uses the example of a shopping list to demonstrate the 
relationship between the ‘mark’ that is the mark on the shopping list and the 
simultaneous present/absent, sender/receiver position. The shopping list is only 
useful to the writer of the list who was present when writing the list, but holds the 
possibility of being absent whilst present either in terms of memory or death, or, 
to another who is able to be present in the absence of the writer. In other words, 
both the writer of the shopping list (or any written text) and another who re-reads 
the shopping list (or any written text) are at once both positioned as  
present/absent, sender/receiver. The function of the ‘mark’ is contingent upon the 
logic of iterability: it rests on being able to re-read and repeat the ‘mark.’  
Transferring these principles to the text of Zami, it is possible to interpret Lorde’s 
uses of ‘mark,’ ‘print’ and ‘tattoo’ as that of occupying the simultaneous 
present/absent, sender/receiver position.  Royle (2003:78) calls it ‘…a question of 
spectrality at the origin, ghostliness as the structure of signification.’    
In the preface to Of Grammatology, Spivak pays close attention to 
Derrida’s use and meaning of ‘trace,’ and comments that:  
But his word is “trace” (the French word carries strong implications of 
track, footprint, imprint), a word that cannot be a master-word, that 
presents itself as the mark of an anterior presence, origin, master. (Spivak, 
1997:xv; parentheses in original)   
Although Zami troubles the idea of a fixed origin, starting point and end point, at 
the same time, Zami has trouble with not fixing an origin and an end.  Whilst 
Zami contests the legitimacy of ‘a master-word,’ it becomes seduced into 
displacing ‘a master-word’ for an alternative ‘master.’  Of course, the alternative 
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is a Black lesbian feminist ‘master-word,’ but, nevertheless, it is contingent upon 
an implicated mark or trace.   
The activism of Black feminist theory confronts the same issue and, rather 
than pretending or ignoring the predicament, perhaps it would be more productive 
for Black feminist theory to be active in exploring this dialectic. The name 
‘Zami,’ just like the name ‘Black feminist,’ draws on a tradition of Black 
women’s writing and autobiography (Braxton, 1989) and history which locate 
identity and experience beyond any stable, singular context or signifier.   
Royle explains that: 
It is in many ways perhaps helpful to think of Derrida’s work in terms of 
the mark, rather than of “text” or “writing” in the traditional, narrow sense 
of these words. (Royle, 2003:68; emphasis in original) 
The use of the metaphors ‘print’ and ‘tattoo’ in Zami is not restricted to words or 
text. The reference to ‘…emotional tattoo’ (Lorde, 1996:222) indicates that it is 
experiential, and constitutive of subjectivity and inter-subjective relations. The 
marks on the pages that form Zami communicate that the work of the ‘mark’ is 
not restricted to words, letters and ink on paper; rather, the ‘mark’ extends to all 
experience and beyond. Derrida explains that: 
…a “text” that is henceforth no longer a finished corpus of writing, some 
content enclosed in a book or its margins, but a differential network, a 
fabric of traces referring endlessly to something other than itself, to other 
differential traces. Thus the text overruns all the limits assigned to it… 
(Derrida, 1977b:69)   
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The print, tattoo, mark and trace are boundless; they cannot be contained in time, 
place or space.  Any notion of a recognizable, neat, linear relation is challenged. 
Spivak (1999:424) explains that ‘This track, of a previous differentiation and a 
continuous deferment, is called “trace.”’  
Both Lorde’s experience, and the impact of her experience in the 
consciousness of the reader, move beyond, and cannot be contained by, the text of 
Zami.  Here, the potential for using Zami as a resource for the activism of Black 
feminist theory is located. The ‘mark’ or Lorde’s ‘print’ continually requires, and 
results in, ‘Another meeting’ (Lorde, 1996:223).  Perhaps Black feminist theory 
could be represented and practiced as an infinite referral and deferral of ‘[a]nother 
meeting’ that ‘overruns all the limits assigned to it…’ (Derrida, 1977b:69).  
Spivak comments that:  
…I shall begin with “trace/track,” for it is a simple word; and there also 
seems, I must admit, something ritually satisfying about beginning with 
the “trace.” (Spivak, 1997:xv-xvi)   
Indeed, there is ‘…something ritually satisfying about beginning…’ the 
‘Epilogue’ with the word ‘print’ in the first sentence.  Thus, what is performed is 
the beginning of the end. The structure of the first paragraph of the ‘Epilogue,’ 
and specifically through the ‘mark’ of the word ‘print,’ is a disruption of temporal 
spatial points of reference - namely, the beginning and the end.  Derrida 
comments that: 
The trace is not only the disappearance of origin…it means that the origin 
did not even disappear, that it was never constituted except reciprocally by 
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a nonorigin, the trace, which thus becomes the origin of the origin. 
(Derrida, 1997:61) 
 
‘My Mother’s Mortar’ 
The ‘origin of the origin’ (Spivak, 1997:xviii) is invoked and personified in the 
position of the figure of ‘mother’ from the ‘Epilogue’ of Zami through to the 
‘Prologue’ to Zami and from the ‘Prologue’ through to the ‘Epilogue.’  For 
example: 
Once home was a long way off, a place I had never been to but knew out 
of my mother’s mouth. I only discovered its latitudes when Carriacou was 
no longer my home. There it is said that the desire to lie with other women 
is a drive from the mother’s blood. (Lorde, 1996:223-224; emphasis in 
original) 
So, we have the situation where the ‘Epilogue,’ located within the final pages of 
Zami, reiterates the position of ‘mother’ as the ‘drive’/origin of lesbian desire.  
This is in stark contrast to society’s prevalent stereotype of lesbianism as the 
consequence of a failure of motherhood. Here, it is evident that Zami, as an ‘act of 
narrative resistance’ (Beard, 2009:2-3), troubles the signification of the trope 
‘mother,’ and the relationship between ‘mother,’ desire and sexuality.  Anatol 
(2001) uses the idea of ‘border crossings’ in her analysis of the ways in which 
Lorde’s lesbianism is intertwined both with her heritage and her relationship with 
her mother in Zami.   
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Furthermore, society’s homophobic constructions of a failure of 
motherhood as the origin and end result of lesbianism are an example of how the 
demarcations between beginning and end are used as tools of oppression. This 
point is articulated by Christian: 
Society has tended to blame the mother for the daughter’s lesbianism.  
Lorde sees her mother as her starting point, but she turns the analysis on 
its head.  She celebrates her mother’s qualities, her strength, her 
perceptions, her sensitivity, rather than society’s view of the lesbian’s 
mother as diseased, as somehow bringing up her daughter in the wrong 
way.  In beginning with her mother’s character, then, Lorde does more 
than present her own development; she attacks one of society’s most 
persistent interpretations of the origin of lesbianism, an interpretation that 
denigrates all women. (Christian, 1985:15) 
Within Zami ‘mother’ is ‘the origin of the origin’ (Spivak, 1997:xviii) of what is 
most fundamental and precious to Lorde; for example, in relation to poetry 
(Lorde, 1996:21) and her lesbianism.  
Perhaps one of the most poetic, sensual and erotic passages in the text is 
the description of Lorde sat between her ‘mother’s spread legs’ and ‘nuzzling’ 
beside her mother in bed: 
Sitting between my mother’s spread legs, her strong knees gripping my 
shoulders tightly like some well-attended drum, my head in her lap, while 
she brushed and combed and oiled and braided.  I feel my mother’s strong, 
rough hands all up in my unruly hair… (Lorde, 1996:22) 
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I remember the warm mother smell caught between her legs, and the 
intimacy of our physical touching nestled inside of the anxiety/pain like a 
nutmeg nestled inside its covering of mace. (Lorde, 1996:22) 
It could be argued that the figure of ‘mother’ within Zami is an example of 
troubling the ‘order of discourse’ (Foucault, 1981), where the discourse of the 
Black mother figure is destabilised. In Zami ‘mother’ is a site of paradox and 
contradiction. The preoccupation in the text with the transgression of the 
conditions of a racist, homophobic patriarchy enables Lorde to transgress or 
destabilise the rules that govern these conditions, including mother-daughter 
relations.  
In ‘My Mother’s Mortar,’ Lorde (1977b) offers another evocative, erotic 
and transgressive representation of ‘mother.’  The scene of the mother-daughter 
encounter is within the domesticity of the kitchen centred on ‘My mother’s 
mortar…’ (Lorde, 1977b:188), which comes to signify home - a location of racial 
heritage, diaspora, gender, the erotic and survival: 
Every West Indian woman worth her salt had her own mortar. (Lorde, 
1977b:188)   
Now where the best mortars came from I was never really sure, but I knew 
it must be…called “home.” “Home” was the West Indies, Grenada or 
Barbados… (Lorde, 1977b:188)   
These next excerpts from ‘My Mother’s Mortar’ resonate with ideas of the 
indeterminacy, instability and fluidity of gender and the erotic found in the 
‘Prologue’ to, and ‘Epilogue’ of, Zami:  
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The mortar was of a foreign fragrant wood, too dark for cherry and too red 
for walnut…There were rounded plums and oval indeterminate fruit, some 
long and fluted like a banana, others ovular and end-swollen like a ripe 
alligator pear…I loved to finger the hard roundness of the carved fruit… 
(Lorde, 1977b:188)  
Up again, down, around, and up, so the rhythm would begin. The thud 
push rub rotate and up, repeated over and over; the muted thump of the 
pestle on the bed of grinding spice, as the salt and pepper absorbed the 
slowly yielded juices of the garlic and celery leaves and became moist… 
(Lorde, 1977b:191) 
My mother…put her heavy arm around my shoulders.  I could smell the 
warm herness rising from between her arm and her body, mixed with the 
smell of glycerine and rosewater, and the scent of her thick bun of hair. 
(Lorde, 1977b:198)      
In reply to the questions that Foucault asks: 
How, under what conditions, and in what forms can something like a 
subject appear in the order of discourse?  What place can it occupy in each 
type of discourse, what functions can it assume, and obeying what rules? 
(Foucault, 1969:118)  
These excerpts from Zami and ‘My Mother’s Mortar’ are examples of how Lorde 
transgresses racist, homophobic patriarchal rules about the domestic space of the 
kitchen, the signification of the ‘mother’ figure, ‘uses of the erotic,’ sexual taboos 
and the writing genre of biography.  Of course, it is never an either/or position of 
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to be or not to be in ‘the order of discourse,’ but, as Kemp (2004) argues, the 
juxtaposition of being Black and being a lesbian opens up space for subversion of 
that order.  
 
Electrical Sparks of the Dialectic 
Both Lorde and Derrida, in their own particular ways, explore the relationship 
between difference and interdependency.  These two different theoretical 
approaches both resonate with, and push at, each other.  This is a good example of 
how the juxtaposition of deconstructionism and the activism of Black feminist 
theory enables what Bhabha calls a ‘…translational move that opens up an 
interstitial space for the negotiation of meaning, value, judgment…’ (Seshadri-
Crooks, 2000c:376). Furthermore, the method and tools of the analysis can be 
seen to reflect, embody and perform the subject under analysis.  It is a mutually 
constitutive relation. Thus, what becomes apparent is interdependency between 
the content and form of the text, the possible re-readings and the tools for those 
possible re-readings.  In her essay, ‘The Master’s Tool Will Never Dismantle the 
Master’s House’ (1979b), Lorde speaks at length about the connection between 
the concepts and experiences of difference and interdependency:   
Difference must be not merely tolerated, but seen as a fund of necessary 
polarities between which our creativity can spark like a dialectic.  Only 
then does the necessity for interdependency become 
unthreatening…Within the interdependence of mutual (nondominant) 
differences lies that security which enables us to descend into the chaos of 
knowledge… (Lorde, 1979b:111)   
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Both Derrida and Lorde locate the space of the dialectic as a site empty of 
threat and, as such, as a site for creativity.  Interdependency of difference becomes 
less threatening in the situation of removal of hierarchical rankings of first and 
last, privilege and foreclosure, and absence and presence. Lorde’s reference to 
‘spark like a dialectic’ resonates with Lesnik-Oberstein’s (1994) use of the 
metaphor of ‘electrical sparks’ to examine the construction, function, implications 
and the potential of deconstructionism: 
Deconstruction does not, by my reading, strive towards the nihilism that 
“everything means everything, therefore nothing means anything”, as is so 
often claimed (hence the frequent equation of deconstruction with 
“destruction”). This view of deconstruction, I think, comes forth out of 
some critics’ inability to take seriously, whether they ultimately agree with 
it or not, deconstruction's rejection of a “real” world outside constructed 
meaning. I take deconstruction to work with the notion of a type of three-
dimensional, ever-moving ball of electrical sparks of meaning: meaning is 
not located “in” the poles between which the sparks jump - indeed to 
deconstruction these poles do not “exist” - it is the streaks of light left 
behind by the sparks, the “traces”, which represent meaning. The paths the 
sparks seem to draw create relationships of “différance” which are what 
meaning is. Hence each meaning (for instance “male”, “logic”, “nature”) 
is determined by what it is and is not (“female”, “object”, “absence”, 
“madness”, “chaos”, “irrationality”, “civilization”, “freedom”, 
“presence”). If the electrical activity of the network ceases, or exhausts 
itself, “aporeia” is achieved - the draining-away of meaning. (Lesnik-
Oberstein, 1994:21; parentheses and emphasis in original) 
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Application of Lesnik-Oberstein to Lorde’s proposal that differences are ‘…a 
fund of necessary polarities between which our creativity can spark like a 
dialectic’ (Lorde, 1979b:111) provides a theoretical lens that sees ‘the poles’ as 
social constructions that are ‘determined by what it is and is not,’ unstable to the 
point of non-existence.  
Thus, rather than getting caught up in questions of whether the ‘necessary 
polarities’ that constitute difference should be tolerated or not, or pose a threat or 
not, energy should be directed towards the ‘electrical sparks’ generated between 
the polarities and ‘…the streaks of light left behind by the sparks, the “traces”, 
which represent meaning’ (Lesnik-Oberstein, 1994:21). The act of deciphering 
what constructions should be tolerated or not edges dangerously close to an 
unwitting acceptance of (rather than a rejection of) ‘…a “real” world outside 
constructed meaning’ (Lesnik-Oberstein, 1994:21). 
In other words, Lesnik-Oberstein and Lorde direct attention towards what 
we can learn from, and how we can use the situation where, the electrical activity 
within the ‘network’ of oppressive constructions ‘ceases, or exhausts itself.’  I 
would argue that the ‘creativity’ that Lorde envisions for the activism of all 
feminist theory can be found within the ‘draining-away of meaning’ or 
‘“aporeia.”’ 
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Différance and Biomythography 
Shiach argues that: 
Différance is that which allows the production of meaning.  It involves a 
plethora of relationships across time.  Meaning is always constituted by 
both structural differences and temporal deferrals - and this temporal 
element is what we have lost in our concept of “difference”…The question 
then becomes how such a complex relation can be representable: 
“différance as temporization, différance as spacing.  How are they to be 
joined?” One answer, I believe, lies in theatre, which organizes its 
representations explicitly along both temporal and spatial axes… (Shiach, 
1989:270-271; italics in original) 
It could be argued that Zami uses Fon and Yoruba mythology as a medium of 
joining up the ‘plethora of relationships across time’ and space. The drama of the 
interaction between Fon and Yoruban figures, and the symbolic function of each 
these figures disrupts any fixed structure of positive terms embodied in the 
creation of biomythography.  Both the potential of myth, and of mythic spaces to 
disrupt discursive practices, are dependent upon whether they stand outside of the 
fixed structure of positive terms.   
The creation of a biomythography is in itself a transgression of apparently 
fixed borders of writing genres. However, in order to avoid slipping into a myth of 
the myth, so to speak, where myth is in danger of being ascribed an either/or 
quality that is literal or metaphorical, it is imperative to remember that myth is a 
construction ‘…which has the pretension of transcending itself…’ (Barthes, 
1973:145).  Thus, just as constructions are constituted, constrained and implicated 
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by language/discourse, so, too, is myth. I contend that taking the potential of myth 
seriously must ‘…take seriously…deconstruction's rejection of a “real” world 
outside constructed meaning’ (Lesnik-Oberstein, 1994:21).   
I want to foreground two particular theoretical approaches to the critical 
analysis of Fon and Yoruban mythology - namely, a critical feminist approach and 
a Black literary criticism approach.  Both approaches have evolved within the 
dialectic and dialogic of suppression and are modes of resistance to that 
suppression including ‘…the rejection of terms such as “primitive” and “savage”; 
as “civilized” and “barbarian” or “backward”; as “greater” or “lesser” tradition’ 
(Herskovits and Herskovits, 1998:4).  Lorde draws on, and articulates, aspects of 
both approaches in the creation of her biomythography. Foregrounding a feminist 
deconstructionist textual analysis allows paradoxes, contradictions and internal 
instabilities to surface in this close re-reading of the ‘Epilogue’ of Zami.  Grosz 
summarizes the challenge in the following way: 
Only a political or theoretical commitment that can confront its own 
internal paradoxes, its inherent or constitutive inconsistencies, and its 
necessary if changeable limits can be said to have come of age. (Grosz, 
1995:59) 
Feminist approaches emphasise the extent to which Black feminist Fon 
and Yoruban mythology in a text such as Zami displaces and challenges 
phallocentric bias found in hegemonic, Judeo-Christian, Western narratives and 
definitions of women (Bowen, 2003; Davies, 1992; Keating, 1992, 1996; Provost, 
1995).  This approach emphasises the success of the transformational impetus of 
including non-Western mythology and spirituality. An example here would be the 
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work of Keating (1996). Speaking of Gunn Allen, Anzaldúa and Lorde, Keating 
comments that: 
…they use revisionist myths to invent alternate forms of knowledge that 
posit the interconnectedness of the spiritual and material dimensions of 
life.  They create new ways of thinking that displace the boundaries 
between inner/outer, subject/object, spirit/matter, and other dichotomous 
terms. (Keating, 1996:20) 
Black literary criticism emphasises the function of myth in the tradition, 
form, content and theory of Afro-American literature (Gates, Jr., 1988).  This 
approach seeks to identify, articulate and make explicit the rich complexity of the 
theory of Afro-American literary criticism.  Gates, Jr. is clear that ‘…the black 
tradition has inscribed its own theories of its nature and function within elaborate 
hermeneutical and rhetorical systems’ (Gates, Jr., 1988:xiv). In articulating a 
‘black metaphysics’ (Gates, Jr., 1988:xiii) through African, Caribbean and Afro-
American literary traditions, Gates, Jr. argues, ‘…that the central questions asked 
in Western critical discourse have been asked, and answered, in other textual 
traditions as well’ (Gates, Jr., 1988:xiv).  The critical interventions of Gates, Jr. 
(1988) and Keating (1996) question ‘…racist and sexists presuppositions…’ 
(Gates, Jr., 1988:xv) that position Eurocentric narratives, theory and constructions 
as dominant and superior.   
Gates, Jr.’s use of Derrida’s thinking about signification and the use of 
signifiers provides a lens through which to analyse the creation, disruption and 
challenge of signifiers within Zami.  Of particular interest is the way Zami 
manipulates Fon and Yoruban figures as signifiers in order to reconfigure the 
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signified.  An example of this can be seen in the ways in which Lorde uses the 
female ‘Afrekete’ as ‘MawuLisa’s’ youngest daughter and not the male 
incarnation of ‘Eshu/Legba.’  In the ‘Epilogue’ Lorde writes: ‘…and Afrekete, her 
youngest daughter, the mischievous linguist, trickster, best-beloved, whom we 
must all become’ (Lorde, 1996:223; italics in original). This manoeuvre is an 
example of trangressive textual production/practice and discursive positioning at 
work, to great effect, as the importance of the symbolic function of ‘Eshu/Legba’ 
is realised. Displacing ‘Eshu/Legba’ for ‘Afrekete’ has far-reaching implications. 
Keating comments: 
Eshu/Legba is a perpetually luminal figure, a mediator symbolizing the 
disruption of boundaries that bring about personal, social, and cosmic 
change.  In Fon metaphysics Legba’s meditational role is highly disruptive 
yet viewed in a positive light…in Yoruban cosmology Eshu represents the 
boundary transgression leading to new combinations in a never-ending 
process of transmutation and change. (Keating, 1996:165) 
Gates, Jr. comments: 
Metaphysically and hermeneutically, at least, Fon and Yoruba discourse is 
truly genderless, offering feminist literary critics a unique opportunity to 
examine a field of texts, a discursive universe, that escaped the trap of 
sexism inherent in Western discourse. (Gates, Jr., 1988:30)  
Zami uses myth to express the desire to transcend fixed structures of identity in 
recognition of ‘…pieces of myself apart from me - so different…’ (Lorde, 
1996:223).  In her detailed analysis of ‘Afrekete,’ the trickster in the work of 
Lorde, Provost suggests that: 
  
 291    
 
…as a woman and a lesbian, Lorde found resonance in the fluid gender 
orientation and free engagements in unconventional, even taboo, sexual 
practices that these trickster figures enact…With their verbal dexterity, 
indeterminacy, gender ambiguity, and ability to mediate seeming 
contradictions, I believe Afro-Caribbean trickster figures - particularly in 
the incarnation of Afrekete - offer Lorde both a model survivor/fighter and 
particular linguistic strategies which aid her struggle against oppressive 
beliefs and behaviors. (Provost, 1995:47) 
The figure ‘MawuLisa’ functions to represent différance as temporization 
and spatialization on a number of levels.  ‘MawuLisa’ moves across the space and 
temporality of Zami, pulling together the ‘Prologue’ and the ‘Epilogue.’  This is 
represented in the questioning of the ‘always already’ fixed constructions of 
gender and sexuality expressed as a desire within the ‘Prologue’ and personified 
by ‘MawuLisa.’ In the glossary of The Black Unicorn (1995), Lorde explains that 
‘…Mawulisa is the Dahomean female-male, sky-goddess-god principle’ (Lorde, 
1995:120). This is demonstrated in the ‘Epilogue’ where Lorde interweaves myth 
with biography:   
Ma-Liz, DeLois, Louise Briscoe, Aunt Anni, Linda, and Genevieve; 
MawuLisa, thunder, sky, sun, the great mother of us all; and Afrekete, her 
youngest daughter, the mischievous linguist, trickster, best-beloved, whom 
we must all become. (Lorde, 1996:223; italics in original) 
Lorde goes on to state that: 
Their name, selves, faces feed me like corn before labor.  I live each of 
them as a piece of me, and I choose these words with the same grave 
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concern with which I choose to push speech into poetry, the mattering 
core, the forward visions of all our lives. (Lorde, 1996:223) 
It is also interesting to note that Anzaldúa (2007) uses ‘corn’ to signify the 
strength, resource and complexity of her identity as a woman, as a mixed race 
woman and as a lesbian: 
…like corn, the mestiza is a product of crossbreeding, designed for 
preservation under a variety of conditions.  Like an ear of corn - a female 
seed-bearing organ - the mestiza is tenacious, tightly wrapped in the husks 
of her culture. Like kernels she clings to the cob; with thick stalks and 
strong brace roots, she holds tight to the earth - she will survive the 
crossroads. (Anzaldúa, 2007:103; emphasis in original) 
MawuLisa represents the ‘crossroads’ of non-fixed gender category: 
The primal god of the Fon is a Janus figure; one side of its body is female 
and is called Mawu, while the other side is male and is called Lisa.  
Mawu’s eyes form the moon; Lisa’s eyes form the sun.  Accordingly, Lisa 
rules the day and Mawu rules the night.  The seventh son of Mawu-Lisa is 
Legba. Legba is the wild card of Fon metaphysics, the wandering signifier. 
(Gates, Jr., 1988:23)    
It could be argued that the intervention of Lorde’s biomythography 
anticipated the debates within feminist and queer theory that have evolved, and 
are evolving, concerning gender signification, and the relationship between 
gender and sexuality (Butler, 1990a, 1990b, 1993a, 1993b, 2006; Namaste, 2000; 
Stryker, 2008; Whittle, 2002). In the ‘Prologue’ Lorde states: 
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I have always wanted to be both man and woman, to incorporate the 
strongest and richest parts of my mother and father within/into me - to 
share valleys and mountains upon my body the way the earth does in hills 
and peaks.  I would like to enter a woman the way any man can, and to be 
entered - to leave and to be left… (Lorde, 1996:xvi; italics in original)  
In the context of this chapter, the words ‘…to leave and to be left…’ conjure up 
the ‘print’ of ‘[e]very woman I have ever loved…’ (Lorde 1996:223) in the 
‘Epilogue.’  The conceptual framework of difference, including notions of 
undecidability, and the trace and transgression of temporal and spatial borders, are 
invoked within the particularity of trangressive gender, race and sexual desire.  
This is an example of how Zami performs what Keating (1996:4) names as 
‘threshold locations’ and ‘threshold identities.’  It is an example of how iterability, 
polyvoice and inter-textual, intra-textual relations in Zami perform what Derrida 
(1998:14) called the ‘disorder of identity.’ Lorde explains that: 
Eshu is a prankster, also, a personification of all the unpredictable 
elements in life.  He is often identified with the masculine principle, and 
his primary symbol is frequently a huge erect phallus.  But Eshu-Elegba 
has no priests, and in many Dahomean religious rituals, his part is danced 
by a woman with an attached phallus. (Lorde, 1995:119-120)  
Lorde’s engagement with African Fon mythology is reiterated throughout 
her work.  This engagement allowed Lorde to consciously forge a connection with 
her African heritage, demonstrated through: 
…researching ancient myths for more than two decades; traveling to west 
Africa with her partner and two children in the mid-1970s; absorbing 
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diasporan stories into her being to create new myths of a feminist vision to 
strengthen herself for the continuing battles. Concomitantly, her rejection 
of the patriarchal Catholic religion of her youth left her with the need to 
formulate a cosmology in which to center her deep sense of spirituality 
and love of ritual. Creating her own special relationships with the deities, 
she chose Afrekete as her special goddess. (Bowen, 2003:117) 
 
Margins of the ‘Law’ 
Lorde’s response to How to Do Things with Words (Austin, 1975) is to position 
words, letters and nouns outside of the margin, off the page.  In the ‘Epilogue’ 
Lorde describes: 
There were four half-finished poems scribbled on the bathroom wall 
between the toilet and the bathtub, others in the window jambs and the 
floorboards under the flowered linoleum, mixed up with the ghosts of rich 
food smells. (Lorde, 1996:223)   
In the context of this chapter, the ‘between’ position of writing described in Zami 
is representative of intertextuality and resonates with Barthes (1971:160) 
statement that the ‘…intertextual in which every text is held, it itself being the 
text-between of another text…’ In the relation of intertextuality as 
intersubjectivity the ‘between,’ ‘under,’ and ‘in’ the ‘floorboards’ and ‘jambs’ 
embody: 
…those “unlivable” and “uninhabitable” zones of social life which are 
nevertheless densely populated by those who do not enjoy the status of the 
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subject, but whose living under the sign of the “unlivable” is required to 
circumscribe the domain of the subject. (Butler, 1993a:3)  
Thus, I propose that the ‘half-finished poems scribbled’ and ‘others’ 
(Lorde, 1996:223) of fragments/unfinished texts are positioned within 
‘…“unlivable” and “uninhabitable” zones…’ (Butler, 1993a:3).  It is interesting to 
note the textual move between ‘poems scribbled’ and ‘others’ in the social context 
of a racist, homophobic patriarchy, where the ‘others’ are those ‘…who do not 
enjoy the status of the subject…’ (Butler, 1993a:3) are located in the illegitimate 
in-between spaces that are ‘under’ (Lorde, 1996:223) those who are dominant. 
The point is that, as ‘an act of narrative resistance’ (Beard, 2009), Zami disrupts 
demarcated ‘zones,’ ‘the status of the subject’ and ‘the sign of the “unlivable”’ 
(Butler, 1993a:3).  The words ‘mixed up with the ghosts’ (Lorde, 1996:223) 
conjure the idea that categories of race, gender and sexuality ‘…within political 
discourse will be haunted in some ways by the very instabilities that the categories 
effectively produce and foreclose’ (Butler, 1993a:4).   Furthermore, ‘mixed up 
with the ghosts’ is reiterative and prophetic of the themes that haunt the text:  
We spent so much of our young-womanhood trying to define ourselves as 
woman-identified women before we even knew the words existed, let 
alone that there were ears interested in trying to hear them beyond our 
immediate borders. (Lorde 1996:197)    
In Zami where the intertextual is performative of the intersubjective, the things 
that words do (Austin, 1975) include the creation of a speaking subject that:   
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…thus reproduces in the reading subject the experience of splitting, the 
tautness generated by the stretching between identifications and otherness, 
between sameness and difference. (Beard, 2009:35)   
An example of this can be seen early on in Zami, when Lorde is required by the 
school teacher to write her name in ‘…special short wide notebooks…with very 
widely spaced lines on yellow paper’ (Lorde, 1996:14).   
It is possible to interpret the example of Lorde’s experience of staying 
within the ‘spaced lines’ as bringing together the significance of the margin in 
conjunction with the significance of social laws of regulation: 
…the fact that there is a general social law, that this law is the symbolic 
dimension which is given in language and that every social practice offers 
a specific expression of that law. (Kristeva, 1973:25)   
Here, Kristeva opens up the aporia of the law, and the significance of this in 
relation to Zami becomes the predicament of using language and social practice to 
confront the aporia that language and ‘…every social practice offers a specific 
expression of that law’ (Kristeva, 1973:25).  Indeed, this is the predicament of the 
activism of Black feminist theory in the context of the regulations and limitations 
of a racist, homophobic patriarchy. 
As discussed earlier (Chapter 1), Lorde was aware at the age of four not to 
let the Y hang ‘…down below the line in Audrey…’ like a tail; instead, she 
‘…used to love the evenness of AUDRELORDE…’ (Lorde 1996:14).  However, 
and this is where a manifestation of the ‘law’ figures: 
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…I remembered to put on the Y  because it pleased my mother, and 
because, as she always insisted to me, that was the way it had to be 
because that was the way it was.  No deviation was allowed from her 
interpretations of correct. (Lorde, 1996:14)  
The quotation above reflects the complex manoeuvres of the law of a racist, 
homophobic patriarchy that uses the relationship between a Black mother and her 
Black daughter to transmit the law.  Oppressive acts of female genital mutilation, 
foot binding and forced marriages, in conjunction with discourses of shame and 
blame, are transmitted through mothers, sisters, mother-in-laws, daughters and 
matriarchal figures within communities and families. Lorde explains prophetically 
and with irony that ‘I had never been too good at keeping between straight lines 
no matter what their width…’ (Lorde, 1996:15).  Lorde proceeds to write her 
name:   
…slanted down across the page something like this: 
A 
 U 
  D 
   R 
    E 
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The notebooks were short and there was no more room for anything else 
on that page.  So I turned the page and went over, and wrote again, 
earnestly and laboriously, biting my lip,  
L 
 O 
  R 
   D 
    E… 
(Lorde, 1996:15) 
The situation and response (by her teacher) that Lorde is confronted with in 
performing this act is explained by Moi as: 
…the desire to produce a discourse which always confronts the impasse of 
language (as at once subject to and subversive of the rule of the Law), a 
discourse which in a final aporetic move dares to think language against 
itself, and in so doing knowingly situates itself in a place which is, quite 
literally, untenable. (Moi, 1986:10; emphasis in original) 
Lorde finds herself ‘…at once subject to and subversive of the rule of the Law…,’ 
epitomised both in her willingness to walk ‘…over rice on my knees to please 
Mother’ (Lorde, 1996:15) and in the scolding from her school teacher: ‘You don’t 
even want to try and do as you are told’ (Lorde, 1996:16).  
Other instances of Lorde’s transgression of the ‘Law’ of social and 
institutional regulation include the time she spent working at ‘Keystone 
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Electronics’ factory (Lorde 1996:106).  In order to earn enough money to travel to 
Mexico, Lorde recalls that: 
I could not even tell Ginger how I was managing to pull down such high 
bonuses, although she often asked.  The truth was, I would slip crystals 
into my socks every time I went to the bathroom.  Once inside the toilet 
stall, I chewed them up with my strong teeth and flushed the little shards 
of rock down the commode.  I could take care of between fifty and a 
hundred crystals a day in that manner, taking a handful from each box I 
signed out. (Lorde, 1996:125) 
A close re-reading of this passage brings to mind the context of being in the 
bathroom and the reference to toilet made in the ‘Epilogue.’  In both contexts 
there is a transgression of the ‘Law.’ In the ‘Epilogue’ the ‘between the toilet and 
the bathroom’ functioned as a space for ‘half-finished poems scribbled’ and here 
in the factory ‘the toilet stall’ is the place of the act of transgression. Thus, in both 
instances, the act and the actor of transgression are situated within ‘…“unlivable” 
and “uninhabitable” zones of social life…’ (Butler, 1993a:3).  The testimony of 
transgressive acts that have confronted, and continue to confront, social injustice 
throughout the world demonstrate that being in the ‘“unlivable” and 
“uninhabitable” zones’ does not prevent political activism.  
Lorde’s use of the slant down across the page, neither a straight vertical 
column nor a horizontal row, is perhaps symbolic of a message more complicated 
than a rejection of being identified as ‘straight.’  This complexity is captured in 
the statement: 
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I have often wondered why the farthest-out position always feels so right 
to me; why extremes, although difficult and sometimes painful to 
maintain, are always more comfortable than one plan running straight 
down a line in the unruffled middle. (Lorde, 1996:6) 
Read in conjunction with Watson (1992), who uses Butler’s (2006) criticism of 
lesbian identity as an ‘…oppositional structure of heterosexuality…’ (Watson, 
1992:397), the ‘farthest-out position’ represented by the slant across the ‘…very 
widely spaced lines on yellow paper…’ (Lorde, 1996:14) could be interpreted as: 
…the notion of multiple, fragmentary, fluid postures around a set of 
dissonant sexual roles opens up an interplay between hetero – and 
homosexual categories that destabilizes both.  Such a theory would have 
potential for a politics of reading identity differently - reading it, that is, as 
a negotiation among fixed possibilities that both resists and remakes the 
representation of human experience.  In such a negotiation the 
unspeakable would be mapped as what becomes speakable when 
boundaries are traversed, articulated, confused, and undone. (Watson, 
1992:397) 
 
Conclusion 
Zami is part of a feminist tradition of using myth and experimental fiction fused 
with political analysis to attempt alternative, disruptive frames of thinking 
(Bhattacharyya, 1997; Haraway, 1991; Wittig, 1969). I particularly like the way 
that Griggers (1994) takes up Benjamin’s (1978) idea of the destabilization of the 
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origin of an original work of art, and applies it to the issues of an indeterminate 
origin, repetition and destabilisation of positionality.  I would argue that Zami 
adds a Black feminist dimension to debates about ‘techno-fetishization of 
technologies’ in a ‘(post)mechanical’ (Griggers, 1994:120) era where: 
…(post)mechanical reproduction marks the difference between an 
economy of representation, in which representative power is used to 
maintain belief in the harmony of the socius, and an economy of 
repetition, which is characterised by repetitive mass production of all 
social relations . . .The cultural reproduction of lesbian bodies in the age of 
(post)mechanical reproduction, that is, in an economy of simulacral 
repetition, has more than ever destroyed the aura of an “original” lesbian 
identity… (Griggers, 1994:120-121) 
The point is that the creation of the biomythography, Zami, belongs to, and 
anticipates, imaginary and actual transformative spaces/interventions that 
constitute and transgress subject and identity positions.  These interventions are 
particularly useful in creating alternative regimes of seeing (Bhattacharyya, 1997).  
However, as this chapter has demonstrated, in adopting any position from which 
to gaze, the following questions must always be asked: what is outside of view? 
What is not seen?  How is the gaze totalizing that which is in view? 
Foregrounding any issue, method or gaze inevitably excludes or shadows that 
which is not in the foreground.   
Indeed, the same principle applies to (re-)reading against the/a grain even 
when the grain is patriarchy, racism and homophobia.  I wish to conclude with a 
quote from Davies (1992) that encapsulates the aporia of positionality and the 
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problematics of methodology examined in this chapter, with specific reference to 
Zami and the activism of Black feminist theory in general: 
Davies argues that: 
The lived and imaginary narratives that we generate in our attempt to 
speak into existence a different way of being outside the male/female 
dualism need to achieve several contradictory purposes.  We need stories 
that are elaborations of existing stories that mark their problematic nature.  
We need not only see the problems in rational, didactic terms (though we 
need that too) but to see freshly the images and metaphors and story lines 
we have grown up with and learn to read them against the grain.  The 
desire to read them against the grain does not simply come with knowing 
what those alternative readings are, however, because the old story lines, 
through which old discourses are lived out, inevitably compete for our 
attention.  Any reading against the grain implies a detailed knowledge of 
the grain itself. (Davies, 1992:74) 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
‘See Too Much’ 
The dialectical approach is usually perceived as trying to locate the 
phenomenon-to-be-analysed in the totality to which it belongs, to bring to 
light the wealth of its links to other things, and thus to break the spell of 
fetishizing abstraction: from a dialectical perspective, one should see not 
just the thing in front of oneself, but this thing as it is embedded in all the 
wealth of its concrete historical context.  This, however, is the most 
dangerous trap to be avoided; for Hegel, the true problem is precisely the 
opposite one: the fact that, when we observe a thing, we see too much in it, 
we fall under the spell of the wealth of empirical detail which prevents us 
from clearly perceiving the notional determination which forms the core of 
the thing.  The problem is thus not that of how to grasp the multiplicity of 
determinations, but rather of how to abstract from them, how to constrain 
our gaze and teach it to grasp only the notional determination. (Žižek, 
2008a:x-xi; emphasis in original) 
It could be said that this thesis has fallen into the dangerous trap of the dialectic 
explained by Žižek (2008a).  This thesis is structured around a number of 
interconnected aporia, tensions, problematics and predicaments.  This thesis has 
endeavoured ‘…to break the spell of fetishizing abstraction…’ (Žižek, 2008a:x) in 
relation to issues such as positionality, the speech act, author function, 
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representation, interstices, interdependency and borders by illuminating the links 
between these issues not only with each other, but, also, within the constitutive 
contexts that they inhabit. I have grasped at the ‘multiplicity of determinations’ 
(Žižek, 2008a:xi) to show the instability of determinations in order to contest any 
idea of ‘an established’ and to assert the undecidability of phenomena.   
Furthermore, this thesis concerns, and uses, the methodological conceptual 
framework of Black feminist theory - a theory produced out of the dialectic of the 
suppression it seeks to resist.  The suppression of Black women and their work is 
constituted of multiple and intersecting determinations reflected in, and resisted 
by, an immense range, breadth and depth of Black feminist scholarship.  
This thesis has wanted to ‘see too much’ (Žižek, 2008a:xi; emphasis in 
original).  What we see and do not see is highly political because ‘…an optics is a 
politics of positioning.  Instruments of vision mediate standpoints…’ (Haraway, 
1988:288).  I have wanted to see Black feminist standpoints that have been 
mediated out of the picture into the shadows and, then, judged accordingly.  This 
is demonstrated in Christian’s critique of the 1987 special issue of Cultural 
Critique entitled, ‘Minority Discourse,’ where even within a special issue 
foregrounding minoriticised standpoints, the language used served to mediate 
these standpoints into the shadows. Christian explains that: 
…the terms “minority” and “discourse” are located firmly in a Western 
dualistic or “binary” frame which sees the rest of the world as minor, and 
tries to convince the rest of the world that it is major, usually through force 
and then through language, even as it claims many of the ideas that we, its 
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“historical” other, have known and spoken about for so long. (Christian, 
1987:14)  
In addition, I have wanted to see how the production of ‘The Occult of True Black 
Womanhood’ (duCille, 1994) functions not to honour, but to demean, Black 
feminist studies by: 
…treating it not like a discipline with a history and a body of rigorous 
scholarship and distinguished scholars underpinning it, but like an 
anybody-can-play pick-up game performed on a wide-open, untrammelled 
field. (duCille, 1994:243)  
I have emphasised the importance of context and welcomed the ‘wealth of 
empirical detail’ (Žižek, 2008a:xi) as an act of theoretical and narrative resistance 
(Beard, 2009) to confront the problem of the totalizing, ‘always already’ decided 
constructions of Black women and their lives.   
Indeed, this thesis is testimony to the ‘multiplicity of determinations’ 
about Black women that are deliberately absent and disavowed, and as such, the 
‘multiplicity of determinations’ are much more than merely missing out a research 
variable.  The variables are highly political. The ‘multiplicity of determinations’ 
that position the scholarship of Lorde, and Black feminist scholarship in general, 
are highly political.  It is apparent that even though ‘[v]ariety, multiplicity, 
eroticism are difficult to control’ (Christian, 1987:19), this has not stopped those 
in domination from trying.   Re-reading Lorde through a re-reading of 
contemporary and historical Black feminist writings and speeches from across the 
world has expanded and provided an important contribution to the understanding 
of the activism of Black feminist theory.  This has been demonstrated through 
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application of Black feminist theory, and Lorde in particular, to contemporary 
issues of Black feminist practice.  The importance of this application is 
underscored by Christian, who says: 
I, for one, am tired of being asked to produce a black feminist literary 
theory as if I were a mechanical man.  For I believe such theory is 
prescriptive - it ought to have some relationship to practice. (Christian, 
1987:13) 
 
Resisting Attacks on Theory 
In the current climate of negativity towards the value of theory, insistence on the 
positive value of theory is imperative.  This thesis is a contribution to that 
insistence, and that insistence is politically charged because ‘[t]here can, of 
course, be no apolitical scholarship’ (Mohanty, 1984:19). I find Bion’s 
psychoanalytic idea of ‘attacks on linking’ (Bion, 1959) particularly relevant to 
understanding the process of attacks on theory.   
Eaton (2005) provides a detailed application of Bion’s ‘attacks on linking’ 
to the notion of learning, and cites Bion’s experiences of World War I as a critical 
context for the development of his ideas.  Eaton comments that Bion: 
…realized that groups can become anti-learning assemblages and that 
failing to learn (indeed failing to think) can be a matter of life and death. 
(Eaton, 2005:356)   
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Keeping a grip of the capacity to think theoretically is ‘a matter of life and death,’ 
and certainly, a matter of the life and death of the activism of Black feminist 
theory. Here, I am reminded of Christian’s words:  
But what I write and how I write is done in order to save my own life.  
And I mean that literally…a way of knowing that I am not hallucinating… 
(Christian, 1987:21) 
Bion (1959) proposed that ‘attacks on linking’ between an idea (including 
the existence and structure of an idea), the understanding of an idea and the 
habitation of an idea within mental functioning are mounted by the psychotic parts 
of the personality, and can be found in borderline patients.   
Although Bion’s (1959) psychoanalytic conceptual framework was 
developed in the context of working with borderline patients, and despite the 
problems of translating the clinical setting of psychoanalysis to the social setting 
(Parker, 2010), I think there is resonance with historical, liberal and current 
neoliberal attitudes and practices towards theory in general, and Black feminist 
theory in particular.   
‘Attacks on linking’ has a number of relevant effects, namely: the 
attempted obliteration of mental functioning between, and within, the patient and 
analyst; the attempted destruction of the capacity to learn from experience; and a 
‘nameless dread’ (Bion, 1959, 1962, 1967) produced from a lack of containment 
of unbearable (beta elements) thoughts, feelings and imaginings that have been 
evacuated on account of the distress they cause.  Eaton comments that:  
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This word-evacuated-speaks to force and intensity. What is the fate of 
evacuated distress? Put more simply, what is the fate of the infant’s cry of 
pain? In order for distress to be transformed, Bion suggests that it must 
find a home in the mind of another. Ideally a mind can be found to register 
the infant’s pain. Still more important, that mind should belong to an 
individual more emotionally mature-someone with more experience of 
tolerating distress than the infant. If this is so, then pain can be more than 
registered, it can be recognized, reflected upon, and replied to creatively 
and compassionately. Bion asks the question: What does this other mind 
do for the infant in distress? Something helps the experience of raw 
emotional distress become an opportunity to evolve in the direction of 
discovering meaning. Bion says this something that helps is called “alpha 
function.” The discovery of meaning depends upon the mother’s ability to 
use her mind, including her attention, intuition, and emotional experience 
(all factors in her alpha function) to contain her infant’s distress (the beta 
elements) and to transform that distress imaginatively. (Eaton, 2005:358; 
emphasis and parentheses in original)   
The raw emotional distress of being in a racist, homophobic society needs 
the rigour of theoretical containment in terms of recognition and processing of the 
distress.  The cry of pain as a result of oppression needs to find meaning.  The 
attack on theory functions to undermine the activism of all theory as a vehicle for 
resistance to oppression.  In terms of Black feminist theory, it is an attack on the 
‘…connection between experience and consciousness that shapes the everyday 
lives…’ (Hill Collins, 2000:24) of Black women and their work. 
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It could be argued that just as Bion was interested from a psychoanalytic 
perspective in the condition and presentation of the borderline, this thesis shares 
this interest from a Black feminist perspective. The aporia of borders as a site of 
productive thinking is reiterated throughout this thesis both in terms of borders as 
a tool of regulation, and borders as an indeterminate space of subversive potential.  
This thesis set out to transgress temporal, spatial and disciplinary borders, and in 
the spirit of this intervention, I want to offer a re-reading of Anzaldúa’s (2007) 
‘La Conciencia de la Mestiza: Towards a New Consciousness’ through aspects of 
Bion’s (1959) theoretical lens of ‘Attacks on Linking.’   
My purpose is to offer a particular application of Bion (1959) in order to 
insist on resistance to attacks on theory, and I believe that Anzaldúa (2007) offers 
such as resistance.  Anzaldúa states that ‘[t]he mestiza’s dual or multiple 
personality is plagued by psychic restlessness’ (2007:101; italics in original), and 
she explains that:  
In perceiving conflicting information and points of view, she is subjected 
to a swamping of her psychological borders. She has discovered that she 
can’t hold concepts or ideas in rigid boundaries.  The borders and walls 
that are supposed to keep the undesirable ideas out are entrenched habits 
and patterns of behavior; these habits and patterns are the enemy within.  
Rigidity means death.  Only by remaining flexible is she able to stretch the 
psyche horizontally and vertically. La mestiza constantly has to shift out of 
habitual formations… (Anzaldúa, 2007:101; italics in original)   
Although it could be argued that there are some similarities between 
Bion’s and Anzaldúa’s invocations of the borderline/la mestiza as overwhelmed 
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by the flooding of ‘undesirable ideas,’ including the notion that the ‘…work takes 
place underground - subconsciously’ (Anzaldúa, 2007:101), a key difference in 
their formulations, as Anzaldúa describes, is that the ‘…struggle of the mestiza is 
above all a feminist one’ (Anzaldúa, 2007:106).  Although, here, Bion and 
Anzaldúa are concerned with the survival of mental functioning, Anzaldúa frames 
her political treatise in terms of unequal power relations in the context of a racist, 
homophobic patriarchy.  In relation to surviving theory, I understand something of 
Bhabha’s statement that:  
Survival, in that sense, is the precariousness of living on the borderline and 
has been one of my ways of close reading and writing. (Seshadri-Crooks, 
2000c:373)  
‘Attacks on linking’ theory to activism stand in direct opposition to both 
the dialogical and dialectical foundations of Black feminist theory.  I would argue 
that following comment by Hill Collins applies to all Black feminist theory:  
This dialectic of oppression and activism, the tension between the 
suppression of African-American women’s ideas and our intellectual 
activism in the face of that suppression, constitutes the politics of U.S. 
Black feminist thought. (Hill Collins, 2000:3) 
Attacks on the activism of Black feminist theory are no coincidence or accident 
because: ‘One key reason that standpoints of oppressed groups are suppressed is 
that self-defined standpoints can stimulate resistance’ (Hill Collins, 2000:29).   
Remaining steadfast in the insistence of the legitimacy and relevance of 
Black feminist theory is vital for social justice because:  
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As long as Black women’s subordination within intersecting oppressions 
of race, class, gender, sexuality and nation persists, Black feminism as an 
activist response to that oppression will remain needed. (Hill Collins, 
2000:22)  
This thesis contends that the activism of Lorde’s theory in particular, and the 
activism of Black feminist theory in general, provide emotional, intellectual and 
spiritual containment for evacuated distress so that ‘…pain can be more than 
registered, it can be recognized, reflected upon, and replied to creatively and 
compassionately’ (Eaton, 2005:357).  ‘Re-Reading Audre Lorde: Declaring the 
Activism of Black Feminist Theory’ is a conduit to ‘…transform that distress 
imaginatively’ (Eaton, 2005:358).    
 
Constrain Our Gaze 
I return to Žižek’s point quoted earlier in this conclusion: 
The problem is thus not that of how to grasp the multiplicity of 
determinations, but rather of how to abstract from them, how to constrain 
our gaze and teach it to grasp only the notional determination. (Žižek, 
2008a:xi; emphasis in original)  
Here in the conclusion, I want to attempt an abstraction in an effort to ‘constrain 
our gaze’ on ‘….the notional determination which forms the core of the thing’ 
(Žižek, 2008a:xi); the thing being ‘Re-Reading Audre Lorde: Declaring the 
Activism of Black Feminist Theory.’  
Before I begin this abstraction, I want to say a number of things: 
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Firstly, as much as I find the work of Žižek, Derrida and Foucault both 
affirmative in the task of articulating an emancipatory politics and refreshing in 
their audacity of imaginings of revolutionary grand theory, I would like them, and 
other such like theorists, to answer the following questions: why do you not refer 
to Black feminist theory?  Why is the revolutionary, grand theory of Lorde’s not 
in your writings, conference speeches and newspaper commentaries?  Perhaps, 
Žižek’s comment that ‘…today, the false choice between “liberal democracy or 
Islamo-fascism” is sustained by the occlusion of radical-secular emancipatory 
politics’ (Žižek, 2008b:386) should be applied to the shameful ‘occlusion’ of 
Black feminist theory that is tantamount to an attack on linking.   
Secondly, I would insist that they examine the principles of Black feminist 
theory and methodology, including:  
 That Black feminist theory is constituted of the dialectic.  In other words, 
Black women have formulated, crafted and communicated their theory out 
of, and because of, oppression (Hill Collins, 2000); 
 That Black feminist theory is constituted of the dialogical.  In other words, 
Black women have formulated, crafted and communicated their theory out 
of, and because of, active engagement with struggles for social justice 
(Hill Collins, 2000); 
 That Black feminist theory is constituted of the erotic (Lorde, 1978a). In 
other words, Black feminist theory goes beyond ‘…the encouraged 
mediocrity of our society…’ (Lorde, 1978a:54).  Lorde speaks of the 
erotic as: 
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…a lens through which we scrutinize all aspects of our existence, forcing 
us to evaluate those aspects honestly in terms of their relative meaning 
within our lives. And this is a grave responsibility, projected from within 
each of us, not to settle for the convenient, the shoddy, the conventionally 
expected, nor the merely safe. (Lorde, 1978a:57)  
Thirdly, I would give voice to my own disquiet.  If ‘…the master’s tools 
will never dismantle the master’s house’ (Lorde, 1979b:112; emphasis in 
original), how do I reconcile using the conceptual frameworks of white men such 
as Derrida and Foucault to explicate the activism of Lorde’s theory?  Johnson 
comments that: 
Jacques Derrida may sometimes see himself as philosophically positioned 
as a woman, but he is not politically positioned as a woman. (Johnson, 
1989:2; emphasis in original)  
Johnson’s statement could be rephrased as the question: ‘Can the “philosophically 
positioned” woman enable a theoretical understanding of the “politically 
positioned” woman?’   
This thesis has demonstrated that the work of Derrida can enable us to 
understand that an aspect of ‘the master’s tools’ is the aporetics of positioning.  
Derrida does not provide an alternative to ‘the master’s tools’; rather, his interest 
lies in how ‘the master’s house’ is constructed, including its architecture, 
foundations and supporting walls.  I think the key is in ‘“working the cracks”…by 
persistent use of her insider knowledge concerning its pressure points’ (Hill 
Collins, 2000:282).  
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Perhaps, the process of forming different tools is in understanding how 
‘the master’s tools’ function.  For example, the reason that Trafford Rape Crisis is 
constituted as a Collective is based as much on our knowledge and experience of 
hierarchical structures as it is on non-hierarchical structures.  In other words, our 
imperfect efforts to create alternatives to ‘the master’s tools’ are born out of 
knowledge of the function and results of ‘the master’s tools.’   
And, yet, my disquiet persists, because the idea of using knowledge about 
‘the master’s tools’ in order not to replicate these and, thereby, attempting the 
creation of alternative Black feminist inspired tools, has a number of problems.   
Firstly, it contains an inherent contradiction, because any contingency 
based on an understanding of the function of ‘the master’s tools’ and a rejection 
of ‘the master’s tools’ is, in effect, using ‘the master’s tools’ to ‘dismantle the 
master’s house.’  
Secondly, ‘The standpoints of the subjugated are not “innocent” positions’ 
(Haraway, 1988:286) and, as such, the idea that alternatives to ‘the master’s tools’ 
will naturally emanate from subjugated standpoints is flawed.  Butler summarises 
the essence of my disquiet: 
But I am writing here now: is it too late? Can this writing, can any writing, 
refuse the terms by which it is appropriated even as, to some extent, that 
very colonizing discourse enables or produces this stumbling block, this 
resistance? How do I relate the paradoxical situation of this dependency 
and refusal? (Butler, 1990b:121)     
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I agree with Hill Collins that:  
Within these parameters, knowledge for knowledge’s sake is not enough - 
Black feminist thought must both be tied to Black women’s lived 
experiences and aim to better those experiences in some fashion.  When 
such thought is sufficiently grounded in Black feminist practice, it reflects 
this dialogical relationship. (Hill Collins, 2000:31)  
Thus, placing theoretical frameworks in a dialogue with the lived experience of 
grassroots Black feminist practice takes the ‘activism’ of Black feminist theory 
seriously.  The multiple determinations that configure Black feminist scholarship 
within this thesis have been constrained into the ‘notional abstractions’ (Žižek, 
2008a:xi) of applications to confront violence against women, and the necessity of 
Black women-only reflective spaces and dedicated services. I hope that something 
of the essence of the conceptual frameworks used in this thesis can ‘aim to better 
those experiences’ (Hill Collins, 2000:31) of oppressed Black women.   
However, in order to further demonstrate the potential, relevance and 
application of re-reading Lorde and Black feminist theory to current issues, I will 
conclude by pinpointing a number of issues alive in the Black feminist activism 
that I am presently engaged with.  I propose that negotiating ‘…a channel between 
the “high theoretical” and the “suspicious of all theories”’ (Boyce Davies, 
1994:43) can be achieved by exploring the relevance of theoretical frameworks in 
dialogical relation to the activism of Black feminist theory.  Minh-ha summaries 
the task as:  
…a constant questioning of our relationship to knowledge, to way we 
reserve, transmit or bring it to bear on our daily activities.  Our ongoing 
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critical view of the system is motivated, not be a mere desire to blame, to 
right the wrongs and to oppose for opposition’s sake.  Rather, it is 
motivated by the necessity to keep power and knowledge (ours and theirs) 
constantly in check for our own survival. (Minh-ha, 2011:125)   
However, as a word of qualification, there is a difference between opening 
up a dialogue to show relevance and application, and the act of proving a concept 
is correct by testing it against other concepts and practices. However, I find 
Bhabha’s approach very useful:   
I set up a continual tension in the application of a concept, its 
translatability, and demonstrate at the same time its untranslatability.  
That’s not to say its limits.  A concept that merely shows its limits, or is 
pressed to do so, can still develop a sense of its ontological completion or 
authenticity - au fond, “this is what it really is.” (Seshadri-Crooks, 
2000c:372)   
With this caveat, here are a number of contentions alive in the Black feminist 
activism that I am presently engaged with that I have in mind: 
 
Problem 1: Paradox at the Heart of Feminism 
At what point, and in what ways, for example, does the specificity of a 
particular social experience become an expression of essentialism? (Brah, 
1996:95) 
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Trafford Rape Crisis has a dedicated Black, Asian and Minority
22
 Ethnic (BAME) 
women’s helpline service as part of a range of specific services for BAME 
women.  The rationale for having this dedicated BAME service provision is based 
on recognition that the entrapments used to subjugate Black women - in this case, 
in the form of sexual violence - are different to the entrapments used to subjugate 
white women (Lorde, 1980a:118).  In other words, it is in recognition of the 
specific issues that BAME women face and it is in recognition that the differences 
in the context, construction and constitution of sexual violence against Black and 
white women are ‘differences that matter’ (Ahmed, 1998).  The BAME helpline 
service is advertised as a dedicated service for BAME women, so at Trafford 
Rape Crisis we assume that the woman ringing the BAME helpline will be 
expecting the call to be answered by a BAME support worker. The dilemma is, 
for example, if the BAME helpline rings and there is not a BAME woman present 
to answer the call, should a non-BAME category woman answer the call?   Is it 
better for the survivor of sexual violence, who is seeking support, to communicate 
and make a connection with another woman regardless of her racial category than 
not to have the phone answered at all?   
Using the theoretical frameworks within this thesis, I am able to reframe 
the operational issues presented by the BAME helpline in the following questions: 
what do the categories of Black and white function to do? Are we not in danger of 
privileging racial category above service provision? Indeed, are we not edging 
very close to the production of the authentic caller and authentic BAME support 
worker relation?  What are the mechanics used in the invocation of the authentic? 
Does it matter who is speaking? (Foucault, 1969) Is the BAME helpline an 
                                                          
22
 Please see page vii of the Preface in this thesis for an explanation of the tensions in regards to 
the term ‘minority’ when applied in this context.  
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example of the ‘…strategic use of positivist essentialism…’ (Spivak, 2006:281; 
emphasis in original).  
What I have come to know is that the problematic of how to balance the 
things women have in common with the differences between women is the 
‘…paradox at the heart of feminism…’ (Spelman, 1988b:3). Lorde elaborates the 
complexity of this paradox, stating that ‘[s]ometimes exploring our differences 
feels like marching out to war’ (Lorde, 1983a:165). The battle of developing a 
Black women’s service within a feminist Collective of Black and white women 
can, at times, feel overwhelming, and it is hard not to be seduced by the option of 
separatist solutions.  However, Lorde reminds us of the value of the community of 
collective-working:  
As women, we have been taught either to ignore our differences, or to 
view them as causes for separation and suspicion rather than as forces for 
change.  Without community there is no liberation, only the most 
vulnerable and temporary armistice between an individual and her 
oppression.  But community must not mean a shedding of our differences, 
nor the pathetic pretense that these differences do not exist (Lorde, 
1979b:112)   
 
Problem 2: There Is No Atom 
‘there is no atom’ (Derrida, 1995, cited in Royle, 2003:75) 
Many of the women who use the Trafford Rape Crisis helpline use terms such as, 
‘I have others,’ ‘inners’ and ‘alters’ to refer to the different aspects of their 
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internal world that speak.  On the helpline it is not uncommon for the identity of 
the caller to shift in the course of a call.  The shift could be from an adult woman 
to a four-year-old child, and is frequently a shift to a different voice, gender, race, 
language, religion and belief system.  The different voices hold alternative 
perspectives and information about the ‘host’ that often provides useful context or 
details about the trauma of the violence experienced;  for example, the voices that 
emerge from the woman in witness protection when the host is too frightened and 
too broken down to speak.  
In the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) this is classified as a 
‘Dissociative Disorder,’ where ‘Diagnostic criteria for 300.14 Dissociative 
Identity Disorder’ are outlined as the following:  
A. The presence of two or more distinct identities or personality states 
(each with its own relatively enduring pattern of perceiving, relating to, 
and thinking about the environment and self).  
B. At least two of these identities or personality states recurrently take 
control of the person's behavior.  
C. Inability to recall important personal information that is too extensive to 
be explained by ordinary forgetfulness.  
D. The disturbance is not due to the direct physiological effects of 
a substance (e.g., blackouts or chaotic behaviour during Alcohol 
Intoxication) or a general medical condition (e.g., complex partial 
seizures). Note: In children, the symptoms are not attributable to 
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imaginary playmates or other fantasy play. (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000:529; parentheses and emphasis in original) 
Trafford Rape Crisis works with women from a feminist model based on the 
activism of feminist theory.  The majority of women choose to use our service 
because the medical model has failed to understand, and assist with, the trauma of 
surviving sexual violence.   
In our feminist Collective supervision meetings that function to explore 
the content and issues of the support work that we are engaged in at Trafford Rape 
Crisis, I have found the theoretical frameworks used within this thesis of immense 
value.  For example, Derrida’s proposal that ‘there is no atom,’ is explained by 
Royle (2003:26) in the following way: ‘Everything is divisible. Unity, coherence, 
univocality are effects produced out of division and divisibility.’  This captures 
the essence of the multiple voices we encounter within a call on the helpline.   
Furthermore, the ways in which Black literary and oral narrative traditions of 
‘double-voiced texts’ (Gates, Jr., 1988:xxv), polyvoice and polyrhythms  (Boyce 
Davies, 1994:23) have been taken up by Black feminists provide inspired 
approaches to conceptualising ‘…a dialogue with the aspects of “otherness” 
within the self’ (Henderson, 1989:344).   
The encounter with multiple voices within a call on the helpline disrupts 
the stability of the pronoun and, in the work of Trafford Rape Crisis, invokes the 
implications and tensions that constitute the politics of the pronoun that I pick up 
in this thesis in relation to Lorde’s use of pronouns in the speech act (Austin, 
1975; Barthes, 1967, 1971; Benenviste, 1961; Foucault, 1969).   
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The ramifications of this interruption are demonstrated within analyses of 
the telephone call exchanges between Derrida and Cixous, which open up, and 
extend, the ways that the telephone functions as sightless voices of the 
indeterminate and multiplicitous other(s) (Derrida, 2006; Prenowitz, 2008; Setti, 
2012).  Reminiscent of these exchanges is a telephone call between Royle and 
Cixous (2012),
23
 during which Cixous speaks about the telephone as an 
interruption of death and/or absence, an instrument of metaphormosis, and the 
tricks of time and delay that the answering machine introduces and offers.  All of 
these characteristics and opportunities are present and put to use within the 
concept and practice of the Trafford Rape Crisis helpline that is founded on the 
activism of feminist theory.   
In addition, the notion of exceeding the bounds of the text (Barthes, 1967, 
1971; Foucault, 1969), or, in this context, exceeding the bounds of voice and 
unity, and the concept of the supplement that ‘…is neither a presence nor an 
absence’ (Derrida, 1997:314), are further examples of theoretical frameworks 
within this thesis that I continue to draw on within my work on the helpline.   
Moreover, the concept of the impossibility of hospitality, when applied to 
the situation of different voices inhabiting the caller on the helpline, disrupts 
notions of fixed positions of host and guest (Derrida, 2000).  These are just some 
examples of theoretical frameworks that provide approaches to open up, rather 
than close down, the possibilities and productive thinking about the multiple 
voices that are present within a woman who uses our Rape Crisis helpline.   
                                                          
23
 You can hear the telephone conversation between Royle and Cixous (2012) at  
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/video/schools/english/HeleneCixousOnTheTelephone.mp3 and a 
transcript of the call is at http://gullsofbrighton.wordpress.com/2011/06/09/distance-and-intimacy-
cixous-on-the-telephone/#more-110 (Gulls of Brighton, 2011). 
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The work of Trafford Rape Crisis is about using voice (for example, 
through the helpline, writing, art, and therapeutic face-to-face and group work), 
enabling the specificity of women’s experiences to be heard, and using this 
‘transformation of silence’ (Lorde, 1977a) to carve out emancipatory feminist 
intellectual, spiritual and emotional spaces.  In many ways, this reflects the 
journey I am undertaking within the process of this thesis, where the move to 
coming to voice, being heard, and then, finding ways to make effective political 
use of voice, is an on-going and non-linear process.  Hill Collins expresses 
something similar in her journey of moving between the 1990 first edition and the 
2000 second edition of writing Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, 
Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment: 
I have learned much from revising the first edition of Black Feminist 
Thought.  In particular, the subjective experience of writing the first 
edition in the mid-1980s and revising it now has been markedly different.  
I can remember how difficult it was for me to write the first edition. Then 
my concerns centred on coming to voice, especially carving out the 
intellectual and political space that would enable me to be heard…I am in 
another place now.  I remain less preoccupied with coming to voice 
because I know how quickly voice can be taken away.  My concern now 
lies in finding effective ways to use the voice that I have claimed while I 
have it. (Hill Collins, 2000:xii-xiii; italics in original)   
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Occupying the Space of the Concept 
This thesis has a specific focus on the activism of Black feminist theory 
articulated through a re-reading of Lorde. However, the reach of its applications 
applies to the activism of all feminist theory.   The task of inhabiting theory 
invokes a core theme of the thesis - namely, the aporetics of positionality.  I find 
Bhabha’s metaphorical use of habitation and occupation of theory, formulated in 
conversation with Seshadri-Crooks, particularly relevant here:  
I like to think that the reader can almost be moved into occupying that 
space of the concept or the language and be placed in media res.  I would 
almost like it to be a theatricalization of theory so that the reader is a part 
of it and does not understand it sitting in her chair overlooking and judging 
the concept from a distance. (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000c:372) 
…an experience of how, in motion, in transition, in movement, you must 
continually build a habitation for your ideas, your thoughts, and yourself. 
(Seshadri-Crooks, 2000c:373)  
Undertaking the objectives of the analysis in this thesis has involved ‘continually 
build[ing] a habitation for’ and ‘occupying that space of the concept.’  El Saadawi 
summarises the difficulty of this occupancy:  
I create words but words create me.  Words are all I possess, yet I am 
possessed by them…Writing has been the antithesis of death and yet, 
paradoxically, the reason why in June 1992 I was put on a death-list. (El 
Saadawi, 2009:19)   
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The aporia of to ‘possess’ and to be ‘possessed,’ to ‘create’ and to be created, and 
to be put on a ‘death-list’ because of the ‘antithesis of death,’ summons the aporia 
of the impossibility of hospitality.    
In this conclusion, I want to pick up the theoretical lens of hospitality 
explored within the thesis in order to focus the gaze on the political imperative of 
theory. The issues of who is host and guest, constructing and deconstructing 
defences in relation to the ‘absolute, unknown, anonymous other’ (Derrida, 
2000:25) of concepts, and maintaining a hospitable demeanour towards theory 
and the process of writing, continue to be a challenge.   
The essence of the impossibility of hospitality is located in the dialectic of 
the position of ‘the sister outsider.’  Lorde’s identification as ‘the sister outsider’ 
simultaneously encompasses the intimate proximity of ‘sister’ and the potential 
hostility of an ‘outsider.’  The situation of hôte (host) as guest and guest as hôte 
(Derrida, 1999), in terms of being simultaneously inside and outside of re-reading 
Lorde as host and guest in the activism of Black feminist theory, ‘turns the home 
inside out’ (Westmoreland, 2008:6).  Performing this in the context of neoliberal 
‘attacks on linking’ within a racist, homophobic patriarchy amplifies the 
challenge.  The task becomes the impossibility of hospitality of theory within a 
war zone.    
The relevance of Kristeva’s statement that ‘…a person of the twentieth 
century can exist honestly only as a foreigner…’ (Kristeva, 1977:286) applies to 
the twenty-first century and beyond.  The temporal and spatial indeterminacy of 
her statement is secured by her observation that ‘[w]riting is impossible without 
some kind of exile’ (Kristeva, 1977:298). The question of the foreigner becomes 
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even more complicated when the very theory inhabited teaches that the 
demarcation between the hostile stranger and the friendly stranger are mutually 
constitutive.  Thus, any notion of a correct (friendly) and incorrect (hostile) 
reading or application of a concept is an entrapment.  In an interview with 
Seshadri-Crooks, Bhabha explains that:  
…theoretical correctness seems subtly to defeat the process of conceptual 
work, which must entertain the possibility that any particular body of 
thought, despite its ruling paradigms and metaphors, has no sovereign 
mastery of control over its enunciation (inscription or interpretation). 
(Seshadri-Crooks, 2000c:377; parentheses in original)   
The boundary event of this thesis has revealed that:  
…the limits of thought or theory are always showing through other 
borders of historical, conceptual, and ethical possibility.  Theoretical 
thinking teaches us the nontransparency of ideas, the radical indeterminacy 
of signifying structures - and this must apply to the making and holding of 
theory itself, which demands a responsibility to the thinking of a problem 
as always in excess of, or in violation of, the tools for thinking it. 
(Seshadri-Crooks, 2000c:377-378) 
This thesis has responded to ‘…the radical indeterminacy of signifying 
structures…’ through finding ‘…the solution as the unavailability of a unified 
solution…’ (Spivak, 1985a:55).  An excellent example of this is found in 
Derrida’s ‘…turn from “guarding the question” - insisting on the priority of an 
unanswerable question…’ (Spivak, 1999:425). Thus, rather than guarding the 
question of how and why ‘Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface’ 
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(Lorde, 1979a:60), the thesis prioritises the ‘…question of différance…that which 
must be differed-deferred…’ (Spivak, 1999:425; italics in original). Within this 
thesis, the ‘…other borders of historical, conceptual, and ethical possibility’ 
(Seshadri-Crooks, 2000c:377) are the ‘historical, conceptual, and ethical’ borders 
of the activism of Black ‘sister outsider’ theory. The excess is in the dialectic of 
the border as:  
...both the beginning and the outer edge...both the inner and the outer of 
the other. It is thus at once a boundary and a shared space. (Thiongo, 
1996:120) 
The ‘boundary event’ (Minh-ha, 2011) of the activism of Black ‘sister outsider’ 
theory encapsulates the essence of the aporia. The event of the erotic, both as the 
methodology and the subject under analysis within this thesis, ‘…opens up an 
interstitial space for the negotiation of meaning, value, judgment…’ (Seshadri-
Crooks, 2000c:376). 
 
Where Is the Love? 
There is nothing sentimental about Jordan’s (1978) question, ‘Where is the love?’  
This question structures Jordan’s analysis of a public seminar entitled, ‘Feminism 
and the Black Woman Writer,’ at the 1978 National Black Writer’s Conference in 
Howard University.  Jordan states:  
From phone calls and other kinds of gossip, I knew that the very 
scheduling of this seminar had managed to divide people into camps 
prepared for war.  Folks were so jumpy, in fact, that when I walked into 
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the theatre I ran into several Black feminists and then several Black men 
who, I suppose, just to be safe, had decided not to speak to anyone outside 
the immediate circle of supportive friends they had brought with them. 
The session was going to be hot. (Jordan, 1978:82)   
It reminds me of the battles that took place behind the scenes of the event that 
constitutes the title and content of the ‘Preface’ to this thesis: ‘Declaring the 
Activism of Black Feminist Theory.’   
Out of all of the battles, including practicalities such as funding, 
accommodation, venue, bureaucracy and time, by far the most arduous was that of 
the battle for the legitimate right to the audacity to insist on the intellectual, 
emotional and spiritual space of the convention.  However, I knew in my gut that:  
…in politics, “major repercussions” do not come by themselves: true, one 
has to lay the groundwork for them by means of patient work, but one 
should also know to seize the moment when it arrives. (Žižek, 2008b:392) 
In terms of tactics for negotiating a channel between a resolute insistence that the 
convention should and would take place, and succumbing to criticism and doubt, I 
understand something of Jordan’s predicament:  
I wanted to see if it was possible to say things that people believe they 
don’t want to hear, without having to kick ass and without looking the fool 
for holding out your hand.  Was there some way to say, to insist on, each, 
perhaps disagreeable, individual orientation and nonetheless leave the 
union of Black men and Black women, as a people, intact? I felt there had 
to be… (Jordan, 1978:83)  
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In answer to the question of, ‘Where is the love?,’ it came from 
colleagues, friends, ‘sister outsiders,’ but, primarily, it came from contemporary 
and historical Black feminist texts and speeches providing testimony that the 
journey of the convention was well-trodden. For example, in her 1974 address at 
the conference on ‘Black Women in America,’ Chisholm declared:  
And I stand here tonight to tell to you, my sisters, that if you have the 
courage of your convictions, you must stand up and be counted…Forget 
traditions! Forget conventionalisms! Forget what the world will say 
whether you’re in your place or out of your place. [Applause.] Stand up 
and be counted. Do your thing… (Chisholm, 1974:137; emphasis and 
parentheses in original)  
The ‘Declaring the Activism of Black Feminist Theory’ convention took place 
with resounding success: ‘Nobody stopped talking.  The session ended because 
we ran out of time’ (Jordan, 1978:83).   
And, of course, the relevance of the question, ‘Where is the love?,’ is 
enduring. ‘Where is the love?’ underlies the day-to-day realities of the activism of 
Black feminist theory.  ‘Where is the love?’ structures ‘the priority of an 
unanswerable question’ (Spivak, 1999:425) faced with a series of infinite referrals 
and deferrals manifest in: do we stay at home to put our children to bed, to have 
time with them after they have been in the cruel world, or do we go to the feminist 
Collective political meeting? Do we stay at home to hold our children, partners, 
sisters, brothers and neighbours, and contain their anxieties and their need to be 
held, in every sense of the word, or do we do our shift on the helpline to hold and 
contain the women who have been raped, battered and tortured? Do we give our 
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Black sister a lift home or do we let her take two buses across Greater Manchester 
in the dark and cold on her own because we are too exhausted, because we have a 
deadline and/or because we need to get home? After all, it is 11pm and we left the 
house at 7am in the morning, leaving our children at breakfast club. ‘Where is the 
love?’ 
I conclude with words from Jordan that constitute the work of this thesis 
and the work to be done: 
As a Black woman/feminist, I must look about me, with trembling, and 
with shocked anger, at the endless waste, the endless suffocation of my 
sisters: the bitter sufferings of hundreds of thousands of women who are 
the sole parents, the mothers of hundreds of thousands of children, the 
desolation and the futility of women trapped by demeaning, lowest-paying 
occupations, the unemployed, the bullied, the beaten, the battered, the 
ridiculed, the slandered, the trivialized, the raped, and the sterilized, the 
lost millions and multimillions of beautiful, creative, and momentous lives 
turned to ashes on the pyre of gender identity.  I must look about me and, 
as a Black feminist, I must ask myself: Where is the love? How is my own 
lifework serving to end these tyrannies, these corrosions of sacred 
possibility? (Jordan, 1978:85-86; emphasis in original)  
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Appendix 
 
Routledge ‘Concepts for Critical Psychology’ Series 
Monograph Proposal (Submission: May, 2013) 
 
‘Why Critical Psychologists Must Read Audre Lorde: Race, Gender and 
Social Change’ 
 
Synopsis: 
This book responds to the invitation to re-think disciplinary boundaries by 
orientating critical psychology to Black feminist theory and, in particular, to ask 
critical psychologists to consider the work of Audre Lorde.  This book takes what 
may, at first, seem like an unusual and surprising step across the disciplinary 
boundary of psychology to Lorde’s political essays, speeches, poetry and 
autobiographical works.  Yet, as this book demonstrates, Lorde’s work is 
concerned with issues that are central to psychology; issues such as identity, 
alienation, trauma, loss, the relationship between the internal and external world, 
and the position and constitution of the individual within relationships, the family, 
community and society. Furthermore, Lorde tackles issues that are central to 
critical psychology, such as individualism, essentialism and normalisation.  Lorde 
questions ideological representations of the individual as separated from social 
relationships. For example, she exposes the ways in which ‘…racist social 
structures create racist psychic structures…’ (Oliver, 2001:34).   
It is of no coincidence that the discipline of psychology and the 
productions of psychology (individualism, essentialism and normalisation) exist 
because of, are constituted by, and are contingent upon, boundaries.  Boundaries 
are problematic – boundaries produce problems and boundaries maintain 
problems (Thiongo, 1996:120).  Lorde cautions that ‘…the master’s tools will 
never dismantle the master’s house’ (Lorde, 1979b:112; emphasis in original), so 
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she is very cautious of using boundaries to dismantle boundaries.  In her 
explorations of race, gender and social change, Lorde details the daily reality of 
fragmentation due to multiple and intersecting ideological, political, emotional, 
disciplinary, geographical and demographical boundaries.  Lorde identifies the 
ways in which these fragmented pieces of identity and experience are represented 
in a hierarchy, where hierarchies breed hierarchies or fragmentation further 
fragments (Lorde, 1983b).  This process is replicated in the structure, function and 
outcomes of ‘psychologisation.’  
This particular book rejects the idea of crossing disciplinary boundaries 
and cautious that the very idea of crossing disciplinary boundaries is to accept, 
and thereby, legitimate, the existence of boundaries at all.  Lorde argues that the 
task is to expose how boundaries function to instigate, maintain and perpetuate 
separations of people, thinking and experience that produce the madness and 
misery which create the need for psychology.  Thus, rather than presenting cutting 
edge critiques from outside psychology which work to preserve the idea of an 
‘inside and outside’ of psychology, this book uses Lorde to deconstruct such 
borders.  
Using Lorde as a lens of critical analysis on psychology functions on 
several levels: firstly, it brings unexpected conceptual and methodological 
resources to bear on the contemporary crisis in psychology; secondly, it addresses 
debates at the heart of thinking about the political agenda of psychology. Thirdly, 
the method and practice of bringing Lorde’s work to the table of critical 
psychology forces us to ask why some theoretical lenses are more expected or 
unexpected than others. 
This book offers Black feminist perspectives, language and paradigms for 
conceptualizing core issues of psychology. Lorde provides a theoretical lens to 
scrutinize the silences in psychology in order to show not only how silence 
functions to produce psychological maladies, but, also, to show how psychology 
is constituted of, and contingent upon, multiple and intersecting silences (Lorde, 
1977a).   
A good example of how Lorde’s work can be applied to psychology would 
be to put the notion of ‘normalisation’ under the microscope of her thinking 
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outlined in her autobiographical work entitled The Cancer Journals (Lorde, 
1980b).  Here, Lorde deconstructs the concept, ideology and function of using 
forms of prosthesis to make an amputation invisible and unrecognisable.  It is 
possible to take her explorations of mastectomy, malignancy, the carcinogenic, 
amputation and the socially sanctioned prosthesis as metaphors to think about the 
ways in which psychology functions.  The Black feminist discourse, analysis and 
lived experience of Lorde expose psychology as an artificial prosthesis to create, 
maintain and legitimize the already imposed, artificial prosthesis of normality 
(Lorde, 1980b:9-10). Throughout her work Lorde is concerned with the invention 
and cover up of socially constructed malignancies and versions of cosmetic 
normalisations which are a mimicry of a mimicry (Bhabha, 1994).    
 
Table of contents: 
Chapter 1: Introduction: Race, Gender and Social Change 
Chapter 2: Methodology  
Chapter 3: The Problem of Borderlines  
Chapter 4: The Constitutive Outside 
Chapter 5: Social Structures Create Psychic Structures 
Chapter 6: Silence 
Chapter 7: Mimicry   
Chapter 8: Intertextuality: Case Notes and the (Auto)Biographical  
Chapter 9:  Critical Psychology Founded on Black Feminism without Borders 
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Chapter Outlines: 
Chapter 1: Introduction: Race, Gender and Social Change 
This chapter provides a context for Lorde’s work within Black feminist theory, 
outlining how her thinking resonates with contemporary ideas and debates.  The 
relevance of this context, the relevance of Black feminist theory and the relevance 
of Lorde’s work to psychology will be mapped out, building a robust argument for 
why critical psychologists must read Audre Lorde.  Core to this argument will be 
the case for how Lorde offers a radical alternative framework to think about the 
political role that psychology plays.  Race, gender and social change form the 
nucleus of this book. Race and gender are issues which illustrate how ideology 
and surveillance within the ‘psy-complex’ (Hook et al., 2004; Parker, 2005; 
Parker and Revelli, 2008; Rose, 1998) function to create and maintain categories 
and criteria of ‘the normal,’ ‘the healthy’ and ‘the well-adjusted’ 
individual/community.  However, race and gender form the nucleus of this book 
for another reason; that is, as Black feminist theory teaches, dismantling the 
conceptual apparatus that constructs race and gender offers lessons for the 
dismantling of the conceptual apparatus that constructs ‘psychologisation.’ 
Furthermore, Black feminist theory on race and gender offers models for social 
change. 
 
Chapter 2: Methodology 
This chapter provides a critical analysis of the conceptual tools used in 
psychology.  Traditional qualitative and quantitative tools, methods and measures 
such as predictability, standardisation, sample sizes, objectivity and repeatability 
are products of, and maintain, particular ideological apparatus.  This chapter 
argues that to prioritise questions of what the tool or method can do, and how they 
function, is to miss out a vital priority question; that is, to ask: what constitutes the 
ideological material that the tools and methodology are cut from? Here is where 
psychology could learn much from Black feminist theory.  Black feminist theory 
has critically scrutinised the methodology used to explain, measure, diagnose and 
cure Black women, and in doing so, offers detailed rigorous critiques, models of 
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dismantling components of these phenomena and alternative approaches. The 
chapter draws on Lorde to develop a mechanics of methodological theory.  For 
example, Lorde identifies and demonstrates how the subject under analysis and 
the tools for analysis share a structure and mode of operation that intersect, and 
are contingent upon each other.  
 
Chapter 3: The Problem of Borderlines 
This chapter picks up learning from the previous chapter and illustrates the need 
for methodological tools to be less sloppy. The clever bit about borderlines is that 
they create the illusion of a method to transform the sloppy and chaotic into ‘the 
neat,’ ‘the organised’ and ‘the compartmentalised,’ whilst actually contributing to, 
and sustaining the root cause of, the problem.  The dialectic is that borderlines are 
used to contain the very problems they produce and the psychiatric diagnostic 
category of the borderline is a classic example of this.  Positions on the borderline 
shape the subject and objects of psychology.  
The chapter uses binaries such as inside/outside, recognition/misrecognition, 
absence/presence, inclusion/exclusion and normal/abnormal that are usually 
‘taken for granted’ (Burr, 1995) to illustrate the ways in which categorisation, 
segregation and splitting function to maintain the madness and misery they 
purport to cure. Psychology could learn from more sophisticated models offered 
by Black feminist scholars such as Lorde.  Black feminist models utilise the space 
in-between constructed binaries. Lorde offers an analysis of how and why 
fragmentation produces psychological distress and limitations that stifle creative 
potential. Lorde offers models that illustrate that the sum of the parts is greater 
than that of Western models of splitting up and dealing with parts separated out.  
Lorde works with the mutually constitutive relationship between intersecting parts 
rather than models of addition and subtraction (Crenshaw, 1989).  
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Chapter 4: The Constitutive Outside 
This chapter explains how the discipline of psychology is constituted by what it 
excludes.  Psychology is characterised and identified by demarcating that which 
belongs to it and that which does not belong to it.  People become clients of 
psychologists because of what and where they belong, and do not belong. This 
process produces discourses of essentialism and authenticity, where categories of 
people represent, embody and perform the ‘constitutive outside’ (Hall, 1996:17). 
The concept of ‘difference’ is fundamental to the logic and legitimization of the 
‘constitutive outside.’  It is a logic which functions to mask the anxiety, 
ambivalence and displacement that the concept of ‘difference’ produces. Here is 
where Black feminist theory in general, and Lorde’s work in particular, have 
much to offer in terms of deconstructing the processes and outcomes of the 
‘constitutive outside.’ Furthermore, Lorde’s work on race, gender, class, sexuality 
and social change outlines forms of resistance and alternative models of thinking 
and acting that psychology ignores at its own peril.  
 
Chapter 5: Social Structures Create Psychic Structures 
This chapter uses the work of Lorde as a theoretical lens to focus on the 
relationship between social and psychic structures, using the examples of race and 
gender as mechanisms of oppression.   Although progressive psychological 
approaches, such as psycho-social models, acknowledge the importance of 
context, this chapter uncovers the intersecting social and psychic manoeuvres in 
the process of subject formation.  The chapter draws on the rich, sophisticated and 
often ignored work of Black feminist theory on the psychological impact of 
racism and sexism.  The chapter uses Lorde to orientate psychology to key 
seminal works on ‘epidermalization’ (Fanon, 2008:4), the ‘psychic life of power’ 
(Butler, 1997c) and ‘interpellation’ (Althusser, 1971).   
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Chapter 6: Silence 
This chapter uses the work of Lorde to go beyond an understanding of silence as 
being that which is unspoken.  The chapter investigates how silence operates in 
the role of the ‘psy-complex’ and the growth of ‘psychologisation’ in 
contemporary society.  Instead of a paternalistic promotion of the servicer-user’s 
voice as a measure of inclusivity and customer satisfaction, this chapter promotes 
a critical measure and analysis of the ‘speech act’ (Austin, 1975; Barthes, 1967, 
1971; Benenviste, 1961; Foucault, 1969) and speaking position of psychology. 
The chapter uses Black feminist theory to explore Spivak’s (1988) question: ‘Can 
the Subaltern Speak?’ The principles and implications of this question, when 
applied to the subject and object of psychology, transgress neat boundaries into 
very uncomfortable territory. Lorde’s (1977a:40) imperative of ‘the 
transformation of silence into language and action’ raises questions about the role 
of silence in the power/knowledge relationship, and the performativity of 
language (Butler, 1999).    
 
Chapter 7: Mimicry 
This chapter argues that psychology, as a discipline and practice, colonizes social 
and psychic spaces, and relies on, and (re-)produces, mimicry (Bhabha,1994).  
Mimicry is a necessary aspect of any take-over, occupation and appropriation, 
where X takes over Y in order to control, regulate, re-define and re-inscribe power 
relations.  This chapter argues that the colonisation of social and psychic spaces is 
a key component in the role of the ‘psy-complex’ and ‘psychologisation.’ 
Colonisation produces anxiety and ambivalence and psychology is an anxious 
coloniser.  This chapter draws on the work of Bhabha (1994) to argue that 
psychology is caught up in an equation of colonisation-anxiety-mimicry, 
controlled and masked by paranoid boundaries, where the subject and object of 
psychology are rigorously patrolled.  Lorde articulated how colonisation also 
involves amputation of the diseased and disordered members imported by the 
coloniser, and the imposition of artificial prosthesis invented to camouflage, 
render invisible and unrecognisable, the violence performed in these processes. 
This chapter draws on the work of Lorde, in conjunction with post-colonial Black 
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feminist scholarship (Khanna, 2003), as a theoretical lens through which to 
scrutinise how individualism, essentialism and normalisation function as tools of 
colonisation and mimicry.   
 
Chapter 8: Intertextuality: Case Notes and the (Auto)Biographical 
This chapter provides a critical analysis of the production and function of the 
(auto)biographical text in psychology.  Psychology produces and uses a prolific 
and varied network of (auto)biographical texts/documentation such as patient case 
notes, narrative therapy, life story books for adopted and looked after children, 
survivor testimonials and the use of diaries in psychological interventions such as 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy.  These texts are produced by, and exist in, a 
complex intertextual web (Barthes, 1967, 1971; Foucault, 1969). Furthermore, 
these texts function in psychology to establish authenticity, intention and notions 
of subjectivity and identity. Here is where, and precisely why, Black feminist 
scholarship and traditions of writing are a relevant critical alternative. They 
directly confront and destabilise bounded representations of authenticity, intention 
and subjectivity.  Lorde grounds all of her work in her lived experience. Thus, 
Lorde’s political essays, journals, poetry, letters, biomythography, speeches and 
interviews fuse the biographical and theoretical.  In other words, Lorde dismantles 
the boundaries that are set up between the personal and the political, and in doing 
so, she opens up critical alternatives for social change that build on a long and 
enduring Black feminist literary tradition. 
 
Chapter 9: Critical Psychology Founded on Black Feminism without Borders 
This chapter pulls together key concepts, models and ways forward presented in 
previous chapters to argue why psychology needs Audre Lorde.  This chapter 
offers a robust case for a radical re-positioning of psychology on a Black feminist 
theoretical foundation.   This includes naming the significant elements within this 
foundation, imagining what psychology could look like laid on a Black feminist 
foundation and outlining how this could be a basis for radical social change.  
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Submission Date and Length:  
Submission of the manuscript will be by May, 2013. The length of the monograph 
will be approximately 50,000 words. Each chapter will be approximately 5,500 
words.  
Market: 
This book will be relevant to advanced level undergraduate and postgraduate 
students, researchers and lecturers in psychology, psychotherapy, social work, 
sociology, and those whose work brings them into the field of feminist thinking, 
critical race theory, discourse analysis, literary studies and cultural studies.  The 
book grapples with issues at the heart of key contemporary debates on 
methodology, identity, difference, race, gender, social change, and the 
psychological impact of social constructions. The book threads these core themes 
to construct a powerful argument for re-reading Lorde as an example of the 
application of Black feminist theory to a range of intersecting issues. Equally, it 
would be possible to read each chapter as a contained, informative text in its own 
right. Thus, the book has a flexible, accessible structure, ideal for a text book.   
The focus on Lorde’s work gives the reader a clear pathway into Black feminist 
thinking and its application to critical psychology. It offers a model of transferring 
concepts from one genre to another, involving a questioning of all disciplinary 
boundaries - something that is key to creative critical analysis, which calls for 
thinking beyond, and outside, boxes. 
 
Competition: 
Although there are texts which explore race and psychology (Fanon, 2008; Kovel, 
1988; Memmi, 2003), and texts that examine gender and psychology (The Sage 
Gender and Psychology series published in the 1990s), it is hard to find a text that 
explores the intersection of race and gender as illustrative of the role of the ‘psy-
complex’ and the growth of ‘psychologisation,’ offering a model for social 
change.  It is hard to find a text that offers a robust case for a radical re-
positioning of psychology on a Black feminist theoretical foundation.  It is even 
harder to find a text that provides a detailed analysis as to why critical psychology 
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should read Audre Lorde. The proposed book, ‘Why Critical Psychologists Must 
Read Audre Lorde: Race, Gender and Social Change,’ develops and pushes 
forward key debates in critical psychology (Burman, 1998, 2008; Crawford and 
Unger, 2004; Mama, 1995; Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 1995). 
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